Translation as a Catalyst for the Russification of Ukrainian under Imperial and Soviet Rule

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# Table of Contents

1 Historical Background and Context .................................................................................................................. 1  
1.1 Tsarist Language Restrictions – A Model for Soviet Language Policy ....................................................... 1  
1.1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1  
1.1.2 Education Reforms Under Alexander II ............................................................................................. 3  
1.1.3 Ems Ukaz ........................................................................................................................................... 5  
1.1.4 Reforms Under Alexander III .............................................................................................................. 7  
1.1.5 Russification via Translation and Transliteration ................................................................................ 9  
1.2 Implications and Ramifications: A Prequel for Soviet Intolerance and Linguicide ..................................... 11  
1.2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 11  
1.2.2 Linguicide ......................................................................................................................................... 12  
1.2.3 The Ukrainian Situation Outside Imperial Russia ............................................................................... 13  
1.2.4 Publishing Translations Outside of Imperial Russia ....................................................................... 15  
1.2.5 Translating Ukrainian as a Dialect ................................................................................................... 17  
2 Lexical and Terminological Russification: Functions and Techniques ......................................................... 19  
2.1 Periods of Intense Russification .................................................................................................................. 19  
2.1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 19  
2.1.2 Orthographic Developments ............................................................................................................ 20  
2.1.3 Re-Russification ............................................................................................................................... 21  
2.1.4 Russifying Ukrainian Orthography .................................................................................................... 23  
2.1.5 Lexicology and Terminology ............................................................................................................ 25  
2.1.6 A False Pretext for Russification ...................................................................................................... 27  
2.1.7 Literary Purges .................................................................................................................................. 29  
2.1.8 Conspiracy and Enforcement .......................................................................................................... 30  
2.1.9 Glavlit ............................................................................................................................................... 31  
2.2 A Seemingly Hegemonic Agenda and its Framework ............................................................................... 33  
2.2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 33  
2.2.2 Russification to Simplify Translation ............................................................................................... 35  
2.2.3 Discouraging the Publication of Minority Languages .................................................................... 36  
2.2.4 Mandatory Russian Language Instruction in Schools .................................................................... 38  
2.2.5 The Annexation of Western Ukraine 1939 ....................................................................................... 41  
3 Justified Censorship: Socialist Realism in Translation ...................................................................................... 44  
3.1 Redefining Translation: Theories and Practices ......................................................................................... 44  
3.1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 44  
3.1.2 The New Standard – Free Translation ............................................................................................... 47  
3.1.3 Glavlit vs. Theorists ......................................................................................................................... 51  
3.1.4 Soviet Ukrainian Translation Textbooks ............................................................................................ 52  
3.1.5 Interlinear Crib .................................................................................................................................. 57  
3.1.6 Self-Translation ............................................................................................................................... 58  
3.1.7 Indirect Translations ....................................................................................................................... 59  
3.2 Demarcating and Adapting Controversial Texts ....................................................................................... 62  
3.2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 62  
3.2.2 Censorship in Ukrainian Opera ....................................................................................................... 64  
3.2.3 Didactic Material and Children’s Literature ..................................................................................... 69
3.2.4 Arbitrary Censors ................................................................. 75
3.2.5 Copyright Infringement ........................................................ 76

4 Translating or Refusing to Translate for Ideological Gains .............. 81
  4.1 Assimilation under the Guise of Solidarity ................................ 81
    4.1.1 Introduction .................................................................... 81
    4.1.2 Concealing Historical Events ......................................... 81
    4.1.3 Downplaying the West .................................................. 83
    4.1.4 Internal Challenges ....................................................... 84
    4.1.5 Ideological Concerns ..................................................... 85
    4.1.6 Censorship of Western Legal Texts ................................ 86

5 The Uneven Flow of Translation ..................................................... 89
  5.1 Russian vs. Other Minority Languages in the Former Soviet Republics ..... 89
    5.1.1 Introduction .................................................................... 89
    5.1.2 Uzbek SSR: 1924-1991 ................................................ 90
    5.1.3 Georgian SSR: 1923-1991 ............................................. 93
    5.1.4 Estonian SSR: 1940-1991 .............................................. 94
    5.1.5 Lithuanian SSR: 1940-1991 ........................................... 95
    5.1.6 Latvian SSR: 1940-1991 .............................................. 96
    5.1.7 Moldavian SSR: 1940-1991 ........................................... 98
  5.2 Russian vs. Ukrainian .............................................................. 102
    5.2.1 Introduction .................................................................... 102
    5.2.2 Quantity ......................................................................... 103
    5.2.3 Quality .......................................................................... 105
    5.2.4 Language Inequality ..................................................... 107
    5.2.5 The Decline of Ukrainian Translation .............................. 108
    5.2.6 The Sixties ................................................................. 110

6 Conclusion .................................................................................. 114

7 Bibliography .............................................................................. 117

8 Appendices .................................................................................. 121
  8.1 Appendix A ........................................................................... 121
  8.2 Appendix B ........................................................................... 122
  8.3 Appendix C ........................................................................... 123
List of Tables

Table 1 - Russification of Ukrainian Terms Considered Polonisms in the 1900s ................. 26

Table 2 - Examples of the Russification of Ukrainian Archaeological Terms in the 1980s ....... 37

Table 3 - Journals of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: Languages of Publications, 1969 and 1980 .......................................................................................................................... 38

Table 4 - Percentage of Ukrainians Claiming Ukrainian as Their Native language, 1959-1979 ... 103
Legend

**AUCP(b)** – All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), replaced the **RCP(b)** from 1925-1952.

**Belles-lettres** – All literary works consisting of fiction, poetry, drama, or essays.

**Bourgeois Nationalist** – A Marxist expression used in the USSR to denote those who promoted the development of independent culture, language, and historical traditions. Bourgeois nationalism is said to create ethnic divide rather than multicultural unity.

**Brezhnev Era** – 1964-1984. Also known as the “Freeze.”

**CP** – Communist Party.

**CP(b)U** – Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, 1918-1952.

**CPSU** – Communist Party of the Soviet Union (replaced the **AUCP (b)** in 1952).

**CPU** – Communist Party of Ukraine, replaced the CP(b)U from 1952-1991.

**Detgiz** – Soviet children’s publishing house for original and translated works.

**Druzhba Narodov** – A Moscow literary monthly which specialized in the publication of non-Russian writers in Russian translation.

**Ems Ukaz** – “A secret decree issued on 30 May 1876 by the Russian tsar Alexander II in the town of Ems, Germany, aimed at stopping the printing and distribution of Ukrainian-language publications within the Russian Empire. It represented a continuation of the repressive anti-Ukrainian policy introduced by the circular of the Russian minister of internal affairs, Petr Valuev, of 20 June 1863. The Ems Ukase prohibited the printing in the Ukrainian language of any original works or translations. Historical documents could be printed in the original orthography, but belles-lettres could appear only in Russian orthography. It also forbade the importation from abroad of Ukrainian-language publications, the staging of plays and public readings in Ukrainian, and the printing of Ukrainian lyrics to musical works. All manuscripts permissible under the new act were subject to approval by the censors before publication.”*

**Gauleiter** – A leader or chief official of a political district under Nazi control.

**Glavlit** – The Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs was an agency, in operation from 1922-1991, mandated by the CPSU and responsible for the approval and safeguarding of all publications. Glavlit worked in close liaison with the KGB with respect to overseeing the censorship of publications.
Glasnost – The policy of maximal publicity, openness, and transparency in the activities of all government institutions in the Soviet Union, together with freedom of information, introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev the mid-1980s. This policy was designed to reduce the amount of corruption within the CPSU by allowing management practices to be available as public information. Glasnost also lead to a relaxation of censorship in literature and in the media, and it was ultimately the result of the public’s loss of faith in the Soviet government and the communist regime.

Gorbachev Era – 1985-1991. Also known as the “Melting.”

Holodomor – The Famine/Genocide of 1932–3 (Голодомор; Holodomor - from moruty holodom ‘to kill by means of starvation’). A manmade famine, initiated by Soviet leader Josef Stalin, whereby of millions in the Ukrainian SSR perished as a result of starvation.

KGB – The Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security) was the national security agency, intelligence service, and secret police of the Soviet Union from 1954 until 1991. The KGB was also an overseer in censorship of publications.

Kremlin – The seat of the government of the Soviet Union in Moscow.

Khrushchev Era – 1953-1964. Also known as the “Thaw.”

NANU – National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

NSPU – National Writer’s Union of Ukraine.

Perestroika – A period of political and economic restructuring lead by Mikhail Gorbachev shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union.


RCP(b) – Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 1918-1925, and succeeded by the AUCP(b).

RSFSR – Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, a member of the USSR.

Sixtiers (shestydesiatny) – A group of writers, translators, and poets, formed in the 1960s but dismantled by the 1970s, who attempted to curb Socialist Realism during the period of de-Stalinization. The sixtiers staged a number of protests in support of Ukrainian nationalism and used art as a tool of political resistance.

Socialist Realism – The term Socialist Realism was officially adopted during the First Congress of Writers of the USSR in August 1934. Socialist Realism became the model for all forms of art, including literature, theatre and visual art. The theoretical basis of Socialist Realism was primarily inspired by the works of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, along with speeches of several Party leaders and various resolutions of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Socialist Realism was designed to glorify the positive features of socialism, which were considered to be true and revolutionary, through artistic expression.

**SPU** – Writers’ Union of Ukraine.

**SSR** – A member country (republic) of the USSR (e.g. Ukrainian SSR).

**Surzhyk** – A mixture of wheat and rye that is considered to be a lower grade of flower. The term refers to a degraded sociolect made up of Russian and Ukrainian.

**The Intensification** – Stalin Era 1932-1945.

**The Peak** – Stalin Era 1946-1953.

**Ukaz or Ukase** – A proclamation of the tsar, government, or a religious leader (patriarch) that had the force of law in Imperial Russia.

**Ukrainianization** – A brief period (1917-1932) in which Ukrainian underwent progressive linguistic development and flourished in print.

**USSR** – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1924-1991). The Union was comprised of Russia (RSFSR) and 14 surrounding countries called Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs).

**Uzbekization** – A brief period from 1924-1929, resulting from the formation of the Uzbek SSR, whereby the Tajik SSR was annexed to the newly formed Uzbek RRS and Tajiks were assimilated through the Uzbek language. This period was also a period of restoration for the Uzbek language throughout the Uzbek SSR.

**VAPLITE** – Free Academy of Proletarian Literature (Kharkiv 1925-1928).

**VAPP** – All-Russian Association of Proletarian Writers.

**Valuev Circular** – A secret decree (ukaz) enacted by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire, Pyotr Valuev (Valuyev), on July 18, 1863, that indefinitely postponed the printing of religious material and scholastic literature in the Ukrainian language.

**Vsesvit** – A Ukrainian periodical that exclusively published translations of world classics and contemporary literary works focusing on cultural, artistic, social, and political life in all parts of the world.

**VUAPP** – All-Ukrainian Association of Proletarian Writers (1924-1925).

**VUSPP** – All-Ukrainian Union of Proletarian Writers (1926-1932).

* **Encyclopedia of Ukraine** – Founded by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and maintained by scholars and editors from the Universities of Alberta (site) and Toronto.
Note on Transliteration

All Ukrainian and Russian lexicons presented within this thesis have been transliterated using the Library of Congress System (LC) or the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA). As the use of both systems varies from one scholarly source to another, the transliterated versions for both the Russian and Ukrainian alphabets according to the LC and IPA systems are provided below. Proper names have not been transliterated within direct citations and archaic spellings within citations have not been changed. Proper names found outside of direct citations are spelled to match the spelling within direct citations. At times, proper names are transliterated according to the IPA system in one source, and according to LC system in another.

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Abstract

Studying the last century and a half of Ukrainian linguistic history reveals relentless attempts to stifle the development of Ukrainian as well as to suppress translation activities under both the tsarist and Soviet regimes. Exploring the morphological evolution of the Ukrainian language discloses evidence of terminological inconsistencies due to the lexical russification of Ukrainian during the Soviet regime, leading to inconsistencies between the standard of Ukrainian used in the Soviet Union versus that used in the diaspora. Additional examination of Ukrainian linguistic history discloses political motives for banning translations, refusing the right to translate, censoring translations, and punishing translators who rejected the mandatory Soviet literary norm of Socialist Realism. In order to further understand the implications of translation practices in the Ukrainian SSR, it is important to examine the language policies, political agendas and translation practices prior to and throughout the Soviet regime.

This thesis explores and analyses the russification of Ukrainian through translation policies designed to fulfil Soviet political and ideological agendas. It compares power differentials between Russian and Ukrainian, as well as between Russian and other minority languages in translation, and examines the resulting terminological inconsistencies. It shows unequivocally how translation, transliteration, and censorship were used to foster linguicide and assimilate Ukrainian minorities, from the late tsarist era to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Résumé

L'étude des 150 dernières années d'histoire de la langue ukrainienne révèle des tentatives incessantes afin d'entraver le développement de cette langue et d'assurer la suppression effective des activités de traduction pendant les régimes tsariste et soviétique. En explorant l'évolution morphologique de l'ukrainien, on peut montrer que les incohérences terminologiques liées à la russification lexicale de l'Ukraine sous le régime soviétique ont mené à des différences importantes entre la norme ukrainienne en Union soviétique par rapport à celle ayant cours au sein de la diaspora ukrainienne. Un examen plus poussé de l'historie linguistique ukrainienne dévoile également des motivations politiques visant à interdire les traductions, à refuser le droit de traduire, à encourager une pratique censoriale de la traduction et àpunir les traducteurs qui ne se conforment pas à la norme littéraire obligatoire du réalisme socialiste. Afin de comprendre toutes les dimensions du traduire dans la RSS d'Ukraine, il est important d'examiner les politiques linguistiques, les programmes politiques de même que les principes guidant les pratiques traductives avant et pendant le régime soviétique.

Cette thèse a donc pour but d'analyser le processus de russification et de soviétisation de l'Ukrainien, dans le domaine de la traduction, comme méthode d'endoctrinement culturel à des fins politiques et idéologiques durant la période soviétique. Elle permet de comparer les rapports de pouvoir entre le russe et l'ukrainien ainsi qu’entre le russe et les langues minoritaires de l’Union soviétique, d'examiner les incohérences terminologiques qui en résultent, ainsi que de déterminer en quoi la traduction, la translittération et la censure traductionnelle ont contribué au « linguicide » ukrainien et à l'assimilation des
minorités ukrainiennes depuis l'époque tsariste jusqu'à l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) for their generosity and support by awarding me the Marusia and Michael Dorosh Master’s Fellowship.

J’aimerais aussi remercier mon superviseur de thèse, Marc Charron, pour son soutien moral et professionnel lors de la rédaction de ma thèse.

Finally, I would like to dedicate my thesis to my beloved grandmother: Vična tobi pamjat, moja doroha babusja.

One cannot have a real culture which is not pre-eminently national. Non-national culture is something cheap, something for the masses and this is what the Bolsheviks want to create.

Alexander Ginzberg
Introduction

Historically speaking, translation has proven to be a unique and powerful tool, fulfilling multiple purposes stretching far beyond a simple means of communication for which it is most often used. In the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), translation was a strategic tool that worked to the advantage of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) while working to the detriment of minority languages in other SSRs, including the Ukrainian SSR. The implementation of Soviet language policies, particularly those involving translation, was instrumental in unifying the SSRs at the expense of dissolving their national cultures and languages. Forced usage of the Russian language effectively de-nationalized Soviet citizens and assimilated them under the pretext of solidarity. The catalyst for promulgating Soviet language policies throughout the SSRs was translation, specifically, the translation of all published materials into a singular and “politically correct” language. As this particular relationship between a linguistic tool (translation) and its role in Sovietising and russifying subjects of the Ukrainian SSR has not received much consideration in research done by either linguists or political historians, an opportunity was identified to make a contribution to the body of knowledge of both by undertaking such research.

For well over a century, russification through translation has been an ongoing practice for Ukrainian – a language whose development was hindered and has regressed as a result of the unrelenting imposition of russification that began during the tsarist era as a result of language policies implemented by autocratic Imperial Russia. In the late 19th century, Ukrainian print was banned throughout Imperial Russia, even in the form of
translation. The only way to publish a Ukrainian translation was to publish abroad and then to clandestinely smuggle the illicit publication back into the Russian Empire. The alternative to publishing abroad was to transliterate into Russian Cyrillic and publish lexically russified translations that were permitted to be in circulation within Imperial Russia. In either case, writing or translating into Ukrainian was a struggle up until 1905 when restrictions on Ukrainian print lessened, but only for a short while.

When the Bolsheviks rose to power and overthrew the Russian monarchy in 1917, Ukrainian was able to flourish in print for a short period of time until Stalin implemented new language reforms in the 1930s. These reforms were designed to bring national languages closer to Russian by artificially russifying terminology with the objective of de-nationalizing Soviet minority cultures. To further stifle the development of Ukrainian, the Bolsheviks instigated a mass purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which included artists, authors, historians, literary scholars, poets, and translators who were accused of being bourgeois nationalists and, therefore, a threat to the solidarity of the USSR as well as to the communist regime. These intellectuals were allegedly capable of encouraging or plotting national resistance using language and literature as a vehicle and, for this reason, were expunged, interned, and silenced. Without the impediment of the intelligentsia, Stalin could pursue his linguistic goal as Soviet leader of the USSR, which was to see Russian surmount all other Soviet languages, including the second most important language – Ukrainian.

In the peak years of Stalin’s reign, the Ukrainian language underwent major lexical transformations. Ukrainian orthography was adapted to the likeness of Russian orthography and Ukrainian lexicon was stripped of its foreign affixes. Russian affixes were used instead to bring Ukrainian closer to Russian. The russification of Ukrainian caused major impediments for standardization as these changes were not adopted in Ukrainian
communities outside of the Ukrainian SSR. Furthermore, translated works had to meet the approval of Glavlit censors who were responsible for assuring that all publications were reproduced in accordance with Socialist Realism - a requirement for publishing from the Stalin period up until Glasnost. Thus, translations were merely socialist and politically correct interpretations of the original, adapted for the Soviet audience. In many cases, controversial novels exposing the reprehensible side of the Soviet regime with its oppression of minorities, such as Ukrainians, were censored, falsified or produced according to an understatement of facts prior to translation for the Ukrainian audience. Even translation manuals for university courses were inflated with political discourse, including a profusion of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, and endorsed “free translation”, which was the term Soviet translation theorists such as Ivan Kashkin used to uphold Socialist Realist interpretations and apply them to translation.

In addition, Russian held a preponderant position in terms of quality and quantity of translations vis-à-vis Ukrainian and other minority languages in the USSR. There was a steady influx of Russian literature, both original and translated, which entered the Ukrainian SSR and saturated the Ukrainian audience with Russian Soviet culture and literary figures. The number of Ukrainian authors translated into Russian and distributed in the RSFSR, however, was modest in comparison. The supply of Ukrainian translations kept declining in the Brezhnev era while the demand for Ukrainian world literature never decreased. In more serious cases, the shortage of Ukrainian literature reached a point in which Soviet Ukrainian pupils were reading Russian translations of their own Soviet Ukrainian authors. In spite of continuous demand, Russian language books were simply replacing Ukrainian translations under the pretext that Ukrainians were proficient in Russian, a proficiency that corroborated the success of russification during the Soviet
regime. Any literature and scholarly material that was imported from outside the Soviet Union was simply translated into Russian then distributed to other SRRs once approved by Glavlit. This material was not always in compliance with International Copyright Law. Sometimes imported works were translated into minority languages but, as the Soviet population grew increasingly fluent in Russian, minority language translation became less of a concern.

This thesis is divided into five chapters that examine the chronological and historic panorama of translation activities in the Ukrainian SSR and how the events of the last century fostered Soviet russification policies. In terms of the methodological framework used, this thesis is primarily historical and descriptive. Such a methodology is well suited to covering a wide spectrum of areas within translation studies and for examining multiple subtopics spanning an extended period of time. A historical-descriptive approach is particularly applicable to situations where there is a lack of relevant and readily available research material that would further expound upon the topic in question. As a result of the complexity and originality of the subject chosen for this thesis, very few sources within the field of translation studies were found to be directly applicable.

Chapter one presents a historical outline of tsarist language policies that set the stage for subsequent Soviet language policies. Linguicide, as well as underground translation activities that led to contraband between Austro-Hungarian and Imperial Russian Ukraine, resulting in stricter policies against the import of Ukrainian translations under tsarist rule are also studied in chapter one. Chapter two explores the linguistic alteration of the Ukrainian alphabet, lexicon, and terminology which were some of the initial steps towards russification, essentially distinguishing Soviet Ukrainian as its own standard separate from all others used outside of the Soviet Union. Chapter two also discusses the rise of Russian
in Soviet Ukraine as well as the concomitant literary purges of translators who were considered to be ideologically suspect. Chapter three examines the implementation of Socialist Realism and the implications with respect to translating opera, didactic material and teaching translation. Chapter three also explores various methods of translation used in the Ukrainian SSR as well as issues arising from censorship and copyright. Chapter four reviews the ideological factors for translating, or refusing the right to translate, as well as for preventing the spread of foreign or ‘bourgeois nationalist’ values. Chapter five investigates translation activities in other SSRs and draws several parallels between these and the circumstances in the Ukrainian SSR. It also considers the power differentials between Russian and Ukrainian translations, the silencing and censorship of revolutionary sixtiers writers in Soviet Ukraine, and the decline of Ukrainian translation altogether as a result of the successful implementation of russification policies.

For nearly seventy years, assimilation of national minorities was a top priority on the Soviet agenda, and language manipulation - though translation - was one of the means by which this undertaking was carried out. This thesis examines how translation was used as a catalyst for the russification of Ukrainian first under Imperial and then Soviet rule, starting with tsarist language policies regarding translation activities (which were fundamental in laying the foundation for Soviet languages policies) followed by the development of translation activities in the USSR up until the period of Glasnost.
1 Historical Background and Context

1.1 Tsarist Language Restrictions – A Model for Soviet Language Policy

1.1.1 Introduction

Linguistic reforms that imposed the russification of Ukrainian and other minority languages in the Russian Empire can be traced back to the reign of Alexander II and his successor Alexander III. Alexander II proved to be austere with his draconian-like policy towards non-Russian languages within the Empire. Imperial Russian historian David Saunders argues that in an attempt to suppress minority languages, Alexander II placed restrictions on the use and print of Belarusian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian (Saunders, 1995, 30). After his father’s assassination, Alexander III followed in his predecessor’s footsteps by continuing to enforce a policy of intolerance towards minority languages in an attempt to achieve solidarity through linguistic homogeneity by means of a slightly less rigid policy than the one previously implemented by his father. One of his tactics in striving to suppress the existence of minority languages within the Empire was through the application of language reforms whereby the usage and spread of non-Russian languages was limited, inevitably giving them next to no linguistic rights within the Empire. In the case of the Ukrainian language it was repudiated to the point of not even being recognized as a distinct language within Imperial Russia. Russian, however, was made mandatory in all educational institutions and in all forms of administration, thus inexorably promoting its
status and outranking all other languages within the Russian Empire. Lenore Grenoble, a scholar of Slavic language endangerment, notes the following:

Under the Tsarist regime, Ukrainian was declared forbidden. Tsarist reports abound with statements denying the existence of Ukrainian as a distinct linguistic system. Active repression of the language can be dated at least to 1876, with the official proclamation of Tsar Alexander II, which prohibited the use of Ukrainian in schools, theatres, public performances, and so on. Tsar Alexander III softened the proclamation somewhat in 1881, authorizing limited use of Ukrainian in the theatres with special permission, and allowing the printing of Ukrainian dictionaries, provided that they used Russian Cyrillic. (2003, 83)

It was clear that from the moment these strict measures were invoked to reduce the propagation of minority languages, the tsars responsible for the implementation of such policies were manifestly attempting to assimilate minorities. These policies, which began with the forewarning Valuev Circular of 1863 followed by the stricter Ems Ukaz of 1876, were strategic ways of preventing national resistance by introducing restricted use of minority languages aimed at stifling the propagation of nationalist sentiment. The primary reasons for the establishment of language policies such as the Valuev Circular of 1863 were twofold: it would allow the Russian Empire to maintain its hegemonic position by controlling the spread of minority languages and, more importantly, it was a preventative measure out of fear of another nationalist rebellion such as the one inspired by the Polish Uprising of 1863. As Slavic sociolinguist Andrii Danylenko asserts:

The Circular was so designed as to “hold back” the advancement of Ukrainophilism, including the appearance of the Ukrainian Bible as one in a series of Ukrainian-language publications. The ban appeared to be a corollary to the complex bureaucratic process and nationalistic shift in public opinion, predetermined for the most part by the Polish Uprising of 1863 and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainophile activity.¹ (2010, 14)

¹ Quoted in Miller, The Ukrainian Question, pp. 124–125.
One of the major restrictions of the Valuev Circular was the indefinite hold on publishing the Bible in Ukrainian translation, an endeavour already underway at the time by Ukrainian translators Pylyp Moračevs’kyj and Panteleimon Kulish. From that point on, translation activities were assumed outside the Russian Empire.

In addition to examining the purpose of late 19th century tsarist language policies, it is also important in this thesis to study the techniques and the theories applied to enforce these policies. George Shevelov, Ukrainian literary scholar and Slavic philologist, underlined how Imperial Russia’s legislation was entirely in the hands of the tsar who had the authority to single-handedly implement whatever laws he felt suited his agenda. Shevelov states that the tsar was the de facto law maker: “Autocratic Russia had no constitution. The source of legislation was the supreme will of the tsar” (1989, 5). Therefore, the tsar’s language policies - which undermined Ukrainian along with many other languages - were a reflection of his own linguistic agenda with respect to minority languages like Ukrainian, which he considered superfluous in Imperial Russia.

1.1.2 Education Reforms Under Alexander II

Tsar Alexander II disapproved of minority language education. He was not convinced that there was any merit in studying languages such as Ukrainian as they were considered to be vernacular languages at the time. Consequently, he implemented strict language reforms that omitted native minority languages from school curriculums, putting a halt to Ukrainian education. According to Russian historian Robert Montgomery,

The Russian autocracy held an increasingly negative view of mother-tongue education among the non-Russian people of the Empire over the course of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and – especially under the last three tsars – efforts to stifle schooling in non-Russian languages intensified as part of the policy of russification and discrimination that was one of the distinctive features of late tsarist rule. (2005, 105)
The discriminatory tsarist language policies were designed in such a way that failure to comply would result in arbitrary amercement. As Saunders suggests: “The government had not set out to nip Ukrainophilism in the bud. Rather, at a time of panic, it had punished anyone against whom it had a shred of evidence. Its militancy looked likely, however, to bring Ukrainophilism to an end” (1995, 43). The regime was designed in such a way as to be met with little resistance from the minority populations. Those who protested or defied the language restrictions were punished accordingly.

The school reform of 1870 banned the use of Ukrainian as a language of instruction and was an intrepid way of ensuring indoctrination from a young age, forcing everyone to use Russian even if it wasn’t the dominant language used within the home or community. The transition from native language to Russian was applied unevenly throughout the empire and was determined mostly by geography and demographics. Montgomery describes how the language component of the education reforms was structured:

Thus, 1870 “Rules on Measures towards the Education of the Non-Russian Natives Inhabiting the Russian Empire,” for example, specified the following treatment for three different categories of peoples: “1 [For] little-Russified peoples,… chiefly the Eastern peoples and the peoples of the Volga region, primary education is to begin in the native language of the pupils using textbooks written [in their language] in the Russian alphabet. The native language is to be viewed here only as a means aiding the transfer of teaching into Russian. 2: [For] peoples living [in areas] interspersed with Russian population,… teaching should be carried out in Russian by instructors who know the native language of the pupils. 3: [For] people who are sufficiently Russified – Ukrainians, Belorussians and others,… it is categorically forbidden to use the native language.” (2005, 105)

The transition of russification unfurled unevenly and at different rates across the Empire. Those minorities whose languages were more distant from Russian than Ukrainian, for example, were assimilated more slowly than cultures whose native languages were
considered closer to Russian, like Ukrainian and Belarusian. In pre-Soviet times, Ukrainian was not recognized as a language in itself. According to Shevelov, it was “labelled a dialect of Russian, just as Ukrainians themselves were officially only ‘Little Russians’” (1989, 8). The same principle of russification was also applied to Belarusian. The lack of recognition for Ukrainian as its own distinct language was the pretext used as the central pillar in sustaining the indoctrination process. By completely disregarding the structural and lexical differences between Russian and Ukrainian, the subjugation of ‘Little Russians’ and their transformation into ‘Great Russians’ could be justified and facilitated at once.

The lack of recognition for Ukrainian as a language combined with the reforms limiting its public use unquestionably jeopardized the fate of the language and left many Ukrainians with no choice but to give into the forced russification. The tsar considered Ukrainian to be a language for peasants and the uneducated. The idea of linguistic inferiority of minority languages was deliberately encouraged by the tsar to the point where minorities, heavily proselytized by tsarist propaganda, were convinced of their own linguistic triviality. As Shevelov notes: “It is not surprising that peasants, too, were often ashamed of speaking Ukrainian and, in conversations with people of the upper classes, they inserted as many Russian words as they could” (1989, 9).

1.1.3 Ems Ukaz

The Ems Ukaz of 1876, issued under Alexander II, implemented very strict restrictions on the use and publication of Ukrainian and was seen as an extension of the restrictions put in place by the Valuev Circular of 1863. Shevelov claims that the Ukaz prohibited original Ukrainian works from circulating in the Russian Empire but did not specify restrictions on translations:
The ukase of 1876 proscribed the printing of any texts, either original or translated, in Ukrainian, except for belles lettres and historical records. It also forbade any theatrical performances or public recitations in Ukrainian; the importation of any Ukrainian books published abroad, the teaching of any discipline in Ukrainian in schools; and the preservation or circulation of any Ukrainian books in school libraries. (1989, 5-6)

The ukaz of 1876 was finally amended in the decree of 1881. The amendments stated that Ukrainian texts could be reproduced using Russian Cyrillic. There were, however, still some loopholes in the new reforms whereby texts could be reproduced in proper Ukrainian, though these evasions were short-lived. As it stood, there were some options for publishing in Ukrainian during the reforms. Acceptable forms of publication included translations from Russian into Ukrainian, as well as the importation of Ukrainian books published outside of the Russian Empire. Soviet and Russian historian Basil Dmytryshyn explains that these exceptions were “corrected” in 1892 and 1894:

In theory the decree of October 8, 1881 represented a modification of the ukaz of 1876, but the modification was extremely slight. The new measure left intact the restrictions imposed in 1876, and it insisted on the impossible use of Russian orthography in producing Ukrainian texts. Now, as before, enforcement of the restrictions against the Ukrainian language was in the hands of censors, many of whom were very arbitrary. There were some, however, who actually sympathized with the Ukrainians, as they saw a contradiction between the intent of the decree and its wording which paralyzed the intent. Thanks to these censors it became possible (often with the aid of bribery or personal connections) to find loopholes in the law. One such loophole, used effectively until it was closed in 1892, allowed Ukrainian writers and publishers to produce translations into Ukrainian of Russian literary works. Another loophole, used until authorities sealed it hermetically in 1894, permitted the import of Ukrainian books that were published abroad. Unfortunately both these loopholes fell far short of fulfilling the actual need with the result that at the end of the nineteenth century the bulk of the Ukrainian population was illiterate, a condition harmful not only to the “Ukrainian Cause” but to the interests of the Russian Empire as well. (1970, 26-27)
In spite of the restrictions, small publishing achievements were reached in the first part of the 20th century. Permission was granted for transliterated Ukrainian stories to appear in the Kiev newspaper entitled *Kievskaja starina*. Shevelov asserts that although the stories appeared in transliteration, the fact that they were granted permission to be published in the newspaper was a major feat: “In 1903, the Kiev governor-general M. Dragomirov permitted fiction in Ukrainian, rendered in the Russian alphabet, to be published in *Kievskaja starina* (1989, 8).” Nevertheless, there was still one last obstacle before receiving approval for printing and that was to get past censorship. Shevelov explains that: “Only a very small fraction of Ukrainian texts readied for publication succeeded in getting through the censorship, and they were exclusively belles-lettres or publications for the uneducated”\(^2\) (1989, 8). Publishing in Ukrainian proved to be challenging because of all the restrictions regarding transliteration and the limited genres of literature permitted for publication. Nonetheless, despite these restrictions, Ukrainians were still persevering in attempting to publish in Ukrainian.

1.1.4 Reforms Under Alexander III

Fortunately, under the rule of Alexander III steps were taken towards lessening the severity of language reforms for Ukrainians. Although the modifications were far from even-handed, they did provide Ukrainians with less strict language policies than those of the obdurate Alexander II. Nonetheless, Alexander III’s agenda still attempted to gradually russify the population and implement a system of linguistic assimilation. During his reign, the following amendments were made to the language reforms as a result of

\(^2\) The ‘uneducated’ implies people living in rural areas or in small villages, generally farmers by vocation, with little formal education and limited access to schooling.
recommendations suggested by the Minister of Internal Affairs, as Dmytryshyn carefully describes:

Apparently as a result of these interpositions, Minister of Internal Affairs Count N.P. Ignat’ev submitted to the new Tsar, Alexander III, a memorandum urging review of the anti-Ukrainian discriminatory measures. On the Tsar’s orders, accordingly, a special commission was organized, consisting of C.P. Pobedonostsev, two state secretaries, and the Head of the Main Department of Printing. This commission recommended that the discriminatory measures be retained. At the same time, however, it suggested: 1) that the government allow the appearance of Ukrainian dictionaries on condition that they follow the rules of Russian orthography, or rules used no later than the end of the eighteenth century; 2) that Ukrainian stage performances approved by the censor be submitted for a review by local officials; 3) that the Main Department of Printing in St. Petersburg have the exclusive authority to issue permits to print Ukrainian texts for musical compositions, provided they followed the officially-approved rules of Russian orthography; and 4) that organization of special Ukrainian theatres and performing groups to stage Ukrainian plays be strictly prohibited. On October 8, 1881, Alexander III approved these “modifications” and they acquired the force of the law… (1970, 25)

The new reform allowed very limited use of Ukrainian. The law with respect to printed material claimed that only some forms of Ukrainian texts could be printed, under the specification that texts were printed using Russian orthography (i.e. the Russian alphabet) instead of Ukrainian Cyrillic, which differs orthographically and phonetically. This clause, which stated that texts must be printed using Russian orthography, continued to subvert the status of Ukrainian, and it changed the dynamics of the russification process by adding two new components: transliteration and translation. Consequently, the law remained discriminatory and left ample leeway for incessant attempts to russify minorities. The truth remained that Ukrainian under the guise of Russian orthography was, incontrovertibly, still russification.
1.1.5 Russification via Translation and Transliteration

This form of russification, via translation and transliteration, helped to promulgate the spread of Russian using seemingly less harsh means than the total banning of Ukrainian which existed in the later part of the 19th century. Accordingly, Ukrainians were reading transliterated texts as their only legal means of accessing Ukrainian literature. In that rested the premise for russification through a hybridization of Russian and Ukrainian. A given reader would read his/her text, situated somewhere between two languages. As the text appeared in Russian Cyrillic but used Ukrainian vocabulary and syntax, it resulted in a premature form of “surzhyk” which is a sociolect made up of both Ukrainian and Russian lexical and syntactic components. The fundamental expectation was that the reader would adopt the Russian Cyrillic (with applicable phonetics) and naturally, in a matter of time, make the leap to use pure Russian diction, phonetics, and syntax; ultimately substituting one language for another. This confusion of languages would later lead to superfluous borrowing from Russian along with the fusion of Russian and Ukrainian, forming what is known contemporarily as surzhyk, in the Soviet period.

Even though the ban on Ukrainian was officially lifted in 1905, the abrogation did not imply the end of linguistic repression for Ukrainians, as the impending Soviet takeover would eventually demonstrate. Until then, translation and transliteration were necessary to sustain the Ukrainian language as well as its literature. During the prohibition, the role of transliteration and translation for Ukrainian was simultaneously to preserve works and to avoid writing in Russian. Additionally, the role of transliteration was twofold: on the one hand it was used primarily to russify Ukrainian (along with other minority languages); on the other hand it was one of the only legal ways to publish in Ukrainian. The strict language
reforms put in place by the tsars would set a precedent for Soviet language polices which would share similar nationalism coupled with russocentric objectives for its subjects.
1.2 Implications and Ramifications: A Prequel for Soviet Intolerance and Linguicide

1.2.1 Introduction

Language policies implemented towards the end of the 19th century were incontestably discriminatory and unbending; however, the early 20th century reforms were even more degrading as a result of the rise of the Bolsheviks following the Revolution which overthrew the Russian Monarchy. Under Stalin’s rule, language reforms became considerably stricter and unruly disreganders were expelled using increasingly forceful measures, as discussed in the following chapter. The growing stigma associated with Ukrainian as a nationalist language that promoted division (as it was perceived to be during the tsarist period) continued during the Soviet period and provided grounds for stifling the development of Ukrainian. The rising intolerance of Ukrainian in the USSR was a direct consequence of lingering tsarist bigotry. Ivan Dziuba, a Ukrainian literary scholar and member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, stated that Lenin, the first leader of the USSR, acknowledged Imperial Russia’s oppression of linguistic minority groups:

The XII Congress of the RCP (B) qualified Russian chauvinism as ‘a reflection of the former privileged position of Great Russians’. Even earlier Lenin had noted: ‘...the Great Russians, under the yoke of the landowners and capitalists, had for centuries imbibed the shameful and disgusting prejudices of Great Russian chauvinism’; ‘Accursed tsarism made the great Russians executioners of the Ukrainian people.’³ (1968, 62)

³ Quoted in Lenin, CW, XXX, p. 295; XXV, p.91.

Lenin was opposed to linguistic chauvinism, but when Stalin succeeded him as leader of the USSR he enacted language policies that rivalled those of the tsars. The tsarist reforms vis-à-vis linguistic repression set the stage for Bolshevik authoritarianism towards
languages, as well as general intolerance towards foreign influences. The underlying motives for applying such harsh conditions towards minority languages during the Soviet Regime served the same purpose as those that existed during the tsarist regime – colonizing the minorities through russification. The ideology, in both cases, was indistinguishable and was designed to valorize Russian above all and to undermine all other languages to the point of extinction.

1.2.2 Linguicide

Both under tsarist and Soviet rule, Ukrainians were repeatedly subjected to linguicidal acts. Ukrainian literary scholar Maria Ovcharenko concludes that linguicide was rebranded under the false pretext of internationalism (or russification) of the Ukrainian school system: “Ethnocide under the guise of ‘internationalism’ runs parallel with linguicide, which is especially evident in the entire school system” (1987, 27). Linguicide, therefore, can be interpreted as a direct attempt to expunge a particular group using the sole factor of language. When an entity or state tenaciously promotes one language over another; when it forbids public usage of a language, prohibits education in a given language or persuades speakers of a given language not to pass their native tongue (which is often different from the official language(s)) onto their progeny, then there is substantial evidence of linguicide, as thoroughly described by Ukrainian Canadian lexicographer and linguist Jaroslav Rudnyč’kyi:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part or to prevent the natural development of a language or dialect should be considered as a linguicide act:

A. Killing members of a community speaking a respective language or dialect (genocide);
B. Imposing repressive measures intended to prevent the natural, organic development of a language or dialect;
C. Forcibly inflicting on a bilingual community conditions of cultural development calculated to transform it into unilingual groups;

D. Against the will of an ethno-lingual group, denying the right of a language to be taught in public schools, to be used in mass media (press, radio, television, etc.);

E. Against the demand of an ethno-lingual group, refusing moral and material support for its cultural endeavours and language maintenance efforts.

(1976, 23-24)

There is enough evidence to substantiate the fact that major acts of linguicide were committed during the late tsarist periods as well as during the Soviet regime, many of which will be elucidated in the following chapters. It is apparent that the general suppression of minority languages in the Russian Empire, and the strict language policies that were enforced, may be considered linguicial acts conducive to extirpating minority languages. As the Russian Empire both denigrated and refused to let the Ukrainian language develop, even in translation, it was advocating absolute linguicide. The tsars’ policies met every condition listed within the definition of linguicide and, as a result, Ukrainians were deprived of their basic linguistic rights to communicate, publish, translate and teach in their native language. The Soviets would also prove to be contenders of linguicide from the 1930s until the fall of the Soviet regime.

1.2.3 The Ukrainian Situation Outside Imperial Russia

For Ukrainians living within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in a region known as Western Ukraine or Galicia (Halychyna) and Bukovyna (Appendix A), the linguistic situation was significantly less oppressive than in the Russian Empire, even during early Soviet rule. With the exception of Transcarpathia, Ukrainians were permitted to communicate, publish and write in Ukrainian under Austro-Hungarian rule. Although only
a small percentage of all Ukrainians lived in the Western region, Ukrainians were able to further develop and preserve their language, keeping it relatively stable since geopolitical factors maintained them at a distance from the politics of russification in the Russian Empire. Grenoble explains that, prior to the Great War, Ukrainians were dispersed in the following manner:

In pre-Soviet times, the Ukrainian population was divided into several territories in three different States. Approximately 85 percent of the world’s total Ukrainian population lived in Russian Ukraine, 13 percent in Austrian Ukraine, in the territories of Western Ukraine and Bukovina, and 3 percent in Transcarpathia. Although the use of Ukrainian was permitted in Austrian Ukraine, it was largely prohibited both in Transcarpathia, and in Russian Ukraine, where the majority of the population was located. (2003, 83)

Because Ukrainians were split among several territories prior to World War I, Ukrainian developed most unevenly. Whereas linguistic and literary progress was stable and rising in Western Ukraine, linguistic regression was an enduring reality in the Russian Empire. During the interwar period (Appendix B), however, Western Ukraine was annexed to Poland; Transcarpathia was annexed to Czechoslovakia, Bukovyna was annexed to Romania, and Imperial Russian Ukraine became the Ukrainian SSR.

For the majority of Ukrainians under Russian rule, publishing in Ukrainian Cyrillic was unrealizable; however, Eastern Ukrainians could publish in Ukrainian in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where such activities were not prohibited. Authors who were adamant about publishing in Ukrainian could realize such endeavours in cities such as Lemberg (also known as Lviv) in Galicia. Publishing in Lemberg and smuggling back Ukrainian works was technically illegal in the Russian Empire but the authorities had poor control over the situation. According to Shevelov: “The government also failed to halt fully the
importation of foreign, mainly Galician, Ukrainian-language publications into the Russian Empire” (1989, 8).

**1.2.4 Publishing Translations Outside of Imperial Russia**

Ukrainian author, poet, and translator Panteleimon Kulish (1819-1897) was also known for his major translation activities that he undertook in Galicia. Ukrainian historian Dmytro Doroshenko states that he carried out the greatest translation endeavour of Shakespeare’s classics in Ukrainian for his time. In 1882 Kulish published three translations in Lemberg:

“Kuliš succeeded in publishing only one volume comprising *Othello, Troilus and Cressida* and *The Comedy of Errors*” (1931, 709). Kulish had ambitious plans to publish many more of Shakespeare’s works and he had prepared manuscripts for nearly a dozen further translations to be published in Lemberg:

In 1889, he had finished in manuscript, besides the three already published, the twelve following plays: *King Lear, Coriolanus, The Taming of the Shrew, Romeo and Juliet, Julius Caesar, Much Ado about Nothing, Macbeth, Antony and Cleopatra, Measure for Measure, Hamlet, Cymbeline, and The Merchant of Venice*. He did all he possibly could to obtain the permission of the Russian Imperial Censor to publish his translations, but it was of no avail.⁴ (Doroshenko, 1931, 710)

It wasn’t until after Kulish’s death in 1897 that the rest of his translations were edited and published by Ivan Franko, a prominent Ukrainian poet and writer. Doroshenko relates that Franko published nearly all of Kulish’s unpublished translations between 1889 and 1902 in Lemberg: “He corrected all the errors of translation, and changed awkward and unhappy expressions to such a point that the translation, having passed through the crucible of these two great Ukrainian poets, is indeed a beautiful one” (1931, 710). This example serves to

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illustrate the tremendous effort put forth by translators from Imperial Russia in order to publish their works in Ukrainian, in addition to the willingness of Ukrainian writers in Galicia to assist them with process.

Another example of translators collaborating occurred when Kulish undertook the task of translating the Bible into Ukrainian, a project which was denied in Imperial Russia. Kulish translated the Bible into Ukrainian with the help of Ivan Puliuy (a theologian and scientist) and Ivan Nechui-Levyts’kyi (a renowned Ukrainian writer and theologian). Ukrainian literary scholar, interpreter, and researcher in Soviet literary politics George Luckyj avers that the Ukrainian Bible was published posthumously in Vienna after Kulish’s death:

This mammoth project, in which Kulish was assisted by Puliuy and, later, by Ivan Nechuy-Levytsky, took decades to complete. It appeared in print after Kulish’s death, in 1903 in Vienna. Kulish’s widow received, after some delay, the sum of 4,400 guldens, which was a small fortune. In the nineteenth century the book (which existed in sections) was not allowed to be sold in Russia. In Ukraine it was first printed in 1928, in Kharkiv, sixty years after Kulish first started translating it, so that, in his words: “soon all the Christian world will learn that there is in the world a new Christian family, fifteen million strong.” (1999, 86)

Luckyj maintains that the translation of the Bible, which took years to complete, was the result of foreign subsidies: “Puliuy had contacts with the British Bible Society, which promised to finance this major undertaking. Over several years Kulish worked at it. At first he offered a rather free, poetic translation, which the reviewers did not like. Later, he provided a more scholarly translation” (1999, 85). Even when the ban on Ukrainian was lifted in 1905, Kulish’s translation of the Bible was still prohibited in Imperial Russia and only appeared in Soviet Ukraine nearly a decade after the rise of the Bolsheviks (Danylenko, 2010, 20).
1.2.5 Translating Ukrainian as a Dialect

There was, however, an additional stipulation for which Ukrainian could be used in translation under Imperial rule. This exception naturally, nonetheless, required the use of transliterated Russian Cyrillic, seeing as the target audience was Russian speaking. Russian translators could sometimes use Ukrainian in translation to mimic a foreign dialect since Ukrainian was still considered only a vernacular language in Imperial Russia. Soviet censorship scholar Maurice Friedberg emphasizes that in a Russian translation of Molière’s *Monsieur de Pourceaugnac*, Nikolai Minsky used Ukrainian to represent a French regional dialect:

Early in the twentieth century the poet Nikolai Minsky (Pseudonym of N.M. Vilenkin, 1855-1937) translated Molière’s comedy *Monsieur de Pourceaugnac*, in which the central protagonist’s two alleged wives speak respectively in the Picard and the Gascon dialects of standard French. Since at the time Ukrainian and Belorussian were widely perceived by Russians not as distinct Slavic languages but as dialects of Russian, Minsky had the wives speak Ukrainian and Belorussian. This stratagem backfired, presumably because the use of all three Slavic languages on the stage created the illusion that Molière’s comedy was actually set in Russia. (1997, 158-159)

Translating into Ukrainian for dialectal purposes was, however, a rare instance whereby translators could justify publishing segments in Ukrainian. Likewise, the use of Ukrainian to represent a foreign dialect confirmed the tsarist conviction that Ukrainian was considered to be nothing more than a dialect of Russian. This was reaffirmed in Russian translations of foreign works which contained a dialectal component.

Russian imperial intolerance of minority languages, along with linguicidal attempts to hasten their demise, led to subsequent Soviet intolerance and further linguicidal attempts to suppress national minority languages in the USSR. There is substantial evidence to support the claim that both language suppression and russification were intended to weaken the
threat of national minority resistance and consolidate the population, unifying them through strategic language planning and forced linguistic assimilation. This was intentionally carried out using a variety of means including censorship, translation, transliteration, as well as through lexical and terminological russification. The effectiveness of these methodologies is examined in the following chapter.


2 Lexical and Terminological Russification: Functions and Techniques

2.1 Periods of Intense Russification

2.1.1 Introduction

As previously stated, forceful russification predated the Soviet era and was a remnant by-product of tsarist imperialism. Linguistic anthropologist Laada Bilaniuk suggests that the framework behind russification was the introduction of characteristics of the Russian lexicon, morphology and phraseology into Ukrainian: “The linguistic interventions included grammatical, morphological, and orthographic rules that were to make Ukrainian more similar to Russian and thus more ‘politically correct’” (2005, 87). This process was carried out by a team of linguists who planned lexical and morphological changes of minority languages by modifying or omitting certain characters so that the language being adapted, in this case Ukrainian, seemingly appeared more Russian, a fact which allowed for straightforward assimilation of the Ukrainophone masses via an outwardly more Russian version of Ukrainian. At the end of the Great War, with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the assassination of the Russian royal family, and the rise of the Soviet regime, many transformations were imminently underway, and the future of the Ukrainian language was ambiguous and just as vulnerable to russification as it was in the 19th century under tsarist rule. Throughout the Soviet regime, language reforms changed as a function of the agenda of whichever leader was in power. Not many leaders, however, promoted the independent development of minority languages.
2.1.2 Orthographic Developments

At its very inception, as explained by sociolinguist Jacob Ornstein, the Soviet regime intended to further the development of minority languages under Lenin: “The Soviets came to power committed to allow the ethnic minority groups to develop according to the Leninist slogan ‘national in form, socialist in content.’” With some 200 distinct languages within its borders, the USSR has been the scene of the vastest and most complex official language-planning effort known in history” (1968, 121). The period known as Ukrainianization, a period in which Ukrainian was actively promoted within the Ukrainian SSR, was short-lived. In the early 1920s, Ukrainianization was introduced primarily to help promote communist ideology by using the vernacular of ordinary Ukrainians as a vehicle for the Communist Party to gain popularity, especially in rural areas where Ukrainian was most prevalent. This was one of the main goals of Ukrainianization and it was encouraged up until the 1930s when there was suddenly a shift in the Soviet agenda. Until then, however, there were attempts to further develop Ukrainian and strive towards properly standardizing the Ukrainian lexicon and normalizing its orthography, as Bilaniuk suggests:

In the 1920s, under Soviet power, initial restriction of Ukrainian was followed by a time of relative support for non-Russian cultures and languages. An official committee of linguists and literary scholars was established to deal with the standardization of the Ukrainian language. The work of this committee resulted in the *Ukraïns’kyi pravopys*, which outlined the basic rules of grammar and orthography. These standards were approved, with participation of Galician Ukrainians, at the 1927 Kharkiv Orthographic Conference and formally instituted on January 1, 1929. (2005, 79)

One of the most challenging and important items resolved at this conference was the question of orthography that, until then, had been developing independently in both Eastern

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5 This expression was used by Josef Stalin during a speech given in 1925.
and Western Ukraine. As Shevelov clarifies: “The conference was obliged to confront the difficult problem of two orthographic traditions, the Central-East vs. the West Ukrainian” (1989, 132) and of deciding which one to follow or adopt. Due to the longstanding and ongoing political fissure between Eastern and Western Ukraine, Ukrainian was unable to develop uniformly, creating various standards of Ukrainian and dialects. For this reason, it was imperative for scholars from both Eastern and Western Ukraine to decide upon a standard set of grammatical and orthographic rules for Ukrainian. Shevelov explains that both Eastern and Western Ukraine adopted the “Skrypnykivka” set of rules, named after Mykola Skrypnyk – an active supporter of Ukrainianization: “These rules were signed into law by Skrypnyk on 6 September 1928; published in 1929, they became compulsory in all schools and publications of the Ukrainian SSR” (1989, 132).

**2.1.3 Re-Russification**

Although Ukrainian became standardized and showed signs of development, the new standard was in effect for a very short period of time as a result of new language reforms. By 1933, the Ukrainian language regressed as Stalin abolished Ukrainianization and enforced a return to the policy of russification for minority languages. Ukrainianization was set into reverse-motion and the orthographic rules that were signed into law were abrogated. The goal of standardizing Ukrainian, which seemed promising for the future of the Ukrainian language, was officially over as Shevelov remarks:

The political course of the 1930s also deeply affected the Ukrainian language from within. It was subjected to regimentation more severe than any in its history. For the most part this was another manifestation of the centralization and regularization typical of the time; in part it had been prepared by the earlier, strict regimentation of the language’s spelling
(in the broad sense, including morphology and orthoepy\textsuperscript{6}), terminology, syntax, and vocabulary. The spirit of standardization that had been introduced by the normalizers of Skrypnyk’s time was now turned against them. (1989, 153)

As the Soviet agenda changed, so did its language policies regarding minority languages. The new reforms were starting to look more and more like the crippling tsarist ones that had been in use not long before. Just as Ukrainians thought the way towards linguistic freedom and development was being paved, language planning took a different course, turning in the complete opposite direction and devastating their aspirations. The reintroduction of russification brought upon language reforms that were similar to those of the tsarist period and became the new direction for language planning in the Soviet Union.

Immediately after investing considerable time and effort towards codifying Ukrainian, the Soviet Union ironically implemented new language reforms that were aimed at dismantling Ukrainian and reconstructing it using Russian as a model. This evidently symbolized a major impediment for the development of Ukrainian. Upon learning the news of the reforms, Mykola Skrypnyk (a member of the AUCP(b), the CP(b)U, a key promoter of Ukrainianization and the one who conceived the Skrypnykivka set of rules adopted in 1929) committed suicide in 1933. This act reflected his attitude toward the re-russification of Ukrainian, as well as his understanding of the fate of the Ukrainian intelligentsia under Stalin. Ovcharenko describes how Ukrainianization was completely abandoned, including the greatest achievement in Ukrainian orthography, the Kharkiv orthography, which was now replaced by a new set of orthographic rules that brought Ukrainian closer to Russian:

\textsuperscript{6} Orthoepy is the study of correct pronunciation.
Under the blows of these purges and “reforms” the best Ukrainian orthography, the so-called Kharkiv orthography, 1928-1929, was also destroyed and in 1931 replaced by the orthography reflecting influences of the Russian language. These influences are exemplified especially in the area of foreign and international words which, according to the new “improved” rules, are to be spelled exactly as they are spelled in Russian orthography. (1987, 19)

The new orthography, also known as Postyshivka (named after Pavel Postyshev who was commissioned by Stalin to oversee the dismantling of Ukrainian), was promoted on the grounds that it was better and more innovative than the former rules (Ovcharenko, 1987, 19). The new rules genuinely brought Russian and Ukrainian closer with respect to lexicon, orthography and phonetics, but they were not adopted outside of the Ukrainian SSR, a fact that raised lexical issues between different standards of Ukrainian and, once again, divided the East from the West.

2.1.4 Russifying Ukrainian Orthography

Some examples of drastic changes to the structure of Ukrainian in the 1930s include the lexicographic modification of certain word endings as well as the orthographic and phonetic modification of the Ukrainian alphabet. As Bilaniuk explains:

For example, the genitive case ending for feminine nouns with roots ending in two consonants was changed from “и” /y/ to “и” /i/. The Ukrainian letter “и” /g/ was eliminated, its place to be filled by the remaining letter “и” /h/; the phonetic distinction between /h/ and /g/ was thereby eliminated in orthography to match the lack of the distinction in Russian which only has the letter “и”/g/. (2005, 87)

Words which contained “и” /g/ were simply reproduced and pronounced as “и” /h/.

Ovcharenko elaborates on the lack of distinction between the two phonemes:

In many cases, this is a distortion of the Ukrainian pronunciation, as, for example, is the case of eliminating from the Ukrainian alphabet the letter Г (г), despite the existence of the phoneme Г in the Ukrainian sound system. Complying with this obliteration, the
Ukrainians now have to pronounce such names as Hugo, Hegel, Goethe, Gordon, Garfield as Huho, Hehel, Hete, Hordon, Harfield, etc. Other similar mutilations of the Ukrainian pronunciation, besides the obliteration of the letter G, are too numerous to be listed. (1987, 19)

Thus, the transcription of “ґ” /g/ and “ґ” /g/ was consolidated at the expense “ґ” /g/, which was also phonetically lost until 1990. What seems peculiar about this orthographical change is that Soviet language planners did not tamper with the pronunciation of “ґ” /h/ and change its phonetics to /g/ in order to bring both script and pronunciation closer to the Russian variant. The word Germany is another example of a word that was transformed from its original Ukrainian form Німеччина (Nimechchyna) into a russified form Германіа (Hermania), which was a closer match to the Russian equivalent Германия (Germania), yet there remained still a phonetic distinction in spite of the russification of the orthography.

Further structural changes were imposed with a view to rendering Ukrainian seemingly more Russian, removing from it any derivatives that did not match Russian derivatives. In other words, the goal was to rid Ukrainian of foreign influences not akin to Russian that lingered in the language. Thus, Ukrainian was modified to match Russian transliterated equivalents. According to Bilaniuk:

The transliteration of words with Greek roots was changed to match the transliteration applied in Russian; for example, the transliteration of Greek theta was changed from “τ”/t/ to “φ”/f/, as in the words анатема (anatema) which became анафема (anafema) ‘anathema’, and мит (myt) which was changed to міф (mif) ‘myth’. (2005, 88)

These modifications, however, were not adopted in Western Ukraine, a territory that remained annexed to Poland until its Soviet occupation in 1939 (Appendix C). Until then, Ukrainian developed independently in Western Ukraine and was not subjected to russification or forced grammatical or lexical amendments. It is also worth noting that
nowhere in the Ukrainian diaspora were any of these Soviet-driven lexical or orthographic modifications officially adopted; the diaspora predominantly used the Western Ukrainian variant. There were many similar lexical changes in Soviet Ukraine that were not adopted outside of Soviet Ukraine. This led to important debates over the legitimacy and normalization of Soviet Ukrainian, not to mention variants in technical terms and discrepancies in dictionaries printed in the Ukrainian SSR versus those printed outside. Such discrepancies inevitably posed problems for translators translating into Ukrainian at that time.

2.1.5 Lexicology and Terminology

Ovcharenko explains how in the 1930s Ukrainian experienced some of its most linguistically radical transformations: “In lexicography they uniformly gave preference to synonyms identical with or similar to Russian words. These violations of linguistic integrity resulted in the replacement of 50-80 percent of the Ukrainian scientific terminology by the Russian version of such terminology” (1987, 19). The lexicographers of the 1930s were assigned the task of removing foreign elements from Ukrainian terms and replacing them with Russian ones. Polish elements that were commonly found in Ukrainian, along with German ones, were no longer permitted. Shown in Table 1 are some examples of the lexical evolution that occurred between the 1920s and the 1930s. They serve to illustrate how Polonisms were eliminated from Ukrainian.
Table 1 – Russification of Ukrainian Terms Considered Polonisms in the 1900s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ukrainian 1920s</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Ukrainian 1930s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cal - ‘inch’</td>
<td>Cal</td>
<td>Djujm</td>
<td>Djujm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Áruš - ‘Strip (Metal)’</td>
<td>Arkusz</td>
<td>List</td>
<td>Lyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Val’nýcja - ‘Bearing’</td>
<td>Walnica</td>
<td>Podšípnik</td>
<td>Pidišýpnyk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ólyvo - ‘Lead’</td>
<td>Olow</td>
<td>Svinéc</td>
<td>Svynéc9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vahálo- ‘Pendulum’</td>
<td>Wahadlo</td>
<td>Májatnik</td>
<td>Májatnyk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sublimát -‘(Corrosive) Sublimate’</td>
<td>Sublimat</td>
<td>Sulemá</td>
<td>Sulemá8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antymón -‘Antimony’</td>
<td>Antymon</td>
<td>Sur’má</td>
<td>Surmá</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wexler, 1974, 159

Prospects for the development of Ukrainian looked unfavourable and turned into amplified linguicide that continued for decades until the later part of the 20th century. The deliberate introduction of Russo-Soviet lexical elements (drawn from Marxist-Leninist expressions) was designed to promote communist ideals, as Slavic linguist Paul Wexler notes:

Whenever Ukrainian is in need of new words, regulators suggest that the language turn directly to Russian for materials and models. Russian neologisms encountered in Marxist-Leninist writings, for example, should be used in Ukrainian translations: Russian postepenovščina ‘gradual character’ becomes postepenovščyna, Russian peredíška ‘respite’- peredýška and Russian levonardónik ‘Leftist-Populist’ – levonardónyk. (1974, 185)

7 Quoted in Vse-ukrajins’ka akademija nauk 1935.4.6-7. Ibid., 1934.1.12 replaces cýna ‘tin’ (Polish cyna) by ólyvo (Russian ólovo). Li’jin 1964 gives the form ólovo, labelling ólyvo as colloquial; olivéc’ is retained as ‘lead-pencil.’ Andrusyshen 1957 gives Val’níčja in the meaning of ‘buffer, buffer-head.’

8 Quote in Vse-ukrajins’ka akademija nauk 1934.1.12.

9 Quoted in Ibid. Russian also has sublimát (product of sublimation) and antimónij, antimónija (archaic). “Rezoljucija komisij NKÖ v spravi perevirky roboty na movnomu fronti v pytannjax terminolohiji” 1934, p.18 criticizes an earlier replacement of požar ‘fire’ (Russian požar) by požěča, kočerná ‘poker’ (Russian kočerga’) by kocjubá, kočerhárna and kočerhéřka ‘boiler-room’ (Russian kočergárka) by parovýčnja, pryposobiljáty ‘to adapt, apply; accommodate’ (Russian prisposobilját) by prystosóvuvatry, prykladáty ‘to adapt, apply’ (Russian príkladívyvat’) by zastosóvuvaty, kurýty ‘to smoke’ (Russian kurít’) by palýty, kustár ‘homecraftsman’ (Russian kustár) by domorób. Vse-ukrajins’ka akademija nauk 1935.4.8 objects to the form ljústro for ‘mirror’ as a Polonism (Polish lustro) and recommends dzérkalo instead (Russian zérkalo).
In fact many of the neologisms incorporated into Ukrainian came as a result of communist texts translated from Russian, whether the source was Engels, Lenin or Marx. As Wexler further remarks: “An important means of enriching the lexical storehouse of Ukrainian, and of activating many features in Ukrainian which heretofore have been unproductive, is the translation of Marxist-Leninist classics from Russian into Ukrainian” (1974, 185). The lexical planning was designed to absorb Ukrainophone masses into a predefined Soviet construct (with Russo-Soviet societal values) and to dissuade them from closely identifying with and favouring their “national” or “bourgeois” roots. Sovietisation was not merely a question of language; it was a matter of culture as well as mass-identification and mass-assimilation. All lexical planning was tailored to enhance Soviet solidarity.

2.1.6 A False Pretext for Russification

One of the pretexts for russifying the Ukrainian language was the customary belief that Ukrainian was merely a dialect of Russian, as previously declared in Imperial Russia. In other words, it was a popular misconception to believe that they were practically the same language with only negligible distinctions. Thus, the conviction of linguistic similarity between Russian and Ukrainian provided one logical reason for russification. A further alleged reason for russification was that Russian was considered a “purer” language than Ukrainian (i.e. a language with fewer foreign borrowings); therefore, Ukrainian should be shaped in the image of Russian, a highly regarded and “superior” language. The theory of Russian “purity” in support of russification was examined and studied by scholars in the USSR who were sceptical of such claims. The fallacy of Russian purity was illustrated through a study conducted by Ukrainian scholar and translator Vitalii Radchuk, who claimed that Russian is no purer of a language than Ukrainian. As Bilaniuk explains:
The scholar Vitalii Radchuk (2000b) took the argument even further that Russian is just as impure as Ukrainian, presenting scientific evidence that all languages are Surzhyk mixtures, even though they are not recognized as such. Radchuk cited a 1957 study by the Russian scholar O. Trubachov of 10,779 Russian words whose etymologies were provided in M. Fasmer’s four-volume etymological dictionary of Russian. Trubachov found that only 0.9 percent of the words where exclusively Russian; of the rest, 58.5 percent were late borrowings, 10.3 percent were onomatopoeic or of unclear origin, 29.5 percent were general Slavic and early borrowings, and only 0.8 percent were shared only by the eastern Slavic languages. This evidence refuted the supposed unique linguistic closeness of Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Russian (which had been used by pro-Russian scholars to argue for the naturalness of the unification of these nations). By citing Trubachov’s study, Radchuk also sought to return linguistic legitimacy to Ukrainian, which was often discredited for its lack of a “pure form” – after all, even the prestigious Russian was a thorough mixture. (2005, 158)

The claims on which both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union elected to Russify Ukrainian (i.e. to “cleanse” the impure Ukrainian, merely a dialect of Russian) were erroneous and groundless. Although pro-Russian scholars, such as Viktor Vinogradov, were determined to prove these claims to be true, there were always less biased scholars who would find shortcomings in these theories. Those, however, who could possibly challenge such notions during the Stalin period - namely the intelligentsia, scholars, translators, and writers - were often targeted and purged before they could expose linguistic untruths and pose a real threat to supporters of Russification.

Another basis for Russification in the 1930s, as explained by Bilaniuk, was partly driven by “a rivalry with English, which was becoming widespread around the world.”

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11 Viktor Vinogradov was a Soviet linguist and philologist. Vinogradov was Director of the Linguistics Institute, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and a recipient of the Stalin Prize in 1951. He also cooperated with authorities during the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, a show trial where the accused were sentenced for allegedly having published anti-Soviet material in foreign editorials.
Soviets viewed this spread as “insidious” rather than “natural like the spread of Russian” (2005, 85). Russian was threatened by the propagation of English and, in order to compete internationally with its contender, immediate action was needed to prove the linguistic merit of the rising lingua franca of the Soviet Union. The rise of Russian could be interpreted as an attempt to forcefully colonize the rest of the Soviet republics using language as a catalyst.

2.1.7 Literary Purges

It is important to keep in mind that during the early Soviet period, authors, playwrights, and poets who were skilled and well-versed in other languages were often translators in addition to being authors; often there was not much distinction between the professions. These were usually the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the greatest intellectual assets for promoting Ukrainian, but real threats to the campaign of russification. For this reason, much of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was liquidated in the 1930s. Examples of literary purges in the Ukrainian SSR include the following people: Oleksander Finkel 1899-?, linguist and author of Teoriia i praktyka perekladu (Theory and Practice of Translation, 1929), (Luckyj, 1988, 9); Petro Diatliv 1880-?, poet and translator (Luckyj, 1988, 6); Mykyta Hodovanets 1893-?, journalist, writer, and translator of foreign fables into Ukrainian (Luckyj, 1988, 10); Mykola Ivanov 1886-?, translator of Spanish literature (Luckyj, 1988, 13); Ivan Krushelnytsky 1905-34, poet and translator of “Hofmannstahl” (Luckyj, 1988, 19); Ivan Kulyk 1897-1941, chairman of the Ukrainian Writers’ Union, poet and translator of American poetry (Luckyj, 1988, 20); Volodymyr Svidzinsky 1885-1941, poet and translator of Aristophanes into Ukrainian (Luckyj, 1988, 36); Mykola Zerov 1890-1941, major poet, literary scholar, and translator of Latin and French poetry (Luckyj, 1988,
Some of the above committed suicide or were executed; however, most were arrested and spent the remainder of their lives performing forced labour while in exile (in Siberia) where they eventually died. Some of their works were even republished or translated posthumously such as a collection of Volodymyr Svidzinsky’s poems that appeared in the collection *Medobir* (Munich, 1975). The above group of writers and translators represented a threat to the Bolsheviks and were purged because they could potentially assemble bourgeois nationalist resistance to the Soviet regime through minority language endorsement.

### 2.1.8 Conspiracy and Enforcement

During the period of linguistic cleansing in the 1930s, russification was ruthlessly enforced and made a point of as a political agenda. Ukrainian elements were to be removed and replaced with Russian elements in all spheres of scientific terminology, such as mathematics and physics, as Bilaniuk states:

> For example, treatises such as Khvylia’s 1933 article, “To Destroy the Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism on the Linguistic Front”, spearheaded the efforts of special language censorship brigades in 1933-35 (Kocherga and Kulyk 1994). These brigades took up the task of censoring terminological dictionaries, systematically excluding the existing Ukrainian term in favour of Russified ones. (2005, 87)

As the politics changed, Andrii Khvylia made a point of condemning artists who were disseminating ‘nationalist’ ideas, such as Les Kurbas, and replacing them with persons adept at depicting a socialist Ukraine in the arts. Grenoble explains that in the 1920s

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13 Khvylia was head of the Press Section and the Cultural Propaganda Sections of the CP(b)U. Afterwards, he became the Deputy Commissar for Education. He vanished shortly after his arrest in 1937.

14 Les Kurbas was a renowned and talented director at the Berezil theatre (one of Soviet Ukraine’s most respected theatres). He was a political prisoner and was shot on November 3, 1937, in Karelia (RSFSR).
intellectuals were encouraged to further develop Ukrainian, but in the following decade these same people were being pursued, removed and silenced: “An official commitment to Ukrainianization continued, but in the 1930’s it was coupled with purges of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, including many of the leading figures in the pro-Ukrainian language movement (Grenoble, 2003, 84).” People who showed enthusiasm towards anything Ukrainian were suspect of being bourgeois nationalists and were potentially subject to investigation and/or persecution.

2.1.9 Glavlit

All publications, whether original or translated, were subject to approval from the Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs (Glavlit), the agency responsible for censoring publications before they could be printed and distributed, as Russian and Soviet literary scholar Robert Magidoff notes: “Commonly known as Glavlit, its full name is the Central Administration on Literary and Publishing Matters. The Propaganda Department appoints the director and editor-in-chief of each publishing house, holding them responsible for the fulfillment of the plan by their respective house, and above all, for the ideology expressed in the books they are putting out” (Magidoff, 1948, 482). From the early 1920s until the collapse of the Soviet Union, all printed matter passed through Glavlit, as Russian and Soviet historian Stuart Finkel clarifies:

All printed matter was to be submitted to Glavlit for approval except that emanating from explicitly exempted official organs, and new publishing entities had to receive Glavlit’s blessing. Anything “hostile to the Communist Party and Soviet Russia” was to be categorically forbidden, especially when “hostile to our ideology in fundamental matters (public life [obshchestvennost’], religion, economics, the national question, the artistic sphere, etc.)” (2007, 149)
All publications that were deemed unfit for the Soviet reader were flagged by Soviet censors, altered, and then produced in a “more suitable” manner. Finkel notes that Glavlit had considerable authority and could resort to drastic measures in order to ensure that printed matter did not compromise the integrity of the Soviet Union:

It was Glavlit’s task to lead this charge, first through closing publishing houses, prohibiting specific publications, reducing press runs and circulation, and imposing fines and jail time; and second by means of more subtle “ideological pressure” applied to editors, by bringing in more suitable people, and by removing unacceptable individuals from leadership positions. (2007, 148)

In other words, Glavlit had the authorization to do whatever was considered necessary in order to ensure the suitability and safety of printed matter. Its guidelines were all part of the language initiative set out by the CPSU in Moscow. Glavlit was in charge of ensuring that all publications, originals and translations, were compliant with Socialist Realism which became the literary norm for all publications in the USSR from the 1930s onwards. This topic is examined in greater detail in the following chapter.
2.2 A Seemingly Hegemonic Agenda and its Framework

2.2.1 Introduction

The stimulus behind language planning during the Stalin period onward was purely a matter of centralizing power, that is to say linguistic hegemony through censorship and russification. According to Ivan Dziuba: “The second psychological and ideological force of russification is Russian Great-Power chauvinism. It constitutes the ‘psychological’ mechanics of russification, its ‘soul’ (1967, 134).” For the Communist Party to further propagate its ideology and exert control over its population, the implementation and strict enforcement of language policies was compulsory.

Linguistic hegemony in the Soviet Union lasted for nearly seventy years and at almost every moment there were censorship activities that involved translation. Supportive examples can be given starting from the 1920s up until Glasnost. The Kremlin’s objective throughout most of the Soviet period was simply to gain power and maintain it by foisting Russian and Soviet culture upon minorities, which spread rapidly throughout the USSR at the expense of all other languages and traditions. Lenore Grenoble affirms that the increasing spread and use of Russian was always promoted in a positive manner to persuade citizens that using Russian would unite everyone, making the Union stronger as a whole:

Party rhetoric proclaiming the importance of Russian was also on the rise. The official view of a single Soviet ethnic group, the result of ‘the convergence and fusion of people’ (sblizhenie i sliianie narodov), was becoming a reality. The sphere of Russian usage spread beyond education to many administrative levels, including local-level administration. It had become the lingua franca of the USSR. This extended beyond the spread of language to the development of a new kind of ethnicity. One of the explicit
goals formulated in the Brezhnev era was the establishment of a Soviet people (sovetskii
narod) as emblematic of the development and fusion of the various nationalities into a
supra-nationality. At the 1971 Party Congress, Brezhnev formulated his view of the ‘new
human community’ sharing a common territory, state, economic system, culture, the goal
of building communism and a common language. (2003, 58-59)

The idea of using Russian as the model Soviet language was reprehensible because of its
underlying implications which revealed an exclusively linguicidal agenda for minority
languages. Not surprisingly, Russian was to represent much more than just a model for
terminology and language planning as scholar in Soviet language politics Michael Bruchis
declares:

Although the exponents of the CPSU’s language policy sought to reassure alarmed
linguists and literati in the non-Russian Soviet republics that it was merely a question of
Russian serving as a model for newly coined terminology, in reality, long-term goals of
far greater significance were being pursued in the application of this principle. These
long-term aims are intended to intensify the one-sided influence of Russian on all levels
of non-Russian Soviet languages, to root out from them long-established terminology and
commonly used words, to introduce Russian morphological, syntactical, stylistic, and
other models, to displace non-Russian languages from their most important social
functions, and turn them into second-class means of communication. (1988, 216)

This describes a twofold strategy for russification: firstly, to create a watered-down version
of the minority language and, secondly, to enfeeble its communicative value. Russification,
in this sense, hindered the natural development of minority languages and implanted
elements into the language that would ordinarily not evolve within it, similar to a grafting
of languages with branches that are observably not organic. It also served to devalue and
diminish the integrity of minority languages by making them virtually impractical in
everyday administrative and educational life. This created a linguistic hierarchy that
inevitably placed Russian above every other language.
2.2.2 Russification to Simplify Translation

Another positively-spun motive for the russification of minority languages was the need to facilitate translation between languages of the Soviet Union. Since Russian was seemingly more developed than all other languages in the Soviet Union, particularly in specialized areas, it only made sense to base the specialized terminology of minority languages on the likeness of Russian in order to simplify and speed up the translation process. This argument of simplifying the task of translation was used to further uphold russification activities, as Soviet sociolinguist Simon Crisp contends:

Whereas in the early 1930s Western European loanwords were commonly found in the young written languages, these were soon to be replaced by their Russian equivalents. In a later period this process was formalised in the theory of a common terminological stock for all languages of the Soviet Union, the avowed aim being not only to facilitate matters like technical translation from one language to another, but also to contribute to the development of a Soviet cultural heritage common to all the peoples of the USSR, based on the fact that the role of Russian in areas requiring a sophisticated technical terminology is more or less inevitable. (1990, 35)

Translation was one of the many tactics employed in fostering the russification of minority languages on the pretence that a linguistically similar lexicon, in terms of orthography and morphology, would simplify the enormous task of specialized translation for Soviet translators. Since Russian claimed to be the most developed language at the time, it could provide all minority languages with the same common base for technological terms. Therefore, minority languages in the Soviet Union could simultaneously mirror the linguistic developments of Russian and expeditiously access an extensive, Russian-based, specialized terminology.

In the 1930s, publication of specialized texts had to follow the model of Russian and borrow from it as often as necessary when in need of new terms or replacement terms for
those no longer considered Russian enough. The new Russo-Soviet Ukrainian was being fully implemented in areas of specialized language use even though its linguistic reliability was questionable due to all the Russian calques which were rigidly enforced and which were not previously akin to Ukrainian. As Ornstein explains:

In the early 1930s, a sharp reversal took place and a new policy was initiated, which, with modifications, has remained to this very day. The role of Russian in the Soviet communication network steadily increased, and that of the minority tongues decreased, with their functions quite rigidly circumscribed. Lexical coinage -- the main device whereby a language is made to keep abreast of current needs -- had to follow a uniform pattern. Words in the “obligatory categories” of socio-political, economic, and scientific-technical vocabulary were to be borrowed from Russian, either directly or as loan translations (calques, in linguistic terminology). Writers who insisted on employing “archaic” or “feudal” terms ran the risk of being branded “bourgeois nationalists.” (1968, 121-122)

There was a growing stigma associated with national languages. To use any remnants of non-russified linguistic constructs was not only forbidden but, as noted above, also politically suspect. Even when there were clearly appropriate and functional terms available in the source language, a borrowing closer to Russian was necessary in its place for the sake of complying with language policies and avoiding accusations of disloyalty towards the Soviet Union.

2.2.3 Discouraging the Publication of Minority Languages

There was increasingly less encouragement for publishing specialized Ukrainian texts in the Soviet Union. By the 1970s, Russian had almost fully replaced Ukrainian in professional sectors. Even with the Russo-Sovietisation of minority languages, their use was seldom encouraged when publishing within technical fields, particularly in the sciences. In fact, in the 1970s, terms continued to be russified. Shown in Table 2 are some examples
of archaeological terms that underwent morphological transformations in order to resemble the Russian term:

Table 2 - Examples of the Russification of Ukrainian Archaeological Terms in the 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ukrainian 1970s Term</th>
<th>Russified 1980s Term</th>
<th>Standard Russian</th>
<th>English Gloss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Bilaniuk, 2005, 92

Dziuba attests that specialists who wrote in minority languages were rarely published in their native tongue: “As for the works of dozens of great Ukrainian scientists in various branches of the natural sciences, if they are published, then it is in most cases only in Russian, and not in Ukrainian” (1968, 144).

Table 3 presents data that show almost a 50% decrease in the number of scientific journals written in Ukrainian between 1969 and 1980 (from 14 to 8). A similar trend is observed in the case of bilingual journals. Noteworthy, is the almost 200% increase in the number of Russian language scientific journals (from 11 to 32) over the same time period. These results clearly demonstrate the takeover by the Russian language in the area of scientific publishing.
Table 3 - Journals of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: Languages of Publications, 1969 and 1980

| Year | Ukrainian | | Russian | | Bilingual | |
|------|-----------|----------------|---------|----------------|---------|
|      | Number    | Percent   | Number  | Percent   | Number  | Percent   |
| 1969 | 14        | 46.6      | 11      | 36.6      | 5       | 16.6      |
| 1980 | 8         | 19.0      | 32      | 76.2      | 2       | 4.8       |

Source: Solchanyk, 1985, 88

The preference to use Russian within the scientific community was a major linguistic setback, as Bilaniuk notes: “One of the most severe impediments to the development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in science was the conversion in the 1970s of almost all the scientific journals of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR into the Russian language” (2005, 92). Bilingual scientists who were able to publish in Russian wrote in Russian. Otherwise, Ukrainian scientists who wanted to publish and be recognized by a wider audience translated their articles into Russian prior to publication.

2.2.4 Mandatory Russian Language Instruction in Schools

From the 1930s onwards, another important constituent of Soviet language planning revolved around two issues: mandatory Russian language instruction for minority languages and the de-emphasis of native language education. As a result, Ukrainian books were taken off library and store shelves and replaced with Russian books. Simultaneously, national language schools were shut down and replaced with Russian language schools. Grenoble argues that as a result of Russian becoming the official language of the USSR, it began to play a more important role in educational and political spheres:

Minority languages became seriously threatened as they were no longer used in schools and publications in these languages were seriously cut back. The key change – regardless of the immediate local-level particulars – was that Russian became the official language of the USSR and occupied a central position in education and government. These reforms represented an open move toward russification of the country. (2003, 57-58)

Schooling for Soviet children provided an opportunity for Sovietised language to be implanted and broadly disseminated through a structured curriculum by way of Russo-Sovietised textbooks. Mandatory bilingual schooling provided an opportunity for direct Russian immersion in the school system, which ensured that Soviet Ukrainian students became fluent in Russian and familiar with Soviet Russian literary icons.

Whereas a Ukrainian curriculum during the early Stalin period (mid-1920s to the early 1930s) helped to promote the CP(b)U using Ukrainian as an instrument to gain popularity, a Sovietised curriculum was introduced from the 1930s onwards to indoctrinate and establish a Soviet identity among youth by de-nationalizing didactic material and replacing it with Sovietised content. Language, in this case, was a means to achieve an ideological objective. Dziuba explains that in the 1920s minority languages were used for political gains: “Let us recall how serious the CP(B)U in the 1920s concerned itself with the absorption of Ukrainian culture by the broad working masses, and how it considered national culture and language a powerful instrument of communist cultural construction and education” (1968, 148).

As previously noted, Ukrainianization was short-lived and politics steered language planning in a new direction. Dziuba observes that in the early 1930s, a new period of russification, which would increase in severity, had begun. By the 1950s, russification literally turned into the substitution of one language for another:
Now we are faced with the total antithesis of this: Ukrainian culture, and in particular the printed word, is being steadfastly ignored and replaced in its entirety by Russian culture and Russian books. This is what is happening, if not everywhere, at least among considerable sections of the city populations, and especially in the ‘upper strata’ of society. The case is the same with the public authorities, which do nothing to disseminate Ukrainian culture among the population, especially not amongst its younger members. (1968, 149)

Ukrainian was not being promoted and little effort was made to familiarize youth with their native language. Eventually, new educational reforms were introduced which would further cripple the development of Ukrainian. As Grenoble explains: “Clause 19 of the Education Reforms of 1958-59 stated that education in the mother tongue was no longer compulsory. The overall impact of the 1958-59 legislation was that the instruction of Russian increased at the expense of native languages” (2003, 57). The results, however, varied widely. Although Russian replaced native languages in schools, cultural restrictions were lessened under Khrushchev, which may have encouraged a slight increase in use of some minority languages, within sizable linguistic communities, outside of schools (2003, 57). Therefore, Ukrainian was only really given a chance to develop outside the school system.

Up until the 1950s, russification was designed to bring national languages closer to Russian, but in the 1950s the objective was to replace them with Russian as the official language of the Soviet Union. Grenoble argues that Russian was to become the language of all Soviet citizens:

A major change in language policy began in the mid-1950s. Prior to this period, the national languages were the focus of Soviet language planning. From the mid-1950s there is a major shift in the policy whereby the goal is to establish Russian as the language of the Soviet Union. The Khrushchev era (1953-1964) introduced the vision of a new Soviet people, united not only politically, but also through the use of one language. (2003, 57)
Up until *perestroika* in the mid-1980s, there were ongoing restrictions on minority languages in all spheres of society; the motives for the increased presence and use of Russian were merely a matter of russocentrism and hegemony under the pretext of internationalism and Soviet unity. The proliferation of Russian meant two things: the presence of minority languages would decrease and the dignity of minority languages, even ones like Ukrainian spoken by millions of Soviet citizens, would be undermined.

### 2.2.5 The Annexation of Western Ukraine 1939

Bilaniuk speculates that because Ukrainians were able to use their language in a multitude of societal areas under Polish rule\(^{16}\), Ukrainian carried an altogether different symbolic importance in Western Ukraine where it was considered a real language and did not hold the same low status as in russified Soviet Ukraine. The linguistic pride of Western Ukrainians would prove to be a challenge to Soviet integration when the region was finally annexed. Bilaniuk explains how the use of Ukrainian became emblematic of a victory over longstanding linguistic oppression:

> The Polish language generally had more power and prestige, but Ukrainian political and educational institutions were allowed to exist, and there the Ukrainian language became widespread as a symbol of ethnic pride and defiance of colonizing regimes, with a relatively high symbolic value. (2005, 89)

The Ukrainian language that was used in Western Ukraine had followed the Skrypnyk orthography and was not lexically stripped of all its foreign elements as it was in the Ukrainian SSR. The annexation of Western Ukraine represented a major impediment to language adaptation in Soviet Ukraine. Western Ukrainians possessed their own culture and

\(^{16}\) The majority of Western Ukraine belonged to Poland during the interwar period. A smaller portion of Western Ukraine was divided between Czechoslovakia and Romania.
were reluctant to being russified but such demonstration of nationalism was considered a threat to the solidarity of the Soviet people. As a result, with the annexing of Western Ukraine another series of linguistic cleansing and nationalist purging was introduced. According to Bilaniuk:

Following transfer to the USSR, Western Ukrainian ethnolinguistic pride posed a new challenge to Soviet policies of russification, which had to counter the linguistic influence of Polish and German as well as the more developed national aspirations of western Ukrainians. (2005, 90)

The politics of linguistic and cultural assimilation were aggressive and disillusioning for Western Ukrainians. Western Ukrainians had to accept the new russified standard that was officially adopted in the Ukrainian SSR. Whereas Western Ukraine had previously been known as a haven for Ukrainian translating and publishing, it was no longer under a jurisdiction that allowed for its independent linguistic development to flourish.

Bilaniuk notes that the most strict linguistic impediments were put in place under Stalin’s rule; his successors maintained similar restrictions but they were drawn out over a longer period of time: “The direct intervention in the structure of the Ukrainian language that was so intense under Stalin slowed down but did not cease in the later Soviet years” (2005, 91-92). Almost up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, russification continued to be enforced, to various degrees, by nearly all Soviet leaders. Crisp proclaims that in an attempt to secure Russian as the dominant language of the Soviet Union, Stalin deliberately set out to silence anyone who would challenge the language reforms: “Stalin himself almost certainly believed in the future domination of the Russian language and in his final years, so far as we can tell, subjected the national languages to some fairly crude pressures” (1990, 39-40).
During the Khrushchev (1953-1964) and Brezhnev (1964-1982) eras, the violence seen from the twenty-five year reign of Stalin (1928-1953) had decreased; however, russification was not removed from the Soviet political agenda. Russification would take on a covert form for the next thirty years after Stalin. Distorted facts and political messages would be transmitted through the censorship of translation, while russification of dictionaries and orthography would cause various inconstancies between Ukrainian used within and outside of the Soviet Union, making the task of translating into Ukrainian particularly challenging from the Stalin period onward.
3 Justified Censorship: Socialist Realism in Translation

3.1 Redefining Translation: Theories and Practices

3.1.1 Introduction

In August 1934, the notion of Socialist Realism came into effect as a result of the First Congress of Writers of the USSR. It was resolved that Socialist Realism would provide the foundation and guidelines for all literary, performing and visual arts in the USSR until Glasnost. Socialist Realism entailed a contemporary socialist interpretation of art (i.e. Marxist-Leninist), rejecting all previous historical interpretations. A brief description of Socialist Realism was published in a 1934 addition of the newspaper Pravda; this definition was taken from the statutes of the Soviet Writers’ Union prior to the first congress. According to Russian literary historian Jeffrey Brooks:

Socialist realism, the basic method of Soviet artistic literature and literary criticism, demands truthfulness [pravdivost'] from the artist and a historically concrete portrayal of reality in its revolutionary development. Under these conditions, truthfulness and historical concreteness of artistic portrayal ought to be combined with the task of the ideological remaking and education of laboring people in the spirit of socialism (Pravda 5/6/34). (1994, 977)

The above extract from Pravda only provides the first two sentences of the definition from the statutes. The remainder of the definition is provided below and was taken directly from the 1934 Congress. Historian and sociologist Régine Robin quotes the continuation of the excerpt from the statutes as follows:

Socialist realism guarantees to creative art an extraordinary opportunity to manifest any artistic initiative and a choice of various forms, styles, and genres.
The victory of socialism, and the rapid growth of productive forces unprecedented in the history of humanity, the burgeoning process of the liquidation of classes, the elimination of all possibilities of exploitation of man by man and the elimination of the contrast between city and countryside, and, finally, the progress of science and culture, create limitless possibilities for a qualitative and quantitative increase in creative forces and for the expansion of all types of art and literature. (1992, 11)

Socialist Realism was essentially a form of artistic expression, based on Marxist principles, which glorified only the positive aspects of socialism. It portrayed a classless society where the working-class man was the protagonist. Thus a realistic artistic representation of socialism in the Soviet period could range from the “Worker and Kolkhoz Woman” statue by Vera Mukhina in Moscow to the Bolshevik fictional hero, Nikolai Vershinin, described in Armoured Train 14-69. In Socialist Realist literature, the “positive hero” or the “new man” was portrayed as a futuristic, positive archetype whose objective was to, for example, “collectivize, build a dam, increase productivity, built a factory, etc” (1992, 148). The antihero was portrayed as an anti-communist with an archaic vision who believed in class distinction and whose objective was to “prevent [the hero] from collectivizing, destroy[ing] the dam, the factory” (1992, 148). The dichotomy between the pro-collectivizing, positive hero and the antihero who opposed collectivization was not only emblematic of the struggle between the “good” Bolsheviks and the “bad” bourgeoisie, but of the battle between the Reds and the Whites, socialists versus nationalists, and unity against division. In Socialist Realist literature, the only heroes were supporters of socialism. All those who did not support socialism were considered antagonists.

17 Vsevolod Ivanov’s Armoured Train 14-69 is a play, based on a novel, about a Bolshevik hero who together with the help of a group of partisans seizes the ammunition of a counter-revolutionary armoured train.
Thus Socialist Realism was the de facto literary current from which no republic in the Soviet Union was exempt. At the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, Maxim Gorky proclaimed that Soviet literature, from all republics, was to evolve simultaneously in the same direction. Slavic Studies scholar Myroslav Shkandrij quotes Maxim Gorky on this point as follows:

The significance [of this Congress] lies in the fact that the literature of all our nationalities, which was scattered before, now appears as a united whole before the face of the revolutionary proletariat of all countries...

I consider it imperative to point out that Soviet literature is not only literature in the Russian language; it is an all-Union literature. Because the literatures of the fraternal republics, which are distinguished from us only by language, live and work by the light and by the benevolent influence of the idea which unites the entire world of workers divided by capitalism...\(^{18}\) (1992, 183)

All literature, including translations of Soviet (and foreign) works, had to adhere to the Socialist Realist model in order to be published in the Soviet Union. Non-conforming interpretations were subject to revision that was carried out by the censorship agency, Glavlit, whose mandate was to ensure first and foremost that translations reflected a Soviet interpretation of the original. Instead, the actual objective of Glavlit was to ensure that translations were filtered and that all content that compromised the values of the Soviet Union was either modified or removed before final publication. This chapter will examine Soviet translation theories and practices under the model of Socialist Realism. Revision and editing will be covered in a subsequent chapter.

\(^{18}\) Pervyi vsesoiuznyi sezd sovetskikh pisatelei, 1934, stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow 1934), 15, 688.
3.1.2 The New Standard – Free Translation

As previously mentioned, Socialist Realism became the precept for all genres of art, including translation. Translators who attempted to incorporate other approaches to translating or interpretation using modes outside of a socialist precept were considered perfidious to the Soviet state. As Friedberg explains: “From the 1930s onward, Soviet translation practice was strongly influenced by the then official approval of free translation and an ongoing struggle against the sin of literalism. Allegedly ‘excessive’ fidelity to original texts became ideologically suspect” (1997, 181). In other words, if a translator rendered a direct translation of the original text he or she could be accused of having disloyal intentions towards the Soviet Union. If translators did not deviate from the original text they were accused of promoting non-Soviet values, a task which in itself was perceived as trying to sabotage the unity of the Soviet Union. The pretext of severing Soviet unity helped propel the real motive for promoting “free translation” (or adaptations in accordance with Socialist Realism) which was to justify the glorification of the Soviet Union.

Translating in an ideological manner and leaning towards a Socialist Realist interpretation were challenging activities that often resulted in self-censorship during the translation process. Translators were obliged to appease Glavlit, the official overseer of all publications, as this entity ultimately decided which texts were compliant and fit for publication. Translators, however, could not successfully negotiate with Glavlit since its assessments were considered beyond reproach. Ivan Kashkin, the principal scholar of Socialist Realism in the area of literary translation (Friedberg, 1997, 103), was an advocate for innovatively construing the original and translating in accordance with the Soviet concept of Socialist Realism. Friedberg quotes Ivan Kashkin’s theory of ideological truth regarding translation:
A Soviet literary translator, he emphasized, must ‘perceive and reproduce the reality of the original in the light of our world view [and] the translator’s participation in the life of our literature.’ The translator is responsible for ‘the understanding and appropriate interpretation of the original…And the chief criterion of this understanding must be ideological truth, the truth of the meaning [ideinosmyslovaia pravda].’ (1997, 104)

Kashkin’s socialist perception of translation provided theoretical grounds in support of “free translation” which acceded to censorship activities and CPSU commissioned bodies, such as Glavlit, to enforce the application of distorted interpretations of reality.

But not all Soviet translators were convinced by Kashkin’s theories or believed in adopting Socialist Realist interpretations of texts. Other Soviet theorists from the 1960s-1970s, such as Givi Gachechiladze, argued that translations should reflect the image and temporality of the original. He upheld the following view. As Friedberg explains:

‘The originally created image cannot be changed. If one were to ascribe to it something new and characteristic of the translator’s [own] epoch, this would be tantamount to a betrayal of historical truth.’ 19 Gachechiladze’s objections were seconded by P.I. Kopanev. 20 (1997, 105)

Even though Soviet translation scholars denounced the application of Socialist Realist interpretations to the practice of translation, their criticism alone was insufficient to effect any changes. Friedberg argues that translation theorists and scholars who endorsed faithful representations of the original, like Kornei Chukovsky, were ousted and replaced by theorists like Mikhail Pavlovich Alekseev and Ivan Kashkin who were the main advocates for Socialist Realism in translation:


20 Quoted in Kopanev, Voprosy istorii i teorii, p. 270.
It was they who denounced literalism as a variety of Formalist scourge. In its place they endorsed the type of free translation that supported a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of specific historical situations, even if doing so entailed disregarding ‘accidental’ peculiarities and features of the original text. (1997, 113)

In the hierarchy of Soviet translation scholars, those who maintained Socialist Realist interpretations of source texts in their theories were commended, whereas those who did not -- like Mikhail Mikhailov, translator of Schiller, Goethe, Lenau, and Byron, who claimed that a translation which does not properly reflect that original “makes even a smooth and polished rendition quite worthless” (Friedberg, 1997, 73) -- were criticised for their beliefs and forced to conform or be arrested and meet their final fate (like Mikhailov) in Siberian labour camps.

As far as the debate concerning theories of translation was concerned, those who gave preference to and supported Soviet ideologies within their theories, like M. P. Alekseev, were distinguished for being intellectual proponents of communism. In fact, translation theorists competed to display theoretical grounds in support of Socialist Realist content. Much of the scholarly debate involved the glorification of socialist theories, as Friedberg remarks in his study:

My account of Soviet theoretical polemics concerning various aspects of literature is intentionally brief. Depressingly, until the Gorbachev era, much of the discussion was essentially self-congratulatory, marred by obligatory lip service to the Marxist-Leninist creed and attempts to demonstrate that a given theoretical premise was a correct extrapolation from current Communist dogma. (1997, 105-106)

In this sense, academic theories were used to sustain “free translation” practices in furtherance of Socialist Realism. As a matter of fact, a proponent of Socialist Realism such as Soviet poet Andrei Voznesensky, firmly believed that “there are no untranslatable texts, but that translation is actually capable of improving upon even a major poet” (Friedberg,
1997, 102). In other words, there was nothing wrong with “free translation”, especially if it rendered an improved version of the original. Thus, theories of translation that were construed in such a way to support whatever political agenda was being promoted at the time were favoured over those that did not. As a result, there was academic support for the application of Socialist Realism to translations. The Central Committee continued to foster Socialist Realism this way up until Glasnost.

Friedberg noted in his study that there was no distinction made between Russian translation theories and those of minority languages in the USSR. Theories prescribed by prominent Soviet Russian theorists also became the universal foundation for translation practices between minority languages of the Soviet Union. It was assumed that Socialist Realism was applicable to translation practices between all languages of the USSR, as Friedberg explains:

Inasmuch as this dogma was allegedly universal in its application, no attempt was made to distinguish between translation into Russian and translation into or from other Soviet languages. The hundreds of articles and scores of books written on literary translation in Soviet times, many of them by persons who themselves worked in the languages of the national minorities, failed to reveal the slightest suggestion that the principles of translation into Russian might not be applicable to other languages. (1997, 106)

Thus there was no basis upon which to suggest that theories pertaining to Ukrainian translation were any different from those pertaining to Russian translations, as they did not evolve separately and there was no real distinction between the two under Soviet rule. The fundamental key to understanding translation practices in the Ukrainian SSR is to study Soviet translation theories, which were predominantly based on those of Soviet Russian translation theorists. For the most part, Soviet translation theories were designed to further the national homogenization of the Soviet Union.
3.1.3 Glavlit vs. Theorists

In juxtaposing the power of authority and theoretical notions, one rule vetoed all others; the censor had the final word in what would be approved for publication, regardless of any opposing scholarly arguments. With respect to the translation of non-Soviet works, they were carefully selected and were translated for the Soviet public in an abridged version that incorporated Soviet elements and deflected foreign concepts not considered acceptable for the Soviet audience. In other words, foreign works which expressed ideas and views not akin to Soviet culture would be revised in such a way that the target text would present a Sovietised rendition of the original. Foreign works that expressed inappropriate images or portrayals of the USSR would be subjected to heavy censorship during the editing stages of translation. As Friedberg notes: “During the preceding seventy years, however, translations had been routinely censored. Affected were occasional unfavourable remarks in foreign books about the USSR or Communism, whether in authorial speech or voiced by literary characters” (1997, 139). It was important for the Soviet translation to depict a bright image of communism even if a different picture was depicted in the source text.

There were major discrepancies among Soviet translation theorists regarding Socialist Realism; some glorified Socialist Realism and others adamantly denounced such interpretations. Soviet translation theorist Efim Etkind was dubious of Socialist Realist interpretations. According to Friedberg: “Efim Etkind (then still in the Soviet Union) questioned the wisdom of advising translators to be guided by factors other than those found in the text proper” (1997, 105). That is to say that Etkind was conflicted about misleading translators and about instructing them to interpret the text through a Socialist Realist scope that fabricated interpretations rather than just translating what appeared in the text. He questioned the limits of a Socialist Realist interpretation and whether this type of
interpretation exceeded the boundaries of translation. Russian literary scholar Victor Erlich claims that Etkind was more of a formalist-structuralist than a Socialist Realist: “He once described his methodology half seriously as ‘structuralism with a human face’” (2000, 732). Although Etkind taught theory of translation, his Materiia stikha (1978, 1982) was denied publication in the Soviet Union and was instead published twice abroad after he fled the USSR in 1974, as confirmed by Erlich: “Completed before his forced emigration, this book was turned down by the publisher ‘Sovetskii pisatel’ on the grounds that it ‘assigned to poetry an absolute value, irrespective of its social mission’” (2000, 732). Soviet theorists were not immune to the literary politics of the USSR; even Etkind was silenced and forbidden from publishing works that were not socialist enough in content.

3.1.4 Soviet Ukrainian Translation Textbooks

Although some practical and theoretical translation manuals produced in the USSR may have prescribed to structuralist models, the actual practical application tended to shift away from structuralist theories, even in the years of Glasnost. In one example of a theoretical Soviet Ukrainian translation manual, written by Il'ko Vakulovych Korunets’ and published in 198621, there was very clear evidence that the manual itself was russified and written in compliance with Socialist Realism. For example, on page 17 of his manual the models used to describe the translation of literary book titles were all taken from Soviet Russian authors and refer to their English translation, rather than taking specific Ukrainian examples of literary works translated into English. For example, Korunets’ discusses how the English translation of The Lay of Igor’s Host (Слово о полку Ігоревім), an Old Slavonic epic,

21 Korunets’ manual (A Course in the Theory and Practice of Translation) was published in English in the USSR. The translator is unknown and the manual was not translated into Standard English. Many awkward terms are used in the manual along with numerous non-idiomatic expressions and improper syntax.
required a historic and philological approach to translation just like the same method used to translate well-known Soviet Russian titles into English. There are no examples of Ukrainian titles translated into English, however:

The same approach was needed to translate the title of Maxim Gorky’s play ‘На дне’ which was translated (in the USA) verbally as *On the Bottom* but then retranslated faithfully as *The Lower Depths*. Similarly the name of Sholokhov’s novel ‘Тихий Дон’ when translated verbally as *The Quiet/Still Dawn* would not convey its poetic flavour. In the faithful translation it sounds like a poetic line: *And Quiet Flows the Don or*: *The Don Flows Home to the Sea*.

What is most confounding about the above citation is that the example used by Korunets’ consists of two Russian authors, along with their emblematic Soviet works, in order to discuss Ukrainian-English translation of book titles. Moreover, in the same section, he does not use even one example of a Ukrainian title, even though many works of Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, and Lesia Ukrainka had been translated into English and could have served as examples instead of Russian authors. This reveals just to what extent Russian literary figures had replaced historic Ukrainian literary figures in Soviet Ukrainian literature.

A further look into this manual presents examples and exercises for students who were translating into Ukrainian from English. Nearly all the sample exercises were directly associated with Marxist-Leninist statements or writing. Excerpts taken from page 60 illustrate examples of sentences students were asked to translate:

1. The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonism (Marx, Engels).
2. A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism (Ibid).
3. The highlights of Manchester’s civil tribute to the International Brigades who fought for democracy in the Spanish civil war was the unveiling of the memorial plaque at Manchester Town Hall.
4. The TUC at Brighton has strongly condemned the dramatic rise in youth unemployment.

5. The TUC has been given its mandate – both under this disastrous Tory government and the next Labour government.

6. The pipe-line deal between West Germany and the Soviet Union was considered a peaceful form of business of purely commercial terms (M. Star).

Further examples demonstrate the extent to which political discourse pervaded the manual.

On page 61, students were asked to translate the following paragraph as part of an exercise in translating from English into Ukrainian:

> The materialistic conception of history is brilliantly illustrated in the writings of both Marx and Engels. Their theory of society and method of analysis has been the basis for the study of the specific conditions of many very different countries, in the course of which Marxist theory has been further developed. The outstanding examples of this was undoubtedly Lenin’s searching analysis of the specific situation in Russia and the resulting strategy which culminated in the first Socialist revolution, the first break in the global power of capitalism and imperialism, and the birth of the first Socialist system.

This same excerpt in the form of a translation exercise continues for approximately another two paragraphs. There are many exercises like the one above, in which Marxist-Leninist praise seems more important than the actual exercise itself. The final translation exercise of the manual consists of a full page and a half text of Marxist philosophy, which students have to translate from English into Ukrainian.

translation, off-hand translation/interpreting, rehash, high-translation/interpreting, synchronous interpreting, versification, rough translation. Although some of the techniques might overlap, seem redundant, or even be very specific, there is one in particular worth drawing attention to, as it is the very academic ground for Socialist Realist interpretations in translation; that technique is called “free interpretation”, which as Korunets’ explains, is a translation that is not consistent with the original: “Finally “free interpretation” may denote a free adaptation of foreign literature works to other national literatures like that of I.P. Kotlyarevsky’s *Eneid* which has very little in common with Virgil’s work” (1986, 7).

Korunets’ example of Kotlyarevsky’s *Eneid* was irrelevant because the translation was a parody carried out in 1798 under very different political and sociolinguistic circumstances than those in the Soviet Union a century and a half later. He affirms, nevertheless, that “free translation” is indeed a biased, yet acceptable, method of translation.

Korunets’ insinuates that a “free translation” inevitably displays a predilection for Socialist Realism because of the very subjective nature of such interpretations: “Besides, ‘free interpretation’ is used to denote a strongly subjective conveying of the sense, the structural, stylistic or artistic peculiarities characteristic of a source language work/text (i.e. вільний переклад, вільний переказ)” (1986, 7). A subjective conveying of the sense doesn’t assign a limit or boundaries to how far the translator can interpret freely, which it why “free translation” is the academic gateway through which Socialist Realist interpretations are justified.

Regarding interlinear translation, a method of translating that requires “faithful” rendition of text, Korunets’ claims that interlinear translation was extensively used and praised for that matter, as a direct and practical way of translating between the various languages in the USSR: “It also provides faithful sense-to-sense translations which are used
by masters of pen to create on their bases artistic variants of works in rare languages and thus acquaint the readers with brilliant literary samples of other nations” (1986, 15). Paradoxically, the English translation of his textbook does appear to have been as carefully translated.

Soviet translation theorists actually supported interlinear translation practices and were encouraged to use them. Throughout his textbook, Korunets’ stresses the word “faithful” and claims that translations should be rendered as faithfully as possible without, however, ever defining what a faithful translation entails: “Hence a faithful translation of a larger passage/text and of a belles-lettres text in particular is a complex process involving an equivalent conveying of all its main constituent parts making up the semantic, the structural, the stylistic and other planes of a text” (1986, 148). He uses rather indistinct terms to denote what a translator was actually supposed to convey. Korunets’ uses the phrase “an equivalent conveying”, which in the USSR could mean adding Socialist Realist precepts to the interpretation and then translating the text to obtain “an equivalent meaning.” Throughout the textbook, the word “faithful” appears without proper definition and without stating towards what or to whom one needs to be faithful.

A point of interest is that Korunets’ himself was a member of the “sixtier” translators’ resistance movement and a member of the National Writer's Union of Ukraine. This means that his didactic material must have been censored before publication since much of the political propaganda that appeared in his textbook would have otherwise compromised the values of the sixtier literary movement. The contradictions between theories of translation as Korunets’ presents them, not to mention the lack of Ukrainian content, were indicative of Soviet censorship. “Free translation” was subject to interpretation but found to be acceptable. “Faithful translation”, the exact opposite of free translation, was equally
subject to interpretation as it was never really defined but its use was strongly advocated. To add to the lack of clarity and contradiction, Korunets’ never specified under which conditions to use one or the other method. It is quite clear from this evidence that not only did Soviet translation theories conflict with actual translation practices, the theories themselves conflicted with each other in order to accommodate and justify Socialist Realist interpretations.

3.1.5 Interlinear Cribs

It is important to keep in mind that in the Soviet Union most translation activities stemmed from Russian and any modes used were based on Russian examples and models. Among the more popular modes of translating used in the Soviet Union were: cribbing, self-translation, and translating from translations. The most frequently used mode for translating, primarily between Russian and minority languages, was that of interlinear cribs and trots, also known as interlinear translation. This mode of translating involves printing the translated text, in small characters, between the lines of the original text. As Friedberg notes:

The use of interlinear cribs was common practice in translations into Russian from the Soviet minority languages – even from languages with many millions of speakers like Uzbek or Tatar. For example, of the 119 books by Tatar authors translated into Russian between 1969 and 1973, only eight or nine were direct translations. The rest, or over 90 percent, used interlinear trots. (1997, 172)

Interlinear cribs were also an aid used between source language and target language translators. At times, authors themselves would draft cribs for the translator and the final product would be a collaborative effort between the parties. Friedberg alleges that sharing
credit for the translation, however, was not typically in the interest of Russian translators (1997, 180).

3.1.6 Self-Translation

Self-translation was another mode of translation used in the Soviet Union, but the reliability of such translations was usually debatable, although as Friedberg reports: “A number of Soviet minority writers were almost bilingual, almost able to write as well in Russian as in their native tongue” (1997, 180). If an author wanted to be published, it was in his/her interest to write/translate into Russian. Self-translations, however, were viewed as substandard and suspect because they were usually associated with an author’s self-promotion. As Friedberg points out:

Moreover, self-translations, as a rule, are anaemic and colorless. Recognizing the fact, authors writing in the Soviet minority languages were eager to be professionally translated into Russian, especially since only those writings appearing in Russian really reached a wide audience. Accordingly, it was in the minority author’s self-interest to provide a potential translator with a good interlinear trot that would call attention to various nuances of the original. (1997, 180)

The outcome and quality of the translation ultimately depended upon the self-translator’s skill level and knowledge of both source and target languages. Consequently, a translator who had limited knowledge of the target language could self-translate using trots and then seek professional translation. In general, self-translations were often questionable simply because authors wanted to publish their works and this was the fastest and simplest route.

Nevertheless, bilingual authors and translators were not on an equal footing. As for the “so-called Soviet school of translation”, the prevailing attitude, as Russian literary translation scholar Lauren Leighton insists, is that “translation is what Soviet translators call a high art” (1990, 445). Held in high esteem is the translation process itself and the
language proficiency of the translator. The caveat here is that a great bilingual author is not necessarily a great translator since one language is naturally stronger than the other. Russian literary scholar and specialist in Russian bilingual writers Elizabeth Klosty Beaujour notes that the author’s uneven knowledge of both languages poses a risk for translation because the translated text may disclose the author’s linguistic limitations in either source or target language:

Not only does the bilingual writer often try to show that he can write anything he wrote in one language just as well in the other (a rejection of his early certainty that something could or should be written in only one or the other language), his final years may also involve the creation of a new idiolect, in which elements from his various languages appear in a new polyglot synthesis. These works tend to be idiosyncratic in narrative structure as well as in language, and they often belong properly neither to standard genres nor to a ‘national literature.’ (1984, 70)

It is clear that self-translations are considered contentious due to the questionable and varying abilities of the author/translator. However, this concern was marginal compared to that of auto-promotion which, according to Friedberg, was of higher interest: “Distrust of translators was further strengthened by the fact that many were themselves poets and prose writers unable to publish original work of their own” (1997, 181). Thus, self-translation from a minority language into Russian was a surer way by which Soviet minority language authors could be published. Translating into the lingua franca would also target a larger audience and attract more interest than translating into minority languages.

3.1.7 Indirect Translations

Translating from a translated text was also a widespread mode of translation in the Soviet Union. In fact many translations into and out of minority languages were carried out using Russian translations from other languages. This was the case when there was a lack
of demand for translations involving certain minority languages. Some texts translated into Soviet minority languages were taken from Russian translations that were actually taken from other intermediary translations. As Friedberg confirms:

Moreover, there is simply not enough steady translating work in these “minor” languages to justify professional interest. Ginzburg surely knew that until quite recently, translations from even such major foreign languages as Chinese, which have long literary traditions, were made from English renditions. Similarly, translations from lesser-known Slavic languages like Czech were made from the more widely spoken Polish, while Swedish or Norwegian texts were re-translated from German.\(^\text{22}\) (1997, 173)

In fact, Ibsen’s plays were introduced into Ukrainian through German in the early Soviet period as Ukrainian literary scholar Larissa M. L. Z. Onyshkevych admits (1999, 50). Therefore, not all texts were translated directly from the source language into the target language. The simpler approach was to translate from languages that were already familiar to the translator. In the case of Ukrainian translators those closer major languages would include German, Polish and Russian. Nonetheless, some Ukrainian translators, like Borys Ten, translated Schiller’s *The Robbers* (1952) and *William Tell* (1964) from English rather than from Russian, which is curious seeing as Russian would have been a more familiar language than English for a citizen of the Soviet Union.

In some cases, translations into Ukrainian have been done both first hand and second hand for the same novel, such as was the case for translating a section of Schiller’s poetry within a novel by Dostoevsky:

Encountering quotations of Schiller’s poetry in a novel by Dostoevsky, V. Strutinsky rightly translated them into Ukrainian from Zhukovsky’s Russian Schiller rather than from the German original, since he knew that Zhukovsky’s version was the one most familiar to Soviet readers. (Friedberg, 1997, 172)

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\(^{22}\) Friedberg referencing Ginzburg, *Nad strokoi perevoda*, pp. 2-8.
Soviet Ukrainian translators, when presented with the choice, however, would invariably choose caution. There is no doubt that it is easier and much safer to translate from an adapted Russian translation than to take a chance on a foreign original.

In summary, translations were inevitably bound to endure an extended period of enforced misrepresentation as a result of Socialist Realism, as many of the common translation methods used in the USSR were questionable, subject to interpretation and inconsistently applied. Cribs were not always reliable, self-translators usually had their own self-promotional agendas, and indirect translations were given the benefit of the doubt. Even Soviet translation textbooks were censored and saturated with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric.
3.2 Demarcating and Adapting Controversial Texts

3.2.1 Introduction

Censorship went much farther than merely editing, removing sections, and rewording translated texts; it was a matter of concealing sensitive topics and depicting the Soviet Union in the most positive light. Texts and information that were too sensitive for censorship were simply banned or eliminated. If a banned book turned up on a bookshelf, it was quickly removed and burned. During Stalin’s rule, any Ukrainian author or translator suspected of spreading nationalist sentiment would be considered a threat and was consequently purged. In the 1930s, much of the Ukrainian intelligentsia consisting of poets, translators and scholars disappeared as a result of the man-made famine (Holodomor) and as a result of labour camps in Siberia. Among these were Mykola Zerov, a celebrated Ukrainian translator, who was arrested and sent to the Solovetsky Islands (in the White Sea) where he was executed: “On 9 October 1937 he was resentenced, to death by firing squad, and perished during the mass executions of political and other prisoners marking the twentieth anniversary of the October Revolution of 1917” (Zerov, Mykola”, Encyclopedia of Ukraine). Many translators, writers, and poets encountered similar fates and were only published posthumously and after they were “rehabilitated.”

Therefore, it was necessary to conceal sensitive information, either by silencing authors or by book banning, to prevent this information from coming into contact with the public. Writers and translators who felt as though their lives were in danger ceased to continue their literary activities; meanwhile, those who continued their work were consumed by the perpetually transmuting demands of Glavlit and the enforcement of censorship. Glavlit archival researcher Arlen Blyum points out:
The main purpose is to instil terror in anyone who writes, to create general fear and uncertainty in authors who, for their own self-preservation, vainly try to guess at the almost daily changing wishes of the authorities. It is evident that the determining feature of totalitarian censorship is that for it the fact itself of banning is more important than the contents of the work banned. In other words, in the totalitarian view repression as such (true also in respect of the physical liquidation of people) has its own self-fulfilling value.

(2003, 17)

Book burning and expurgation were some of the other common and disseminated forms of censorship exercised prior to and during the Soviet regime. Furthermore, during the de-nationalization policies such forms of censorship increased along with the conspiracy of silence and revisionism. Revisionism of works was marked by embellished or falsified translations that were modified in accordance with Soviet linguistic policies. These policies can be summarized in the five points below, as outlined by sociolinguist and Ukrainian translation scholar Alexander Krouglov:

1. Imposition of Russian as the main language of science, technology and education, since other languages “hinder” scientific and technological progress;
2. Upgrading the status of Russian to that of principal language or the language of wider communication within the former Soviet Union;
3. Gradual substitution of Russian for ethnic languages in mass media;
4. Imposition of a Soviet, Russian-biased cultural identity;
5. Elimination of all national differences, thus creating a new unity of people – Soviet people. (1997, 13)

With respect to Ukrainian, the types of modifications affecting original works or translations would be in fulfilment of points 4 and 5 of the above citation. Original works or translations which did not strive to follow these principles were flagged by censors who brought their concerns to the attention of their Glavlit director, who would then contact the chief editor of the publishing house where the censors were working and instruct the chief...
editor to either censor the text or expeditiously reject it. Such a situation is described by Soviet Russian literary and cultural historian Steven Richmond in an interview with chief Glavlit censor Vladimir Solodin (1997, 583) regarding his experience as one of the chief censors of Glavlit from 1971-1991. Solodin notes how Glavlit operated as well as the extent of its authority regarding textual manipulation and the type of content targeted for censorship. He also expressed his belief that, in general, Glavlit was an organization with good intentions; however, it sometimes carried out dishonourable acts of censorship: “We did some bad things, but I think that in general we did decent things” (1997, 586).

As previously discussed, any attempt under Soviet rule to publish original works or translations was subject to some form of deliberate editing or censorship if the material conflicted with Soviet publishing policies. This would be the case for any text written within the Soviet Union, including all SSRs, as well as publications imported from outside the Soviet Union and translated into Russian, Ukrainian, or other languages. Texts that were considered a threat to the Soviet Union, texts in which the contents were not compatible with Soviet ideology and thus deemed inappropriate would be modified in such a way as to no longer conjure up controversy or pose a political or ideological threat. In some cases, complete excerpts would be removed.

3.2.2 Censorship in Ukrainian Opera

During the Ukrainianization campaign in the 1920s, Russian and European opera in Ukrainian translation began to appear; this was regarded as a symbol of progress for minority language development. By the late 1940s and early 1950s, the translation of Russian opera classics into Ukrainian was perceived as a success since most Ukrainian opera performances were sold out, compared to the same Russian language performances
throughout the Ukrainian SSR at the time. According to the statistics noted below, Ukrainians preferred attending Russian opera staged in Ukrainian over simply attending Russian opera. In fact, the numbers presented below indicate that the attendance for Russian opera stage in Ukrainian surpassed that of Russian opera by 80 percent. Even though Ukrainians preferred Russian opera translated into Ukrainian, there were still more Russian operas staged than Ukrainian translated operas in the Ukrainian SSR during the Stalin period (Yekelchyk, 2000, 608). Although Ukrainians were content with translated Russian opera, Muscovites did not share the same sentiment as noted by Ukrainian and Russian historian Serhy Yekelchyk:

In 1950, the average attendance at Russian-language productions of *Eugene Onegin* and *The Queen of Spades* was 550, or about 100 percent of the ‘plan,’ while attendance at the Ukrainian-language production of *Susanin* was 970, or 180 percent of the ‘plan.’23 (Aside from improved comprehension, almost a nonissue for educated western Ukrainians, these attendance figures suggest that at least part of the public was boycotting productions in Russian.) Only one company, the Kiev Opera, presented all Russian classical operas in Ukrainian translation, which some visiting Moscow critics considered an affront to Russian culture. (2000, 608)

What Yekelchyk is suggesting is that even though Eastern Ukrainians had some difficulty understanding the Ukrainian translation, due to their lack of direct contact with Ukrainian as a result of a more intense and longer russification process than in Western Ukraine, they would rather watch a performance staged in Ukrainian over one in Russian. One particular account of a composer and musicologist who voiced his resentment at the appearance of Russian classic operas staged in Ukrainian came from Igor Belza. He didn’t think it was necessary to translate Pushkin into Ukrainian. As Yekelchyk explains:

23 Yekelchyk referencing TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2015, ark. 185.
In 1952, Igor’ Belza, an inspector from Moscow, found it outrageous that the Kiev company had staged *The Queen of Spades, Ivan Susanin*, and *Eugene Onegin* in Ukrainian. Although Belza did not object to the quality of Ryl's'kyi's translations, he questioned the very need for Ukrainian libretti: ‘Why could one not use the Russian text and, indeed, the text by [Aleksandr] Pushkin?’ Nevertheless, the practice of performing the Russian classics in Ukrainian remained, at least in Kiev. (2000, 605)

The general sentiment among Muscovites was that it was offensive to reproduce the words of such highly regarded Russian authors such as Pushkin into Ukrainian – as if to say that Pushkin’s words were incapable of being expressed in Ukrainian with the same grandeur as in Russian. To translate Russian classics into Ukrainian was especially frowned upon by Russophiles and by Russians who came to settle the eastern border regions of the Ukrainian SSR.

In the late 1940s, the Kiev Opera was invited to perform in Moscow at the Bolshoi Theatre and the two following Ukrainian operas were featured: *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* and *The Zaporozhian Cossack*. On June 15, 1951, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* was performed in Russian in Moscow (Yekelchyk, 2000, 611). Although both performances were generally well-received, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* was subsequently criticized in two newspapers, *Zvezda* and *Pravda*, for several ideological ‘shortcomings’ (Yekelchyk, 2000, 613). As for *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*, “the opera was guilty of insufficiently glorifying the eternal Russian-Ukrainian friendship” (Yekelchyk, 2000, 613). The 1948 edition of *The Zaporozhian Cossack* was banned in Moscow because it was considered historically inaccurate. As Yekelchyk points out, Moscow officials were outraged by the fallacies:

> Although *The Zaporozhian Cossack* was performed in Ukrainian, sensitive bureaucratic ears in Moscow detected several ideological heresies. The opera's plot concerned

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24 Yekelchyk referencing RGALI, f. 962, op. 11, d. 558, l. 82. Of course, "Pushkin's text" did not refer to Ivan Susanin.
Cossacks who fled to Turkish-controlled territory after Catherine II ordered the destruction of the Zaporozhian Host in 1775. After some humorous and romantic adventures, which are actually central to the plot, the Sultan allows the Cossacks to return home in the finale. To a Moscow official, all this was a ‘slanderous story.’ (2000, 615)

Although the opera was deemed historically inaccurate because it downplayed Russia’s involvement in the liberation of the Cossacks and it falsely depicted the relationship between the Cossacks and the Sultan, the 1948 libretto was still presented in Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odessa (Yekelchyk, 2000, 615), which suggests that it was an acceptable storyline for the Ukrainian Soviet audience, but not for the Russian Soviet one.

Since Moscow did not approve of the 1948 libretto of The Zaporozhian Cossack, a translation was carried out and, “in October 1951, the Stanislavskii and Nemirovich-Danchenko Musical Theater in Moscow premiered The Zaporozhian Cossack ‘in a new Russian translation by G. Shipov’” (Yekelchyk, 2000, 615).

Yekelchyk lists some of the changes that appeared in the new Russian translation. These deliberately emphasized the positive character of a Russian ambassador and stressed Ukrainian oppression under the Ottomans. Evidently, these changes were made to incorporate the correct ideological interpretation for the Russian audience, as Yekelchyk notes:

A closer look at the new Russian libretto, approved by the censors for publication and staging throughout the Soviet Union three months after the premiere, reveals heavy-handed editing and rewriting. What Ukrainian bureaucrats and intellectuals presented as their ‘first national opera’, Shipov rechristened ‘popular musical comedy.’ He introduced a negative Cossack character, the clerk Prokop, as if to set off the new positive one - the Russian ambassador who sings the aria ‘The hour of liberation approaches.’ Throughout the libretto, Shipov skilfully casts aspersions on the Turks and made the Cossacks complain of their life in the Ottoman Empire. To improve Hulak-Artemovs'kyi's work, he
also included several of the most popular Ukrainian folk songs as additional arias. (2000, 616)

The new Moscow version ran successfully “for two and a half years until the Ukrainian secretary for propaganda, Ivan Nazarenko, attended a performance during one of his visits to the capital in April 1953” (Yekelchyk, 2000, 616). He left the theatre and “submitted a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” (Yekelchyk, 2000, 616) expressing his aversion to the adapted Russian version:

The production, he wrote, had ‘little in common with the authentic version presented in Ukrainian theatres.’ The inclusion of new and improbable characters, together with well-known folk songs absent from the original score, turned the Moscow production into the ‘crudest falsification of the widely known and beloved opera.’ Applying the official rhetoric of ‘authenticity’ to this Ukrainian operatic classic, Nazarenko demanded nothing less than the banning of the new Russian libretto. (Yekelchyk, 2000, 616)

The adaptations in the new Russian translation, however, were justified on the premise that others classics had been adapted for the Bolshoi theatre. The Central Committee, however, considered the existence of two separate versions of the opera to be unacceptable and they established a joint committee assigned to compose a single, “standard synopsis and libretto” (2000, 617) but, according to Yekelchyk a consolidated version was not agreed upon:

Significantly, the clash between Moscow and Kiev concerning *The Zaporozhian Cossack* ended in an implicit compromise. The Stanislavskii and Nemirovich-Danchenko Theater staged the ‘new’ version of the opera, in which the Russian ambassador liberated the Cossacks, while the Ukrainian companies stuck to the traditional plot, with the Sultan performing this feat. (2000, 617)

The deviations in plot between the Russian and Ukrainian versions of *The Zaporozhian Cossack* disclose ideological-oriented representations. The Ukrainian version presented an
interpretation with which the Soviet Russian did not agree because it downplayed the positive Russian image. What is important to remember is that, for a Soviet Russian audience, a version which emphasizes positively connotated Russian features was absolutely necessary, which is why the Ukrainian version was banned in Moscow. The variations between both versions reveal the difficulties in standardizing performances from one SSR to another. They also reveal how often these discrepancies would go unnoticed for long periods of time. The fact that the plot line in the Ukrainian version was not deemed ideologically fit but nonetheless remained in repertoire in the Ukrainian SSR indicates that Moscow did not have complete control over censorship in the performing arts. In other words, because the performing arts included an important theatrical component -- the language of gesture (i.e. an extra-linguistic component) in additional to a written script -- censorship was more difficult to control.

3.2.3 Didactic Material and Children’s Literature

During the Khrushchev period, nearly all didactic material for Ukrainian elementary school children consisted of Russian material translated into Ukrainian. This hardly included traditional Ukrainian literary works, historic figures or Ukrainian themes in general. In fact, a scholar of Soviet politics and ethnic relations Yaroslav Bilinsky notes that Ukrainian teachers were upset about the lack of Ukrainian content in the didactic material and that one in particular from Western Ukraine went as far as writing a letter to the editor of the Ukrainian textbooks:

He complains that the material of the anthologies is so arranged that Ukrainian schoolchildren are made to study the Ukrainian language on the basis of translations, presumably from the Russian. He had counted the pieces in the reader for Grade I and found two Ukrainian folktales, one single Ukrainian folksong, fifteen excerpts from Ukrainian classics, and as many as fifty-two translations. In the first four grades the
schoolchildren read about 250 translations and only one-third as many Ukrainian folk-tales, songs, and classic excerpts. Contemporary Soviet Ukrainian writers had more of their works included, but often these were repetitious and poor.25 (1968, 162)

Not only was most didactic material translated from Russian, but it also excluded Ukrainian national components and provided Soviet Russian content, in Ukrainian translation, in its place. Students did not study renowned Ukrainian historic literary figures like Taras Shevchenko (an artist, poet, writer and the founder of modern Ukrainian) or Ivan Franko (a poet and writer who translated Homer, Dante, Goethe, Pushkin, Zola, and others, into Ukrainian) because these figures were deemed ‘nationalistic.’ As a result, children’s didactic material was russocentric with a Socialist Realist portrayal of literary history.

The complaints with respect to Ukrainian education lagging behind continued but to no avail and teachers were unsatisfied with the shortage of available Ukrainian didactic material. Teachers sent letters to the editors of two different Ukrainian newspapers: Literaturna Ukraiyina and Robitnycha hazeta; both journals had sent some of their employers to investigate the shortage of Ukrainian literature in print, and they went to bookstores and school libraries in Kiev only to confirm the piteous state of Ukrainian publishing as Bilinsky stresses:

The most noxious aspect of the continuing battle of editions is that Ukrainian books for schoolchildren and teachers, unlike books in Russian, are extremely difficult to obtain. School library shelves bend under the weight of such fat but insubstantial volumes as S.P. Zhikharev’s26 Zapiski sovremennika, while at one school not a single copy of Sosyura’s poems in the original Ukrainian was to be found. (The late Sosyura is a recognized Soviet Ukrainian poet, and his works are assigned reading in Ukrainian schools,) The librarian had to use a Russian translation of his poems and translate them back into the original as

26 He is identified as a relative of Count S.S. Baratynsky.
well as she could in order to acquaint the students at least with the contents of a poem.27
(1968, 165)

As may be seen by the above, the reality of the situation was that in Soviet Ukrainian schools students were reading Russian translations of Ukrainian Soviet writers without having direct access to the original Ukrainian version. Examples such as this one underline the extent to which the Ukrainian language was being repressed within the school system and how little effort was put forward to make Ukrainian literature accessible in its source language.

Furthermore, universities only carried small numbers of major English classics in Ukrainian translation; meanwhile, Russian copies were available in greater numbers. In addition, Ukrainian schoolbooks did not include any works of the two most famous Ukrainian literary figures, Ivan Franko and Taras Shevchenko, not even in translation. Also, contemporary Soviet Ukrainian authors such as Oles Honchar were only available to students in Russian translation, even though he wrote in Ukrainian. As Bilinksy affirms:

It was disclosed, e.g., that there were only three copies of the new Ukrainian translation of the *Odyssey* in the entire library of Kiev University.28 Finally, the fact that the regime’s Russification policy often reaches curious extremes is borne out by the complaint in the *Komsomol* paper of the Ukraine that the Ukrainian Concert Bureau’s 1964-65 subscription series of readings for schoolchildren in Kiev did not include any of the literary works of Ivan Franko and Taras Shevchenko - two Ukrainian classics. Moreover, the works of Oles’ Honchar – presently the chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers – and the late O. Dovzhenko were given in Russian. The article ends with this: ‘It is, of


course, very nice that our pupils are being acquainted with these works in Russian, but they would sound just as good in the original."\(^{29}\) (1968, 166)

These examples illustrate the degraded state of Ukrainian education and support the claim of russification through translation. Such examples also serve to highlight to what point greater emphasis was placed on Russian culture and language within the school system of the Ukrainian SSR.

Schoolbooks for children, particularly translated Soviet literature, underwent censorship prior to publication. Offensive notions that depicted the unattractive side of the communist regime with respect to disputatious matters like collectivism were censored. Herman Ermolaev, a scholar of Soviet censorship and Socialist Realism, describes how in Mikhail Sholokhov’s *Virgin Soil Upturned*, certain themes which evoked “nationalistic” elements or dim views of communism were deliberately censored by re-orientating them positively or by simply omitting them before translating the book from Russian into Ukrainian: “The 1934 version of *Virgin Soil Upturned*, issued by Detgiz in its *School Series* was an amputated document containing just over half of the original text. The young readers were not supposed to learn about the more brutal and ugly aspects of collectivization” (1997, 96).

The censorship went as far as to remove nearly half the original novel as Ermolaev confirms: “Six chapters were missing in their entirety” (1997, 96). Some omissions included major divisive dialogue regarding collectivization; others included “deletions or drastic abridgements of some of the most impressive landscape scenes”, and “on several occasions, the children were spared the site of gore or offensive bodily processes”.

\[^{29}\text{Bilinsky referencing Molod’ Ukrayiny, February 28, 1965, p.2; or DSUP, IX, No. 1, 14-15.}\]
especially with respect to the purging of Cossack and Kulak people for the sake of “political brainwashing” (Ermolaev, 1997, 96). The new censored version was approved for elementary school students and, because all elements specific to Ukrainian oppression had been extracted, the novel was deemed appropriate in terms of didactic material for children in the Ukrainian SSR; it appeared in Ukrainian translation the following year: “No doubt Soviet authorities viewed the 1934 edition for schoolchildren as an important education tool. Twenty thousand copies of it appeared the following year in a Ukrainian translation” (1997, 96).

It was in the interest of the Central Committee to enforce censorship of children’s literature so that they would have faith in the Soviet regime, thus allowing for indoctrination of Soviet youth while they were kept in the dark from discovering the realities of Soviet life. By creating the illusion that Soviet life was idyllic and by inaccurately portraying Soviet life, children would have no knowledge of the governmental injustices inflicted upon the peasantry, the proletariat, or the intelligentsia. Ivan Holowinsky, a scholar of educational psychology, discusses how one of the main goals of Soviet children’s literature was to raze nationalism and promote Sovietism: “The contents of the books for Ukrainian children consistently de-emphasized national identity. Instead there is an attempt to create “a Soviet” identity for non-Russian nationalities, a trend which was not emphasized for Russian children within the Russian Soviet Socialist Federation” (1987, 79). The formation of identity through translated literature was a key instrument in forming social constructs and shaping identity for non-Russian communities (notably during the peak of Stalinization) that were targeted as subjects for assimilation into the greater Russian community as part of the Soviet language policy.
By introducing translated literature that disregarded all divisive and unattractive aspects of Soviet life in an attempt to create solidarity among the SSRs, the Soviet authorities and Glavlit fully condoned the biased views portrayed in translated works. It is obvious that works were deliberately censored to help foster Soviet indoctrination, protecting people from the truth by removing any elements that hinted at nationalism or an identity that could be separate from the Soviet construct. The fact that these techniques were not used for texts diffused in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) implied that Soviet identity was practically synonymous with Russian identity. Thus is appears that the regime’s goal in the translation of didactic material was to convert the non-Russian population into Sovietised Russophones using Russian-Soviet literature as a model for all Soviet literature.

Other literary publications were massively disguised through censorship practices that commonly took place at the revision stage of translation. Excerpts that expressed compromising political thought were removed from literature or simply rephrased in an acceptable manner before publication and distribution to the Soviet masses. Political censorship in Soviet publications fluctuated greatly depending on the edition and location of publication. There was a remarkable discrepancy regarding the representation of Soviet political figures in Ukrainian translated literature. For example, it was possible to portray political figures in one source, then differently in translation. One example that highlights this divergence is the depiction of Khrushchev in the 1974 Ukrainian edition of Pyotr Pyotrovich Vershigora’s *People with a Clear Conscience* which differs greatly from his representation in the original Russian version. As Ermolaev notes:

The treatment of Khrushchev in Vershigora’s *People with a Clear Conscience* lacks consistency, but is, on balance, quite favourable. I checked six editions of this book
published between 1966 and 1985. Four of them are nearly identical with the 1959 Sov. pis. version that retained many good things about Khrushchev the man and the leader. Notable exceptions come up in the 1974 and 1982 editions brought out in Kiev by the Ukrainian Politizdat. The 1974 edition, in the Ukrainian language, discarded every mention of Khrushchev’s name in chapter 16 of part 1. Only twice is he called “a member of the Military Council,” and much of what he said in a talk with a partisan is attributed to a general. Khrushchev’s name and his high posts are mentioned in chapter 18 of part 4, but his dialogue with Vershigora is severely truncated. Two pages of the next chapter are filled with quotations from two of his 1944 speeches, but his name is not even mentioned. It is replaced by “it was said” and “the words sounded.” (1997, 188)

This meant that the use of his name was deliberately avoided in translation. The suppression of positively-connoted Khrushchev remarks in the Kiev edition is indicative of his disrepute among the Ukrainian population. It is plausible that the Ukrainian version was adapted so that Ukrainians would not be reminded of Khrushchev’s rule over Ukraine, although it is not entirely certain. As Ermolaev speculates, “Whether a harsh treatment of Khrushchev in the Kiev publications of Vershigora’s book had anything to do with his ten-year rule of Ukraine as Stalin’s Gauleiter remains an open question” (1997, 188-189).

3.2.4 Arbitrary Censors

Oddly enough, sometimes censors removed parts of text that posed no ideological or political threat whatsoever; at other times censors failed to remove sensitive content which appeared in translation. Not all censors were equal in their treatment of publications as there was no standardized practice for the application of censorship. Everything that looked suspicious, even if completely harmless in reality, was flagged. Glavlit had a tendency to find fault where there actually was none, a fact confirmed by Blyum’s findings while investigating the archives of Glavlit in the 1990s:

30 Sovetskij pisatel’ (Sov. pis.) was a publishing house based in Moscow.
A great number of the archival documents that I have examined tend to create an impression of absurd surrealism. The pettiness and pathological captiousness displayed by the Glavlit officials were very often not in the least activated by any possible ‘danger’ posed by a text totally lacking in subversive intent. But that is the whole point: totalitarian censorship makes no distinction between the important and the unimportant, the material and the immaterial. It seizes equally on ‘criminal’ anti-Soviet text and on a trivial misprint in a cross-word or an odd turn of phrase in a translation. (2003, 17)

As suggested above, Glavlit was over-cautious to the point of arbitrariness in some of its censorship practices. Although the censorship guidelines were strict, the arbitration of censorship was subjective and inconsistent. It was up to the censor to decide whether content should be flagged, and not all censors were consistent in their evaluations.

3.2.5 Copyright Infringement

Up until 1973, the USSR did not adhere to International Copyright Law. Translation activities were executed without the permission of the original author and translators’ notes did not mention anything about excisions or major adaptations from the original. As Soviet censorship researcher Marianna Tax Choldin reveals: “Translations published in the sixties were not subject to copyright, and consequently Soviet editions from this period were not required to include any reference to changes made” (1986, 336-337). American attorney in art law Allen Cramer explains that within the Soviet Union publications of translations from outside the USSR, without permission, was intra vires with respect to Soviet publishing law which did not recognize International Copyright Law: “As a result, that country's state-controlled publishing firms have, generally without seeking permission or paying royalties, printed whatever foreign works they felt were suitable for Soviet minds” (1965, 531-532). The Soviet Union had its own copyright law which protected translated works and original works published in the USSR, but foreign authors were excluded from
Soviet copyright protection if their original works were published outside the USSR. The problem was that most foreign works were published outside of the USSR which meant, pursuant to Soviet Copyright Law, that the author’s permission was not required nor was the author entitled to royalties. In such cases, translations of foreign works were considered originals and the translator was regarded as the author according to Soviet Copyright Law, which vetoed International Copyright Law within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Unless non-Soviet authors published their translations within the USSR, they were not entitled to royalties under Soviet Copyright Law. Cramer notes that up until the end of the Stalinist peak of rule, the USSR had allegedly published nearly a billion copies of books in violation of International Copyright Law:

During the period from 1917-1950, it has been estimated that one billion copies of books protected by foreign copyright were published in the Soviet Union. Among these were more than seventy-seven million copies of 2700 books by some 200 United States authors, including Jack London, Mark Twain, Theodore Dreiser, Upton Sinclair, Erskine Caldwell, Sinclair Lewis, John Steinbeck and Ernest Hemingway. Numerous foreign scientific and technical publications, short stories, plays and miscellaneous


33 London has been the most popular foreign author in the Soviet Union. From 1918 to July 1, 1959, 691 editions of his works totaling 20,416,000 copies were published there. Twain, the second most popular American author, had 256 editions of his works totaling 10,926,000 copies published in the U.S.S.R. during the same period. The figures for the others were: Dreiser, 133 editions totaling 9,531,000 copies; Sinclair, 249 editions totaling 4,167,000 copies; Caldwell, 12 editions totaling 1,112,000 copies; Lewis, 36 editions totaling 996,000 copies; Steinbeck, 12 editions totaling 835,000 copies; and Hemingway, 17 editions totaling 487,000 copies. Numerous younger American writers have also been published in the U.S.S.R. For example, John Updike's novel, *The Centaur*, was recently published by the Soviets. Letter from John Updike to Allan P. Cramer, Feb. 27, 1965. See generally Hindus, *House without a Roof: Russia after Forty-Three Years of Revolution* 88-96 (1961).

articles have also been published in the U.S.S.R. Thus, that country has been characterized as "the world's most active literary pirate." (1965, 532)

The Soviet Union resisted implementing International Copyright Law for decades because of its many undesirable policies, primarily of capitalist interest, which did not appeal to the officially communist Soviet Union. Firstly, there would be economic consequences such as the payout of royalties. Secondly, International Copyright Law would restrict arbitrary censorship. Thirdly, the Soviet Union would have to keep an official record of the number of translations published, not to mention the translations from Russian into minority languages as well, and these statistics would be known to the international community. Fourthly, freedom of translation would be revoked – a freedom which gave Soviet translators full rights to their translations as original authors and allowed them to publish without the author’s consent. Fifthly, the profiteering of author’s rights was a very anti-communist concept with which the Soviets did not agree. As Cramer observes: “Since the major demands from foreigners in this area have centered upon royalties, the Soviets claim that the concern over international copyright is merely a manifestation of the typical

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35 For example, a Soviet edition of 43,000 copies of Modern American Short Stories, which included works by Hemingway, Thomas Wolfe and John O'Hara, was printed in English in 1963. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1963, ? 7, p. 8, col. 3.


37 For example, several articles by humorist Art Buchwald have been printed by Soviet magazines. Letter from Art Buchwald to Allan P. Cramer, Nov. 15, 1963.

capitalist interest in money" (1965, 539). The USSR, however, was more concerned with its right to censor than with its contribution to capitalist ventures. As Cramer further explains:

Furthermore, they [the Soviets] are aware that often a publisher, rather than the author himself, owns the foreign rights to a work. This affords a basis for the Soviet claim that their avoidance of royalty payments is due to their opposition to ‘enriching an exploiting class.' This appears to be simply a smokescreen, however, for their real political reason for denying protection, namely that recognition of international copyright would prevent official editing of foreign works. Their position thus facilitates the dissemination of Communist propaganda. (1965, 539)

Although there were European and American attempts at the Confédération Internationale des Sociétés d'Auteurs et Compositeurs and the Author's League of America (Cramer, 1965, 537) to persuade the Soviet Union to recognize International Copyright Law, such attempts were futile since the Soviets were unsympathetic to the cause and had no interest in enforcing fair book reproduction policies in spite of international pressure. After decades of

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resistance, and as a result of growing international pressures, the Soviet Union eventually assented to International Copyright Law. Tax Choldin remarks that:

After May 1973, when the Soviet Union acceded to the Universal Copyright Convention, a translation that had been altered in any way was required by law to contain a statement like the one found on the verso of the title page of *Rabota*, ‘Pecha taetsia s sokrashcheniiami’ (printed with abridgments). However, this kind of general statement hardly tells the whole story, and the Soviet reader, without access to the original, is in no position to assess the kinds of changes that have been made, or the extent of those changes. There is also ample evidence that the legalities are not always observed. (1986, 337)

The recognition of International Copyright Law in the USSR did not put an end to “free interpretation” or censorship practices. All that changed was that translators had to include a disclaimer stating that the translation appeared in abridged form - a loose umbrella term which did not reveal much about the amount or nature of the abridging. It is interesting to note, however, that much of the illegally imported literature was translation into Russian, followed by translations into numerous minority languages, including Ukrainian, and mass-distribution without the author’s consent.
4 Translating or Refusing to Translate for Ideological Gains

4.1 Assimilation under the Guise of Solidarity

4.1.1 Introduction

In the Soviet Union, literature transmitted to the masses was intentionally translated in a stilted manner in order to disseminate certain ideas to the population, either by inserting and/or removing segments of text to further promote communist ideology or to encourage the defamation of foreign societies, as well as abolish domestic, nationalistic propaganda within the Soviet Union. Stuart Finkel suggests that censorship was a deterrent against “bourgeois nationalism” which stemmed predominantly from minorities: “Censorship is a weapon for us to counteract the growing influence of bourgeois ideology” (2007, 148). Censored translations were a preferred instrument for promoting selected beliefs, precepts, and views of the world within the Soviet Union to the detriment of those outside. The Central Committee in Moscow had such a powerful grip over literary distribution that it could put a Union-wide ban on an author and refuse the right to translate him or her into or from minority languages.

4.1.2 Concealing Historical Events

One example which illustrates how certain historical events were dismissed in translation is Anatolii Kuznetsov’s Babij Yar, a novel published in 1966 in the Soviet

43 Anatolii Kuznetsov was a Soviet Ukrainian author from Kiev.
Union but only after editors at “‘Iunost’ (Youth) made over 300 political revisions in the manuscript” (Ermolaev, 1997, 187), including removing references to Ukrainian peasants dying tragically in the Holodomor and how they “were driven into collective farms at gunpoint” (Ermolaev, 1997, 203). Censors also removed “all negative references to Stalin” (Ermolaev, 1997, 189) and “parallels between him and Hitler” (Ermolaev, 1997, 189).

Kuznetsov left the USSR to have his works translated and published abroad where he would not be subjected to heavy censorship. “His works were banned, removed from shelves, returned to Glavlit, then shredded” in the USSR from the 1970s onwards (Ermolaev, 1997, 185). Babij Yar, Kuznetsov’s personal account as an eye-witness of the Babij Yar mass executions in Kiev (conducted by Nazis) in 1941, whereby thousands of Ukrainian gypsies, Jews, and Ukrainian nationalists perished and were buried in a mass grave, was not translated in the Ukrainian SSR and only appeared in Ukrainian translation after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Babyj Yar, Kiev, 1991, Radyanskyj pys’menyk). For decades, while numerous translated copies of Babij Yar circulated outside the USSR, Ukrainians were prohibited from reading this book which detailed the atrocities of their own recent history. Moreover, the banning of Babij Yar shielded Ukrainians from the duplicitous reality of the Soviet regime. Kuznetsov was exiled from the Soviet Union, changed his name, and managed to smuggle his original manuscript with him, which was published in Possev, a publishing house in Frankfurt, in 1970.

Tax Choldin claims that the most salient yet unsurprising aspect of censorship was the denial of the existence of censorship within the Soviet Union, in spite of its widespread tradition: “In striking contrast to Tsarist Russia, however, even the existence of censorship is no longer officially acknowledged in any published Soviet source” (1989, 30). Disbelief and denial were defence mechanisms to protect classified information about Soviet
government operations from leaking out, as well as to prevent public loss of confidence in the Soviet government. Active dismissal of censorship was necessary in order to extend and uphold the longstanding act of censorship itself.

4.1.3 Downplaying the West

Any topics dealing with Western society, in terms of politics or market economy, were generally flagged for censorship; these were perhaps some of the most censored topics with respect to imported works. If certain ideas or values portrayed in foreign works were in disaccord with Soviet Socialist Realism, they were usually censored and rewritten either to include components of Socialist Realism in the translation, to downplay positive facets of Western society, or to include anti-communist sentiment. Anti-communist political views could not be published, even in translation, because such views could potentially leave an impression on Soviet readers and inspire them to a national uprising against the communist regime. Misinformation and falsification about the West were crucial strategies for indoctrinating Soviet subjects into accepting that the West was corrupt and full of ill-intentions to subjugate Soviet minds. Tax Choldin suggests that the xenophobia concerning foreign values in the USSR was an issue present throughout the regime up until the end when Glasnost was in full effect:

It is generally acknowledged by Western students of Soviet history and ideology that the essential concerns underlying the institution of censorship in imperial Russia are still central to the operation today: the fear of alien values and ideas and the belief that the West is out to subvert the populace ideologically. (1989, 30)

The perpetual fear of foreign values infiltrating the Soviet Union, along with the way in which they would influence internal ones, was always a serious concern. Projecting false images of the West and constructing them to appear inferior to domestic ones was common
practice in the Soviet Union. Because Soviet readers had no access to original foreign works, they only saw foreign societies through the optics of Socialist Realism and, furthermore, were unaware of the degree to which translations deviated from their originals.

4.1.4 Internal Challenges

Western literature, economics, and political systems were not the only ideological threats to the Soviet readership. There were other, more local, menaces that existed inside the Soviet Union, menaces that were supporters of cultural development through national languages. They were referred to pejoratively as “bourgeois nationalists.” Several Ukrainian writers were accused of disseminating “bourgeois nationalist” political views as a result of certain themes expressed within their writing. Some examples include Ivan Dziuba, Oles Honchar, and Vasyl Symonenko, who were criticized and silenced by the authorities. The Soviet Union made no distinction between external and internal potential enemies of the Union. For this reason, as well as to prevent minorities from encouraging nationalist or political movements using literature as a vehicle, publications of non-Russian Soviet citizens were not to deviate from the cultural and linguistic norms outlined by the Central Committee; this required the de-emphasis of national elements and the accentuation of Socialist Realism, which had been long established since the mid-1930s. Ukrainian literary scholar Bohdan Romanenchuk notes:

During the 1920’s the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was not yet sure how the new literature should be shaped. Hence, during that time some searching and some departures from norms were still possible. One thing was certain, however: the literary creations of the non-Russian peoples in the USSR were not allowed to develop individually and separately from Russian literature. (Romanenchuk, 1987, 38)
Keeping minorities in line and attempting to divert them from autonomous literary and linguistic development was part of shaping Soviet social constructs as well as a prudent measure against future upheavals and resistance stemming from staunch nationalist sentiment.

4.1.5 Ideological Concerns

The Bolsheviks were sceptical of Soviet minorities to the point where minority languages were saturated with translations from Russian. This ensured close ties with Soviet Russian culture, and prevented the independent development of national literature that could inspire revolutionary movements to strike against the Communist regime. To keep Ukrainians from developing an independent national literary culture, Ukrainian literature was not to deviate in genre and style from Russian literature, and the mode by which literary ties were kept close between the two nations was through a steady flow of translation from Russian into Ukrainian. According to Romanenchuk:

In the Party statement concerning the Ukrainian literary creation, promulgated in 1927, the Central Committee of the Communist Party announced (in addition to directives) that special care should be paid to the development of new cadres of Ukrainian literary critics of Marxist persuasion, while the responsibility of those critics should be, among others, the preservation of a close interrelationship between the Ukrainian literary associations and those of Russia. One of the ways of achieving this close relationship between the Ukrainian and Russian literatures should be to foster an ever increasing number of translations of literary works of the “brotherly Russian people” into Ukrainian and an exchange of writers between the two republics. (1987, 39)

The influx of translation from Russian was supposed to create a close connection or an affinity between Russian and Ukrainian; in other words, the translations of Russian works were designed to draw the two languages/cultures closer together in a manipulative way.

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Subjecting Ukrainians to Russian literature was a preventive measure that was put in place from the very early Soviet stages to establish solidarity and prevent nationalist revolt.

4.1.6 Censorship of Western Legal Texts

The Kremlin’s distrust of Soviet citizens reading translations of foreign publications was exhibited through their mass-censorship projects. Soviet readers were not trusted to interpret uncensored texts because of the likelihood of being influenced or politically motivated to push for reform in the USSR. A scholar of Soviet law Jurij Fedynskyj admits that when translations of Western legal texts were introduced in the Soviet Union there was a special emphasis placed on the preponderance of Soviet law over Western laws:

Authors of forewords seemingly do not trust Russian readers who might form their own opinions of capitalist law as presented in translations. Forewords serve as a kind of insulation from the influence of foreign ideas. The superiority of Soviet law as the law of the highest historical type is placed beyond any discussion. Shortcomings of the capitalist legal system are pointed out again and again. (1975, 552)

Soviet readers were not able to form accurate conclusions when comparing Western law and Soviet law because Western texts were censored in translation. Readers were deprived of the right to access legitimate foreign information regarding Western legislation, precedence cases, and verdicts. Interestingly enough, much of legal translation in the 1960s was done in violation of International Copyright Law, as Fedynskyj remarks: “Relatively heavy translating activity was conducted at the time when foreign authors' rights were not protected in the Soviet Union”44 (1975, 553). Moreover, Fedynskyj also notes that Harold F. Lusk was unaware that his Business Law had been translated during the 1960s in the Soviet Union: “It came as a real surprise to Lusk who had not been asked permission or paid any

44 The Soviet Union joined the International Copyright Convention in May 1973.
royalties” (1975, 553). Not only was his work translated and published (in Moscow in 1961) but it was abridged without his knowledge or consent. 45

Translation of Western legal texts carried out in the Soviet Union without consent took place for the most part after World War II and were taken primarily from English, French, German and American authors. Examples include the following works:

The conclusion of World War II opened a new period. Translations of Western legal literature became numerous. They comprised leading Western textbooks (civil law and common law) in latest editions expanding into a wide variety of subjects like: civil law (Enneccerus, Julliot de la Morandière), especially the law of contracts (Anson, Salmond, Gaudemet, Savatier), criminal law (Das ausländische Strafrecht der Gegenwart, Kenny), criminal procedure (Wilshere), constitutional law (Jenks, Wade, Brecht, Maunz, Prelot), administrative law (Vedel), local administration (Detton), commercial law (Charlesworth, Lusk), copyright (Sidjanski), international law (Oppenheim, O'Connell, Anzilotti, Hyde, Verdross, Serres, Satow), conflict of laws (Wolff, Raape), maritime and air law (Higgins-Colombos, Shawcross-Beaumont), court organization and administration (Archer, Karlen), comparative law (David). (1975, 551)

More interesting than the violation of copyright was the way in which translations of legal texts were censored in the USSR. Some translations were abridged but it is not clear whether the excisions were arbitrary or ideologically motivated. As Fedynskyj notes: “Translations were prepared, generally, very carefully. In cases of abridged translations, some lengthy cases included in original editions were eliminated. A tendency to omit ‘just’ decisions but to translate controversial ones was not established” (1975, 551). Translations were vigilantly censored and presented with very explicit forewords that valorized the principles of Soviet law and explained the purpose of translating foreign law, which was

strictly for educational and comparative functions. Furthermore, these translations were not distributed on a small scale: “Most of the translations listed here were published by the State Publishing House for Foreign Literature without indication of the number of copies printed. Translations published by other institutions included this detail. From the data available we can conclude that the number of copies was not small” (1975, 551). The lack of regulation within the State Publishing House for Foreign Literature allowed for the reproduction of countless translations without having to provide any statistics and likely contributed to the Soviet Union’s reluctance to comply with International Copyright Law.
5 The Uneven Flow of Translation

5.1 Russian vs. Other Minority Languages in the Former Soviet Republics

5.1.1 Introduction

Russification affected all of the republics in the USSR and spread as far as into the Soviet satellite states of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Other SSRs suffered the same type of linguistic oppression as Ukraine did, which involved the russifying of local lexicon and syntax. Translation practices in the other SSRs were comparable to those of the Ukrainian SSR in terms of censorship, a sharp increase in Marxist-Leninist texts translated from Russian, the sudden presence of russified didactic material, in addition to the biased praise and support of pro-Soviet authors, linguists, translators, and scholars. Likewise, translation practices were far from reciprocal between minority languages and Russian due to linguistic power differentials. Because Russian was the dominant language of publication, most translation activities stemmed from Russian. The opposite was rather intermittent. What is perhaps of greater interest is not necessarily the uneven flow of translation, but the difference in quality when comparing translations from minority languages into Russian and translations from Russian into minority languages. There were certain trends, such as literalism, which were frowned upon when translating into Russian, but were tolerated when translating into minority languages, as noted by Friedberg:

Yet another kind of evidence exists for the self-demeaning, servile posture of Soviet minority authors toward the literature of the Russian Big Brother. At a time when no manifestations of obsequious literalism were tolerated in translations into Russian, that
same literalism was actually encouraged in translations from Russian into the languages of minorities. (1997, 184)

The final product of translation was most unbalanced as highlighted further on in this chapter. In order to understand the broad spectrum of Soviet translation practices, it is important to examine how translations were treated in the other Soviet republics. This chapter examines translation practices in other Soviet Republics namely the Uzbek SSR, Georgian SSR, Estonian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR, and Moldavian SSR, which were also subjected to censorship and russification.

5.1.2 Uzbek SSR: 1924-1991

In the Uzbek SSR, russification was a result of tsarist colonial expansion into the East circa the late 1800s. The first attempts to introduce Russian borrowings were in areas of specialized language. As Central Asian Studies scholar Shirin Akiner remarks: “A rapid lexical expansion was required in order to accommodate the sudden influx of administrative, technological and cultural innovations. Not surprisingly, many new terms were borrowed from Russian, either as direct loans or in the form of calques” (1997, 3). Russian borrowings were a result of industrialization in addition to the implementation of Russian bureaucracy that was being introduced at the time. During the period of Uzbekization from 1924-1929, which took place at the same time as Ukrainianization, priority in translations into Uzbek were technical publications and, naturally, Marxist-Leninist classics: “Of great stylistic as well as lexical consequence was the translation of a wide range of literary, technical and political texts from Russian. The works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin began to appear in Uzbek from 1925 onwards” (1997, 23). This was also the case in the Ukrainian SSR and other SSRs. One procedure that helped to facilitate the translation of Soviet texts into Uzbek, as Bilinsky mentions, was the double modification of its orthography: “It may be recalled that
in 1928 the Arabic script of the Uzbek language was changed to a Latin one, in 1940 again changed to the Cyrillic alphabet, resembling that of Russian” (1964, 81). The transformation of orthography with the addition of Russian lexical units introduced into Uzbek contributed to facilitating the task of translation.

During the Brezhnev era, the pervasive use of trots and the use of second-hand translations from Russian were two reasons for which the quality of Uzbek translations was seriously undermined, as underlined by Friedberg: “The use of interlinear cribs was common practice in translations into Russian from the Soviet minority languages – even from languages with many millions of speakers like Uzbek and Tartar” (1997, 172). Translations were seldom performed directly into Uzbek without passing through Russian first which, in fact, was equally the case for many minority languages.

Uzbek was the third largest language in the USSR (after Russian and Ukrainian) in terms of the number of its native speakers. Yet in the 1970s, translations of Western European literature into Uzbek were still being made from Russian intermediaries. Mirkarim Asim’s Uzbek version of Heinrich Mann’s Man of Straw (Der Untertan) was a translation of I. Gorkina’s Russian Vernopoddannyi, while E. Vakhidov’s rendering of Goethe’s Faust into Uzbek used Boris Pasternak’s Russian text. (Friedberg, 1997, 174)

Uzbek scholar Rano Faizullaeva noted that in the Russian translation (from Pasternak) of Faust, the Russian translators’ recurrent deviations from the original text were “compounded by the shortcomings of their Uzbek colleagues” (Friedberg, 1997, 174). In other words, the deviations in the Russian translation combined with the limited proficiency of Uzbek translators undermined the quality of the final Uzbek translation, which is a result of the lack of reference material available to Soviet translators in the 1970s. As Friedberg notes, quoting from Lev Ginzburg (a well-known German-Russian translator): “There are no dictionaries on sale – not only Russian-German ones, but also no Russian-Armenian,
Armenian Russian, Russian-Uzbek, etc\textsuperscript{46} (Friedberg, 1997, 198). To further complicate matters, most Uzbek novels and folklore translated into German were actually translated back through Russian in order to ensure a kind of “reciprocity”, which only “perpetuated the defects of the latter” (Friedberg, 1997, 174).

Even though there were a few capable translators who could translate from European languages directly into Uzbek, most translated into Uzbek using Russian translations of original European works. As for translations from Uzbek into Russian they were performed by translators who had limited knowledge of the source language and used interlinear trots. Friedberg notes:

However, most renderings of Uzbek verse as well as long Uzbek novels were produced from interlinear versions.\textsuperscript{47} Even books clearly identified on the title page as “translated from the Uzbek” by a specific individual were usually based on cribs employed by someone who knew no Uzbek at all.\textsuperscript{48} The same was true of other minority languages, as a Tadzhik translator reported. (1997, 175)

Translations from Uzbek were falsely labelled for promotional reasons. Even though the translations were performed by people with little knowledge of Uzbek, this was of no real consequence for the target Russian audience because they were predominantly monolingual Russian speakers who would likely not question the translated text as long as it was well written and met Russian readers’ expectations.

\textsuperscript{46} Quoted in Ginzburg, \textit{Nad strokoi perevoda}, p.22.

\textsuperscript{47} Quoted in Gul’nara Gafurova in \textit{Khudozhestvennyi perevod} (Erevan, 1973), pp.223-24.

\textsuperscript{48} Quoted in Soiuz Pisatelei SSSR, Sovet po khudozhestvennomu perevodu, \textit{Aktual’nye problemy teorii khudozhestvennogo perevoda} (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1967), 2:89.
5.1.3 Georgian SSR: 1923-1991

In the Georgian SSR works translated into Russian during the Stalin era, in the 1930s and 1940s, tended to be heavily “domesticated” for the Russian target audience, often to the dismay of Georgian scholars such as Elizbar Ananiashvili. The ultimate concern of the Russian target language translator was for the final version to sound perfectly Russian. One example which serves to illustrate the superiority complex of Russian and the total disregard for minority languages in Russian translation was confirmed in a remark made by Soviet writer and literary scholar Yuri Libedinsky, who believed that there was nothing unprincipled about Russian translators being unmindful of their source language:

Thus the Georgian translator Elizbar Ananiashvili was appropriately offended at some remarks by Yuri Libedinsky, one of the founding fathers of Soviet literature, who is chiefly remembered for this Communist-inspired novel, A Week (published in 1922). Not only did Libedinsky find nothing wrong with translators ignorant of the languages of the work they translated. He also claimed that all was well as long as the rendition “sounds well in Russian” and the translator “gets rid of everything jarring to the Russian ear.” (Friedberg 1997, 182)

Whether it was Georgian or Ukrainian, Russian translators generally had an arrogant view of the minority languages with which they worked. The goal was to produce fluid and domesticated translations into Russian from minority languages, irrespective of the original language’s stylistics or rhythm. In fact, during the Brezhnev era, Elizbar Ananiashvili warned “his colleagues who made use of trots that efforts to retain prosody of the original could backfire” (Friedberg, 1997, 176) because Georgian and Russian have differing metrics which Russian translators would simply neglect. However, not all translations from Georgian into Russian were unsatisfactory. During the Stalin era, in the late 1930s, Marina Tsvetaeva was assigned the task of translating a large portion of Vazha Pshavela’s poetry.
from Georgian into Russian, and the outcome was commended by Georgian scholars, as Friedberg notes: “The Georgian scholar Alexander Tsybulevsky claimed that Tsvetaeva’s renderings of Pshavela were as good as her original verse” (1997, 193). Therefore, not all comments regarding translations from Georgian into Russian expressed the same view as Libedinsky.

5.1.4 Estonian SSR: 1940-1991

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, were all annexed as SSRs in 1940. After WWII, immediate plans were made to begin russifying and sovietising all three republics simultaneously. In the 1950s, Russian overshadowed Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian in both elementary schools and high schools (Bilinsky, 1964, 82). Estonian authors were required to comply with Soviet literary norms; in other words, cooperate in the application of Socialist Realist interpretations of both original and translated works, which, in turn, discouraged authors from writing to a point where in the mid-1950s translations from Russian consisted of the majority of publications in the Estonian SSR. Sociolinguist Arlene Clachar explains that:

Estonian scholars and writers tried to move away from the national themes emphasising instead the general ‘Soviet’, which more and more became associated with the Russian people, its culture and language. In general, literary production came to a complete halt. The number of titles published was the same in 1945 as in 1913 and they were mainly translations from Russian. In fact, between 1944 and 1954 more Russian than Estonian literature was published. (1998, 108)

Authors found it futile to write because their works would be censored. As a result, Estonian culture was subjected to Soviet Russian culture through translated works which were effectively russifying the Estonian population. During the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, Russian gained even more ground over Estonian in government operations, industry
and academia, as highlighted by Clachar: “In 1978, a secret decree of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party legally legitimised the priority of Russian over Estonian, declaring Russian the only means of active participation in social life” (1998, 109). Therefore, Russian was replacing Estonian in political affairs, and Estonian was reduced, like Ukrainian, to a secondary language only useful in unofficial matters.

5.1.5 Lithuanian SSR: 1940-1991

During the later Stalin period, the Lithuanian SSR experienced the same process of russification as the Estonian SSR did through translated works. The Lithuanian SSR was likewise saturated with translations from Russian authors who were loyal proponents of Stalin. Lithuanian poet, scholar, and translator Tomas Venclova supports the claim that these translations of Soviet Russian authors were intended to impose Socialist Realism upon Lithuanians:

The Sovietization and Russification process was carried out in brutal, obvious forms. An attempt was made in a brief time to change totally the cultural orientation of the nation. In such circumstances it is perhaps quite inappropriate to use the word ‘culture’ (viewing culture as a system of conventions, we nevertheless may grant a cultural status to Stalinism, but it is a case of a particularly degraded culture). All this was very evident in the field of translation. The lion's share of translations belonged to the works of Soviet Russian writers, among them almost exclusively to Orthodox Stalinists. (1979, n. page)

During the Khrushchev period, however, Lithuanian translators were instilled with optimism because censorship was not enforced to the extent it had previously been under Stalin. Censors were sometimes ignorant of texts that should have been flagged; other times they were simply indifferent or turned a blind eye, as Venclova suggests:
Many translators and editors showed sincere concern with the national Lithuanian culture; they even succeeded in promoting some good projects and circumventing the censors. From time to time, one or another state official at least temporarily ‘closed his eyes’ so as not to hinder either the writers or the editors. (1979, n. page)

Thus censors were more lax during this period of “Thaw” which meant that translating Russian literature into Lithuanian could be carried out while reducing, to some extent, socialist propaganda and focusing on translating with fewer political motives and with less scepticism and resentment towards Russian literature in general. According to Venclova:

Contemporary Russian literature, translated into Lithuanian, no longer left a hopeless impression. At the same time, the level of ‘informational noise’ lessened, although it still was dominant. Translations appeared of genuine writers like Isaak Babel, Aleksandr Grin, Mikhail Zoshchenko, and much of Paustovksy. The works of future dissidents Anatoly Gladilin, Vladimir Maksimov, Georgy Vladimov appeared. Gorky, moreover, vanished, and his antipode, Solzhenitsyn's *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* was published. (1979, n. page)

The significance of Gorky’s translations being removed and replaced with less stilted translations of other less patriotic Russian authors, was symbolically a tremendous marvel because for the longest time Gorky was perhaps the most famous Soviet Russian author, and the most notorious icon of Socialist Realism, whose opinion of minority languages was both low and publicly disclosed. In other words, Gorky was publically vocal with respect to his views of Ukrainian which he considered to be an unimportant language within the USSR.

**5.1.6 Latvian SSR: 1940-1991**

In the Latvian SSR, towards the end of the Stalin era, the situation mirrored that of the Estonian and Lithuanian SSRs. Latvian schools were an important target for “intellectual russification”, which was carried out by deliberately inserting Russian elements into
Latvian didactic material. Bilinsky described this process of studying Latvian through the scope of Russian as illogical and counterintuitive:

In his carefully documented article ‘Schools and Educational Standards in Occupied Latvia’ K. Dzilleja provides an example of what he calls ‘intellectual Russification’ (that is, Russification of the intellect through the medium of non-Russian languages). He writes that in the Latvian Grammar of 1954 for Grades VII to XI most of the language examples are taken from Russian writers. This would be comparable to studying English grammar by following Corneille, Voltaire, Stendhal, Hugo, and other masters of the French language. (1964, 82)

This was one of the ways Russian established its superiority over Latvian. Moreover, the didactic material provided was sovietised and translated directly from Russian, with some of the Russian source texts included in the textbooks. The didactic material included translations of distinguished historic and contemporary Russian authors and poets who were the focus of study, rather than Lithuanian ones, as explained by Bilinsky:

The reading material for the Latvian classes is not only filled with propaganda articles of the ‘Soviet Latvian’ writers, but there are translations from Russian, too. So those scarce hours are devoted to the discussion of the Russian poets from the eleventh to the eighteenth centuries, Lomonosov, Krilov, and Gorky, and the heroes of the ‘Great Fatherland's War.’ Thus, intellectual Russification is even taking place during the lectures on Latvian language. (1964, 82)

The textbooks in no way coincidently emphasized Soviet Russian elements. The whole face of Latvian literary historiography was adapted and shaped by Russian literary historiography. A similar situation existed in Soviet Ukrainian schools where Ukrainian

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national literature was replaced with translations of Engels, Lenin, and Marx, as well as of those of major Soviet Russian authors such as Gorky and Sholokhov.

5.1.7 Moldavian SSR: 1940-1991

The Moldavian SSR, like the Baltic SSRs, was annexed to the USSR in 1940. Slavic linguist Donald Dyer confirms that during the Brezhnev era the effects of russification in the Moldavian SSR were most visible in mass media publications translated into Moldovan (also known as Moldavian), which were almost always translated directly from Russian: “During the Soviet period, there were almost no newspapers in Soviet Moldova that published material originally written in Moldovan. A newspaper's articles were first written in Russian by the editorial staff, and then translated into the native language, Romanian” (1999, 92). Furthermore, a large portion of translations was consigned by the CPSU and was naturally of a political nature, as Dyer attests: “There also existed a tremendous number of translated materials disseminated from and by Moscow. The Moldovan written media, under rigid state control, were instructed to publish translated versions of material from party leaders” (1999, 92).

There was also a rush to deliver the translations into Romanian (the native language) because they were due for mass media distribution the very next day. Dyer explains that: “Typically, speeches for newspaper articles were submitted in the evening and had to be on the front page of the following morning issue, so translation needed to be immediate. In most cases, the newspapers simply printed the translations which were supplied” (1999, 92), and they were published in spite of their use of non-standard lexicon and unidiomatic Russo-Moldavian phraseology.
As for political translation in the Moldavian SSR, there were serious concerns regarding the russification of Romanian in political discourse. During the 1970s, Soviet Moldovan linguist T. Iliasenco attempted to prove that the language of East Prut (Moldovan) existed independently of West Prut (Romanian) in its own literary tradition. However, “all attempts to ‘prove’ the independence of the Moldavian language have been doomed to failure” (Bruchis, 1984, 116) as Moldovan proved to simply be the same language as Romanian only with the arbitrary insertion of non-standard Russian syntax and vocabulary. In his article, Bruchis uses an example of a speech by Brezhnev, translated into both Moldovan and Romanian, to disprove Iliasenco’s theory, as Bruchis explains:

Translations of these segments, reproduced by Iliasenco in the form in which they appeared in periodicals in Soviet Moldavia (given here in transliteration) and Romania,

Moldovan (a) va servid reptu n stimulp entrui ntensificareac ontinuuaa lupteip entrupace
Moldovan (b) au rostit cuvinte calde, bune despre tara noastra
Romanian (a) va fi un stimulentp entrui ntensificareain continuarea lupteip entrupace
Romanian (b) au rostitc uvintec alde, binevoitoarela adresat ariin oastre

show that these are two closely similar translations (with particular syntactic and lexical differences), which do not transcend the bounds of one and the same Romanian language. (1984, 117)

Bruchis underlines the fact that all the lexical units in the Romanian version exist in Moldovan, and “it is not difficult to see that the translator from Soviet Moldova rendered the Russian text as closely as possible” (Bruchis, 1984, 117). Dyer also notes that according to Sylviu Berejan of the Moldovan Academy of Sciences, linguists were under duress to prove that Moldovan and Romanian were two separate languages. He claims that “during the Soviet period the pressure placed on Moldovan linguists by Soviet authorities to

51 The Prut River separated Romania from Soviet Moldova. East of Prut was Soviet Moldova and West of Prut was Romania.
promote Moldovan as an independent literary language was overbearing. Moldovan linguists were forced to write either that Moldovan was not Romanian or to steer clear of the topic altogether” (Dyer, 1999, 87). There was clearly an ideological gain for the Soviets by attempting to make a thorough distinction between Moldovan and Romanian.

As for Bruchis, he continued to emphasize that the reason for disjuncture between Moldovan and Romanian was due to a guideline which instructed Moldovan translators to produce foreignized translations of Soviet political discourse:

Thus, if we take the translations of the second of these segments, cited above, the parts are exactly the same (au rostit cuvinte calde), and the differences between the other parts (bune-binevoitoare, despre-la adresa) are explained by the fact that in Soviet Moldova, as in all other national republics of the USSR, translators of socio-political literature, and especially party documents, had to follow the Russian text as closely as possible (1984, 117).

In other words, it was a requirement to russify the target language translation. Furthermore, russified elements which appeared in Moldovan Romanian texts were not established as standard Romanian and, therefore, Iliasenco did not succeed in proving that Moldovan and Romanian were two separate languages. Likewise, there were similar attempts to distinguish Soviet Ukrainian from all other forms of Ukrainian but to no avail.

Other publishing issues in Moldovan stemmed from bilingual authors whose works displayed conspicuous Russian influence. Ion Druţă, Moldovan émigré author and honorary president of the Moldovan Writers’ Union, was criticized for his works published in the 1980s because of his widespread use of Russian syntax in his works written in Romanian. According to Dyer’s interview with Semion Cebanu, the latter commented on the russified characteristics of Druţă's writing: “However, in Druţă's latest works--those from the 1980s - - it is clear that he is 'thinking' in Russian, and then translating into Romanian. There are
even what must be considered 'mistakes' in his Romanian” (1999, 93). Dyer provides some examples of grammatical and syntactical errors such as Druţă's use of the Russian preposition *izpod*, meaning ‘near’ in Russian, but translated literally into Romanian means ‘from under’, which appeared in his Romanian works and was indicative of russified syntax (1999, 93). Thus, the issue with bilingual authors who were russified was that their native language publications would show obvious signs of Russian borrowing, as a result of a lost familiarity with their native language. This, in turn, resulted in a failure to properly write or translate into their target native language.

By examining the translation practices in various SSRs, it is obvious that russification through translation was not unique to the Ukrainian SSR; it was omnipresent in the entire USSR. Irrespective of the minority language in question, Russian outranked all languages in the USSR. Translating into Russian was undertaken more attentively than translation into minority languages, and translation from Russian into minority languages was a way to disseminate Socialist Realism and secure Russian as the lingua franca of the USSR. After examining translation practices in other Soviet republics, it becomes clear that the trends within the Ukrainian SSR were similar to those in other republics. Studying these tendencies helps to substantiate the fact that the Ukrainian SSR was not the only target for expansive russification, but rather one of many. The previous examples of cases taken from various SSRs demonstrate that the objectives of the CPSU, to russify and aver conformity with Socialist Realism, were broad in scope – reaching beyond the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR and concurrently targeting all others republics. The CPSU’s objectives were far-reaching and achieved mass-scale linguistic indoctrination until the collapse of the Soviet Union.
5.2 Russian vs. Ukrainian

5.2.1 Introduction

In the USSR, the most frequently translated source language was Russian, for both general and specialized texts. Russian was also the target language for translation of foreign texts imported into the USSR. Despite Soviet claims of mutual enrichment among the nations of the USSR, Soviet Ukrainian culture was far less accessible to the rest of the USSR than Russian Soviet culture was to the Ukrainian SSR and other Soviet republics. More importantly, Ukrainian culture itself was not extensively available to Ukrainians in the SSR. Dziuba notes that: “In the Ukrainian Soviet State the responsible authorities, first and foremost the Government itself, in no way endeavour to make Ukrainian Soviet culture truly accessible to the whole nation” (1968, 149). Russian was the most promoted language, and Russo-Soviet culture was the most promoted tradition, even though it was not the first in demand within the Ukrainian SSR. Below in Table 4 are the statistics for native Ukrainian speakers in both the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR as a whole. It appears that over a thirty year span, even with russification in full effect, nearly ninety percent of Ukrainians identified Ukrainian as their native language.

Table 4 - Percentage of Ukrainians Claiming Ukrainian as Their Native language, 1959-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Solchanyk, 1985, 95

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Even though Russian was readily spoken and taught in Soviet Ukrainian schools, people still wanted to have access to Ukrainian translations of original works. As Dziuba affirms: “The Ukrainian reader wants and must have in his own language the achievements of universal culture, particularly the literary classics of the world” (1968, 147). Dziuba further explains that there was ample demand for access to international literature presented in Ukrainian translation: “In our country there is great demand for world classics in translation” (1968, 147). Nevertheless, the demands were not met and nothing was being done to change the situation. Dziuba reports that: “Experience has shown that the editions of good translations from world literature into Ukrainian, such as Homer’s Odyssey (translated by Borys Ten [1963]), Dante’s Commedia (translated by M. Ryl’s’ky and P. Karmans’ky [1956]), Goethe’s Faust (translated by M. Lukash [1955]), or Aesop’s Fables (translated by Yu. Mushak [1961]), were sold out very quickly” (1968, 147). The translation demands in Soviet Ukraine were not met because russification should have theoretically encouraged Soviet Ukrainians to switch to Russian books and decrease the overall need for Ukrainian translations. The rationale was that if Soviet Ukrainians were well-versed in Russian, their literary needs could be satisfied in Russian.

5.2.2 Quantity

As for the quantity of translations undertaken, in his Ph.D. thesis on post-Stalin linguistic shifts among Ukrainians, Soviet Studies scholar Stephen Rapawy underlines how the higher status of Russian was linked to the disproportionate number of translations into and out of Russian when compared with Ukrainian and other minority languages. Within

the USSR, Russian was the ultimate source language for translation into minority languages and was seldom the target language for translation from minority languages. Language titles (novels) accounted for a smaller percentage of translations than books (in general):

Russian literature enjoys qualitative as well as quantitative advantages. In 1970, 3.6 percent of Russian language titles and 7.7 percent of books were translated from foreign languages, but for Ukrainian literature comparable figures are 12.1 percent and 30.5 percent, and for literature in the remaining indigenous languages the figure increased to 30.5 and 43.7 percent, respectively.53 (Rapawy, 1978, 126)

Likewise, Russian was the ultimate target language for translation from non-Soviet literature; however, the majority of translations into indigenous non-Russian languages in 1970, including Ukrainian, stemmed from Russian language books and less than 20% of translations stemmed from non-Russian languages. As Rapawy explains:

But during the same year 81.0 percent of the foreign language titles translated into indigenous non-Russian languages were Russian language books. Given such predominance of Russian literature and coupled with extreme centralization, it is reasonable to assume that Russian literature serves largely as a model even for that portion of the native language literature not translated from Russian. Thus, the possibility of a truly indigenous literature developing and flourishing in such a milieu seems hardly possible. (1978, 126-127)

These percentages of translated works elucidate the situation in which Russian was the medium through which Ukrainian, and other non-Russian languages, accessed foreign literature. Russian received relatively little influx from other minority languages, meanwhile Ukrainian and other languages were saturated with translations from Russian. Moreover, Russian was the second-hand medium through which Soviet minority languages received translations of world literature. What this says about the Russian Soviet Federative

53 Percentages were derived from data in VKP, Pechat’ v 1970 godu, p.10.
Socialist Republic (RSFSR) is that the focus was on exporting Soviet Russian culture rather than equally importing Soviet minority culture. Access to world literature was generally regulated through Soviet Russian translations which were naturally censored for the Soviet reader.

5.2.3 Quality

There were serious implications about quality when translating between Ukrainian and Russian, due to the similarity of the two languages, which resulted in semantic shifts with respect to the use of homophones and polysemous words. The implications for these shifts, however, were not only due to the closeness of both languages but were additionally the result of translators’ negligence in naturally superimposing Russian onto Ukrainian and assuming that Russian words logically incorporated the same semantic meaning in Ukrainian. The assumption that Russian and Ukrainian had interchangeable homonyms was a common fallacy that brought Soviet translators to the conclusion that translating between similar languages posed more challenges than translating between more distant language families. Maurice Friedberg notes that:

Interlingual homonyms (identical sounding words with different meanings) are the most serious trap, according to Ryl’sky. Another danger is the tendency to exaggerate ethnic coloration by imparting to the rendition too much of the ethnic flavour of either the source or target language. Interlingual homonyms are apparently very insidious. Another difficulty arises from the fact that the same word may be folksy in one language and bookish in another, ‘positive’ in one and ‘negative’ in the other. For example, in Russian baba is a generally ‘friendly’ term which may be used to refer to a young woman, while in Ukrainian it is only derisive. (1997, 170-171)

In Ukrainian, however, baba literally means grandmother or old lady with a somewhat pejorative connotation. The misconception that certain words which existed in both
Ukrainian and Russian were identical in definition was a usual shortcoming of Soviet translators working between Russian and Ukrainian. These errors occurred with the most basic of words like *kholodno*; which means cold in Russian but means chilly in Ukrainian. Translators between Russian and Ukrainian would often mistake these for synonyms, even though *zymno* is the more accurate word for cold in Ukrainian.

The erroneous belief in interchangeable homonyms was not the only problem when translating between Russian and Ukrainian. Improper phraseology and syntax as well as arbitrary omissions were also problems according to Soviet scholars. Ukrainian translators were often criticized by Soviet scholars for translating unmindfully into Russian, a fact Friedberg underscores:

A group of Soviet scholars who reported in 1971 on the current state of translations from Ukrainian into Russian declared: ‘All of the translations we have examined carried into the Russian text Ukrainian words, expressions, and syntax. At the same time, every so often translators, as if bored with their work, would simply omit from the rendition entire sentences, utterances or even large chunks of the text.’ ⁵⁴ Such sloppiness was a particularly common in translations from and into the minority languages. It reflected their low status compared with renditions into Russian of Western European and American texts. (1997, 171)

The above passage elucidates two very important notions: firstly, the translators were perhaps aware of the structural and lexical differences between Ukrainian and Russian but did not bother to respect these differences and their intentional sloppiness was mostly an act of resistance; secondly, the questionable quality with respect to translations from a minority language was a direct reflection of its inferior status vis-à-vis Russian.

⁵⁴ Quoted in *Voprosy teorii khudozhestvennogo perevoda*, p.211; emphasis added.
5.2.4 Language Inequality

Because translation into and out of Russian from Ukrainian was not on the same level of competency and, therefore, treated differently than translation into and out of Ukrainian from other languages, translators of Ukrainian were required to be more vigilant when translating from Russian because it was considered to be “above” all languages in the USSR and, thus required extra vigilance. Friedberg notes that this patronizing attitude towards Ukrainian translation persisted even in the Brezhnev era:

A Ukrainian scholar complained in 1973 that after years of hard struggle against literalism, the practice had still not been completely uprooted. In particular, it seemed to have wormed its way in Ukrainian translations of Russian literature. This choice seems not to have been accidental. The literalist Ukrainian translators argued that playing games with ‘spirit’ and ‘meaning’ – in other words, free, paraphrastic translation – might be tolerated in renderings of French of English or other foreign writing into Ukrainian. In translating Russian literature, however, one must take care to treat it ‘lovingly and literally.’

The belief that translating from Russian into Ukrainian required a different treatment than translating from other languages into Ukrainian exemplifies the extent to which Russian had priority over other languages and the degree to which its status was elevated. Ukrainian translators who were of the belief that translating Russian entailed a privileged handling corroborate the partiality of Soviet translation activities.

To further illustrate the extent of language inequality between Russian and Ukrainian the example of Iurii Ianovsky, a renowned Soviet Ukrainian playwright and poet who became a “conforming artist”, confirms that Russian translations were a priority over Ukrainian original works in terms of the order of publication. He was a member of

55 Quoted in Aleksyi Kundzich, Tvorchy problemy perekladu (Kiev: Dnipro, 1973), p. 98; emphasis added.
VAPLITE (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) who, unlike many of his colleagues, was not purged.\(^{56}\) He adapted his writing style to adhere to the preferred Socialist Realism literary doctrine and was able to publish in both Ukrainian and Russian, however, not necessarily in this order, as Luckyj reports:

Ianovsky’s play *Duma pro Brytanku* (A Duma about Brytanka) was published in Russian in 1937 and in Ukrainian a year later. It dealt with the revolution and the civil war. After the war, Ianovsky’s novel *Zhyva voda* (Living Waters, 1947) was severely criticized; it reappeared in radically revised form, entitled *Myr* (Peace), after the author’s death. Also first in Russian, Ianovsky’s play *Dochka prokurora* (The Procurator’s Daughter) was performed in 1954, a week before his death. (1992, 61)

Although Ianovsky was a Ukrainian playwright, both his *Duma pro Brytanku* and *Zhyva voda* appeared first in Russian translation before the original Ukrainian version was officially published. The appearance of the Russian translation before the appearance of the Ukrainian original is indicative of Ukrainian’s subordinate status to Russian during the Stalin era.

### 5.2.5 The Decline of Ukrainian Translation

In the de-Stalinization period of the 1960s, Dziuba compared Soviet translation practices during the Lenin period to those of the Khrushchev period. He expressed his concern over the decreasing amount of translated literature available to the Ukrainian public. Moreover, he argued that the increasing shortage of Ukrainian translated literature contrasted sharply with the objectives of early Soviet translation policies to further develop and enrich minority languages. As Dziuba states:

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\(^{56}\) The majority of Vaplite members, including other translators such as Mykola Kulish and Maik Yohansen, were imprisoned and executed. Others, including Pavlo Tychyna, were forced to capitulate to the Soviet regime and adapt their work to adhere to the fundamentals of Socialist Realism.
And what about translation? What about bringing the Ukrainian reader the wealth of world culture in his own language? This is one of the great concerns to which every civilised nation has always devoted the maximum attention and effort. In the 1920s Ukrainian publishing houses were successfully carrying out a far-reaching plan for complete multi-volume editions of the world’s literary classics and of the most outstanding works of philosophical, political, sociological, historiographical thought, and art criticism, in good translations, with apparatus criticus, and with the participation of eminent specialists. (1968, 146)

Furthermore, Dziuba conveyed his genuine apprehension for the future of Ukrainian if increasingly fewer translated world classics were accessible to the Ukrainian reader. He argued that the reluctance to translate foreign texts into Ukrainian was equal to denying basic linguistic rights and was a sheer sign of linguistic regression that made Ukrainians dependent on Russian for access to foreign classics:

Now these translations have become such bibliographic rarities that it is virtually impossible to get hold of them. New translations are being produced on a fairly miserable scale, so that we have only individual books from the world’s classics. Some of our most brilliant translations such as Goethe’s Faust (translated by M. Lukash), Dante’s Commedia (translated by P. Karmans’ky and M. Ryl’s’ky), and others, are being published in such miserably small editions that it is impossible to acquire them no matter how much one may want to. The publication of the world’s philosophical and sociological literature in Ukrainian translation is out of the question. (1968, 146)

Dziuba further points out that translation of world literature was becoming less available in Ukrainian print, and this unanticipated lack of obtainable translations was disconcerting since the demand for Ukrainian translations never declined. Furthermore, he suggests that access to translated literature was a basic right which was not met in the Ukrainian SSR. The act of denying access to translated works is reproachful on the grounds of stifling cultural development. Dziuba recognizes that forcing Ukrainians to read foreign works in Russian translation rather than in Ukrainian was inequitable:
But these are things that must make up the tangible culture life of modern nation, if it is not to fall into a state of spiritual inferiority. If we failed to provide these for the Ukrainian nation and if we suggested that it could reach the world’s intellectual life through the medium of Russian culture rather than directly, we would actually refuse it one of its most basic rights, and transform into parasitism and dependence what should and could be friendly reciprocal help. Also we would actually increase the backwardness of Ukrainian culture and push the Ukrainian language yet further into the background, since translations are not liabilities but rank among the greatest assets of every culture. (1968, 147)

Dziuba was attempting to convey a few important messages: translations enrich culture and language; translations provide a window of contact onto foreign worlds; translations are a sign of linguistic development within a culture. Refuting the right to translate was tantamount to linguicide.

5.2.6 The Sixties

One of the best known members of the sixtier movement was Ivan Dziuba. He was considered a renegade nationalist by Soviet officials and was imprisoned as a result. From 1965 onward, Dziuba was no longer published in the USSR; in 1972 he was arrested and expelled from the Writer’s Union of Ukraine (SPU). His book Internationalism or Russification? was considered an important and informative publication, revealing the reality of Soviet language politics in the Ukrainian SSR:

In it he demonstrated how the Soviet regime had departed from the theoretical principles of Leninist nationality policy and had been Russifying Ukraine and destroying its society and intelligentsia under the pretext of internationalism—in effect, how the Soviet government was perpetuating the colonial policies of tsarist Russia. (‘Dziuba, Ivan’, Encyclopedia of Ukraine)

Although banned in the Soviet Union, it was quickly translated into four languages outside of the USSR. “It was published in the West in 1968 and was subsequently translated into
Russian, English, French, and Italian—providing a fundamental source of information on contemporary Ukraine” (“Dziuba, Ivan”, Encyclopedia of Ukraine). Additionally, Dziuba expressed the need for a publishing house, within the Ukrainian SSR, that could employ a team of professional translators to translate world classics into Ukrainian:

In our opinion it would be worthwhile creating a special publishing house that would bring out works from foreign literatures of the people of the USSR in Ukrainian translation. Such a publishing house could rally to itself highly qualified translators and could meet the demands of Ukrainian readers more fully. (1968, 147)

In order to enhance the linguistic and literary prestige of Ukrainian, Dziuba believed that the Ukrainian SSR was in dire need of more translated world literature rather than merely issuing Russian language books or second-hand translations from Russian.

Aside from Dziuba, there were several others writers, scholars and translators who were part of the sixtier resistance movement and who were also persecuted for deviating from the Socialist Realism literary doctrine. The sixtiers were accused of being enemies of the Soviet Union for purportedly wanting to start a nationalist movement through their writing. Because the sixtiers were considered a national threat, their works were consequently banned and denied translation into Russian until glasnost and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many sixtiers were arrested and even banished from the USSR. Luckyj describes the series of events:

Let us recall the political arrests of 1965 and 1972, let us recall that the post-sixtier poets were deliberately excluded from literature and that therefore literary development was crushed. Some of the sixtiers - M. Vinhranovsky, Iu. Shcherbak, I. Zhylenko, V. Symonenko, and the present author – were removed from the literary process; some found themselves behind bars – O. Berdnyk, V. Zakharchenko, A. Shevchuk, I. Svitlychny, V. Ruban, and others; the Ukrainian school of translators formed in the 1960s was destroyed; L. Kostenko remained silent, O. Honchar was ostracized because of his Cathedral, as well as B. Antonenko-Davydovych for his journalism. Ukrainian literature
was thus not in a state of stagnation, unlike Russian, it was in a state of pogrom.57 (1992, 76)

The case of Soviet Ukrainian author Oles Honchar may be regarded as an example of literary politics during the Brezhnev era, also known as the “Freeze.” He published a novel entitled Sobor (Cathedral, 1968), “which was officially censured and subsequently removed from circulation” (“Honchar, Oles”, Encyclopedia of Ukraine) because its contents were deemed controversial as the novel explored the question of nationalism, Soviet bureaucracy, and the failure of socialism. Honchar’s Sobor, although approved for translation into Russian by chief editor Sergei Baruzdin of Druzhba Narodov (a literary monthly which publishes non-Russian writers in Russian translation), was a challenge to publish because of the full ban on it up until it was reissued in Russian translation in 1986, at the beginning of glasnost. The politics regarding Sobor and its divisive contents caused major delays in obtaining approval for its translation. The struggle for permission to translate was drawn out for nearly two decades as Russian and Ukrainian political historian Roman Solchanyk reports: “Mr. Oliynyk58 used the forum of the Congress of Soviet Writers in Moscow to raise the "Sobor" issue once again, noting that the editors of Druzhba Narodov had struggled for 18 years to obtain permission for the novel's publication” (1986, n. page). Honchar’s novel was heavily criticized and Sobor was excluded from his full collection of works published in the late 1970s, according to Solchanyk: “‘Sobor’, however, became an ‘unbook’, and was not included in the six-volume collection of his works published in 1978-1979. Indeed, it was not even listed in the author's bibliography appended to the collected edition.” (1986, n. page). Interestingly enough, all of Honchar’s other works were

58 Borys Oliynyk a renowned Ukrainian academician, author and poet.
indeed in line with Socialist Realism and remained in circulation – with no restriction on translation - while *Sobor* was banned, with translation prohibited indefinitely.

During the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, translation activities into Ukrainian gradually decreased as a result of russification which, through mandatory school instruction and administrative use, enabled Russian to steadily replace Ukrainian. Because the use of Russian was becoming increasingly pervasive, there was less need to make literature accessible through other mediums than Russian. Notwithstanding the high demand for foreign works, small quantities of foreign novels were translated compared to the number of Russian titles which surfaced. The fact remained that the bulk of world literature was translated into Russian, especially during the post-Stalin period, without the intention of making it available to the Ukrainian public on the pretext that Ukrainians were fluent in Russian. Additionally, Russian translations were treated with more care than Ukrainian ones, a fact which resulted in large qualitative discrepancies between Russian and Ukrainian translations. There were also quantitative differences which made Russian the dominant source language and Ukrainian a very marginal one. Rapawy notes that in 1970 over 80% of foreign titles translated into Ukrainian were actually Russian language titles (1978, 126-127); meanwhile, the number of translations from Ukrainian into Russian was not comparable. Lastly, the politics of censorship heavily impeded the general ability to translate; this affected all minority languages in the USSR including Ukrainian, the second most spoken language in the Soviet Union.
6 Conclusion

The USSR existed for nearly seventy years and, for almost its entire existence, linguistic assimilation by way of russification of minority languages has incontestably been a priority of Soviet leaders such as Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. Stalin’s reign brought a series of reforms that would assiduously suppress the development of minority languages like Ukrainian, and would carry on for decades until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The rhetoric used by Stalin, “national in form, but Socialist in content” was the platform on which he maximized the importance of a common Soviet language to unite all Soviet citizens while de-emphasizing the relevance of national languages in building socialism and solidarity in the USSR. The superimposition of Russian as the preeminent Soviet language was an important factor in justifying the sedulous russification of minority languages that affected all spheres of translation in the USSR, including opera libretti, legal texts, and literature.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that russification of Ukrainian initially began during the tsarist period and was taken over and amplified by the Soviets. The tsarist period imposed serious restrictions on publishing in Ukrainian; translations were prohibited and had to be published outside the Russian empire. Until the Russian Revolution in 1905, the only Ukrainian works that could circulate within the Russian Empire appeared in transliterated Russian Cyrillic. Such prohibitive measures were the precursors to
The subsequent Soviet language policy which, through its imperious attitude towards Ukrainian, sought to thwart its progression.

The language policies for publishing in the USSR supported further russification of Ukrainian by re-standardizing the Ukrainian Cyrillic alphabet in the likeness of Russian Cyrillic, stripping Ukrainian terminology of all roots not akin to Russian and artificially implanting Russian affixes to bring the two languages closer together. This ultimately posed major lexical inconsistencies as Galicia and the Ukrainian diaspora did not adopt these changes. The introduction of Socialist Realism in literature played an important role in the fate of translated texts as serious restrictions with respect to Ukrainian national elements were stringently enforced. Ukrainian historic literary figures were replaced with Soviet Russian figures and all translated material had to meet the approval of Glavlit censors before proceeding to print. The publication of translations provided an opportunity to manipulate information by concealing facts, obscuring details, or stating overt falsehoods in order to influence or prevent the target audience from knowing too much. Censoring translated literature became a mode of upholding socialist values, through Socialist Realism, by repressing foreign concepts or bourgeois nationalist content.

The quantity and quality of translations between Russian and Ukrainian, as well as between Russian and other minority languages, demonstrated above all else that Russian was always treated with higher regard than Ukrainian and other languages. Translation into Russian was diligently rendered while translation into Ukrainian or other minority languages were often substandard. Russian was always the number one source language for distribution within the USSR and the number one target language for imported material.

Looking retrospectively at all the facts about translation within the russification process, it is evident that censorship in translation also played an important role in the
formation of Soviet Ukrainian identity and that it was used for political and ideological gains. The amount and nature of abridgements speak to the magnitude of censored publications produced by the Soviet Union for its Soviet Ukrainian audience, as well as to the level of textual manipulation within its very own translation bureaus. From the data collected and information presented in this thesis, the evidence is irrefutable - translation was used as a catalyst for the russification of Ukrainian under Imperial and Soviet rule.
7 Bibliography


8 Appendices

8.1 Appendix A

This map displays the Ukrainian ethnolinguistic and political boundaries in the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1772-1914.

Source: Magocsi, 1985, 20
8.2 Appendix B

This map displays the Ukrainian ethnolinguistic and political boundaries in 1930 during the interwar period.

Source: Magocsi, 1985, 22
8.3 Appendix C

This map displays the Ukrainian ethnolinguistic and political boundaries in 1938 prior to the annexation of Western Ukraine to the USSR.

Source: Magocsi, 1985, 23