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THE CORPORATIVE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY

by

Thomas Manning

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December 1938
Ottawa, Canada.

Ph.D., June 1939.
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I.

Introduction

During the past twenty years our modern civilization has been undergoing a series of changes which has weakened and, in some cases, destroyed that complacency which characterized the prewar period. There is a crisis in modern society which is a source of deep concern to all social theorists. There is almost unanimous agreement that there is something wrong with the social order. When, however, it is a question of the causes of this crisis, the seriousness of it, and what sort of remedies should be applied, there is a wide divergence of opinion.

According to some we are just completing the Renaissance and are about to enter upon the "New Middle Ages" (1). Others see in the present crisis, the prelude of the coming struggle for power between Communism and Fascism. Marxists see in the disintegration of capitalism, the inevitable emergence of state socialism. Others are equally convinced that the same disintegration will result in the adoption of some sort of Fascist regime.

(3) ibid.
However, not all see in the present chaos of society the necessity of going to the extreme of totalitarianism, whether communistic or Fascistic. They believe that society can be reconstructed according to Christian principles, based upon true concepts of man, society and the state.

This alternative to the equally false theories of liberalism and totalitarianism, is not a mere patching up of a social order which is based upon the false principles of religious, political and economic individualism, but a "reconstruction of the social order" in accordance with the teachings of Catholic philosophy and sociology. In other words, a new social order must replace the one which is not a social order but a social chaos. The source of this chaos is the foundation of erroneous principles regarding man, society and the state, upon which our modern civilization has been based. As Leo XIII said so well:

If anyone look carefully at the bitterness of our times and, if, further, he considers earnestly the causes of those things which are done in public and in private, he will discover with certainty the fruitful root of the evils which are now overwhelming us, and of the evils which we greatly fear. The cause he will find to consist in this evil teaching about things human and divine which has come forth from the schools of the philosophers.

(5) Cornelius Lucey, A Christian Alternative to Communism and Fascism, Dublin, 1937
(6) Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, Rome, 1931
it has crept into all orders of the state, and it has been received with the common applause of many. Now it has been implanted in man by nature to follow reason as the guide of his actions, and, therefore, if the understanding go wrong in anything, the will follows easily. Hence it comes about that wicked opinions, whose seat is in the understanding flow into human actions and make them bad. On the other hand, if the mind of man be healthy and strongly grounded in solid and true principles, it will assuredly be the source of great blessings, both as regards the good of individuals and as regards the common weal."

There is probably no period in the worlds history when there was such a need for the true principles to which Leo XIII refers, than the present day. The false philosophical, theological, the sociological doctrines of the three Revolutions, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the French Revolution, are producing their chaotic harvest from the seeds sown during the past four centuries. To meet this avalanche of destructive ideas which is threatening the very existence of civilization, there is a need for a Christian program which will serve as a beacon to guide men during the present period of darkness and confusion. This program must not be merely concerned with immediate problems and issues, but it must be a definite social ideal, an ideology, which will color all present social remedial activities.

(7) Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, Rome, 1879.
4.

There are many socially conscious individuals who do not sufficiently realize the importance of basic concepts and ideals in social reconstruction. They are so concerned with the immediate problems of society, that they fail to realize the necessity of having an ultimate ideal of society which will be the goal and object of the immediate reforms. As a recent writer puts it;

"Ultimate and seemingly distant goals have a more direct influence on immediate and practical measures in all issues of private and social life than is usually supposed. The manner in which we try to relieve existing social evil, calling for undelayed redress, is really dictated by the concept which we have formed of the nature and purpose of society. Proposals of reform take their general character and coloring from the ideological background, against which they are seen. It is the social perspective which counts and tells in the choice of immediate measures. On this perspective depends the entire orientation of practical policies, though this may not be apparent to the superficial observer. Policies have their roots in corresponding creeds and receive from them their direction and complexion. Fundamentals, in spite of their abstract character, are of paramount and vital importance."(8)

Consequently those who are to reconstruct society according to Christian principles must have a clear concept of what society ought to be because, "without a definite pattern of the social ideal before our mind, we grope

(8) Bruehl, Charles, Christian Corporatism, Ecclesiastical Review, Sept. 1937
in the dark and can at best only pursue a shifting course of opportunism; singleness of purpose and consistency will be impossible." The physician is obliged to make a study of the healthy organism before he studies disease. Likewise, the social physician must have a definite understanding of the healthy social organism before he can prescribe a cure for the ills of modern society. The lack of such knowledge has produced disastrous results in many cases. It has been the cause of many grotesque remedies which have tended to kill, rather than cure the ailing social organism.

The Christian cure for the present chaotic state of society is described by Pope Pius XI in the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, which was written in 1931 in commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the encyclical Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII. The encyclical bears the title "On Reconstructing the Social Order and Perfecting it Conformably To the Precepts of the Gospel." The papal program for the reconstruction of the social order is found in paragraphs 76 to 98 and since the heading of this chapter bears the same title as the encyclical itself, it is quite

(9) Bruehl, loc. cit., 1234.

(10) De Ordine sociali instaurando et ad Evangelicae legis normam perficiendo, in annum XL, post editas Leonis XIII Litteras Encyclicas "Rerum Novarum".
evident that these paragraphs contain the main portion of the encyclical.

The Holy Father points out that what has been said previously regarding the right distribution of property and a just scale of wages is concerned directly with the individual and only indirectly with the social order. The Pope then states that in order to complete the work which was begun in the way of reconstruction by Leo XIII, two things are necessary: the reform of the social order and the correction of morals. It is necessary to remark in passing that the phrase, "the reform of the social order and the correction of morals" is very important. There has been a tendency on the part of some to select one to the exclusion of the other. The reformer of the social order is inclined to consider the moral reformer a dreamer who was out of touch with the realities of life. The moral reformer, on the other hand, is inclined to consider the reformer of social conditions a materialist who ignores the necessity of a spirit which moves and quickens the world. Both are essential for the reconstruction of society along chrestian lines.

(11) Von Neill Breuning, Reorganization of Social Economy, Milwaukee, Bruce, 1936, 195
(12) "Quae de partitione aequa honorum et de justis salariis hucusque enuntiavimus, singulares personas respiciant nec nisi oblique socialem ordinem attingunt."
(13) "Attamen ut ejus feliciter incepta stabiliantur perficienturque reliqua, atque uberiora adhuc et laetiora in humanam familiam redundant emolumenta, duo necessaria maxime sunt; institutionum reformatio atque emendatio morum." AAS, 202.
There is no successful reform of social conditions unless moral reform is present. There is no effective moral reform unless the proper atmosphere is provided for it by a corresponding reform of social conditions. Both are absolutely necessary. As Von Nell Breuning says so well, "Absolute necessity does not tolerate either a "more" or a "less"; it either exists or does not exist. Nor can the work on moral reform be called more necessary than endeavor regarding the reform of conditions, on the ground that the moral is of a higher and nobler rank than the purely materialistic. This would be an unwarranted change from one sphere into another, an illogical thought, a transition to a different order."

The introductory remarks of the Pope regarding the reconstruction of the social order are concerned with the state.

"When we speak of the reform of the social order it is principally the state we have in mind. Not indeed that all salvation is to be hoped for from its intervention; but because on account of the evil of Individualism, as we called it, things have come to such a pass that the highly developed social life which once flourished in a variety of prosperous institutions organically linked with each other, has been damaged, and all but ruined leaving thus virtually only individuals and the state. Social life lost entirely its organic form."

(14) Von Nell Breuning, op. cit. 198-199
(15) "Ac refomationem quidem institutionum cum commoramus, res publica praecipue menti observatur non quasi ab eis opere universa salus spectanda, sed quia ob 'individualismi' quem diximus vitium eo res sunt redrectae, ut prostrata aeqaeae extincta loculate illa et quondam per diversi generis consociationes compositae evoluta vita sociali, fere soli remanserint singulares
8.

The state is the first institution which needs reform because it is the state which has destroyed the organic life of society and taken upon itself functions which do not properly belong to it. This thought of the Pope has been frequently misunderstood. As one writer puts it: "This is one of the passages to which we have repeatedly called attention as being misleading in the English translation. The original text reads to this effect; When we come to treat of institutions, we first of all think of the state (as being in need of reform)."

This is a very important point because present day tendencies are toward statism which leads logically to totalitarianism, which is the very antithesis of the corporative society which is advocated by the Holy Father. The Papal program is an absolute reversal of this growing policy of centralization. As he says;

"The state, which now was encumbered with all the burdens once borne by the associations rendered exsirvta by it, was in consequence submerged and overwhelmed by an infinity of affairs and duties."

(15) continued. "Hominum et res publica, haud parvo ipsius rei publicae detrimento.

(16) "We Have No Program, The Guildsman, Germantown, Illinois, June, 1937."
It is indeed true, as history clearly proves, that owing to the change in social conditions, much that was formerly done by small bodies can nowadays be accomplished only by large corporations. None the less, just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the community at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so too it is an injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies. The state should leave to these smaller groups the settlement of business of minor importance. Let those in power, therefore, be convinced that the more faithfully this principle be followed, and a graded hierarchical order exist between the various subsidiary organizations, the more excellent will be both the authority and the efficiency of the social organization as a whole and the happier and more prosperous the condition of the state."

(17)"haud parvo ipsius rei publicae detrimento, quae, amissa forma regimannis socialis susceptisque oneribus omnibus, quae deleae illae consociationes antea perferent, negotiis et officiis propemodum infinitis obruta est atque oppressa.

Nam etsi verum est, idque historia luculentur ostendit, ob mutatas rerum condiones multa nunc non nisis a magnis consociationibus possese praestari, quae superiores etate a pervis etiam praebebantur, fixum temen immotumque menet in philosophia sociali gravissimum illud principium quod neque moveri neque mutari potest: sicut quae a singularibus hominibus proprio marte et propria industria possunt perfici, nefas est eisdem eripere et communitati demandere, ita quae a minoribus et inferioribus communis atibus efficia praestari potest, ea ad maiorem et altiorem societatem vocare iniuria est simulque grave damnum ac recti ordinis perturbatio;

....Minoris igitur momenti negotis et eures quibus aliquo maxime distineretur, inferioribus coetibus expedienda permittat suprema rei publicae auctoritas oportet...........

Quare sibi animo persuasum habeant, qui rerum potiuntur: quo perfectius, servato hoc 'subidarii' officii principio, hierarchicus inter diversas consociationes ordo viguerit, eo praesatantioriorem fore socialem et suxtoitatem et efficientem, eoque feliciorem laetioremque rei publicae statum."
10.

In this section of the encyclical, the Holy Father enunciates a fundamental principle of Christian social doctrine, namely, the principle of Subsidiarity of Social Activities, also referred to as the principle of Subsidiarity of Associations. It is this principle which differentiates the Christian program for reconstruction from every collectivistic and one-sidedly exaggerated universalistic social philosophy.

The encyclical then proceeds to say that it is the primary duty of the state and all good citizens to abolish class conflict and restore harmony between the various ranks of society. The method to be used to accomplish this harmonious cooperation is the reestablishment of vocational groups (ordines). In other words, the restoration of well-ordered members of the social body which bind men together "not according to the position they occupy in the labor market, but according to the diverse functions which they exercise in society."

(18) Von Neill Breuning, op. cit., 206
(19) "Id autem in primis spectat, in id intendere et rei publicae et optimae civis debent, ut "classium" oppositarum disceptione superata concurs "ordium"conspiratio exeditetur et provehatur"
(20) "In reficiendo igitur "ordines" ars politica socialis incumbat necesse est".
(21) "Ast perfecta sanatio tum tantum efforescat cum oppositione illa e medio sublata, socialis corporis membra bene instructa constituentur; "ordines" nimium, quibus inserantur homines non pro munere, quod quis in mercatu laboris habeat sed pro diversis partibus socialibus, quas singuli exerceant."
The term ordinés which is used by the Holy Father and is enclosed in quotation marks in the Latin text, has given rise to a number of English translations. It is translated by some as vocational groups, by others as occupational groups, Others have transl.ated it as Guilds. One author has transferred the Latin "ordines" to the English "orders". Among the other English equivalents are Corporations, Functional groups and Guilds Joint Industrial Councils.

The official English version of the encyclical uses vocational groups. The term occupational groups is rejected by one of the outstanding authorities on the vocational group theory, in the United States because it fails to convey the true meaning of the Latin "ordo" and lacks the ennobling and broader concept which is contained in the idea of vocation. He also points up that the use of occupational groups is based upon the acceptance of the class concept and for that reason in evident opposition with the true meaning of the encyclical which is to establish a new social structure in which the present classes disappear.

(22) Forty Years After. Reconstructing The Social Order. N.C.W.C., Washington D.C. 1931
(23) John Ryan, Catholic Teaching on Our Industrial System, N.C.W.C. Washington D.C.
New Guilds, N.C.W.C. Washington, D.C.
(26) Lucey, loc. cit. 6.
(27) Reconstructing the Social Order, N.C.W.C. Wash. D.C.
(28) Guildsman, June 1934
(29) Ibi.
Some have suggested the term vocational estates, but it has the disadvantage of being meaningless to the average American. In addition, it suggests an "objectionable horizontal social stratification and is hardly suited to the present state of society with its many divisions deserving to be regarded as organic parts." Moreover the proposed vocational groups resembles the guilds more closely than the old estates. The social strata are to be cut thru vertically by the vocational groups uniting the individuals of the several horizontal layers who are engaged in the same profession, trade or industry.

The word corporation is sometimes used to designate the "orders" of the encyclical but it has not the same force and meaning that it has in the French from which it is adopted. Corporation in English means usually a business combine or stock company. For that reason it cannot be used to designate a vocational group.

There are some writers who favor the use of the word Guild to designate the "ordo" of the encyclical. Greater weight has been added to this opinion by the use of the word corporation in the recent encyclical Dimini Redemptoris.

(30) "Why Guilds"?, The Guildsman, Oct. 1937
The word corporatio is an old Latin word. The Italian has a similar term. In an address at the meeting at which the "fasci di Combattimento" were founded, Mussolini stated "It may be objected that this program implies a return to the guilds (corporazioni)". The English translation of the "Dixit nimirum Redemptoris" refers to the Corporation. The Latin text gives, "corporatorum hominum collegium". In the earlier part of the same encyclical the word "coll egium" is used in the phrase "artificium collegia", which is translated as "guilds of workingmen". (31)

Again in the same Encyclical, the pope says that the great guilds of artisans and workingmen of every type arose in the Middle Ages as a result of the activity of the Church. And further, "These guilds, ridiculed as "medieval" by the liberalism of the past century, are today claiming the admiration of our contemporaries in many countries who are endeavoring to revive them in some modern form." (32) Volpi, Economic Progress of Fascism, (32) "Again, Why Guilds?", Guildsman, Nov. 1937 (33) "On Atheistin Communism", N.C.W.C. 26, par. 54 (34) Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XXIX, 31 Martii 1937, p. 93 (35) ibid p. 84. (36) ibid. "His innixa principiis Ecclesia humanam societatem renovavit; sicutem, suae impulsione virtutis, miranda prorsus orta sunt caritatis instituta, itemque potentissima illa artificium omne genus collegia, quae utique superiore saeculo Liberalismi sectatores contemptui habuerunt, quasi Medii Aeaeatis inventa; quae tum, intra- admirationem commoveunt, et quorum forma in pluribus nationibus multorum experimento tentata, reviviscit." p. 84-85.
Another argument advanced in favor of the use of guild is the fact that "Quadragesimo Anno" objects to class divisions and class conflict, and the clearly states that the grouping into "vocational groups" is not to be along the lines of employer and employee but on the basis of common social function. But that was the distinctive feature of the medieval guilds. As an article in L'Unite states,"We do not form two rival organizations, of employers and employees, with a view of uniting them in a federation. We regroup the employers, their workmen, and apprentices into the industrial family which they should rightly have composed. We form but one body, and they will not, or hardly separate. We apply the true doctrine taught by the Vatican." (37)

A very good reason for using the word guild is the fact that it is quite commonly used in English and does not share the vagueness of occupational or vocational group. Moreover it frees the concept from any suggestion of Fascism which would be true if the word Corporation were used. We already have in existence the American Guild of Musicians, the Newspaper Writers Guild, the Actors Guild etc. For that reason guild seems to be more acceptable as the designation for the vocational group idea.

(37) L'Unite, Montreal, August 19, 1937.
This system of guilds or vocational groups is known by various names. It has been called Solidarism but this name does not seem desirable since it is more adapted to the field of theory and is not likely to gain any great popular favor. Universalism, which is suggested by some is subject to the same criticism. Corporatism or corporative system, while an accurate description of the system presents the difficulty that the Fascist system is labeled with the same name and for this reason it seems that it would be objectionable as the name for the Catholic system.

Since the proposed vocational group, as we have pointed out is the modern version of the guild, it seems that the new system may properly be called the "Modern Guild System". Another name which has been used is "A Guild Social Order. Either one of these seems preferable to Corporatism. First because the word Corporatism which is taken over from the French language is unfamiliar to American ears. Secondly, it avoids the use of an "ism" which is rather important these days. Thirdly, it frees the Catholic system from being confused with any Fascist set-up.

(38) "Naming the New System", The Guildman, June, 1933, 10,
The system which is advocated in the encyclicals has sometimes been termed the corporate state or the corporative state. This term is not accurate because the essential function of the state is the exercise of political power, that is, of the supreme power on the temporal plane. Strictly speaking the expression "corporate state" means that the political power of the nation should be entrusted to the corporations. As we shall see later in the thesis, the corporations or guilds are members of the societal body but their function is the administration of the general welfare of the profession and not the power of co-ordination, and the exercise of supreme power which is reserved to the government or the state, strictly speaking.

Another reason for avoiding the use of "corporate state" is that it is used to designate the Fascist concept of totalitarianism in which the corporate regime is set up by the state and the corporations are absorbed in the state. In reality they are used by the state to coordinate the various industries and professions of the country. For that reason it is corporatism of the state, rather than, the corporate state.

(40) Religion and the Modern State, Dawson (Sheed and Ward), New York, 135.
This then in summary is the Christian solution for the present chaotic state of society. It is not a blueprint which can be applied to every nation without variation. It is rather the principles of a Guild system which must be worked out to suit the needs of each nation and the mentality and requirements of various peoples.

The Guild Social Order is not a new solution. It has been the program of Catholic Social Philosophy for more than a hundred years. It is true that not all Catholic sociologists and social theorists advocated this system but the more advanced groups did and their solution is that which is advanced by Pope Pius XI as the program of social reconstruction for the world.

The Guild system idea was elaborated by Adam Heinrich Mueller (1778-1829) and Franz Von Baader (1765-1841) in Germany. But during the latter half of the nineteenth century it was elaborated especially by Vogelsang in Austria, Kettler, Pesch and others in Germany, Marquis de la Tour du Parn, Count De Mun in France.

Much has been done also in the development and elaboration of Catholic Social teaching by the Fribourg Union (renamed the Union of Malines after the war) and the Semaines sociales de France and Canada.
18.

It is impossible to trace the development of the corporative movement in the various countries of Europe in this thesis. Its leaders saw the effects of the new doctrines of economic liberalism and they realized that some solution must be proposed which would correct the pagan abuses which were so prevalent in the eighteenth century. The realized, too, that socialism was offered to the worker as the solution for his economic problems and in many cases was winning many adherents even among Catholic workers. They turned to the teachings of the Church for the principles of their social program, principles of the common good, legal, commutative, and distributive, justice, the rights and duties of employers and employees.

These great leaders of Catholic social teaching recognized, too, the necessity of organization of employers and employees, not along the lines of two opposed class organizations, but in an organization, formed by charity and mutual cooperation. They found the model for this organization in the medieval guilds, which had been destroyed by the ravages of individualism. And so they advocated a return to the organic concept of society as opposed to the atomic concept of individualism, a return to the guilds.

None of these thinkers wished the return to the medieval world. As Vogelsang said, "The modes of existence which have once served mankind for the development of its
earthly life are used up and void. No one will hold that the world would again be at home therein. But the idea which gave birth to these forms still lives; it lives and will live forever; for it is permeated with the Christian spirit, which communicates to it its own everlasting character. And from the fountainhead of these same social and political ideas the needs of man can be provided for also today; because even to-day they contain the same ingredients which they contained in times long past."

The Catholic principles for social reconstruction, advocated for the past hundred years by Catholic leaders of social thought, received wider recognition by the growth of corporate sentiment which has arisen since the War, but particularly as a result of the pronouncements of Pope Pius XI in the encyclicals "Quaragesimo Anno" and Divini Redemptoris". Unfortunately, in the United States, with a few exceptions, the essential features of the new system are not generally grasped. This may, in part, be due to the lack of an organized Catholic Movement, which has flourished in various European countries. However, in past years there has been a remarkable interest taken in the Papal program for reconstruction. It has been the subject of many articles, speeches, and books.
It is the purpose of this thesis to give a general survey of the Catholic principles which form the background of the "Modern Guild Order" of Quaerentesimo Anno. Following the advice of Leo XIII, Ite ad Thomam", we turn to the works of the Angelic Doctor for our principles of the social order. In the first part of the thesis we intend to describe the healthy social order. Then describe the present chaotic condition of society and its causes. Finally, we will describe the remedy which has been proposed by the Pontiff, the vocational groups, or the Modern Guilds.
Chapter I.
The Concept of Order

An understanding of what is required for the reconstruction of the social order necessarily presupposes a knowledge of what constitutes a true social order. It is the purpose of this first part of the thesis to elaborate the concept of the social order according to the teachings of St. Thomas. This chapter is devoted to an analysis of the concept of order.

Order is a fundamental and common concept of our everyday life and yet comparatively few have a complete and precise notion of its meaning. The term is given several meanings in the English language, but its primary and fundamental meaning is synonymous with systematic arrangement or harmony. It has been defined as an established (41) succession of harmonious relations. There is implicitly contained in this definition, as in the various other definitions and concepts of order, the idea of end or purpose. For example, the order of a living room differs from the order of an office, because of difference of purpose. The expression, "in order to" suggests the arrangement of activities toward a specific aim which is the end of the action.

(41) The Order of Nature, Joseph Marling, Catholic University of America, 1934, p.28.
Order in its primary sense is one of the fundamental concepts of our thought. Next to clearness of ideas orderly sequence is the requisite for the exercise of the intelligence. For that very reason, it does not lend itself easily to definition or analysis. It is easily recognized and appreciated by the man in the street. But, since we are interested in a definite understanding of order, we must subjct the concept to a philosophical analysis.

The concept of order, altho it is not treated "ex professo", dominates the philosophy of St. Thomas. From a consideration of the various passages of his works, which are concerned with the concept of order we will be able to arrive at a definite understanding of the meaning of this concept.

Order dominated the philosophy of St. Thomas. The things of nature and their properties are characterized (2) by order. What is true of nature, is also true of man. The entire moral and ethical system of the Angelic Doctor is based upon the concept of "debitus ordo". The social structure is subject to order. Society is organized upon

(2) Commentary on Aristotles Physics, VIII, 6.
(3) "Cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures, ordine autem quodem ab uno in multitudinem procedatur, necesse est inter potentia animae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter esse attenditur; quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ad alteram; tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem objectorum." Summa Thoel., I, q.77 a.1.
(4) "Peccatum proprium consistit in actu quiagit propter finem aliquem, cum non habet debitum ordinem ad finem illum. Debitus ordo ad finem secundum aliquam regulam mensuratur." ibid, I-II, q.21, a.1.
23.

a fourfold order; of ruler an subjects, of subjects among themselves, of one people to another; and in the household, of husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant. (5)

Finally, religion consists in the observance of a relation which exists between man and his creator.

According to St. Thomas, order pervades every grade of being. No being is entirely devoid of order. The purpose of creation itself may be expressed in terms of order; an order of part to part, and of the whole to its final end (5) which is God.

St. Thomas does not seem to have advanced a specific definition of order. In several places, however, he has described the various elements of order and shown how these may be found in various forms.

In the Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences he says;

Respondeo dicendum quod ordo in ratione sua includit tria, scilicet: rationem prioris et posterioris; undesecondum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo alic-

(5) "Quadruplex autem ordo in aliquo populo inveniri potest; unus quidem principium populi ad subditos; alius autem subditorum ad invicem; tertius autem eorum qui sunt de populo ad extraneos; quartus autem ad dementicos, sicut pater ad filium, uxoris ad virum et domini ad servum." Summa Theol. I-II, q.104, a.1

(6) Ibid. IIa-IIae, 81, 1.

(7) "Finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi," Summa Theol. I, c.103, a.2, ad 3.
24.

uorium, secundum quos aliquis altero prius dicitur et secundum locum et secundum tempus et secundum omnia hujusmodi. Includit etiam distinctionem, quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praeponit nomen ordinis quam significat. Includit etiam tertio rationem ordinis, ex qua etiam ordo in speciem contrahitur. Unde unus est ordo secundum dignitatem, alius secundum organum, et sic de aliis."

(9)

Again the Angelic Doctor says;

"Considerandum est autem quod ad ordinem tria concurunt. Primo quidem distinctio cum convenientia; secundo, cooperatio; tertio, finis. Dico autem distinctionem cum convenientia, quia ubi non est distinctio, ordo locum non habet. Si autem quae distinctio sunt in nullo convenirent, unus ordinis non essent." (10)

These are but two passages of the many which might be cited but they serve to give us a distinct concept of order. The first gives the intrinsic elements. The second adds the all important extrinsic element, the purpose or end.

We will consider the intrinsic elements first and we may arrange them in the following manner. I. A number of distinct things. 2. A certain common relation which unites them. 3. A definite ratio ordinis according to which the relation is established.

(9) In I Sent., d. 20, q. I, a. 3, ad I.
(10) In De Div. Nom., VII, II.
The existence of order demands, in the first place, a number of distinct things. Consequently there are two necessary factors which must be stressed in this connection. There must be at least two or more things; and these must be distinct from each other. The very concept of number implies distinctness. A unit expresses the denial of actual dividedness. Multitude is but a number of units, each one undivided in itself and each one is not the other. Order therefore cannot exist where there is a question of one simple unit.

Distinctness is not a constituent part of the meaning of order, but it is rather a presupposition of it. The distinct units are already there when order supervenes and arranges or unifies the distinct units after a certain fashion. Consequently the distinct units may be regarded as the material cause of order, into which the form of order is introduced.

The second element in the concept of order is relation. So important is this element that St. Thomas calls order a relation.

(I1) "Sic ergo primo in intellectu nostro cadit ens et deinde divisio, et post hoc unum quod divisionem privat, et ultimo multitudo quae ex unitatis constituitur." In Metaph., X,4.

(I2) "Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quamdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est." De Patentia, VII,9.
He considers all order as a proportion. Relation is the unifying factor which gives the characteristic of unity to the distinct entities. It is in relation that order subsists. St. Thomas speaks of relation as the "ratio prius et posterioris," but he indicates that the priority may be "secundum locum" or "secundum tempus" or secundum omnia hujusmodi."

In order to understand St. Thomas view of order it is necessary to recall that relation is one of the ten categories of being. Aristotle was the first to classify the modes into which reality is divided. He spoke of these modes as the categories of being: substance and nine accidents. Relation is one of the latter since it possesses its reality not in itself but by inhering in a substance as in a subject.

This, however, is the only point of similarity between relation and the other accidents. Each of the other accidents implies an entity or mode of being which is proper to one substance considered in regard to another substance. Whereas other accidents formally inhere in a subject, relation, formally considered, serves to give a thing disposition towards something else.

(i3) "Omnis autem ordo proportio quaedam est."
   In Physc., VIII, 3.
(i4) "Ratio propria relationis non accinitur secundum comparationem ad illud in quo est sed secundum comparationem ad aliquud extra."
   Summa Theol., I. 28, 2.
27.

Relations do not pertain to substances in their individuality but to two or more inseparably joined. If these substances are removed and one alone remains, the relation disappears. It is for this reason that relation is referred to by St. Thomas as possessing the least reality, the most feeble existence of the categories.

There are three necessary elements in every relation, the subject, the terminus to which the subject is referred, and the foundation of the relation, or the basis on whose account the subject is referred to the terminus. The subject and terminus are called the extremes; but the foundation is called the medium or cause of the relation.

The third requirement of order is the ratio ordinis. Here ratio means the specifying element according to which things are arranged in a particular fashion. The "ratio" is something intrinsic to the order itself, and with the relation which is based upon it, forms the formal cause of an orderly series. It must be common to each member of the arrangement. Objects may be related according to essence or any generic or specific accident which is common to all of them. This places a limit upon possible orders and at the same time indicates the variety of ordered series that is possible.

(I5) "Relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta." De Potentia, VII, 9.
"Minima habet de ente inter omnia genera."
ibid., IX, 5, ad 2.
One order differs from another in kind according to the ratio upon which it is established. We may go still further and seek the determinant of the ratio. In other words, we may study the source of order.

St. Thomas tells us that order is always spoken of in relation to some principle. Wherever there is order there is some principle. And since the term principle has a variety of meanings it follows that there is a great variety of orders possible. An order is composed of prius and posterius. But since, as Aristotle says, a thing cannot be spoken of as before and another as after in a determined series, except by a comparison with some source or beginning of the series, it follows that the

(I6) "Includit etiam tertio ratio ordinis, ex qua etiam ordo in speciem contrahitur. Unde unus est ordo secundum dignitatem, alius secundum originem, et sic de alis." In I. Sent., d. 20, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.

(I7) "Ordo semper dicitur per comparisonem ad ali- quod principium. Unde sicut dicitur principium multipliciter scilicet secundum situm, ut punctus; secundum intellectum ut principium demonstratio- nis; et secundum causas singulas; ita etiam dicitur ordo." Summa Theol., I, q. 42, a. 3. "Oportet quod ubicunque est aliquod principium, sit etiam aliquis ordo." Ibid. II-II, q. 25, a. 1.

(I8) "Prius and posterius are "Nomina significantia ordinem". In Metaph., V. I6."
entire order will thus be characteristic of its principle.

In its widest sense, a principle signifies that from which something proceeds in any way. A line originates in a point and proceeds from it. Th dawn is the beginning of the day. In these cases the initials are antecedents but not causes. They lead those which follow but they do not produces their followers. If, however, if there is an intrinsic connection between the principle and that which develops from it, it is a cause. That which is produced must differ from its principle in substance and must depend upon it, or there is no question of cause and effect.

All the relations which arise between the cause and its effect will exist among the various members of the order.

(I9) "Dicendum est quod secundum Philosophum in V. Metaph., text com. XVI, prius et posterius dicuntur in quolibet ordine per comparationem ad principium illius ordinis, sicut in loco per comparationem ad principium loci, in disciplinis per comparationem ad principium disciplinae. Sic ergo et in ordine naturae dicitur aliquid esse prius per comparationem ad naturae principia, quae quidem sunt quatuor causae." Quodlibet, V. 19.

(20) "Omne enim a quo aliquid procedit quocumque modo dicimus esse principium." Summa Theol. I, 42, 3.

(21) Summa Theol., I.q.42, a.3.
The character of the principle gives us a knowledge of the general character of the order. As the principle so
(22) th order which follows. If the principle is logical or physical, the order will be logical or physical. If a certain point in space or a specific moment of time is taken to serve as the principles of an order, the order will be spatial or temporal. If the principle intrinsic to the series, is a cause, the order will be causal e.g. a series of generations with reference to an ancestor. All the relations of similarity and dependence which arise between a cause and an effect will exist between the various members of the order.

Although we may know the general character of the order from its principle, if we wish to know the specific determinant of that character in its fullness we must have recourse to the extrinsic principles of order in the strictest sense, to its efficient and final causes. And since the action of the efficient cause is elicited by the final cause, it is in the end or purpose of the orderly arrangement, that the ultimate explanation of order is found.

31.

St. Thomas states this in his enumeration of the elements of order as distinction marked by agreement, cooperation and the end. In order to show that these requisites belong to every order, he states that operation of some sort as well as an end, is proper to every order.

Here we come to the teleological aspect of order. Experience bears out the conclusion that whenever we arrange things we act with a purpose. We may merely intend to restore order where confusion reigned or again we may intend the arrangement to be a means which is over and above the establishment of order as when we construct a machine for a certain type of work. In this case the various parts of the machine are adjusted in view of the purpose of the machine as a whole. Theratio ordinis is dictated and imposed by the purpose of the machine.

In order to understand the machine we must know what it is supposed to do. We may admire the nice adjustment of the parts but we are not satisfied until we know the reason for this arrangement. When we know this we are able to appreciate why the parts were assembled in this particular fashion.

(23) In Div. Nom., IV, I.
(24) "Sicut enim omnis ordinis est aliqua operatio, sic et finis." Ibid.
32.

Order is of a twofold nature. There is, in the first place, the coordination of parts in a series to form a whole. Secondly, there is the subordination of each and all the members to a specific end. The end or purpose of the order first coordinates the members and then subordinates the whole. In order to illustrate this point, St. Thomas uses the illustration of an army. There is an order of coordination between soldier and soldier and an order of subordination between the entire body of men and the general, who embodies the purpose of the army. The order of subordination is primary since the order of coordination is established with a view to it.

Since the end may be either ultimate or particular, it is possible to distinguish a universal and a particular order. A particular order in an individual series in relation to a specific end, which it is immediately to achieve. A universal order is a number of inter-related particular orders.

(25) "Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus. Unus quo aliquid creatum ordinatur ad alium creatum; sicut partes ordinantur ad totum, et accidentia ad substantias, unaquaeque res ad suum finem." Summa Theol. I, q. 21, a.1. ad 3
(26) "Est in exercitu ordo partium exercitus ad invicem secundum diversa officia, et est ordo ad bonum ducis quod est victoria; et haec ordo est praeceps propter quem est primus ordo." In I. Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 2.
33.

It is the result of a universal end which effects the inb-
erreâiâtion by subordinating the particular ends to itself. (27)
The universal order of reality, for St. Thomas, is the tot-
ality of all natural orders interrelated in subordination
to the final end of all, which is God.

The world therefore, for St. Thomas, is a manifold
of individual things each of which has its one particular
nature. The nature of any object is the source of its ac-
tivities. By means of this activity each nature strives to
attain a specific end which is proportionate to its being
and powers. This is the order of execution. The order of
intention is the reverse. The order of the world comes
from the First Cause which planned an end for each specif-
ic object, and endowed that object with the nature and pow-
ners necessary to attain the desired object.

(27) "Accipi potest duplicis ordinis considereto;
quorum unus quidem dependet ex prima omnium c
causa, unde et omnia complectitur; alius part-
iculariss, qui ex aliqua causa creato dependet
et continet illa quae causae illi subduntur;
et hic quidem multiplex est secundum divers-
itatem causarum quae inter creaturas inveni-
untur; unus tamen eorum sub altero continetur,
sicut et causarum una sub altera existit."
Cont. Gent. III, 98.

(28) Ibid. III
(29) Ibid. III
34.

Not only has each object its particular end, but there is an ultimate end of all things which is God. A mere consideration of God as the First Cause is sufficient to establish this. In striving for their particular ends, things strive for God. Their efforts to attain their full perfection is an endeavor to be like God, that is, to manifest His goodness according to the measure and manner of their being.

The order of the universe preexisted, as a plan in the Divine Mind. Consequently it is rooted in the Providence of God. Moreover, in the actual execution of the order of nature, over and above the natural endowments of finite objects there is required the concomitant principle agency of the Creator. God is therefore the source, the Prime Efficient Cause, and the End of the order of the universe. The order of nature therefore is the "ordination of things to their end, and particularly to their final end which is the Divine Goodness."

(30) Summa Theol. I, q. 44, a. 4.
(31) "Diligere autem Deum super omnia, est quidem conaturele homini, et etiam cullibet creaturae non solu rationali, sed irrationali, et etiam inanimaetae, secundum modum amoris qui unicum creaturar competere potest." Ibid., I-II, c. 109, a. 3.
(32) Ibid., I, q. 22, a. 1.
(33) Ibid., I-II, q. 1, a. 2.; I-II, q. 21, a. 4. ad 2.
(34) "In rebus autem creatis inventur bonum...quantum addordinem earum in finem; et praecipuae in finem ultimum, quae est bonitas divina. Hoc igitur bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens a Deo creatum est." Ibid., I, q. 22, a. 1.
35.

We see, therefore, that nature is permeated with order. Order may be simply defined as the proper plan or arrangement. It is the placing of equal and unequal things in their place. More strictly and philosophically, it is the exact adaptation of things to their end.

Order implies some principle which unites that which is many. The genuine unifying principle is the end or purpose which the arrangement is to attain. Each individual being in nature exemplifies and illustrates a particular order. Each being has a definite purpose which determines its mode of activity. Finite particular ends are subordinate to more universal ends until, the one universal order of nature is attained. The universal end to which all other ends are subordinate is God. In giving each natural object a specific end, God, the Creator is establishing for each a specific mode for imitating the Divine Essence. The striving for perfection is a striving to imitate God according to the nature and activity of the being.

II. The Nature of the Social Order.

We have seen that order is the use of a thing in accordance with the purpose for which it was made, the subservience of means to an end. We may say, in general, therefore, that a Christian Social Order is one that makes adequate provision for the attainment of the purposes of life and provides the opportunity of realizing these purposes or aims to all its members. Such a social order cannot be constructed arbitrarily but must be based upon the inherent tendencies of human nature and the natural moral law. It must envisage man in his totality, considering both his individual and social nature.

A. The Nature of Man.

Since man is a being, the laws of his life must harmonize with the laws of all being. Like every other being of creation man has an end. Since man has a twofold nature, this end is twofold; a material end which is the perpetuation of the species and a spiritual end, which is happiness, imperfect in this life, and perfect in Heaven.
37.

As all other creatures, man is imperfect and needs guidance in attaining his end. The lower orders of beings seek their end necessarily, but man is free in the sense that he can act in accordance with the law of his being or he can act against it. Consequently the guidance of man to his end must be a guidance of the reason, or in other words, a moral guidance. This moral guidance of man to his end is called the Natural Moral Law.

The end of man is fixed by nature. It is determined and is in no sense free. Man’s will is necessarily inclined to that rational good which is the perfection of his form as a man. This end which is necessarily determined is the foundation of the natural law and it serves as the standard of judgement of man’s actions. It is that rule of conduct which reason itself tells us has been established by the Author of man’s nature and is promulgated by being impressed upon the very nature of man. This natural moral law, which is intrinsic to man’s nature, establishes morality. It does not lead necessarily to absolute perfection but rather directs man to his final end in a manner suited to his free, intelligent nature, since it deals only with those things, without which the order to the end could not be observed.

3) Summa Theol. I-II, q. 91, a. 2; q. 94, a. 2.
4) Ibid. I-II, q. 63, a. 3; q. 91, a. 2. ad 2um
5) Ibid. I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
6) Ibid, I-II, q. 94, a. 2 et 3.
B. The Nature of Society

We have already stated that the social order must be constructed according to the natural tendencies which exist in man and according to the natural law. Although St. Thomas did not write a treatise on the social order we may obtain a very practical synthesis of his ideas on the subject from his various works.

A society, in general, is nothing more than a union of men who unite their efforts in order to attain some common good. An analysis of this definition shows that it contains four elements which correspond to the four causes of philosophy. The first element, "the union of men," is the formal cause which specifies the material cause which is "men." Since "union" not only means a group already constituted but also the action which unites the group, it implies the efficient cause. Finally, "in order to attain some common good" designates the end or purpose of society, or, in other words, the final cause.

(8) "Societas nihil aliud esse videtur quam adunatio hominum ad aliquid unum communiter agendum." Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum ac Religionem. C. 111.
39.

We shall briefly consider these various causes of society in general and then apply the general principles to the various types of society.

1. The Material Cause of Society.

Man is the material cause of society. Human nature contains powerful tendencies which prompt men to live in society. Man, therefore, is naturally a social animal because in order to seek his end, he has complicated physical, moral and intellectual needs which he is unable to satisfy by himself. Consequently, man must form a part of some group through which he obtains the help which is necessary to satisfy these needs.

Since society is necessary for man, the question arises as to the degree of this necessity. A thing is necessary, when it cannot be otherwise. It is of two kinds; absolute and relative. Absolute necessity depends upon the relation which exists between the terms, either because the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject, i.e. it is necessary that man be an animal, or because the subject is essential to the predicate, e.g. that a number be equal or unequal.

(9) "Homo naturaliter est animal sociale, ubi potest qui indiget ad suam vitam multos qui sibi solus praeparare non potest; consequens est quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicujus multitudinis per quam praestetur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum." I Ethica, lect 1a.
(10) Lexicon, Summa Theol., Tomus VI, Marietti, Rome.
A thing is conditionally necessary when it depends upon a condition or supposition, e.g., it is not necessary that John be seated, but if he is, it is necessary that he sit, while sitting.

Since man has the will, not only to live, but also to live well, or, in other words, to improve the condition of human existence, his membership in any society depends upon the condition that he be able to fulfill these two requirements. Hence society is conditionally necessary as an indispensable means of conserving and improving life.

Society is more necessary for men than animals. Although both men and animals are of a social nature, uniting in groups to procure sustenance, protection and mutual defence, nevertheless there is a difference of degree between animal and human sociability. The animal is equipped by nature with a means of defense, and is endowed with the necessary requirements to obtain food and shelter for himself, so that he is individually self-sufficient when he reaches maturity. This is not true of man. If we compare him physically with the animal, he is far less able to cope with his environment. His senses are not as acute.

(12) De Regimine Princ., I, 1.
his strength is relatively slight in comparison, and yet his needs are immeasurably greater.

However man has reason which supplies the place of the natural physical equipment of the animal. This raises him above the animal and makes him the lord of creation. Language enables him to communicate his thoughts and desires to others. Reason makes it possible for him to supply his wants by industry. Since these wants are greater than his individual ability can supply, he must have the help and cooperation of others, and, in consequence, a natural division of labor takes place. Thus natural inclination and reason both lead men to unite their efforts in order to supply their individual differences in the pursuit of their end.

2. The Final Cause of Society.

The purpose of every society, says St. Thomas, is the realization of the common good. When men unite their efforts in a society, they do not thereby sacrifice their individuality, but to their insignificant but important efforts, there is added the efforts and activities of the collectivity.

(13) *De Regimine Principi. I, 1.*
(14) "ad aliquid unum communiter agendum" *Contra impugnantes Dei Cultum ac Religionem, c. Ill.*
42.

In any society there are two elements, the individuals and the collectivity and these elements are inseparable. A collectivity without individuals is an abstract concept, but the collectivity with the individuals is a reality. Although these two elements are inseparable, they are distinct co-elements. As St. Thomas says, "the name collectivity implies two things; a plurality of individuals and a unity, scil. of some order. A people is a multitude of men ruled by some order."

Since there are two co-elements in society, the question arises as to which of these elements the common good pertains. This difficulty is only apparent because the common good is twofold, individual and collective.

(15) "Multitudo praeter multa non est nisi in ratione; multitudo tamen in multis est etiam in rerum natura." Quaest. disput. De Potentia, q. 111, a. 16, ad 16.

(16) "Nomen collectivum dōo importat, scilicet pluralitatem suppositorum et unitatem quandam, scilicet ordinis alicujus. Populus enim est multitudo hominum sub alium ordine comprehensorum." Summa Theol. I, q. 21, a. 1. ad 2.
43.

The necessity of the individual common good is evident from the fact that man enters society to conserve and (17) perfect his natural being. Hence the aim of any social group is, in a certain degree, the good which is proper to each individual member. However since man is not an isolated individual, but a part of the collectivity, and since each and every individual forms part of the group with him, the common good is that good which is distributed to each individual. (18)

This is the teaching of St. Thomas who states that there is a good which is proper to man as an individual and the common good which pertains each one inasmuch as he is a part of the whole. Hence the common good is that good which is distributed to the individuals inasmuch as they are members of the society. Therefore the individuals, but not the individual, is the end of the group. Each is a partial

(17) "Homo naturaliter est pars aliquidus multitudinis per quam praestatur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum." I Ethic., lect la.
(19) "Est quaedam bonum proprium aliquidus hominis in quantum est singularis persona....... est bonum commune quod pertinet ad hunc vel illum in quantum est pars aliquidus totius; sicut ad milium in quantum est pars exercitus et ad civen in quantum est pars cimitatis." Quaest. disput. De Caritate, I, a. 4. ad 2.
44.

end. The good of the group is superior to that of any individual member.

In addition to the good which pertains to the various individuals of the group, the society as a collectivity has its own proper good which consists in the conservation of its unity. St. Thomas calls this the good of the collectivity in contradistinction to the common good which pertains to this end and that individual.

Since there are two species of the common good, that of the collectivity considered as a unit, and that which is distributed to the various members, the problem of reconciling these two common goods arises. Although it is impossible for us to give a detailed exposition of this problem, it is necessary that we at least give some conclusions regarding the problem because it will arise in the consideration of membership in the guilds which will be treated in the second part of the thesis.

Although man seeks in society that which benefits him individually, nevertheless the collective good is the means which he has of arriving at the individual good.

(20) "Bonum multitudinis est magis quam bonum unius qui est de multitudine."
Summa Theol. I-II, a. 2. ad 2.

(21) "Bonum consociatae multitudinis."
"Bonum commune quod pertinet ad hunc vel illum." De Regimine Princ. I, 1. c.11.
Unless the good of the collectivity is maintained, man will not be able to secure his individual good. For that reason man is interested in the collective common good, which is social unity, and seeks its preservation. Consequently, society is, for the individual, an intermediate end.

3. The Efficient Cause of Society.

Since a society is a union of men who unite their efforts for the realization of the common good, it is necessary that this union be brought about by some agent or efficient cause. The agent ut quod is man. The principle quo is a natural and free determination of the will.

Man is the efficient cause of society. Father Schwalm proves this statement by the example of a child who becomes a cooperating cause in the familial society by making known his needs in the physical and moral and spiritual order to his parents and thereby uniting his efforts with those of his parents in attaining the end of the family.

Society is the result of a natural and free determination of the will. Man, by an essential and necessary

(23) "Omnis communitas est instituta aliquo operante." I Politic. I.
(24) Schwalm, op. cit. I, 34.
determination of his will, wishes, in a general way, everything which conserves his being. But his presence in society is a means of conserving his being. Therefore, man by a natural and necessary determination of his will, in a general way, wishes his presence in society.

The free will, subject to the necessities of existing circumstances, and also the subjective influences of environment and heredity, is the proper cause of the different species and varieties of societies. It is also a factor in the transformation of existing societies.

Consequently, speaking of society in general, we say that man is its efficient cause.

4. The Formal Cause of Society.

The formal cause of anything is that act which intrinsically determines and specifies the material cause. Therefore, the formal cause of society is the act, or proper perfection which intrinsically constitutes it as a society. In an composition, the form is always in proportion to the end, as a means. Since society is the work

(25) Schwalm, op. cit. I, 35
(26) ibid. 41 sq.
(27) ibid. 67 sq.
of man, resulting from his nature and free will, the form of society is in proportion to the end or purpose of society, i.e. the adequate means of arriving at the end or purpose of society.

We have already seen that the final cause of society is the common good of the members. Now the common good, in relation to society, has a twofold aspect. It is first of all, in the intentional order, that is, in the state of something chosen or selected. But in order to realize these desires, the common good must become the term of the action, or in other words, transmitted to the real order.

This is a common action of the group inasmuch as it is the action of each and every member in relation to the attainment of the final end or purpose of the society.

Each member has a part to play in this action. Some play a primary part. Others play a secondary part. Consequently each one contributes more or less according to the demands of the common good. These relations of primary and secondary activities among the members in relation to the common good, constitutes the order in the society. This order, or harmonization of individual efforts in relation to the end of society, is the formal cause and since this order is directed to one end, it is the formal principle of social unity.

48.

Therefore the form of any society consists essentially in the order established among the members in view of the requirements of the common good. This social unity, since it unites the members, without suppressing their individual activities, is relative. Each individual has his own degree of action and importance, but the actions of all the individuals, coordinated and directed toward the same good, constitute a unity of action.

The principle of the unity of action is authority. Every man seeks his individual good which is called by St. Thomas, the Bonum proprium. Now since the individual good varies, i.e. what is good for A is not good for B, it follows that each individual has his own proper good which is personal and variable.

Since this is true, it is necessary that someone have as his function, the maintenance of social unity, in directing others towards the common good. "The social life of many is impossible, unless some one preside who directs then towards the common good. For many tend toward many objects, whereas one tends to a single object."

(30) "La forme des societes consist donc essentiellement dans l'ordre etabli entre leurs membres dans la vue et dans la poursuite du bien commune." Schwalm, op. cit. I., 85.

(31) "Socialis vita multarum esse non posset nisi aliquis praesideret qui ad bonum commune intenderet. Multi enim per se intendunt ad multa, unus vero ad unum." Summa Theol. I, q.96, a.4.
49.

Speaking of the necessity of authority, St. Thomas says,"

"If it is natural for man to live in the society of others, it is necessary that there be some one among them to govern them. When many men live together, each providing what is to his own advantage, the multitude tends to scatter (its efforts) unless there is some one charged with the common good of the multitude, just as the body of a man or an animal ceases unless there is some common ruling power in the body which tends to the common good of all the members." (32)

Consequently, the authority in a society is that part of the group which guides it to the attainment of the common good. It realizes the individual and collective common good. Authority directs the individual and collective activities toward its realization and as a result realizes more completely the social unity which is necessary. As a result, therefore, each member attains his particular good in the common good of society.

(32) "Si naturale est homini quod in societate multarum vivat, necesse est in hominibus esset per quod multitudo regatur. Multis enim existentibus hominibus et uno quoque id quod est sibi congruum providente, multitudo in diversa dispergeretur, nisi etiam aliquid esset de eo quod ad bonum multitudinis pertinet, curam habens, sicut et corpus hominis et cujuslibet animalis difluere et nisi esset aliqua vis regitiva communis in corpore quae ad bonum commune omnium membrorum intenderet." De Regimine Princ. I, I, c. I.
The result is, therefore, that peace which St. Thomas says is the purpose of all government:

"The good of the multitude living in society consists in the conservation of that unity, which is called peace. Without peace the usefulness of the social life ceases, and the multitude, being at variance, becomes a burden to itself. This is the reason why the leader must devote himself to the procuring of the unity of peace." (33)

(33) "Bonum autem et solus consociatae multitudinis est, ut ejus unitas conservetur quae dicitur pax, qua remota, socialis vita expirat utilitas; quinimo multitudo dissentiens fit sibi ipsi onerosa. Hoc est igitur ad quod maxime rector multitudinis intendere debet, ut pacis unitatem procuret."
De Regimine Princ. I, l. c. 2.
III Civil Society.

In the previous chapter we saw that man is a social animal, that he has needs which he cannot satisfy individually, and consequently, by a natural tendency, unites his efforts with those of other men as a means of supplying his deficiencies.

The various needs and endowments of human nature give rise to different kinds of social organization. Most important and basic is the family, which is the source of man's natural life and the center of his early physical and moral and intellectual formation. There is the community in which he lives, and there are the various vocational groups of guilds, auxiliaries of the family, in which members of the same trade or profession unite.

None of these groups, however, is fully self-sufficient. Man can exist in them but he cannot attain the degree of well being which he attains in civil society. Outside of civil society, with rare exceptions, man cannot attain his end. Consequently, man is inclined to live in civil society as a means necessary to his end.

As society in general, so we shall consider civil society according to the four causes of philosophy, since as St. Thomas says, "a perfect notion of anything is obtained from a knowledge of all its causes."

(1) I Ethic. 1.
(2) De Regimine Princ., I, 1.; Summa Theol. II-II, 104, 1.
(3) Summa Theol. I-II, q. 55, a. 4.
52.

1. The Material Cause of Civil Society.

Civil society is not made up immediately of individuals but of families. A society coalesces from those elements from which it was constituted and into which it is resolved. But civil society is a natural extension of the family, which finds in civil society a necessary complement. Therefore families and not individuals constitute the proximate matter of civil society.

The basis of society is the family and a well regulated family life is a necessary condition for a prosperous society. Marriage is the basis of the family. Its natural object is the perpetuation of the human race. The family comes into being by reason of the consent of the man and the woman. Its essence is the bond contracted in matrimony. Its effect is the common life of the contracting parties and the offspring. Familial society is a natural society, i.e., a dictate of the natural law.

Civil society also contains other groups, e.g. municipalities, guilds, etc but these are rather extensions of the family. With a few exceptions, it is thru the family that men enter into civil society. The family is intermediary between the individual and the state or ruler. As

(4) "Civitas componitur ex domibus, sicut ex partibus." I Polit., lect 11.
(5) Saint Thomas et la Famille, Deploige, Louvain, 1934. passim.
the individual is part of the family, so the family is part of the state or kingdom.

2. The Final Cause of Civil Society.

The teaching of St. Thomas regarding the finality of society is found in his commentary on the Politics of Aristotle, and may be summarized as follows.

Every society is formed in view of some good. And since it is evident that every civil society is a society, it follows that every civil society is established in view of some good. Man acts under the influence of what seems good, whether it is real or apparent, that is, everything which is done by man, as a man, is done because of some good. And since society is formed by man, as man, the conclusion is that every society is formed because of some good.

The proof of this is found in the principle of the finality of human actions. When we speak of actions which are done by man, as man, we are referring to those actions which are termed human acts, i.e. they proceed from intellect and will together. Now every act of the reasonable will, or a human act, is done because of some good since

(6) "sicut una singularis persona est pars domus ita una domus est pars civitatis vel regni". Summa Theol. II-II, q. 50, a. 3.
(7) "Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt." Ibid. I-II, q.1, a.1.
the specific object of the will is good, and every act of a potency can only tend to its object. Consequently men act because of some end.

Every society is formed as a result of human act for two reasons; first because every society is a human good which nature alone cannot produce and because every acquired human good is realized in virtue of human acts. This statement, which has two parts, requires some explanation.

We stated that every acquired good is the result of human acts. Human good is everything which is necessary for the being or well being of human nature. It may be concerned with either the perfection of the potencies of the rational soul or those of the body, as, however, subordinate to the rational soul. Human good is of two kinds, natural and acquired.

Natural human good is not the result of a human act but is the constituent principles of the human being and the spiritual and mixed potencies which are immediately derived from it, e.g. reason, will, senses etc. In other words, it is the substantial good of human nature and its potencies.

Acquired human goods are those which nature does not produce. They are the material things which are necessary

(8) "Bonum hominis est esse perfectum ipsius hominis." Polit., I, VII, lect. I.
for the conservation of the human being, and the spiritual
goods, the habits of the soul, i.e. science, art etc.

By his reason man is able to judge what is good.
By his will he can wish for it and by his external poten-
cies he is able to acquire it. Nature supplies man with the
principle of knowledge and volition, which are necessary for
him to procure those goods which are necessary for him in
particular. These goods are the result of his personal
acquisition. Hence, goods other than those which consti-
tute human nature and its potencies, are acquired human
goods.

Society is one of these acquired human goods. It is
a human good because man, of himself, is unable to satisfy
by himself all his intellectual, material and spiritual needs.
Hence man has the need of society. It is an acquired human
good because human nature is simply endowed with the uni-
versal tendency of intellect and will toward the social good,
but reason must determine the particular forms of society
which are best suited to serve the human good. Consequently,
society is the result of a natural impulse but its realiz-
ation and actualization is the work of reason.

(9) "a natura inclinante et ratione perficiente."

Poli. I, VII, lect VI.
Hence society, as everything which is done by the re
reasonable will, is caused by a real good. This finality
exists in fieri, before the society is actually formed, and
in facto, after its formation. First it causes the desire
and then it actualizes the potential desire so that the
society is formed.

The good to which civil society is ordained is the
principle good among all the human goods. This conclusion
results from the fact that a principal society procures
a principal good. Every society procures some sort of good
for man. But the goods which are procured by the various
societies are not equal. Some societies procure principal
goods and there are others which supply accessory goods.
But the principal goods are the ends of the other goods.
They are not principal goods in virtue of some metaphysical
perfection but because of a more essential need for them on
the part of man. They are not simply major goods entitively,
but they are major goods in realtion to us. Consequently
the form the ends to which lesser ends must be ordained.
But on the other hand, the means are, among themselves as
ends.

(10) Polit., I, I, lect. I.
(11) "Quisquid enim quod propter eorum quae sunt ad
finem sit secundum proportionem finium."
Polit., I, I, Lect. I.
Hence a principal society, by the fact that it tends toward a principal good, is the end of lesser societies.

That civil society is the principal society is proven by two reasons. First, the whole is the end of its parts, and since civil society includes all other societies, it follows that it is their end. "All the parts are for the perfection of the whole, as matter is for the form; for the parts are as matter of the whole." The less perfect is ordained to the more perfect. That is why every part is found to exist for the sake of the whole. Since civil society is the whole of the other societies, it follows that it is their end.

The second proof advanced by St. Thomas is aims at the common good which is better and more admirable than the good of any part. Since, therefore, the society, which procures a principal good, is the end of all the others, it follows that since civil society procures the principal good in the temporal order that it is the end of all the other societies.

Civil society is first of all the end of the family, not the ultimate end, but the ulterior and partial end.

(12) "Omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut et materia propter formam; partes enim sunt quasi materia totius." Summa Theol., I, q.65, a.2.
(13) "Minus perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est perfectius, unde quaelibet pars inventur esse propter suum totum." Contra Gentiles, I, 111, c.64.
In the material order, civil society procures for the family numerous products which are necessary for man's material life, and which the family cannot procure for him. It is interesting to note that according to St. Thomas, these goods are not only found in civil society, but by it, in virtue of its action which places them at the disposal of man. The family seeks its own particular good, and then as a member of a producing group cooperates with other groups in supplying those goods which are necessary for society as a whole. Civil society does not produce these goods but it rules the ensemble of production and completes the fragmentary production of the family, furnishing it with a perfect sufficiency of life as regards corporeal things.

In the moral order, the family is an imperfect society. The family is not, of itself, able to give man that complete perfection which a perfect sufficiency of life requires. Each family is only capable of realizing an incomplete human good in the moral order. It is the ensemble of families which realizes the totality of human goods. And it is by the cooperation of the ensemble of families that public morality is realized.

(14) Ethicorum I, 1, lect. 1.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
59.

The other societies being either auxiliaries of the family, e.g. guild, school etc., or parts of the state, e.g. municipalities or provinces, are in the same order of finality.

Since the family is made up of individuals, the problem presents itself of the relation between the individual and civil society. Does society exist for the individual or does the individual exist for society? In these days of totalitarian governments, the Thomistic solution of this problem is of vital importance. Avoiding both the exaggerated individualism of the Kentian state and the exaggerated statism of the Hegelian theory of society, St. Thomas establishes a solution which safeguards both individual rights and at the same time the rights of civil society.

The individual is subordinate to the state as a part to the whole. "The common good is the end of the individuals living in society, as the good of the whole is the good of each of the parts. The state is subordinate to the good of human nature. "The end of the state is human good," that

(17) "Bonum commune est finis singulairum personarum in communitate existentium, sicut bonum totius est bonum cuiuslibet partium."
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 58, a. 9, ad 3m
60. (18) is, the best in human things." Hence in this respect the state is subordinate to the individual. In the human good which is the end of the state, the good of the human personality is suprême.

Every individual is subordinatated to the state as to his end. "The imperfect is directed to the perfect; now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. Every individual person is compared to the whole community as part to the whole." That the whole is the end of the parts is evident from the material order since every material part which is contained in a composition is subordinate to the ensemble. This is true of natural things or artificial wholes, whether in the useful or esthetical order.

Moreover that which is imperfect in its nature, has for its end that which has the perfection of this nature. for it finds in the whole the good which mit lacks as an individual. But the part is imperfect in respect to the whole.

(18) "Finis politicae est humanum bonum, id est optimus in rebus humanis." Ethic. I, I, Lect 1.
(19) "Imperfectum ordinatur ad perfectum; omnis autem pars ordinatur ad totum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum. Et ideo omnis pars est naturaliter propter totum. Quaelibet autem persona singularis comparatur ad totum communitatem sicut pars ad totum." Summa Theol., II-II, 64, 2.
(20) Schwalm, Lecons De Philosophie Sociale, II, 425.
61.

Hence the part is naturally subordinate to the whole, otherwise it would be perfect and self sufficient in itself.

An important distinction must be made here. When we say that man is a part of society, we do not mean it in the totalitarian sense. Society is not a substantial whole. Man does not receive from nature his substantial being but only the integral perfectioning of that nature. Hence the individual is a part of society as regards the perfectioning of his nature, not as regards its constitution.

Man, therefore, is a part of society, not as an identical part but analogically, i.e., the individual is to society as the part is to the whole, according to an analogy of proportionality. Civil society is the end of man in the sense that that it is the perfection of his nature and he is to society in this respect as an imperfect part to a perfect whole. It is quite evident therefore in opposition to all totalitarian theories that man is not ordained to civil society in the integrity of his being nor in everything which belongs to him. The human end is superior to the end of civil society. Although every man, as an individual is

(21) Schwalm, op. cit. 425
(22) "Homo non ordinatur ad communem politicam secundum se totum et secundum omnia sua." Summa Theol. I-II, q.21, a.4, ad 3.
subordinate to society, every man, as participating, is the end of civil society, since the end of civil society is, in the temporal order, the good of the human person.

According to St. Thomas, civil society has, therefore, as its end, the attainment of the human good of the members. He uses various terms to describe this good; the good of the multitude, the common good of the multitude, the common good, the common well being, the common utility, the perfect sufficiency of life, all those things which are necessary that man not only live, but live well, the principal good among all human goods, more important and more excellent than the good of one.

From these expressions it is evident that the end of civil society is the common good, that is, the good of the people, human and perfect. The first element in this definition is that it is the good of all the members of the state without exception. Otherwise it would not be the common good. Now it may be the good of all in two ways; in an exclusively numerical manner, or in a manner which is formal at first and then numerical. The common good by numerical extension is the sum total of all the private goods. But the sum total of all the private goods does not form

(23) "Bonum multitudinis-bonum commune-bonum commune multitudinis. Summa Theol. I-II, q.94, a.3.
(24) "Communis salus...communis utilitas. Ibid. q.97,a.2.
(25) "Vitae sufficientia perfecta." I Ethic.1.
(26) "Omnia quae homini sufficient ad vitam...ut homo non solum vivat,sed bene vivat." Ibid.
(27) "Principialius et divinius quam bonum unius." I Pol.1; I Ethic.,III.
the common good properly speaking. Civil society is more that
the sum total of citizens and families and associations, since
it has, in as much as it is a collectivity, its proper oper-
ations and being. Consequently it has an end which is distinct
from that of the private ends of its members. As a result it
must procure and promote a good which is formally distinct
form that of the individuals and private groups.

However, since the multitude does not sexist outside
of the concreto number of the individuals, the public goods
of the collectivity are divided among the individuals. The
common good, therefore, it not merely the good of the collect-
ivity as opposed to the individual good, it is the good of the
collectivity, under its formal aspect, of that which is proper
to the members of this collectivity, the good of human nature.

The third element in the definition of the common good
is that it is a perfect good, a good of full sufficiency of
life. Private goods, whether of individuals or of larger
groups, are of primary necessity. However they are frag-
mentary and incomplete. The common goods is not of primary nec-
essity, e.g. an individual or family may live an isolated ex-
istence, but it is absolutely necessary for the complet good
of life.

(28) Schwalm, op. cit. 429
(29) "ad vitae sufficientiam perfectam" I Ethic. 1.
(30) "Vitae necessaria, sine quibus vita præsens trans-
figi non potest." Ethic. I, 1, lect 1.
Each group within civil society procures a fragment of the common good. Civil society, or more strictly, the state which is the principle of unity in civil society, harmonizes the various goods and proportions them among the various members so that all may share in this common good and thus supplement their individual private goods. Consequently, the ultimate formal element of the common good is the harmonious plenitude of all human goods.

The supreme element in the common good is the good of the human personality. Man is an individual substance. But his individuality differs from that of other individual substances in that it is reasonable. Man is, therefore, a person, a rational individual. Hence two perfections pertain to him, the perfection of being, and its proper operations. Consequently, he has the individual nature of a man, by himself, and not from society.

From this notion of person we can deduce his own-natural good and his right to demand and possess this good. The human person exists by himself and not by reason of any concession on the part of the state. Hence any good which belongs to him as a human person, is a natural right and

(32)Schwalm, op. cit. 433
(33)Summa Theol. I, q. 29, a. 1.
(34)"Sic aut substantia individua proprium habet quod per se existat, ita proprium habet quod per se agat. De Potentia, Q.19, a.1, ad 3."
it is the purpose of the state to conserve it.

The first thing which is necessary for the individual to conserve his being, is individual property, in its two elements, material goods conserving physical life and the free personal disposition of these goods. Consequently, this right must be respected by the state. Another right which flows from the first is that of freedom of individual action. Hence the state has the obligation to safeguard these individual operations, e.g. work, liberty, care of one's goods etc. all those operations which are reasonably necessary for the conservation of the human person according to his nature.

Of all the ends of the state, this is the highest, since the person is the most perfect of all created nature. The good of the state finds its most perfect complement in the personal good of each and every member, or as St. Thomas says, "to order the common good to each person individually."

Therefore, St. Thomas, steers a middle course between individualism, by insisting that the state is subordinate to the common good of the human personality, the natural good of the human species, and statism, by insisting upon the recognition, on the part of civil society, of the rights of human personality.

(35) Summa Theol. I-II, q. 105, a. 4.
(36) Ethic. I, 1, lect 1.
(37) Summa Theol. I, q. 29, a. 3.
(38) "ordinare bonum commune ad singulares personas." Ibid. II-II, q. 61, a. 1, ad 4.
3. The Efficient Cause of Civil Society.

Man naturally wishes civil society because, as St. Thomas says, he is naturally a civil animal. In all men, he says, there is a certain natural impulse to become part of civil society, just as there is to virtue. Civil society is one of those things which is according to nature. It is according to nature in the sense that by it and in it man seeks the means to live according to his nature.

Other groups in society, the family, the professional groups are also according to nature inasmuch as their ends are particular goods of nature. In them man realizes necessary but fragmentary and incomplete goods. Civil society completes these by all the goods which are necessary for human needs, by the common good. Consequently society is a natural good of man, as man, for every man naturally seeks the good of his nature and therefore naturally will to live in civil society.

The explanation of this natural will of the good of human nature is found in the words "as to the virtues". Man naturally wills that which is good. The human will is an intellectual appetite, which is specified by good in

(39) "Homo naturaliter est civile animal" *St. Thomas, Polit., I, I, lect. 1.*
(40) "In omnibus hominibus inest quidem naturalis impetus ad communitem civitatis, sicut et ad virtutes," *Ibid.*
general. Man's will, therefore, seeks good in general, naturally, i.e. by a necessary tendency, but nevertheless indistinctly.

In this indistinct form man naturally wishes the good of his nature. Every being, as being, wills in conformity with that which it is. Every substance wishes in an unconscious fashion the conservation of its natural being. Man shares this tendency according to his rational and volitional nature. It is by it that he is naturally ordained, i.e. by an appetite guided by reason, to live according to reason, "He has an inclination to good which is in conformity with his rational nature; so he has the natural inclination to know the truth as regards God and to live in society."

There is in us a universal and indistinct will of the good of our nature in general. And since civil society forms part of this good we wish it. Man is not satisfied with the good which is obtained in the family or in the professional associations. He has a vague need of public

(42) Summa Theol., I-II, q.10, a.1.
(43) "Quaelibet substantia appetit conservationem suaeesse secundum suum naturam," Ibid., q.94, a.2.
(44) "Inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam rationis quae est sibi propria; sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad ho quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo et ad ho quod in societate vivat." Ibid., q.94, a.2.
order and peace, of the common good to supplement the particular goods of these groups. And he has this necessarily.

Just as man has an impulse to form part of a society, as he has to virtue, so also, as the virtues are acquired by exercise, so civil societies are established by men. The phrase which immediately follows in the Politics is, "he who was the first to establish a state was, for his fellow men, the cause of many great benefits." Consequently St.

Thomas admits a certain consensus which is necessary to form and maintain civil society. Human industry is necessary, i.e. the consent of the will. And consequently, when it is a question of many forming a society, the consent of all is required.

St. Thomas therefore admits a chronological position in regard to the formation of civil society, because he speaks of the first man who established civil society. Consequently he brings up the question of the origin of society. It is necessary to distinguish between the natural impulse to form a society, and the human industry by which it is formed.

(45)"Sicut virtutes acquiruntur per exercitium humanum...ita civitates sunt institutae humana industria." Polit. I, 1, lect 1.

(46)"Illae autem qui primo instituit civitatem fuit causa hominibus maximorum bonorum." Ibid.
St. Thomas, therefore, admits a civil state which succeeds an anterior state, in virtue of anatural impulse which is completed by a free and contracting will. In the beginning there were simple groups in the same vicinity, the children of Adam and Eve. Sons and daughters, nephews and nieces, formed their own homes. Just as the multiplication of offspring is natural, so is the village community. St. Thomas uses this argument to prove the anterior existence of the village society, by the unity of origin of the human race. All the primitive human groups are born from the same primitive couple. Hence the primitive couple produces the village groups.

In this state was found the natural impulse of men towards civil society. The various particular families sought their particular good. But this particular good was only a part of the complete human good. There were many occupations for which one family was not sufficient. There was above the particular good of each family, the common good, the harmonious totality of the human good.

(47) Schwalm, op. cit. 456
(48) Politic., I, I, lect. 1.
(49) Schwalm, op. cit., 457
(50) "sunt multa artificia ad quae una domus sufficere non potest." Ethic., I, I, lect. 1.
This common good of the different families, being according to the nature of the species, a natural appetite of each and all for the proper good of their nature, influenced them. They wished for something more than their domestic security and property, they wished for peace and order among all the families. This desire was supplemented by the privation of certain goods which a family, by itself, was unable to procure.

But this desire which was rather vague was insufficient to establish civil society. It urged men to enter civil society, but, by reason of its vague form, it did not suffice to constitute that particular form of human good which is the civil good. The common good, since it involves the harmonizing of all the particular goods, so that all may share in it, demanded something more than a mere desire for this human good.

In order that the complete human good be realized, it was necessary that there be established a just proportion among all the human goods. It was necessary that men know this proportion and in order to know this it was necessary that they, by their reason, classify the particular goods in relation to the common good. But since the good was the good of all, it was necessary that all the interested parties apply their reason to this just proportion.

(51) Schwalm, op. cit., 462
(52) Ibid.
Moreover in order to realize this good it was necessary that they will it.

This contract therefore involved two things. First, the explicit will of the common good to which free consent was given by all. Secondly, the establishment of an order of power over subjects, which was also freely accepted, in order to realize this common good. And since the order was established in the villages, composed of families, which were relatives, the only type of authority known was that of the fathers or the elders. Consequently their form of government was patriarchal. But it was a patriarchal monarchy, with the right of succession. This was a perfectly natural development.

The form of government, however, depends upon the material conditions of life and the intellectual and moral endowments of the people. The common good does not change but the means of realizing it does. Consequently St. Thomas recognizes different types of government. The particular form of political society belongs to the "Order of Freedom", it must be made.

(53) "Omnis domus regitur ab aliquo antiquissimo sicut a patrefamilias reguntur filii. Et exinde consurgit quod tota vicinia cuae erat instituta ex consanguineis, regebatur propter cognitionem ab aliquo cui erat principalis in cognatione, sicut civitas regitur a rege." Polit. I, I, lect. I.
(54) De Regimine, I, 8 seq.; Summa Theol. I-II, q. 95, a. 4.
4. The Formal Cause of Civil Society

We have already pointed out that the form of any society consists in the order established among the members in view of the requirements of the common good. This social unity, since it unites the members, without suppressing their individual activities, is relative. The actions of all the individuals, coordinated and directed toward the common good, constitute a unity of action and the principle of this unity of action is authority.

The politics of St. Thomas are theo-centric. All authority comes from God, and it is in God that the rulers of civil society must base their right to govern. From God they derive the dignity of their office and the plan of government must be modeled upon that of Divine Providence. Their rights and obligations are derived from His eternal law. "Let a king therefore know that he has undertaken his office, to be in the kingdom, what the soul is in the body, and what God is in the world."

It is evident, therefore, that the rulers, chosen by the people, as the instruments of God, assume a very sacred role. Virtue, therefore, is the first necessary qualification which is necessary in a ruling authority.

(55) De Regimine Principum, I, I, c. 8.
(56) "Hoc igitur officium rex se suscepisse cognoscat, ut sit in regno sicut in corpore animae, et sicut Deus in Mundo." Ibid., I, I, c. 12.
(57) Summa Theol. I-II, q. 105, a. 1, ad 2.
The more numerous are those to be directed, the greater is the virtue required. More virtue is necessary to rule the family than oneself, and much more still to rule a state. Hence St. Thomas says, "it pertains to superexcellent virtue to rule a state or a kingdom." (58)

Since the degree of the virtue is dependent upon the degree of the morality of the action which is performed, it follows that the higher is the morality of the act, the higher is the virtue required for its execution. "But the common good of the multitude is greater and more divine than individual good, and it belongs to the office of ruler to studiously promote the common good." Consequently, the virtues of the ruler must be of a very high degree. St. Thomas makes the statement that, provided the ruler or rulers have the degree of virtue required for their exalted position, the common good is safe, if the subjects have merely enough virtue to obey.

The tremendous importance of the ruling power is more forcefully evident from the principle that it is a similitude of the divine power, since the ruler is to the state what God is to the world.

(58)"De Regimin Principum, I, 1, c.9.
(59) Ibid. ll.
(60) Ibid. c.9.
"Art should follow nature and imitate it," says St. Thomas. Hence the natural regime aids us to form our ideas of the function of authority. In nature we find a universal and a particular regime. The universal, in which all things are ruled by the Providence of God; the particular which is found in man and is most like the divine government. For just as all corporeal creatures and all the spiritual forces are under the ruling of the Providence of God, so also the members of the body and the powers of the soul are ruled by reason, and thus, in a certain degree, reason is in regard to man, what God is to the world. And since man lives in society, the similarity is extended to the fact that the multitude is governed by one man or ruler.

Civil authority must, therefore, be modeled on the divine and must exemplify the same virtues of Wisdom, Prudence, Love, Justice and Mercy. In addition to these fundamental virtues, St. Thomas mentions others which, though secondary, are important. The ruler is the shepherd of his people. He must be magnanimous, meek, merciful, truthful, and humble.

(61) De Regimine Principum, I, 1, c. 18
(62) Ibid.
(63) Ibid.
(64) Ibid
(65) Ibid. c. 1.
(66) Ibid. c. 7.
(67) Comment. in Psal. ii. pp. 32, 44.
St. Thomas not only enunciates these principles, he applies them. "Universally considered, the works of God in the world are twofold; one by which He institutes or creates the world, and the other by which He governs the world already created?" God first created the world and then conserves and governs it by His divine Providence. In creation, the first characteristic that is evident above all is the wonderful harmony and order which prevails, even in the minutest details. Hence St. Thomas says that the first duty of the state is to establish order. This can only be done by good government.

Government according to St. Thomas is leading effectively that which is governed to its end. Now if the thing is directed to an end which is outside itself, it is the duty of the ruler or government not only to preserve the thing intact, but also direct it effectively to its ultimate goal. The ultimate end of the State is the Beatific Vision, which is a spiritual end and outside the sphere of all human authority, and hence needs a special authority, Christ and the Kingdom on earth, His Church.

The ultimate end has subordinate means and subordinate ends. Since the supernatural operates through the

(69) Ibid. c.15.
(70) Ibid. c.14.,II-II,q.102,a2 2.;103, a.3.
(71) Ibid. c.14 and 15.
natural, the temporal rulers have their own special goal, always however keeping the final end in view. A virtuous life is the end of human society as a preparation for the ultimate end. Hence the first duty of government is to see to it that the subjects lead virtuous lives.

Civil authority, therefore, is charged with the public order, in order that the subjects may lead virtuous lives. This involves a threefold obligation. The ruler must institute order among the citizens, he must conserve it and finally he must promote it.

The first duty of the governing authority is to institute virtuous life in society and this involves two conditions: 1. that the subjects live according to virtue, 2. that there be in the community a sufficient supply of temporal goods whose use is necessary for a virtuous life. In order to lead a virtuous life three things are required. 1. The multitude must have as the essential principle, unity and peace, a social policy. 2. the multitude so united must be directed to live well, the legislative policy, 3. thru the care and industry of the rulers the community must have a sufficient supply of material goods, the economic policy.

(72) De Regim. Princ. I, 1, c. 15.
(73) Ibid.
The second duty of civil authority is to conserve this good life. It does this positively by the exercise of the virtues which we have mentioned, and negatively by removing whatever obstacles threaten the continued, peaceful existence of society. These obstacles may arise from several sources. They may arise from nature itself since men are mortal and their efficiency varies during their lives. The good of society, however, must be made permanent. The second obstacle comes from society itself, from the perverse wills of men, which are harmful to the peace and unity of the community because their violate laws etc. The third obstacle comes from outside, such as the attacks of enemies, which threaten to disrupt or destroy society.

Provision must be made against these obstacles by civil authority. By applying the principles of distributive justice, administrative positions must be kept filled; the goods as well as the burdens of society must be distributed among the members in due proportion in accordance with the demands of the common good. By laws and precepts, the subjects must be restrained from evil and led to the practice of virtue. This involves the establishment of necessary laws and sanctions, for the protection of the members and the punishment and amendment of offenders.
Finally, provision must be made for protection from outside enemies.

Civil authority must not only institute and preserve the virtuous life in the community, it must also promote and develop it. This progressive policy corresponds to promotion in divine authority. God gives the first impulse to all created activities, not only in the case of beings without reason, but also, and especially, in those beings which are endowed with reason and free will. And this divine promotion not only does not destroy liberty but is its essential condition.

This promotion is the basis of all authority and consequently is in direct opposition to Liberalism or "rugged individualism." For St. Thomas this interference is not only a right but a duty, which involves a three-fold obligation; if anything is out of due order, to correct it; if anything is wanting to supply it; if anything can be improved, to perfect it.

This therefore in broad outline is the Thomistic concept of civil authority. We have seen that man is not only a social animal but a civil animal. Order is the basis of his social life and authority is the principle or order.

(74) De Regimine Principum, I, 1, c. 15.
(75) "si quid inordinatum est corrigere, si quid melius fieri potest studet perficere." Ibid.
IV. The Structure of Society.

A. The Organic Concept.

The social order of St. Thomas may, in some ways, be compared to the human body. We have seen that man is naturally a social animal. It is impossible for him to attain the happiness to which he is ordained by the natural law without the mutual aid and assistance of his fellow men. Man needs society physically, intellectually, and spiritually. 

Besides implanting in man the inclination to unite with others for the attainment of the common good, whether physical, intellectual or spiritual, nature has, as it were, instituted a definite structure for society. This structure is called organic because of its comparison with the human body.

Just as the human body is composed of various members, which have separate functions, yet cooperate for the common good of the whole body, so, society is composed of members or groups, performing their own peculiar functions, yet coordinated for the good of the whole of society.

(1) Polit. Vll. 4.
(2) "Homo naturaliter est animal sociale utpote qui indiget ad suam vitam multis, quae sibi ipse solus praeparare non potest" Ethic.lect. Ia.
80.

Moreover, just as the members of the human body are, in turn, composed of a number of smaller organic units, i.e. muscular and nerve structures etc, so also, the larger members of society must be constituted of smaller organic units. Among these units there must be mutual cooperation and coordination among themselves, and also a proper hierarchical order, a subordination of the less important to the more important, of the lower to the higher, in relation to the common good of the whole organism. Finally, we come to men, who are the cells of the social bodies.

In the use of this analogy, as in the case of any analogy, we must remember that, although there is a similarity between society and the organism, there are also many important differences. The points of similarity are the unity of the whole body, the unity of the heterogeneous and autonomous parts, and finally, the harmonious action of the parts in the interest of the entire body.

In regard to the differences between the two organisms, we must note first of all that society is a moral and not a physical or physiological organism. There are three important differences between a physical and a moral organism. In the physical organism, the unity is physical,

(4) Ch. Antoine, Cours d'Economie Sociale, L'Organisme Social, 118.
81.

whereas in the moral organism it is moral. Secondly, the autonomy of the parts of the physical organism is only apparent. In the moral organism, it is real. Thirdly, in the physical organism, the members exist entirely for the body, and their activity is directed orientated to the common good. In the moral organism, the different parts have their particular end. They exist independently of the collectivity, and only concur indirectly in the attainment of the common good of the social body.

Therefore in the use of this analogy we must remember that the individual cells of the social body are self-conscious and responsible human beings and that the whole societal body is there for the best development of these persons, not vice versa, as in the human body. The center of initiative and self determination must therefore always remain to a maximum degree in these individual persons or families, and then in the smaller organic units, until nothing is left to the largest all embracing unit except that which the smaller units are incapable of doing for themselves.

(5) Antoine, op. cit. 118
(6) Michel, loc. cit.,
This distinction between the physical and moral organism is absolutely essential if we are to avoid the errors of totalitarianism and the various biological and physiological interpretations which have been put upon the organic concept of society.

We must remember, too, that because each cell has its definite and unalterable place in the organism, we cannot conclude that man, too, as a cell of the social organism must indefinitely remain at the place he happens to occupy.

Society, therefore according to this theory, is an organism, composed of various organs, each of which is independent and autonomous in its own proper sphere of activity. These organs are the various member groups of the societal body, the families, the various municipalities, the vocational groups or guilds. Like the human body, these organs have a principle of coordination, the state, which unites them and directs their activities in the pursuit of the common good of the whole body.

This organic concept involves, consequently, on the one hand a mutual dependence and responsibility among the members, and on the other, the principles of hierarchy and authority.
83.

As Pope Leo Xlll said;

As the Almighty willed that in the heavenly
kingdom itself the choirs of angels should
be of different ranks, subordinated the one
to the other; and as in the Church God has
established different grades of orders with
diversity of function so that all should not
be 'Apostles, nor all Doctors, nor all Proph-
ets!', so also he has established in Civil
Society many orders of varying dignity, right,
and power. And this to the end that the
State, like the Church, should form one body
comprising many members, some excelling oth-
ers in rank and importance but all alike
necessary to one another and solicitous for
the common good. (7)

Following this concept of society, the social order
consists in a proper union of social organs, or in other
words, of functional or vocational groups, "which bind men
together not according to the position they occupy in the
labor market, but according to the diverse functions that
they exercise in society". Consequently, one's position
in society is determined, not by what one has, but by what
one does. Vocational or functional status determines one's
place in the social order.

Vocational status in social science designates the
place or position held by a man or a group in the social
order. It may also be applied to the group having this sta-

(7) Christopher Dawson, Religion and the Modern
State, (New York, Sheed and Ward, 1937) 134
(8) "ordines, nimirum, quibus inserantur homines non
pro munere, quod quis in mercatu laboris habeat
sed pro diversis partibus socialibus, quas sing-
ulii exerceant" A.A.B. Vol. XXIII, 204.
There are as many different "statuses" in society as there are groupings of mankind. First, there is the natural division of mankind into adult men and women and the corresponding groups of youth.

From a historical point of view there have been the estates which were determined by birth. These estates had fixed privileges and a man was eitherborn into them or he was not. These were, for example, the nobility, the burghers, slaves and social castes. Then there are groups which are determined by political status or influence e.g. the feudal estates of the nobility, the clergy and the bourgeoisie. To these three estates was later added the proletariat, which had no official place in the three official estates. Today some wish to add a fifth called the "gutter proletariat, made up of the underworld, criminals, hoboes etc."

Sometimes certain groups are designated from a common economic status, e.g. the middle class. But if we view society from the functional angle we have the most important and most natural division into functional or vocational groups.

(9) "Stand, staendische ordung" in Der Grosse Herder, Vol.11, quoted in Catholic Backgrounds and Current Social Theory, Collegeville, Minnesota, 1937.
In this division we must distinguish between acquired and unacquired professional work and then the incorporation of a special functional group into the larger economic divisions of society, e.g. agriculture, education, health service, etc. It is evident that these divisions may overlap. For example, a stenographer may work under various headings.

There are strong bonds between all the members of the same professional group. These bonds may be designated as intellectual, or the exchange of experiences etc., professional, or the improvement of work, technique of production, and socio-economic, or security against risk of business failure, sickness, unemployment etc. This common functional bond of professional groups has also a high socio-political significance.

A closer examination of the social body as an ensemble of activities which are directed toward the attainment of the common good, indicates a number of functions and functional groups which have a close relation among themselves. A number of groups work immediately for the attainment of cultural goods. Others, much larger in membership, work at the production and distribution of material goods.
36.

Some of these groups are closely interrelated. Others are quite separate. The larger groups can be divided into smaller sub groups, e.g. industry, into heavy and light. Some important functional groups are so rooted in other larger groups that they can hardly be separated, e.g. the dairy industry which forms a distinct group but is connected at one end with farming and at the other with marketing.

In this regard the social organism is like the human body. Although the functions of the various organs, the hands, the feet, the eyes etc., are clearly distinguishable, yet they are intercrossed by other functional groups e.g. bones, nervous and circulatory system. Thus the functional interrelations of the physical organism cannot be divided according to a single system. Differing systems of divisions must be used according to the functions in question. Despite this fact science has elaborated adequate divisions.

In like manner it is possible to arrive at a practically satisfactory division of functions in the social body. It will necessarily have to involve some cross connections or even doubling of some groups, e.g. agricultural schools, belonging to the agricultural and cultural profession.
According to the organic concept, therefore, society is a moral organism, composed of a number of independent and autonomous organs, pursuing their own particular ends but coordinated by a principle of unity, the state, for the common good of the whole body. The social order, therefore, is composed, not of isolated individuals or of classes but of a number of functional groups or guilds. Man's position in society, consequently, is determined by the function he performs in the societal body.

The organic concept of society is not new. It is as old as social theory itself. It was found in Hindu social thought and also had a place in Hebrew thought and writings. Aristotle sets fourth the organic analogy with clarity and precision in Book IV of his Politics. The same conception is found in the writings of Cicero, Livy, and Seneca. St. Paul makes use of the analogy in his Epistles to describe the Church.

Medieval thought was permeated by this concept.

"Medieval thought proceeded from the idea of a single Whole. Therefore an organic constitution of Human Society was as familiar to it as a mechanical or atomistic construction.

(10) Barnes and Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science, (Boston, Heath, 1938) Vol. I. 76.
(12) Aristotle, Politics.
(13) Barnes and Becker, ibid. 678.
was originally alien. Under the influence of biblical allegories and the models set by Greek and Roman writers, the comparison of Mankind at large and every smaller group to an animate body was universally adopted and pressed. "Like Mankind as a whole, so not only the Universal Church and the Universal Empire, but also every particular Church and every particular State, and indeed every permanent human group is compared to a natural body (corpus naturale et organismum). It is thought of, and spoken of, as a Mystical Body, contrasting it with the natural body.

The organic theory is common in the works of St. Thomas. Also in the writings of John of Salisbury and Nicholas of Cues. In the early modern period, Hobbes and Rousseau contrasted the organism and the state, holding that the organism was the product of nature while the state was an artificial creation. "In the late eighteen and early nineteenth centuries fanciful notions of the social and political organism appeared with such writers as Hegel, Schelling, Krause, Ahrens, Schmitthenner, and Waitz. Following them came another school of writers who dwelt at length on the supposed personality of the state. Among these were Stahl, Stein, Lasson and Gierke."

(14) Gierke-Maitland, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, p. 22
(15) Ibid. 24.
(17) Gierke, op.cit. 22-30 Also notes, pp. 103-104, 112, 122-23, 129-137.
(18) Barnes and Becker, op.cit. 678.
(19) Ibid.
Another school of organicists were those who, though they wrote before the emergence of modern evolutionary biology, turned to natural science to discover support of their comparison between the organism and the state. The leaders in this group were Zacharia, Vograff, Frantz and Bluntschli. The middle of the nineteenth century was preeminently the period of great biological discoveries. The result was that this science exercised an important influence in other fields, particularly in that of social theory. The organic theory took on a biological interpretation which attempted to show how biological structure and processes were exemplified by social institutions and processes. Among the progenitors of sociology in this group were Comte, Spenser, Liiienfield, Schaffle, Worms and Fouillée. Their theories may be termed organismic rather than organic due to the excessive interpretations which they placed upon their theories. For Comte, for example, the societal organism is a reality and the individual is an abstraction. This is also true of Liiienfield, Schaffle, Worms and Spenser to some extent.

It would be very interesting to outline the various developments of the organismic theories. However it does not

(20) Barnes and Becker, op. cit. 678
(21) Ibid. 679
(22) Ibid.
(23) Ibid. 679-687.
seem that is necessary for our present purpose. It is sufficient to note, as we have, that a certain amount of caution must be exercised in the use of the organic concept. According to the Thomistic and traditional concept, society is a moral organism. It is neither physical nor physiological. The individual cells in the moral organism are self-conscious, responsible human beings, who have certain inalienable rights which come to them, not from society, but from nature. It must also be remembered, as we have already pointed out in our discussion of the nature of civil society, that society exists for man, man does not exist for society. This separates the organic concept from any of the organismic or totalitarian interpretations which are found among various sociologists and social theorists.

Since society is composed of a number of partial societies, which have their proper and natural functions it is necessary that there be one society which unites these various groups in an harmonious whole. This principle society, which is to the social organism what the soul is to the body, is the state. The word state has a variety of meanings, and we take it to mean here the supreme power in civil society. We believe that this is necessary in order to avoid the confusion which results from using the word state to designate the state as a society and the state as the central or ruling society in the social organism.
The state, therefore, may be defined as the central, supreme, absolutely necessary organism which is charged with the direction of the national society. The state, consequently is concerned with the public and general welfare of the nation. Its activities begin where those of individuals and partial societies cease. Its function is to perform that which exceeds the capacity of sphere of individuals and particular societies. Its concern is the national interest which demands the harmonious adjustment and prosperity of all the elements, members and organs, which form the body of the nation.

The state, as a result, has a twofold obligation or role, negative and positive. Negatively considered, it must not absorb, crush, or diminish the activities which properly belong to the particular societies. Positively, it must protect them, control them and harmonize and direct their activities to the realization of the common good. We have already discussed how this is to be done in our consideration of civil authority.

According to the organic concept of society, therefore, the three natural societies, the family, the municipality and the profession form the organs of the societal

(24) Catechism de l'organisation corporative, Ales, 8.
(25) Ibid. 9.
body. Each has its special function, is invested with its own proper rights and duties, and enjoys an autonomous and immanent activity. These three societies are the masters of their own domain, always, however, under the control and direction of the state, which acts as an harmonizing and directing principle in view of the common good. The function of these particular societies, consequently, is to seek their proper end, protect their members and fulfill, for the common good, their role as the natural organs of the social body.

B. The Atomic Concept.

According to the atomic concept of society, civil society is composed of two elements, the individual and the state. This concept is commonly called atomic because it considers the individuals as atoms in the material mass, each independent and without any natural bond. It is also referred to as the mechanistic concept of society, because the union of the individuals is not considered the result of a natural impulse, but is rather an artificial result of certain external factors.

The atomic theory recognizes only the rights and functions of the individual and the rights and functions of the state. It ignores the rights and functions of all inter-

(26) Afras, op. cit. 9.
(27) Ibid. 5.
mediary groups. It has resulted either in the exaltation of
individual liberty, which is economic liberalism, or in the
exaltation of the state, which is socialism, or in an attempt
to maintain a balance between individual and state rights
in our modern democracies which is called interventionism.
All three attitudes agree in the ignoring of the natural
groups which exist intermediately between the individual
and the state.

This concept finds its origin in the individualism
of the Renaissance and the Reformation, in the Rationalism
of the 18th century, in the French Revolution and the Decla-
ration of the "Rights of Man", and in the theories of econ-
omic liberalism.

A. The Philosophical Basis of the Theory.

The philosophical basis of the atomic theory is
found in the "Contract Sociale" of Jean Jacques Rousseau.
According to Rousseau, man is endowed with the essential at-
tributes of goodness, equality and freedom. These are his nat-
ural and inalienable rights. The fact that he does not enjoy
these rights fully, is due to an accident. Originally, man was
a noble and unrestrained being, quite capable of providing
for all his needs. He was completely free and self suff-
ient and had no need of society. However, eventually, man
abandoned his free state and entered into the association of citizenship. This was not the result of a natural impulse, but of free choice. The change however was a retrogression. It was a falling away from a higher and natural state of existence to a lower and artificial condition. As a result of this misfortune of humanity, it is the duty of the state to establish the minimum number of laws and restore, as far as possible, the freedom which belongs to each individual.

Hence Rousseau attempted "to find a form of association in which the person and property of every associate shall be protected and defended by the force of the community, and wherein each individual, while united with all, may nevertheless remain as free as before, and obey none but himself". Despite the impossibility of achieving such an aim, Rousseau claimed to find the means of obtaining a state in which every one enjoyed unrestricted liberty.

After postulating the absolute equality of all, so that each adult male should count for one, he builds up his ideal state as follows:

"Let each individual unit contribute the offering of himself to the universal and supreme will, and receive in return the offering of the rest. This voluntary act of association

will at once produce a new collective body composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, and this body will receive by the same act, its unity, its life, and its will." (29)

From the fusion of the rights of the contracting parties, which nevertheless remain intact, arises the moral personality and power of the state. This was Rousseau's conception of the only legitimate form of civil society.

When faced with the difficulty of trying to reconcile the supreme will of the collectivity and the unrestricted freedom of the individual, Rousseau said;

"The act of association contains the reciprocal engagement between the public and individuals, and every individual, contracting, so to speak, with himself, is engaged in a double relation, as a member of the sovereign towards individuals and as a member of the state towards the sovereign. But we cannot apply here the maxim of civil law that no man is bound by engagements made with himself for there is a great difference between being bound to oneself and to a whole of which one forms a part." (30)

Again he adds;

"We must further observe that the public resolution which can bind all subjects cannot bind the sovereign to itself; and that accordingly it is contrary to the nature of the body politic for the sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot transgress.... whence we see that there is not, nor can be, any kind of fund-

(29) Rousseau, op. cit. Book 1, Ch. 6.
(30) Ibid.
96.

...ammental law binding upon the body of the people, not even the social contract." (31)

He finally concludes that since at times the interests of the individual may be contray to those of the collectivity, at times the collectivity may force the individual to obey.

"In order, then, that the social pact may not be a vain formulary, it tacitly includes this engagement, which can alone give force to the others that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free." (32)

Despite the inconsistencies of Rousseau's theories it exercised a considerable influence and has inconsistently given rise to the extremes of Liberalism and Socialism.

B. The Economic Basis of the Atomic *Theory.*

The principle of unrestricted individual liberty which Rousseau advanced was adopted by the Liberal School of Economics. The shibboleths, "man is born free", and "man is essentially good, and consequently his tendencies are good," became the basis of the new economic doctrine.

Modern capitalism had begun about a century before the Reformation. During this period the religious state gave way to the secular state, while the weakening of the faith

(31) Rousseau, op. cit. Book 1, Ch. VI.
(32) Ibid. Ch. VII.
the great increase in travel and the consequent growth of the adventurous spirit, led to the triumph of the banker and the trader over medieval restrictions. The Middle Ages were the "Ages of Faith". Faith determined social and political ideals. Man's ultimate end was the most important thing in life. All others interests were secondary to it. The social order existed for the common good. The coronation oath of the king obliged him to seek the common good of his subjects. While the freedom of the serf was curtailed, his fundamental rights of personality were recognized. He could never be cast adrift as the modern proletarian.

Society was conceived as an organism. Each group had its own function in promoting the common good. These groups were interdependent rather than independent. Since temporal interests were subordinate to the eternal, economic functions were considered as means to an end and not an end in themselves. Ownership was a natural right but not an unlimited right. Superfluous goods were to be placed at the disposal of all. Private ownership was conditioned upon use for the common good. Trade was likewise affected by the ethical ideals of the middle ages. The restless seeking of wealth for its own sake was denounced. While trade was frowned upon, finance was denounced. Usury was considered a grievous sin. Hence economics was subject to the restrictions of faith.

(33) Jarret, Social Theories in the Middle Ages, 167
(34) The above is but a very sketchy survey of the subject. A complete treatment is found in; Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Fanfani, Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism,
In the fifteenth century, certain forces appeared which tended both to weaken the sanctions of religion and to strengthen the acquisitive instinct. Travel became more common. The risk consequent upon trading made higher profits an necessity. The bond of the guild upon the craftsman and of feudal obligation upon the landlord, became irksome. Trade without limitations became the ideal of the day. Land was expropriated and the peasants forced into beggers. Build restrictions were gradually undermined by competition and the Black Death. Royal power was increased in order that the rising middle class might due business as they wished. The terrific explosive drive of capitalism, with war and colonization as its spearhead, had begun.

Protestantism, which at first, did not look upon capitalism with a tolerant eye, nevertheless changed its attitude to one more consonant with its teachings. Lutheranism, with its exaltation of the individual led directly to the secular state. Religion became a matter for private practice, not a factor in public transactions. The Calvinists, believing that their fate in the other life was predestined, began to throw themselves frantically into the affairs of this life. Good works, the sign of predestination, became identified with work and thrift. Worldly success was a mark of divine favor.

(35) Cronin, Economics and Society, 10
(36) Ibid.
Puritanism carried these doctrines to their extreme conclusion. The doctrine of the "calling" canonized the acquisitive spirit. The virtues of charity and humility were replaced by the economic virtues of diligence, shrewdness and energy.

The rise of individualism was accompanied by a corresponding decrease in social consciousness. Success was considered a mark of divine favor, poverty was the punishment for sin. Men closed their eyes to the fact that the cause of idleness was social and economic, rather than purely personal. As a consequence, the belief grew that the poor should be treated with severity, rather than charity, in order to correct their evil ways.

At the end of the seventeenth century the psychological attitude of the modern world had completely developed. Economic criteria dominated society. The exploitation of labor, was a sign of the new spirit. Transportation and power facilities were developed and with them the large cities. Corporations and monopolies were begun. Institutions which opposed the new order were silenced. Finally, the state was subjugated and made the servant of business. The rise of the middle class was complete.

In the eighteenth century, the principles of religious and philosophical individualism were applied to econom-

(37) Cronin, op.cit. 11.
(38) Ibid.
theory by the economic liberalists, by Quesnay and the Physiocrats in France, by Adam Smith, Ricardo and John Stuart Mill and their school in England, and by similar groups in Germany.

Economic liberalism began with the Physiocrats, who, following Rousseau's theories regarding the liberty and goodness of men, demanded the free unhampered "rule of nature" in the economic order, or, in other words, the setting aside of all intervention of government or other external organization in the economic order. All human interests in the social life, they held, are harmonious and therefore nothing more is needed than the fullest liberty, excluding all intervention of laws, labor organizations, labor unionism, or even welfare and educational efforts on behalf of the workingman.

Law is merely intended to assure the conditions, which render the development of social life possible, and are dependent upon property, whether used in industry or commerce. Out of these latter arise the relations between man and man. The only concern of the government is to assure liberty of contract. Other than this the utmost liberty must be allowed. The law must not interfere as long as the labor contract remains intact between the worker, as an individual and the employer as an individual.
101.

The Physiocratic, or rule of nature theory crystallized into two principles, which underlie all the philosophies of Liberalism and Individualism, and which were universally applied by it in the industrial order. The first was the denial of the laborers inalienable right to organize. The second was the denial of the states equally essential right to interfere in industrial problems, whenever the good of the worker necessitated it, the common good demanded it, and no other solution could be found.

From the applying of these principles and the rejection of all religious and ethical standards in the conduct of business, arose the injustices which accompanied the Industrial Revolution, and which, to a great extent, persist until the present day. Pope Leo XIII expressed the causes of this injustice when he stated "the ancient workmen's guilds were destroyed in the last century and no other organizations took their place. Public institutions and laws have repudiated the ancient religion."

It is interesting to note that the complete suppression of labor unions in modern times took place as a consequence of the French Revolution. The two first articles of

(39) Husslein, Christian Social Manifesto, (Milwaukee, Bruce) 39.
(40) Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum,
of the Loi Chapelier, passed June 14, 1791.

I. Since the destruction of every kind of association of persons of the same estate or profession is one of the foundations of the Constitution, the reestablishment of them under any form whatsoever is forbidden.

II. Citizens of the same estate and the same profession, workers and journeymen in whatsoever trade, may not, when they are gathered together, elect any president, or draw up rules regarding their pretended common interests. (41)

The breakdown of the organic structure of society led to two consequences. First the mechanization of life, and second, the class struggle. This was not evident at first. As Berdiaev says "the movement towards the secularization which was to end in the mechanization of life and the breakup of all constituted organization was taken in its first phases to be the emancipation of man's effective powers, and the exuberance of their free authority." (42)

It is inescapable that mechanization should follow the breakup of the societal organism for "human powers which escape from a state of organism inevitably become enslaved to mechanization." (43) Man does not realize this at first. "For a time man lives under the illusion that he is independent of all organic ties and he has no suspicion that he will become just a tooth on the wheel of the machine." (44)

With the coming of the machine in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the whole organic rhythm of human life

(41) Husslein, op. cit. 205.
(43) Ibid.
(44) Ibid.
was upset. As Berdyaev says;

"Machinery destroyed the age long pattern and structure of human life as an organic whole with the life of nature. The men of the Renaissance did not know and could not guess that they were paving the way for the triumph of the machine in the world; that mechanism would take the place of organism. The organic structure of life is hierarchical, that is, cosmic, and in the cosmic organism, the parts submit to the whole and all depend on the centre. The centre is the last end, the object of the life of the parts. If the parts of an organism break away from the whole and cease to look at their centre, they insensibly come under the control of a lower kind of nature." (45)

The second and natural result of the atomization of society is class antagonism. As long as society was a well arranged organism, its structure and its form were determined organically by the forces of life. Von Nell Breuning describes the situation this;

"If however society has become a big tub into which the mass of millions of socially detached and atomized individuals has been thrown in confusion, then in the organic forces are replaced by inorganic, mechanical forces. Among these however, if we wish to maintain the simile one externally organizing force dominates, gravity. As a result of prolonged shaking, the heavier particles will move to the bottom, the lighter ones to the top; so to it is with fretfully organized society. We need only ask which force in this instance takes the place of gravity. The answer is not difficult. Experience shows us that lack of means is the leaden weight that attaches itself to man's feet, pulling him into the depths of the economic void, while ownership is the force that keeps him economically afloat." (46)

(45) Berdyaev, op. cit., 42.
(46) Von Nell Breuning, Reorganization of Social Economy, (Milwaukee, Bruce) 213.
The result of this process has been, in the course of time, a separation of men into two layers, according to the amount of their possessions. Consequently men are classified according to possession or lack of possession. The inevitable result has been that at present we have two distinctly separated groups, which, externally, are located above each other and, internally, are no longer united by the interchange of living influence. (47)

These two layers are the owners of the means of production and the wage earners. The one group seeks the service of the workers in the labor market and the other offers its labor in the same market. The unite in their mutual economic production. Both parties have identical interests in this production since both are anxious to produce maximum results. The fact that capital and labor are counterparts in economic production is entirely unobjectionable.

Capital and labor are not only two cooperating, fundamental economic factors, which are mutually coordinated and mutually dependent upon each other for their success or failure, they are also the pillars of social life and its progress. Socially, however, they are antagonistic. As Von Nell Breuning states;

"(47) Von Nell Breuning, op.cit., 213."
"Socially, however they are not counterparts in the words harmless meaning, signifying two friends who are going to play a game of cards; they are antagonists. They are the representatives of interests antagonistic in principle, which seem to be destined to wage endless war; not because they hate each other, not because they bear a grudge against each other, but because their objective interests are antagonistic. (48)

Hence Pope Pius tells us that society remains in a strained and therefore unstable and uncertain state because it is founded on classes with contradictory interests, which are opposed to each other and consequently are prone to enmity and strife. (49)

The logical result, therefore, of the atomic concept of society, is disorder and social revolution. Society is not organized, it is only administered, i.e., it is not a living organism, in which each organ, autonomous in its own sphere of activity, exercises its own proper role and function in relation to the common good. The cause of this condition, as the Holy Father tells us, is the destruction of the organisms which compose the societal body. (50)

The remedy for this unnatural condition is the restoration of the organic concept of society, i.e. the establishment of a regime of social organization in which society will not resemble a collection of atoms which are mechanically united, but an ensemble of living bodies,

(48) Von Nell Breuning, op. cit. 214.
(49) Quadragesimo Annum, A.A.S. Vol. XXIII, p. 286.
(50) Ibid. 203.
which are differentiated, arranged in hierarchical order, and coordinated in view of the common good. In other words, the establishment of a system of modern guilds.

In summary, therefore, we say that since civil society is an organism of the moral order, composed of different organs, exercising a determined function for their own particular good and the common good, the regime of social organization by organized living bodies, seems to be the natural form of civil society. Granting that professional society is one of the natural organs of this society, it demands a form of social organization which not only recognizes its existence, but also a certain autonomy in order that it may perform its natural function. And that form of social organization is the corporative or modern guild system.
V. Professional Society.

A professional society is a natural grouping, intermediate between the family and the state, comprising all those who engaged in the same type of business, ply the same trade, or practice the same profession. Professional society is like the family and civil society, a natural society. We have already seen that the family was the first society. After men were united in civil society, it was natural that those who were engaged in the same type of work should unite. Their union was due to common rights, interests, and habitation.

Consequently professional society is the result of a natural and spontaneous impulse. And since it is the result of a natural impulse it is legitimate. We say that a thing is legitimate when it is in accord with the law. A thing is legitimate in the complete sense when it is in accord with the divine or eternal law, or in other words, with the will of God.

Professional organization is in accord with the natural law, which is the expression of the eternal law in man, because it is necessary in order that man may attain his end, more surely, and more perfectly, in accordance with the aspirations which have been implanted in his nature by the Creator.
We have said that professional society is a necessary society. It is necessary that we distinguish between the two types of necessity, absolute and hypothetical. Absolute necessity is that which cannot not be, e.g. man seeks what is good in all his actions, whether real or apparent. Hypothetical necessity is that which depends upon a supposition or hypothesis, e.g. it is not necessary that I go to New York, but on the supposition that I am going I must take the necessary means to reach there, i.e. a train, a bus or an airplane.

Now God has created man in order that he may attain his end, which end is happiness, imperfect happiness in this world and perfect happiness in the next. As a consequence man tends towards those goods which procure his happiness. These are of two kind, goods of the natural order and goods of the supernatural order. Natural goods are those which are necessary for man's temporal happiness. Supernatural goods are those which assure man of his eternal happiness i.e. grace and the supernatural life.

Since man's proximate end is subordinated to his eternal end, eternal happiness, the material goods of this world are to be used as means to attain his final end.

(2) Summa Theol., I, q. 19, a. 3.
(3) Ibid. I-II, q. 3, 4.
(4) II-II, q. 35, a. 5; q. 25, a. 7; I-II, q. 114, a. 10.
One of the means which God has given man to attain his twofold end are the various societies which are the result of an impulse of nature. These societies are necessary for man but in varying degrees. We have already shown that man is a social animal and that it is only in his association with his fellow men that he is able to attain his proper physical, intellectual and moral perfection. Familial society is necessary because without it man could not develop normally. Civil society is necessary in order that man may live peacefully and tranquilly, participate in the distribution of material goods, and develop physically, intellectually and morally.

Since professional society enables members of the same trade, profession or same type of business, to defend their common interests, and thereby attain the common good of the profession, and consequently, attain their end more easily, effectively and peacefully, it is a natural society.

Professional society is not necessary in the same degree as that of the family and civil society. Man could attain his eternal and proximate end without the aid of professional society. Yet there is in man the natural impulse to unite in professional society. This is quite evid-
ident from history. In Grecian and Roman antiquity there is (5) abundant evidence of the existence of guilds. We have doc-
umentary evidence, dating form the end of the 5th century (6) B.C., for the existence of guilds in Athens and Piraeus.
During the subsequent Hellenistic period there is ample proof of the existence of guilds of merchants, shipowners, navig-
ators, artisans and craftsmen. (7)

In Rome the guilds trace their history at least to (8) the imperial period following the Second Punic War. Some even place their inception at an earlier date. These coll-
egia or guilds were at first organized along the lines of municipal communities. Later, as the result of the growth of state control during the Byzantine period, they lost their not of freedom and were brought under state control. Under this state control, the guilds declined and finally disapp-
eared with the barbarian invasions.

The guilds were reborn in the eleventh century and by the thirteenth century they existed in practically every city in Europe and England. They reached the height of their power and influence during the medieval period. We have al-
ready pointed out how, as a result of the doctrines of eco-
onomic liberalism, the guilds were disbanded after the Fr-
rench Revolution. But the innate desire on the part of man

(5) Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Guilds, 204
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
to unite his efforts with those of other men for their mutual protection and assistance was so strong that, despite all opposition and even prohibitory legislation, it could not be long suppressed. Trade Unions sprung up and gradually the state was forced to accede to the natural desire for association and once again the freedom of association was recognized.

This universal fact reveals among men a natural inclination and a need for professional society. It shows man's need for an organization which fills the gap which exists between the family and the state. One of the lecturers at the Semains Sociale de Canada, 1936, uses a very interesting and very apt illustration to show this necessity. He says that when a man has a very strong constitution it is possible for him to live on bread and water. But if he is sick, if illness is sapping his energies, he needs something stronger and more substantial. Likewise when familial and civil society are evidently healthy, the need of man to fortify himself by association, in order to live in his profession, is less pressing. But when societies are anemic and sick, association is absolutely necessary. Continuing the illustration he points out that although a robust individual may content himself with bread and water, a more nourishing diet is necessary to conserve his power and health.
112.

So also, in a more efficiently organized society, a member of a profession will have more chance of improving his condition and of protecting his rights, if he unites his efforts with those of his fellow members.

Since the family and civil society are necessary in order that the individual may not only live but live well, or in other words, perfect and develop himself, so also, professional society is necessary in order that he may continue the process of perfectioning. Because man not only has the right to his life and normal development, but also, his perfectioning. The professional society is one of the most useful and necessary means for this perfectioning. Consequently, the right of association is only an application of the natural right which every man has of taking the legitimate means to perfect himself according to his natural inclinations.

Although the right of association is a natural right, it is subject to the limitation of the moral law and to the rights of the civil society to which it is subordinate in regard to its end. Hence the right of association is limited, first, in its end, that is, it is impossible to form an association which is contrary to the nature of man, and secondly, by the rights of the state, according to the princ-

(10) Ibid.
113.

Principles of the solution of the conflict of rights. Consequently, an association which is contrary to the common good is not legitimate.

Pope Leo XIII, in his encyclical Rerum Novarum, points out the relations which exist between civil authority and the right of association. First of all he gives the reason for association;

"The experience of his own weakness urges man to call in help from without. We read in the pages of Holy Writ: "It is better that two should be together than one; for they have the advantage of their society. If one fall he shall be supported by the other. Woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up." And further:"A brother that is helped his brother is like a strong city." (11)

From this the Pope deduces the right of association;

"It is this natural impulse which unites men in civil society; and it is this also which makes them band themselves together in associations of citizens with citizens; associations, which it is true, cannot be called societies in the complete sense of the word but which are societies nevertheless!"(12)

The Pope then distinguishes between public and private societies;

"Civil society exists for the common good, and therefore, is concerned with the interests of all in general, and with the individual interests in their due place and proportion. Hence it is called a "public" society, because by its means, as St. Thomas of Aquin says, "Men communicate with one another in the setting up of a commonwealth." But the societies which are formed in the bosom of the state are called private, and justly so because their immediate purpose is the

(11) Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum,
(12) Ibid.
private advantage of the associates. "Now a private society," says St. Thomas again, "is one which is formed for the purpose of carrying out private business; as when two or three enter into partnership with the view of trading in conjunction." (13)

Consequently, public associations are those which are instituted by public authority in order to attain the end of society, e.g. municipal councils. Private associations are those which are instituted by private individuals in order to attain a private end. From this it is evident that there are several differences between public and private associations. Public associations have the same end as the state, whereas private societies have a private end or purpose, whether particular or general. Public associations proceed from public authority, private associations are the result of private initiative and individual liberty.

Moreover, public associations exist independently of their members, in virtue of the continued action of the perfect society which instituted them. Private associations exist and are conserved by the united efforts of the members. They also differ in the extent of their rights. The private associations possess only those rights which come to them from the fusion of individual rights of the members. Public associations enjoy all the rights and priv-

(13) Ibid.
ileges which the authority which constitutes them is able
to grant them. Further, private societies cease by the will
of the members who formed the association. Public associat-
ions can only be ended by public authority.

Nevertheless, particular societies, although they
exist within the state cannot be prohibited by the state
absolutely and as such. For they are natural socieites,
and the state must protect natural rights and not destroy
them. The Pope also points out that if a state does for-
bid the formation of particular societies it is contrad-
icting the very principle of its own existence for both
societies exist in virtue of the same principle, i.e. the
natural propensity of man to live in society.

In addition to permitting these associations to be
formed, the state must allow them to enjoy those rights
which are necessary for the attainment of their end.
Civil authority has, of course, the right to check any
abuses which are contrary to the common good of society.
It can and must prohibit those associations which are det-
rimental to religion, good morality, social peace and soc-
ial security. It can impose upon these associations what-
over restrictions are necessary for the common good.

(15) Antoine, Cours d’Economie Sociale, 435-436.
(16) Rerum Novarum
(17) Ibid.
(18) Antoine, op. cit. 436
(19) Ibid.
116.

There is, therefore, a natural tendency among those who are engaged in the same type of business activity, ply the same trade, or practice the same profession, to unite into professional societies. This spontaneous tendency is a natural consequence of their common rights, interests, activity and the need of mutual protection. In particular the prosperity of their particular profession serves as a means of uniting them.

Moreover, in order that any profession enjoy this prosperity and function properly three things are necessary. First, all the members of the profession must enjoy a material and moral position in society which is in conformity with their dignity as human beings. Secondly, that order and peace exist among the various groups so that each may fulfill its proper function in the best possible manner. Thirdly, that order and harmony prevail among the various branches of the same profession.

II. The Organization of the Profession.

By the organization of a profession we mean the furnishing of that profession with those things which are necessary in order that it may exercise its proper function as a natural organ of society, that is, that it may function autonomously, within the limitations of public order and the common good of society.

Therefore the organization of any profession demands first of all that the profession be given a juridic status. In other words, it must be given a charter by the civil authority, conferring upon it the proper authority to make its own rules and regulations which are necessary for the interests of the profession. This of course entails authority and consequently, legislative, executive and judicial power within the framework of the profession.

The reason for the organization of the professions is that peace and order may prevail within the profession itself, that the same spirit of peace and harmony may prevail among the various professions and that the state may be freed from certain functions and obligations which it has been obliged to assume as a result of the breakup of the societal organism.

(21) Ares, op. cit. 13.
(22) Ibid.
The organization of professional society is necessary for two reasons; first, in order to restore order in society, and second, to restore order in the economic sphere.

We have already pointed out that society is an organism, composed of a number of organs, which are autonomous, and which are harmoniously united by the state in order to attain the common good. Consequently, the common good demands a social order which is human, that is, that every man receives his share of those material goods which are necessary that he may lead a life which is worthy of the human personality. Further, the common good demands an organization which assures man of a share in these goods.

If the professions are not organized they are incapable of fulfilling their proper functions as organs of the societal body and, consequently, due to the disorder which results, man is unable to receive the goods which are necessary for a truly human and complete existence. Moreover, the organization of the profession is necessary as a means of establishing order, discipline, respect for the virtues of justice and charity, and cooperation between capital and labor. If these do not exist within the profession, we can hardly hope for a healthy, ordered society.
It is in the economic field particularly that the need of professional organization is felt. On the one hand we have huge corporations and industries which are organized on a national and, in some cases, on an international scale. On the other, we have the great masses of workers, who, to a great extent are not organized, and, in fact, rivals for employment. Consequently there is a need for collective agreements which cover not just one or a few businesses but whole industries, trades etc. on a local, regional and national scale. The immediate effect of organization, therefore, would be the restoration of the equilibrium which must exist between, the employer, whether an individual or a giant corporation. The second result will be the establishment of fair agreements for a whole industry of trade. Finally, the interests and rights of the workers will be protected, and cooperation will take the place of conflict.

The necessity of professional organization is equally necessary on the part of employers. First, as a means of cooperation with their employees, secondly, that as a group they may defend their interests against unjust state intervention, and finally, that some sort of order be restored in the economic life of the nation. This would involve a certain amount of economic planning, not only within each industry but also among the various industries of the nation.

(23) Arena, op. cit. 15.
(24) Ibid.
It follows therefore that professional organization is today an indispensable means of reestablishing the social order and the common good. Some are of the opinion that the need is so pressing at the present day that the common good imposes upon all the obligation of bringing about this organization and failure to do so is a violation of social justice and charity.

Professional organization is of various types. First, there is the trade union and the employers association. Secondly there is the vocational group or guild and finally the interprofessional association. Of these three the guild is the most perfect form of professional organization because it alone unites all the members of an industry, trade, or profession. The trade union or association is imperfect because it is based upon the organization of opposed classes.

A trade union may be defined as a permanent association of wage earners, having for its purpose the maintenance and improvement of the conditions under which they work. Labor organizations may be divided into three different classes or types on the basis of their structure.

(26) Bye and Heewett, Applied Economics (ed. 2; New York, 1937) 103.
A craft union is an organization of all the workers of one particular craft or trade, e.g. carpenters, bricklayers etc. An industrial union is an organization of all the workers within a given industry, regardless of the type of work each individual may be engaged in. Craft lines are ignored. Examples of this type of union are the United Mine Workers and the Automobile Workers. In the industrial union all the workers in the industry stand together as a unit. This is an advantage over the craft union, in which different parts of the same industry have separate organizations, making it more difficult to obtain unity of action in case of labor difficulties. However the craft union has the advantage of uniting employees engaged in exactly the same type of work, making it easier for them to appreciate their mutual interests. A general labor union is a broad organization of workers regardless of craft or industrial lines. The only qualification is that the applicant be a wage earner.

The local craft or industrial union often belongs to a federation of similar craft or industrial unions on a state and national, and in some cases, an international scale. For example, the American Federation of Labor or the International Garment Workers.

(27) Bye and Hewett, op.cit. 105-106.
In addition to the development of craft and industrial unions on the part of employees, there have been developed associations of employers for the specific purpose of presenting a united front to labor, and in some case, of resisting the growth of trade unionism. The structure of these groups is similar to that of the labor organizations. There is, for example, the Chicago Team Owners Association, which parallels the craft union, and the associations of employers in industries which are closely allied such as the National Metal Trades Association. In many cases, city, state and national associations of employers have been formed, e.g. the National Association of Manufacturers.

The employers associations are of two types—the business like conciliatory associations and the militant associations. The business like employers associations are formed primarily to bargain effectively and collectively with the workers in order to stabilize the trade by establishing peaceful industrial relations, e.g. associations of the building and printing trades. The militant group, on the other hand, have found that in some cases the unions did not live up to their agreements and consequently have an antagonistic attitude towards labor organizations. In other cases these associations have been formed with the definite purpose of preventing an organized

(28) Bye and Hewett, _op.cit._ 110
labor movement. The National Association of Manufacturers has this militant attitude.

The causes of the modern trade union movement are found in the conditions which resulted from the Industrial Revolution. We have already pointed out that the guilds disappeared after the French Revolution. The disorganized workers were for a time, helpless to remedy their conditions. However, the natural tendency for a form a professional society once again asserted itself and the modern trade union resulted. Conditions during the eighteenth century had an important bearing upon labor. The extension of the division of labor, the development of power machinery and the introduction of the factory system had an important bearing upon labor relations.

In the early guild system, journeymen were able to progress in their trade and eventually become masters. The crafts required only skill and a few tools and the number of masters was large. No class struggle developed under such conditions. When however the possibility of the workers passing to the employers class was reduced, the attitude of the workers changed and class division resulted. Today it is very difficult for the ordinary workman to go into business for himself due to the large amount of capital required. Moreover the number of positions at the top of industrial organization is necessarily limited.

(29) Bye and Hewett, op. cit., III.
The worker sells his time to his employer and is paid a wage in money rather than a share of the profit. Since the number of workers is so great personal contact with the employer becomes impossibly and a class consciousness develops. It was this need for organization to represent the workers' interests before his employer that gave rise to the trade union.

The aim of the trade union, therefore is to present a united front of the workers for common action and in this way protect the wage earners and also better the condition of the worker by enforcing reasonable working hours and by maintaining wages at a fair rate so that the worker is not obliged to make unjust wage contract thru the fear of competition or ignorance of working conditions.

Many advantages have resulted from trade unions. The workers, whose individual bargaining power is very weak when compared with that of a powerful employer or corporation, are effectively enabled to meet the employer on more equal ground and consequently are protected from unjust treatment. They also improve working conditions by collective bargaining by which better working conditions, higher wages, and shorter hours are obtained.

(30) Ross, Survey of Sociology, (Milwaukee, Bruce, 1932) 257.
The choice of "walking delegates" or representatives who have an expert knowledge of business and the labor market, enables the trade unionists to deal more effectively on the part of the members. In this way the union is able to obtain a better agreement because the representative is on an equal level as regards training with the company representative. Since he is not connected with the company, he has no fear of being fired.

Trade unions also protect the employer from the competition of employers who treat their workers unfairly since all employers must pay the same wage. They also tend to stabilize the working population by effecting the same wages and working conditions in an entire trade or industry. The trade union pledges itself to keep every agreement made with the employer and consequently the difficulty of numerous private agreements is eliminated. They also tend to bring the employer and employee closer together and thereby promote understanding and cooperation.

Despite the many advantages of the trade union and all it has accomplished for the worker, it has some serious disadvantages. In some cases it has resulted in a labor monopoly which is equally obnoxious as a monopoly of capital. Sometimes, too, the common good has been overlooked by the trade union. Some unions have abused their power to restrict the work-

(31) Ross, op.cit. 258.
ers output or created an artificial scarcity of labor by limiting the membership of the union.

The main point of criticism of the union, however, is that it is a union of only one class and juridically it is only a free association which is based upon a private right. Since the trade union is a grouping of only one class it does not represent the interests of the whole profession, but only those of its own members.

Moreover, there are many sections of the profession which are not included with its scope and as a consequence it is without representation. And since it is only a private association it is not qualified to govern the whole profession and as a consequence the profession is not truly organized.

It is true that collective agreements are formed between employers and unions but these in most cases do not apply to the whole profession or industry but only to the union or unions which are a party to the contract. As a result, there are sections of the profession which do not enjoy the benefits of this collective agreement.

Finally, these contracts which, to some extent, put an end to disputes between capital and labor are not efficacious since they lack juridic sanction. In addition, the unions can only collaborate in the formation and enacting of labor legislation in a private capacity. Since there is lacking a qualif-

(32) Ares, op. cit. 16
(33) Ibid.
(34) Ibid. 17.
ied official public body to represent the interests of the profession or the industry, the power rests to a great extent in the hands of the state, with, of course, the increasing of the functions which do not properly belong to the state.

Further, as we shall see in another chapter, the trade union tends to intensify rather than lessen or eliminate the conflict between classes.
VI. The Nature of the Corporate Order.

Thus far we have seen in broad outline what the social order should be like. We have seen that man is social by nature and develops his abilities only by the constant contact and collaboration of his fellow man. His various demands give rise to various types of society, the family, the municipality, the state and the profession. We have shown that the natural structure of society is that of a moral organism which is composed of a number of organs or societies, which are autonomous in their own sphere, but which are unified and harmonized for the common good by the state. We pointed out that the present chaos of society is due to the break-up of the organic formation of society and the consequent mechanization and atomization of men which has resulted in the organization of society along the lines of two opposed classes.

In our consideration of professional society, which should function as one of the organs of society, we noted that the trade unions which took the place of the defunct guilds in the eighteenth century, despite their achievements, are not the natural formation because they, like, society, tend to intensify the class separation.

We maintain that the remedy for the present strained
and unnatural condition of society, is the restoration of the organic concept of society. This will restore the proper order, harmony, and hierarchy to society and at the same time relieve the state of the burden of function which do not properly belong to it. As Pope Pius XI has said, "the aim of social legislation must therefore be the reestablishment of vocational groups". In other words, professional society must once again be organized into functional groups or guilds.

A. Definition of the Guild.

We will give a descriptive definition first and then the strict definition. In order to understand what the guild is, it is necessary to recall the distinction which we made between the two concepts of society or the distinction between an organism and a mechanism. In the organism the different parts have their own proper, autonomous activity. In a mechanism on the other hand, this specific and autonomous activity is lacking. The role of each part consists in receiving and transmitting an impulse which comes from without. An example of mechanism in the social order is the police department, which receives its impulse from the state as from a central motive power and transmits it to the extremities of the social body.

(1) Quadragesimo Anno, "In reficiendos igitur "ordines" ars politica socialis incumbat nescesse est!"
(2) Ares, Catechisme de l'Organization Corporative, 22
An example of an organism in the social order is the municipality. Men who live in the same section unite in order to attain certain advantages which, individually, they are unable to attain e.g. schools, public transportation, water supply etc. They elect a municipal authority which, in their name, and under the control of the state government, administers the affairs of the community and passes and enacts whatever legislation is required for the peace and welfare of that community. All those who live in that community by reason of their residence there are bound to observe the community laws and regulations.

By analogy, the guild is a natural organ of the social body. It is composed of definite, professional cells and has a specific, immanent and autonomous function, which is orientated directly to its own proper good and indirectly to the common good of the whole social body. The guild, therefore, is based upon functional social activity. It unites all those who are engaged in the same profession and under an authority chosen by them directs the activities of the group to the particular good of the guild and indirectly the common good of society. We have for example existing at present the Bar Association, the Medical Association, which are remnants of this guild idea.
161.

From this descriptive definition we can see that the
guild is not a mechanism of the state which serves as a chan-
nel for the decisions of the state and a means of obtaining
a directive power over the economy of the nation. Neither
is it a group of officials whose function is to direct, in
the name of the state, any trade, industry or profession.
We can further conclude that the guild is intended merely
to represent the interests of one group in society nor is
it an association of two separate groups who are waging
social and economic war.

Several definitions of the guild have been advanced.
It has been defined as a "professional group composed of
unions of workers, employers and consumers, which unites
all those who live, by their labor, from a determined pro-
duction and, who, by that very fact, have a real interest,
which unites them, in knowing that their union will assure
them of the prosperity of their act of producing, and that
each will share its benifits!" Another definition is; "It
is a natural society, intermediate between the family and
civil society in its different degrees!" Still another def-
ition has been advanced; "organizations of all the people
in a whole industry, line of trade or profession, acting un-
der the government to a degree!" This last is rather poor.

(3) L'Organizatiion Professionalle, L'autorite corpor-
ative et l'autorite publique, 192
(4) Ibid.
132.

At the Semaine Sociale de France which was held at Anger in 1935, the President, M. Duthoit proposed this definition which is very precise and complete. The Guild is "an official, public body, an intermediary between private industry and the state, which is entrusted with the management of the common good of a given profession."

The two essential points of the definition are therefore, first, that the guild is an official, public body intermediary between private enterprise and the state, and, secondly, that is charged with the common good of the profession. Every management implies an authority, consequently, the management of the common good of a profession implies an authority within the profession, whose exercise is limited by the common good of the profession. We will consider each element of the definition separately.

The guild is an official and public body. Hence the guild is not a private association but rather belongs in the sphere of public law. In this respect it is like the municipality. Its rules and decisions have a juridic value, that is, they have the force of a law, recognized by the state, and binding all the members of the profession. Like the municipality, the guild can include free associations without absorbing them.

(6) L'Organization Corporative, Semaine Sociale d'Angers, 1935, Par une autorité corporative,
(7) Ibid.
Intermediary between private enterprise and the state. This implies the two terms between which the guild acts as a liaison. The guild is the result of community of interests, rights, duties and work. To this solidarity of interest there is added the bond of law. This however does not mean that it directs each business. The choice of personal and the obligation of maintaining order devolves upon each guild.

But the guild forms one of the organs of society. It is necessary therefore that it be connected with the central authority, or uniting principle, which we call the state. But it cannot be directly attached to the state without grave and serious difficulties. There is a necessity therefore for a body which is intermediary between private enterprise and the state.

In this way the directive power which properly belongs to each enterprise is maintained. At the same time, private enterprise is not independent of the state and its supreme power of control and coordination. In this way the private enterprise is not encroached upon, and it is able to fulfill its proper function is society. On the other hand, the state is freed from those functions which it cannot perform, or can only perform with great difficulty.

Just as the central government cannot efficiently govern a vast territory but must decentralize its power into smaller more efficient units, so, the state cannot intervene and dir-
ect the various professions, but must grant each profession the authority to regulate its own affairs and also represent the profession in civil matters.

As a consequence the authority which the profession possesses is of public law. This is necessary since on the one hand it promulgates laws and regulations which are binding upon all who exercise that particular profession and all who have any responsibility in the economic order, and on the other hand, it must represent the interests of the profession before the authority of the state, in order to defend the rights and interests of the profession.

Entrusted with the management of the common good of a definite profession. Any society is healthy and happy when the activities of that society are harmoniously performed and coordinated. There are three aspects to the common good of a profession. First, the common good embraces each and every member of the profession regardless of status or position. Hence it must safeguard the interests of all the members, by preventing unjust and pagan rivalries, and by promoting justice and charity among them, or as La Tour du Fin named them, "the good morals of the profession."

Secondly, the common good extends to the consumer, since the profession is a form of public service. This involves

(7) Dutoit, loc. cit.
(8) L'Ordre Nouveau, Montreal, I, no. 10. Also Dutoit, loc. cit.
furnishing the consumer with products or services which are of good quality. It also embraces such things as just price, good workmanship and materials etc.

Thirdly, the common good of the profession must safeguard the interests of society in general by cooperating with the other professions in order that society may be able to attain its end, the common good of all. Hence in seeking its own common good, the profession is precluded from any sort of "collective egoism" which would consider only the good of the members of the profession to the exclusion of the good of consumers and the the rest of society in general.

Of a determined profession. The word profession, in its broad sense, designates the state, the condition or the type of activity of a person, e.g. the profession of a lawyer. However it may also be applied to that framework within which a human person exercises his intellectual or manual activity, not only for his own profit but also for the advantage of his fellow men. In this sense it embraces all those who perform the same, or complimentary, type of work. For example, the construction industry embraces architects, engineers, bricklayers, carpenters etc. So also, the health services embrace not only doctors but also nurses, hospital
attendans, stenographers etc. When we speak of the guild as including all the members of a profession, it is in this latter sense.

The authority of the guild, therefore, is restricted to the common good of the guild, just as familial authority is restricted to the family, and municipal authority restricted to the municipality. It is scarcely necessary to note that this authority must be permanent since the solidarity of interests of the members is permanent.

The guild consequently has a twofold function. The first is to regulate the relation between employers and employees in the various private enterprises within the profession. The second essential function is the regulation of production within the profession. This regulation must be the result of a common agreement of all the private enterprises within the profession, and extends to every branch of production. It includes therefore agreements regarding the amount of production, standards of production, markets, and finally, quality and prices. In this way will they maintain stability with progress.

In order to further describe the guild in order that we may have a complete and clear concept of it, it is necessary to distinguish between the authority which belongs to the state and that which belongs to the guild.
As we have pointed out, the word state has several meanings. In its proper sense, the state is a collectivity of men who inhabit the same territory, organized in an autonomous civil body. This is the state society. In a less proper sense, it is used to designate the form of government which administers the country, e.g. democratic, monarchical etc., or the government itself, that is, the civil authority which directs the social body. This is the state power. We are here using state in this last sense.

The purpose of the state is the following: 1. To assure public peace, to assure interior and exterior security, defend the rights of its subjects whether of individuals or inferior groups such as the guilds. 2. To promote public, human prosperity. This embraces both material and spiritual prosperity. As regards material prosperity, the state must provide those general services which it alone is capable of providing adequately and easily, aiding private enterprise and assisting private initiative. As regards moral prosperity, the state must protect and develop public morality. It must not, however, concern itself directly with questions of private morality which are not within its competence.

(9) L'Organization Professionnelle, loc.cit.,195
Civil authority, therefore is limited by the preexistent rights of the individuals and groups which it governs. They are not united in society in order to renounce their rights but to defend and promote them. Moreover the individual, the professional association, the guild, have the right to realize their end in a free manner and the state cannot deprive them of their natural liberties. In addition, the state must respect the rights of the religious, supernatural society.

The state is subject, consequently, to the fundamental laws of civil society, and to the divine law, whether revealed or natural. It must respect the rules of human activity which have been imposed by God. In particular it must observe distributive justice in the division of responsibility and social advantages. (10)

Civil authority is exercised over civil society in it entirety, over the individuals, over the family, the profession and the guild. It cannot, therefore arrogate to itself those rights which belong to the family or to the profession, because the state is not capable of fulfilling their roles. It is essential therefore to distinguish very carefully what pertains to civil authority and what pertains to the organized profession. Only when each has its own definite functions to perform, are we able to avoid the extremes of Liber- (10) L'Organization Professionnelle, loc.cit. 195.
alism and statism. The fact that we insist upon the distinction of the state and the guild does not mean however that they are not in any way united. They are on different planes, the one being in the social-economic order and the other in the political order. The guild, of course, is subordinate to the state, as the imperfect to the perfect, but both together help man to attain his end.

It is evident therefore that the state and the guild are distinct in their activities. And this is the reason why we insist upon the use of corporate order rather than corporate state. It is true that if one uses the term as meaning state society, it is legitimate, but since the term state is usually associated with the state power, or civil authority, it is incorrect. As we have pointed out, the essential function of the state is the exercise of civil power, that is to say, of the supreme governing power on the temporal plane.

The expression "corporate state" consequently, signifies literally, that the maintainence of order, defense, forming of treaties etc pertain to the corporations.

We shall show shortly that the guilds or corporations are organs of civil society. But each organ in society has its proper function. The corporative function is the administration of the common good of the profession, and not the

(11) Duthoit, loc. cit.
exercise of the supreme power of coordination of the various living organs of society. The family and the community have a part to play in the state and yet we do not speak of the family state or the community state.

It is true that the guild or corporation is connected with the state. It is likewise true that the guild or corporation may aid in the reform of the state. This however is only indirectly, by freeing it of many functions which do not belong to it and thereby allowing the state to devote itself to those political functions and problems which are its proper sphere of activity. It may also indirectly modify the state by serving as a consultative chamber in economic matters. Nevertheless, the proper function of the guild is to attain the common good of the profession and safeguard the interests of its members.

Another, and very important reason, for avoiding the use of the expression "corporate state" is that true corporatism is identified with the Fascist Corporate state. This would be unfortunate for although there are some similarities between the two, there are very important differences. The Italian corporations were organized directly by the state, are presided over by members of the Fascist party, and serve to extend state control over the various, (12)

(12) Duthoit, loc.cit.
industries and professions. It centralizes control in the state, whereas the purpose of true corporatism is to decentralize this control.

It is necessary therefore that we make several distinctions. There are several kinds of corporatism. We may distinguish two types according to the role which is assigned to the guild or corporation, social corporatism and political corporatism. Social corporatism limits the activities of the corporation or guild to the social and economic spheres. Political corporatism, on the other hand, believes that the corporation or guild should play a role in the government of the country.

We can draw a further distinction according to the manner of formation of the corporation or guild. First there is "Corporatisme d'association", corporatism of the associations, according to which the corporation or guild is formed slowly, from below, and there is granted to these freely established organs the power to regulate the affairs of the profession. Secondly, there is "corporatisme d'etat", according to which the corporation or guild is established #from above" by the state, and is imposed upon the members of the various professions. The corporations thus established are used by the state as a means of directing the economic activities of the country.

(13) Ares, op. cit. 21-22.
142.

The corporatism which is advocated by the encyclicals is professional corporatism, for the social-economic order, and by associations. In a society which is properly organized, therefore, the functions of the state and the guild will be well defined. The guild will not taken upon itself function for which it is not intended or equipped. The guild is subordinate to the state. Just as the good of the profession as a whole is superior to that of one of the members, so the good of the whole of society is superior to that of one profession. It is incorrect therefore to imagine that the corporative organization of society implies a reform of the state in the sense of Fascism or a dictatorship.

It pertains to the guild, consequently, to defend the interests of the profession, its liberties, its rights, and its autonomy. The state must respect these rights, and interests as well as the autonomy of the guild. As one author says, everything which properly pertains to the profession must be restored to the profession, it being understood, of course that civil authority have a certain amount of control in the interests of the general welfare. On the other hand whatever is public, must be left to the public organs.
with the understanding and reservation that they consult and listen to the authorized and legitimate council of the guilds. (15)

As a result of this adjustment of the relations between the State and economics, the state will not be weakened but strengthened. "On the contrary, it can hardly fail to grow stronger and to win back the sovereignty and dignity it has, to some extent, forfeited. Indeed, "the more faithfully this principle of the subsidiary function be followed, and a graded hierarchical order exist between various associations, the greater will be both social authority and social efficiency, and the happier and more prosperous the condition of the commonwealth! Thus the authority of the state will be reinstated, "the supreme arbiter, ruling in kingly fashion, far above all party contention, intent only upon justice and the common good." (16)

(15) L'Organization Professionnelle, loc. cit., 199
VII. The Necessity of the Corporate Order.

We have seen that the aim of social legislation, according to the teaching of Pope Pius XI, must be the reestablishment of the vocational groups or guilds. The Holy Father and the Catholic Social Movement sees in this restoration the best means to order the national economy, restore social peace between capital and labor, and finally, to reform the state. The organization of the professions, consequently, is the best antidote to the three great disorders from which society modern society is suffering today.

It is not within the scope of this thesis to give a complete analysis of economic planning. We are concerned mainly with principles which must be found in economic society. In our description of the atomic concept of society we traced briefly the development of liberalism in economics. We showed how the doctrines of religious, philosophical and political liberalism were applied to economic as well. The discoveries of new lands, with the consequent growth of trade as a result of expanding markets, the formation of corporations, the changes in agriculture from farming for consumption to farming for a profit, instead of consumption, the dissolution of the guilds, and the growth of the new middle
class, changed the complexion of economics. The concepts of social justice and charity were replaced by individual greed and gain.

By the time the Industrial Revolution came, economic theory and practice was dominated by two principles. First, that the government which governs least is the best and second, that free competition of individual and individual always brings the best man to the top. In other words the free rule of nature theory of the physiocrats was now widely accepted. Human enterprise, consequently, had one aim and purpose, the increase of personal wealth, the making of profit for the individual. At this time, too, commerce had reached the limits of the world. There were new and expanding markets, new sources of raw materials, supplies of precious metals for coinage etc. This constant expansion of commerce had put a great strain upon the existing system of manufacture. Surplus commercial capital was ready for investment and so helped to stimulate manufacturing on a new basis.

The first aid to this desired expansion was the use of power driven machinery, water power at first, then steam, and in our own day electricity. This was the beginning of what is known as industrial capitalism.

(3) Ibid. 9
(4) Ibid.
This period began somewhere in the eighteenth century and reached its maturity when "machinery driven by a central supply of mechanical power became the typical method of manufacturing production. It was at this point that industry replaced commerce as a directing force of economic life and the scale of production as well as the forms of business organization came to be determined by the growth and character of mechanical power." (5)

As a consequence of this development capital became increasingly important. The machinery speeded up production and distribution which in turn resulted in an accumulation of capital which was hitherto unknown. Under this development, too, labor began to collect from farms and small scattered workshops in a single place to work under a single roof with the new machinery. This was the beginning of the factory system. Labor was now separated from the ownership of the means of production. (6)

For the first time there was a sharp line drawn between the employer and employee. During this period the principles of individualism were given their widest application in the economic field. Freedom from all restraint of ethics or religion, self interest and free competition were developed to the utmost. (7)

(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
The new freedom in business was hampered only by the rivalries between various industries. Gradually, however, these industrial enterprises of a similar nature combined in order to eliminate the expense of competition. Thus we had the beginning of monopolies. By means of holding companies, interlocking directorates etc the control of industry became more and more concentrated in the hands of a few. It is true that ownership was more widely spread by the sale of stock but the control was in the hands of a few who in some cases only owned a minority of stock in the enterprise.

Thus by the strangest of paradox's free competition became no competition. "This accumulation of power, the characteristic not of the modern economic order, is the natural result of the limitless free competition which permits the survival of those only who are the strongest, which often means those who fight most relentlessly who pay the least heed to the dictates of conscience."

During the middle ages the purpose of the productive process was consumption, a supplying of the ordinary needs and wants of the time. The main purpose of economics therefore was the gaining an supplying of the means of livelihood.

(8) Economics and Finance, loc.cit. 11.
(9) "Haec potentiae et virium accumulatio, recentissimae oeconomicae quasi nativa mota, fructus est quem natura sua protulit infinita competitorum certandi libertas, quae eos tantum superstites relinquit qui plurimum valeant, quod saepe idem est ac dicere, qui omnium violentissime dimicant qui minus animi conscientiam curant." Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, A.A.S. XXIII, p.211.
On the other hand the goal of economic liberalism is different; it is the acquisition of wealth or the making of a profit. Indeed, the goal is the making of a profit for a further investment. Business or profit for a living has become living for business or for profit.

As a consequence individualism has exalted some of the less noble forces of human nature. Greed, acquisitiveness, pride and cruelty are not the ideals upon which a social order should be built. As Berdyaev has described it;

"A regime which allows the revolting indigence in spite of a general increase of wealth, which is obliged in the name of economic interest to destroy "superfluos" goods although there are people in need of them, which breeds abominable wars, which is possessed by a greed for riches which has become transferred into a disinterested passion, which empties the life, even of the directing classes, of meaning, by making it an accessory of the economic game, such a regime is completely mad, and stands condemned by conscience and reason. The capitalist regime is of all the most uncertain and unstable; it easily leads to crises and catastrophes, nobody knows what the morrow will bring forth, behind it lurks the all consuming covetousness which breeds endless disquiet. The capitalist world gives happiness to nobody. Such is its lack of fixity and assurance that the future of the bourgeoisie is not more secure than that of the proletariat; the millionaire, the owner of a huge business, the rich banker, may be penniless tomorrow; it is a regime of risk and opportunism. It is very dynamic expending immense energy and developing the material powers of production, but it is the ruin of men and deforms the soul alike of employers and employed." (11)

(11) Quoted by Cronin, Economics and Society, Major Economic Philosophies, 38.
Acquisition of wealth, thereof \textit{value}, is the supreme value according to the individualistic school of economics. All other values are secondary. An example of this is the "want in the midst of plenty" which exists in our country. How is this possible. Our productive forces \textit{can} satisfy many times over the wants or needs of the population and yet we have the irrational situation of want in the midst of plenty. The answer lies in the fact that our economy is \textit{guided by} the principle of production for profit, not for consumption. In a system which is based upon production for consumption the existence of unfulfilled needs or wants should speed up production until an equilibrium is reached between the abilities to produce and the need to consume. \textit{(13)}

Economic progress, therefore, is not an increase of profits for the few but the increase of the economic welfare of each and all, in other words, the common good. The economic progress of any nation requires four things:

1. continuous increase in the real income of the people
2. continuous improvement, thru better standards of consumption, in the character of the goods that go to make up that income
3. a decrease in the relative amount of effort, the use of material resources, and the sacrifice of human health and happiness, involved in the production of the income.
4. the greatest possible diffusion of income among the members of society. \textit{(14)}

\textit{(12)} Complete discussion of this question is found in Chase, \textit{The Economy of Abundance}, also, "America's Capacity to Consume," and "America's Capacity to Produce," by the Brookings Institute.

\textit{(13)} Michel, \textit{loc. cit.} 17

\textit{(14)} Bye and Hawett, \textit{Applied Economics}, 652.
We say therefore in the words of Pope Pius XI, that the proper ordering of economic affairs cannot be left to free competition alone. "Free competition, however, though within certain limits just and productive of good results, cannot be the ruling principle of the economic world; this has been abundantly proved by the consequences that have followed from the free rein given to these dangerous individualistic ideas!"

The first function of the guild, therefore, is, in cooperation with the state, to establish order in the economic field. The economic order must be transformed into a human institution, organized hierarchically, for the common good. The labor contract must be made a collective contract which has a juridic force and not just a unilateral contract which may be broken at any time. Both intellectual and manual workers must be allowed to participate in the organization and direction of production and in the planning of the economic life of the country thru their guild councils.

These transformation in the present system will tend to establish a permanent and organic collaboration between

(15) "At liberum certamen, quamquam dum certis finibus continentur, sequam sit et sane utile, rem economicam dirigere plane nequit: id quod eventus satis superquecomprobit, postquam pravii individualisti spiritus placita executioni sune mandata." Pius XI, op. cit. 206.

151.

The second reason for the organization of the profession into guilds follows as a consequence of the first. We have already shown how economic liberalism resulted in the division of society into two opposed classes. Society today still remains in a strained and therefore unstable and uncertain state, being founded on classes with contradictory interests and hence opposed to each other, and consequently prone to enmity and strife. (17) The reason for this condition is that fact that labor is bought and sold like merchandise. The supply and the demand for labor turns the labor market into an arena where the two classes engage in deathly combat. Pope Pius points out that a remedy must be applied to this grave disorder which is leading society to ruin. (18)

There are two remedies for this evil. The Holy Father says, "there cannot be any question of any perfect cure, except this opposition be done away with, and well ordered members of the social body come into being anew, vocational groups namely, binding men together not according to the position they occupy in the labor market, but according to the diverse functions which they exercise in society."

(17) "Reapsea violenta adhuc perserverat et hac de causa instablis ac mutans humane societatis condicio, quippe quae "classibus" innitatur diversa appetentibus et ideo oppositis, propterque ad inimicitias dimicationesque pronis. Quad. Anno. A.A.S. XXXIII, 204

(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) "Hulc pessimo malo, quo tota societas in exitium abripitur, quam citissime esse medendum nemo est qui nonintellegat. Ast peffecta sanatio tum tantum efforescat, cum, oppositione illa e medio sublata, soc-
The second remedy proposed is that of the Communists. Communism is built upon the idea of an essential class struggle, which must continue with inexorable bitterness until all classes shall be finally abolished in the world and there shall be a classless society. Neither Leo Xlll nor Pius XI denies the existence of the class struggle but both of them deny emphatically the inexorable necessity of a condition in which the classes of society are pitted against each other in a war of extermination.

As Leo Xlll so well said; "the greatest mistake that is made in the matter now under consideration is to possess oneself of the idea that class is naturally hostile to class." And he adds that this view is so irrational and false that the exact contrary is true. He adds;

"Just as the symmetry of the human body is the result of the disposition of the members of the body, so in a state, it is ordained by nature that the two classes should exist in harmony and agreement, and should, as it were, fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body politic. Each requires the other; capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement results in pleasantness and good order; perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and outrage!" (21)

The term class struggle may mean any of three things. It may mean a form of social conflict or the theory of its

(20) continued. socialiscorporis membra bene instructa constituantur: "ordines nimium quibus inserantur homines non pro munere, quod quis in mercatu laboris habeat, sed pro diversis partibus socialibus, quas singuli exerceant." Quadragesimo Anno, A.S.S. Xlll, 204.

(21) Herum Novarum, Leo Xlll,
origin and significance or, finally, the principle of action which is based on this theory.

According to the Marxian theory, the history of mankind has been a continuous struggle between classes. With the development of capitalism, society is divided more and more into two hostile camps, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie is engaged in converting "surplus Value" into profits at the expense of the proletariat which resents this. During the process of the struggle the proletariat realizes that the ownership of the means of production is the cause and source of the power of the bourgeoisie and that they can only end their exploitation by the establishment of a socialistic society based upon the common ownership of the means of production.

Marx believed that the proletariat would be victorious in this struggle because of certain inherent weaknesses in the capitalist system. Among these he numbered the inevitable concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, the disappearance of the middle class and the increasing misery of the working classes.

Since it is the class struggle which is to bring about the final emancipation of the working class, the

(22) Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Class Struggle,
(23) Ibid.,
(24) Ibid.
should accelerate the process. In this way the class strug-<ref>(25)</ref>gle becomes a program of action.

According to the communist theory a class is an aggregate of persons who have the same function in the productive process and who therefore have the same source of income. The origin of these classes is based upon the division of labor. "In every society there are two basic classes: one which commands and monopolizes the means of production and the other, the producing class." Between these two classes there are several intermediate classes. These are either transition classes which are the residue of previous class forms, or mixed classes, which include those who in some respects belong to one class, and in other respects belong to another. Finally there are beggars, vagrants etc.

Since the state is under the domination and control of the bourgeoisie, it, too, must be overthrown. The class struggle, consequently, takes on a political aspect, and its aim is the overthrow of the existing form of government and the substitution of a new order. In order to bring this about the class must have certain definite characteristics. "It must be a producing class; it must be welded toge

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(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid.
by the condition of its existence and it must form a large mass or majority of the population."

These characteristic are found in the industrial working class and consequently it is the only class capable of bringing about the revolution. However under contemporary condition peasants and workers are forming an alliance against a financial oligarchy.

Moreover because of the internationalism of finance and industry, the class struggle in modern times is becoming more and more international in character and will, according to communist theory, eventually lead to a world revolution. The revolution will be violent. At first it will be necessary to have a class dictatorship in order to effect the new order. This will be the transition period of socialism and will precede the period of communism which will eventually bring about a classless society. In order to hasten this process, the communists are urged to promote the class struggle in every way possible.

This, in brief, is the solution which is proposed by communism as a solution to the problem of the conflict of the classes. The first comment which we make in regard in regard to this theory is that it is an over simplification of history. The statement of Marx that, "The history of

(30) *Ibid*.
(31) *Ibid*. 
all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" to say the least, contains an enormous amount of exageration. It is a fine formula for simplifying history but it ignores too many inconvenient facts. As Cathrein says:

"Is there any record of class struggles in the whole of Oriental history? There are many accounts of national wars between Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians, Medes, Persians etc. We read of great generals and conquerers who introduced radical changes in the political and social order; but of class struggle there is scarcely a trace.

...Later on the main factors in social evolution were the national struggles between Greeks and Persians, the internecine wars of the Greeks and Greeks, the hostilities of the Greeks and Macedonians, of Greeks and Romans, of the Romans and their neighbors, especially the Catanians. The influence of Greece and Rome upon the civilization of the entire Occident is incalculable, and it is in vain to explain it by reference to the class struggle. Still later we meet the wars of the Romans against the northern barbarians. Then took place that fusion of races from which sprang new and vigorous nations. Was it, perhaps, by class struggles that the Teutonic tribes were gained over to Christianity. Again what is the verdict of the history of India, where the very same classes have been existing for more than 3000 years.

...In fine were science and the arts and thereby the development of civilization ever influenced in any marked degree by class struggles? Are our moderns inventions, especially those of printing and gunpowder, are steam engines and electric motors, are steamboats, railways, factories, telegraphs, etc. to be looked upon as the products of class struggles? And yet they are the real revolutionaries, they are the creators of a new world." (33)

Moreover, the class struggle doctrine unduly simplifies the relations and exagerates the antagonisms of the different economic classes. The latter cannot be properly red-

(33) Cathrein and Gettelmann, Socialism, (1905, Benziger Bros, New York) 138
duced to two classes. There are numerous intermediate classes which, though sometimes, not always are alligned with the working class. In addition, a very large part of the population is not aligned in a single class conflict. "There exists, indeed, a certain sort of class struggle between an large section of the wage earners and a large section of the capitalists; but other large sections hold persistently aloof, or engage in it only feebly and intermittently, and even then not uniformly on the same side. Hence the struggle, such as it is, is much less general, less intense, and less uniform than it appears in the average Socialist picture." 

The words, bourgeoisie and proletariat, capital and labor do not therefore represent classes in the sense which the Socialist understands the word "class", that is, 'a group of men united by a solidarity of interests which urges them to conflict with another group'. It is true that it is possible to find groups in society which are truly opposed to each other. For example, a nation has a real solidarity against other nations. Within the nation there are groups which unite men according as they are engaged in Agriculture, Industry etc. Each of these large groups is held together by many common interests but it also has interests which are

(34) Hillquit and Ryan, Socialism, 109.
divergent from those of its fellow groups. Agriculture will strive, for example, to sell its goods to its rival groups at the highest price possible and vice versa. Again, industry, for instance, comprises several groups, such as coal, iron etc., each of which has rival interests with its fellows. In the coal industry there are rivalries between merchants and producers. On a lower stratum, there are employers, salaried officials, workers, all naturally formed groups which are opposed to each other in some degree. Moreover there is a divergence of interest due to locality. The interests of one district are brought into competition with those of another district etc.

It is clear therefore that the real play of conflicting interests is not as clearly defined as is assumed by the defenders of the class struggle theory. We find that at every stage where men are naturally divided into groups, these groups have a certain solidarity. Each group is an aggregation of units which are bound together by community of interests and each one is interested in the common good of its own group. For example, in the automobile industry, there are owners, salaried officials, worker. It is of interest to all of these that production be remunerative as possible.
The remedy for the class struggle, therefore, is the formation of vocational groups, "Binding men together not according to the position they occupy in the labor market, but according to the diverse functions they exercise in society." Order is unity arising from the apt arrangement of a plurality of objects, hence a true social order demands various members of society, joined together by a common bond. This bond of union is provided by the common effort of employers and employees of the same profession, industry, or type of business, to produce goods or render service to the community and the nation. This bond of union is provided also by the common good of society in which all the groups must cooperate and share.

Since in these groups the common good of the group must prevail, concessions will have to be made on both sides. But the union of employers and employees in one group, bound together by the common interest in the good of the profession, industry or business, will serve as a powerful motive for cooperation and understanding. The feeling of solidarity will replace that of opposition, cooperation will succ-antagonism, class war will become class harmony and peace.

(35) "ordines, nimirum, quibus inserantur homines non pro munere, quod quis in mercatu laboris habeat sed pro diversis partibus socialibus, quas singuli exercant." Q.A. A.A.S. XX11, 204.

(36) Ibid. 204-205.
Thus far we have shown that it is only by organizing the profession and industries, that is, by restoring these natural organs to society, that we will be able to order the economic life of the nation and establish peace and harmony in the social order. There is still another reason for the corporative organization of the profession and industry, namely, to reform the state.

The encyclical Quadragesimo Anno points out that, "when we speak of reform of the social order, it is principally the state we have in mind." The state is especially in need of reform because the state has been the cause of the destruction of the organic social life which flourished at one time, and has arrogated to itself functions which do not properly fall under its competence.

The true meaning of this passage of the encyclical is very frequently misconstrued. As one writer puts it; "This is one of the passages to which we have repeatedly called attention as being misleading in the English translation. The original text reads to this effect: When we come to treat on the reform of institutions, we first of all think of the state (as being in need of reform)."

(37) "We Have No Program", The Guildsman, (June, 1937)
During the past several centuries, but particularly since the Great War, Liberalism has been on the decline and in some cases discarded entirely. The belief that the least government interfered with citizens the better, by a process of evolution has become the belief that the more the government interferes the better. The believe that individual freedom and individual effort are the best guarantee of happiness in civil society, has been transformed into the belief that men can only be happy when society plans and prescribes their lives for them.

The extreme result of this change has been the rise of Totalitarian States. As one writer puts it;

"In the Totalitarian State the government is legally entitled to regiment the civil population just as it regiments its soldiers. It will prescribe what they are to work at, to play at, to read, to believe, to possess, and so on. And it will dominate not only the individual citizen, but also the different associations among citizens. Thus it denies the rights of the family, the trade union, the Church, municipal bodies, and all such societies. And even when it does not suppress these societies altogether, it takes from them all independence, making them just instruments of its policy. As for the citizens of the Totalitarian State, their prime duty is unquestioning obedience to the government and their greatest glory to serve the community. They are never to act for their own private advantage, nor on their own initiative."

(38) But the Totalitarian States are not the only examples of this tendency. The same trend is evident in our own government particularly within recent years. The

(38) Lucey, A Christian Alternative To Communism and Fascism, (Dublin, C.T.S.O 8.)
well known writer, Ralph Adams Cram describes this situation in his work, "Towards The Great Peace." He says:

"In the first place, we, in common with other nations, have drifted into imperialism of a gross scale, and illiberal, even tyrannical working. We could hardly do otherwise for such has been the universal tendency for more than a hundred years. By constant progression municipal governments have absorbed into themselves matters which in decency belong to the individual. Simultaneously our state governments have followed the same course, infringing even on the just prerogatives of the towns and cities, while more than all, the national government has robbed the states, the cities, the citizens of what should belong to them, until at last we have an imperial, autocratic, inquisitorial, and largely irresponsible government at Washington that is the one supreme political fact. This I believe to be absolutely and fatally wrong. In the first place human society cannot function at this abnormal scale. A sane and wholesome society begins with the family—natural or artificial—which has original jurisdiction over a far greater series of rights and privileges than it now commands. From the family certain powers are delegated to the next higher social unit, the village or communah group, which in its turn concedes certain of its inherent rights to the organic group of communities, or states, and finally the states commit to the last and general authority, the national government, some of the elements of authority that have been delegated to them. The principle of this delegation from one organism to another, is common interest and welfare; only those functions which can be performed with more even justice and with greater effectiveness, by the community, for example, than by the family, are so delegated. In the same way the several groups commit to their common government only so much as they cannot perform with due justice and equity to the others in the same group. In the end the national government exists only that it may provide for a limited number of national necessities. 

These words were written by Mr Cram in 1921.

Since that time, the tendency which he opposes, has increased to a considerable extent. The recent depression, unemployment, the inability of local and state government to deal with problems of relief and unemployment, have all tended to centralize more power in the Federal Government. Recent legislation and social legislation are further indications of the same tendency.

The false direction of development which the state in recent times has been following and logically in Totalitarianism or Communism, both of which represent the very antithesis of the corporate order. The Holy Father has in view a reversal of this policy and a development in the opposite direction. He says, therefore;

"The state which now was encumbered with all the burdens once borne by the associations rendered extinct by it, was in consequence submerged and overwhelmed by an infinity of affairs and duties. It is indeed true as history clearly proves that owing to the change in social conditions, much that was formerly done by small bodies can nowadays be accomplished only by large corporations. None the less, just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the community at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so too, it is an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of the right order for a larger and higher corporation to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower groups. This is a fundamental principle of social philosophy unshaken and unchangeable, and it retains its full truth today. Of its very nature, the true aim of all social activity should be to help individuals members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them."
The state should leave to these smaller groups the settlement of business of minor importance. It will thus carry out with greater freedom, power, and success, the tasks belonging to it, because it alone can effectively accomplish these, directing, watching, stimulating and restraining, as circumstances suggest or necessity demand.\(^{(40)}\)

In this paragraph the pope enunciates the principle of Subsidiarity of Social Activites or the principle of Subsidiarity of Associations. As is quite evident this principle is a consequence of the organic concept of society which as we have already pointed out sees in society a moral organism, composed of a number of members, each of which is autonomous and independent in its own particular sphere, but coordinated by the central organ the state which harmonizes all the members in the interest of the common good of the whole of society. There should be, consequently, in society, a division of functions and the state must be restricted to directing, stimulating, watching, etc.

\(^{(40)}\)"res publica, haud parvo ipsius rei publicae detrimento, quae, amissa forma regiminis socialis suceptisque oneribus omnibus cuae deletae illae consociationes antea perferebant, nego\(t\)is et officiis propriis propemodum infinitis obruta est atque oppressa. Nam et\(\text{\textit{a}}\) verum est, idque historia luculentur ostendit, ob mutatas rerum condicione multa nunc non nisi a magnis consociationibus posse praestari quae superiore aestate a parvis etiam praebebantur, fixum tamen immotumque manet in philosophia sociali gravissimum illud princpium quod neque moveri neque mutari potest; sicut quae a singularibus hominibus proprio marte et propria industria possunt perfecti, nefas est eisdem eripere et communitati demandare, ita quae a minoribus et inferioribus communitatibus effici praebrient quae possunt, ea ad maiorem et altiorum societatem avocare inuiaria est simulque grave damnum ac recti ordinis perturbatio;cum
165.

The organization of the various professions, therefore, will relieve the state of many of these functions which, through necessity, it has been obliged to assume. This is particularly true with regard to technical questions, production, prices, foreign trade. Ordinarily the public official lacks the technical knowledge which is required to make wise rules for the management of business and industry. If there existed a National Council representing the various industries and professions, the enactment of necessary regulations for each profession and industry would be a very simple matter. Such a council would also serve in an advisory capacity to the government.

In this way political assemblies will be limited to those functions which they are suited to exercise. Moreover civil liberties will be more effectively and surely guaranteed, because it is only when the proper function and rights of the family, the community, the state, the profession are recognized that the rights of the human person are guaranteed and safeguarded.

(§0) continued "cum sociis quaevis opera vi naturaque sua subsidium affere membris corporis socialis beneat, numquam vero eadem destruere et absbere. Minoris igitur momenti negotia et curas, quibus alioquin maxime distineretur, inferioribus coetibus expedienda permittat suprema rei publicae auctoritas oportet; quo fiet ut liberius, fortius et effacatus ea omnia exsequatur, quae ad ipsam solam spectant, utpote quae sola ipsa praestante posuit et dirigendo, vigilantu, urgendu, coercedu, prout casus fert et necessitas postulat." Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, A.A.S. XXII, 203.
VIII. The Guild Structure.

In the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, the Holy Father does not give an outline of the new guild order. Rather, he contents himself with the declaration of those principles which form the basis of the new social order, leaving the application of these principles and the working out of the scheme to Catholic social theorists. In this connection Dom Virgil Michel makes the sage observation:

"It is characteristic of the mentality of today that the moment we speak of social regeneration we also look for a definitely worked out scheme or plan. We are in the blueprint age of mechanical organization. Contrary to what some may think, there is not extant anywhere a complete, worker-out scheme, much less the true scheme or plan, of a corporately organized society. Least of all does the Quadragesimo Anno pretend to furnish such a plan. The encyclical concerns itself with underlying principles and especially with the moral aspects of society and of social regeneration. It papal author says expressly in regard to technical schemes:

"The Church has not been given the mission to lead men only to ephemeral and perishable happiness, but to that which is eternal. Indeed the Church deems it wrong to interfere in such earthly affairs without reason! But she can never give up the mission entrusted to her by God, of exercising her authority, not indeed in technical matters for which she has neither the proper equipment nor the mission, but in all things relating to the moral law" (1)

As a consequence there does not exist a Catholic plan for a Guild Order, but there are plans which have

(1) Virgil Michel, Christian Social Reconstruction, (Milwaukee, Bruce, 1937) 91.
been worked out by Catholic sociologists and social theorists.

It is our opinion that the Guild Order must not be too ideological and revolutionary but rather that it must make use of those preexisting elements which may be utilized in the establishment of the new order. Moreover it is necessary to emphasize that there is not one corporate scheme which can be applied to every country. Due consideration must be made for national temperament, traditions, peculiar economic conditions etc. within each country.

The charter which the Guild will receive may be conceived in two ways. First, there may be one Guild for each profession, which will legally represent that profession and will be invested with the necessary social authority. Secondly, there may be free Guilds, but subjected to the authority of a supreme Council which is chosen by the individuals in the profession.

The first plan may take one of two forms. Either all the individuals of the profession must belong to the one guild, and hence one obligatory guild, or, all do not have the obligation of being registered in this guild but nevertheless are subject to its decisions. In other words, this Guild would be the legal representative of the profession.

The second plan may take any of three forms. First, only members in any guild have the right to vote in the election of the Guild Council. Secondly, those who are not members enjoy equality of ballot with the members. Thirdly, the guilds have a preferential vote in respect to those who are non members.

This second plan is known as the free union in the organized profession and is the type advocated by the Semaines Social de France, held at Angers in 1935. However, the Rev. A. Müller, addressing a gathering of Christian Trade Unions said that there are circumstances where a single union representing all the workers might be legitimate. He mentions two reasons which would justify this. First, if, in a country there were an excessive number of unions which so dissipated the working class forces that it would reduce them to impotence. Secondly, if the majority of workers were incapable of organization through apathy or indifférence, thereby leaving the field of organization open to revolutionary agitators.

According to this second type of organization, therefore, all the members of the profession will constitute the professional corporation. This professional corporation will have rules to which each one will be subject. Within each

(3) Semaines Sociales de France 1935, L'Organisation Corp.
profession there will be a number of Guilds, either of workers and employers separately, or mixed. At the head of each profession there will be a Council which will be composed of delegates of the guilds with equal representation. This Council will make the rules and regulations for the profession and will determine the practices of the profession.

Whatever rules, regulations and laws are passed by the Guild Council should be sanctioned by a vote of the members of the profession. This Council will be invested with a certain authority over the members of the profession in accordance with the laws of the country. These are the suggestion of M. Martin Saint Leon outlined by him in "Il XL anniversario della enciclica 'Rerum Novarum', published by the Catholic University of Milan and quoted by the Rev. Bernard Dempsey in his translation of Von Hellen Breuning's book, "Reorganization of the Social Economy".

From our description of the nature of the profession and the guild or vocational group, it is evident that the reorganization of the profession will have to evidence the following characteristics:

1. It will have to include all the members of the profession.

2. It will have to have public corporative powers

3. It will have to have extensive autonomy with respect to the state.

(5) M. Martin Saint Leon, Il XL anniversario della enciclica 'Rerum Novarum', Cath. Univ. of Milan, quoted by Von Hellen Breuning, op. cit. 233

(6) Ibid.
170.

I. The Public Organization of the Professions.

We have already pointed out the necessity for the organization of the professions in order that they may fulfill their proper functions as organs of the societal body. The Guild or Vocational Group, therefore, will include all who are active in a specific work or enterprise regardless of whether they be employers or employees, e.g. clergy comprises men of different rank and position in the Church.

The basis of this guild or vocational organization is the union of syndicate. The purpose of corporative reconstruction is to restore order to the professions and as a consequence to the whole of society. Order, as St. Thomas says, comes from the uniting of diverse objects which are thereby arranged in some sort of harmony. It is impossible to establish this order in a profession by grouping together, in one single group, all the elements, which differ in their claims and functions, but nevertheless contribute to the production or manufacture of the same product. "An army with all arms and ranks mixed up would be a disorderly rabble; a group of producers operating without distinction in workshops or services cannot form a reasonably ordered enterprise. Likewise a guild which gathered together all engaged in the same profession, not without arranging them in units and categories, would never form a living and healthy organism."

(7) Catholic Backgrounds and Current Social Theory, 17.  
(8) The Guild Social Order, (Cath. Social Guild) 29  
(9) Ibid.
171.

It seems very necessary to insist upon this because the guild idea has met with hostility in some quarters for two reasons. Many believe that the trade union organization with its collective agreements the best plan for social peace. Moreover, as Father Albert Luller points out many neocorporatists are influence more by their antipathy towards trade unions than by their genuine sympathy for the guild order idea. They would do away with the powerful trade union organization and substitute an organization in which the employers would "count for everything and the workers for nothing!" They envision the lion and the lamb lying down together, but the lamb would be inside the lion! This would explain the antipathy toward the guild idea which exists therefore on the part of the workers and why their attitude is one of mistrust and reserve.

As we have pointed out before the trade union is not the ideal form of organization for the profession but they have answered a need and they have rendered a valuable service and consequently they must find a place in the higher organization which will order and stabilize the economic life.

The relation of the trade union to the Guild may, therefore be stated in the formula of the Semaine Sociale de France, "A free trade union within an organized profession."

(10) Müller, Place of Trade Unions in Guild System, The Guild Social Order, 28.
The trade union is and must remain a free organization. The Guild, or vocational group, involves necessarily the work of discipline and coordination and is necessary for all. Within the Guild, therefore, the union must care for all the interests of those whom it represents.

It is possible for the union to cooperate with the professional Guild in several ways. It may name the representatives to the Guild Councils. It can assist in drawing up collective agreements and applying the decisions of the professional Guild. As we have already stated, some are in favor of only granting the members of the union the right to elect the delegates to the Guild Council. Others favor a preferential vote for union members, whereas others are of the opinion that individuals who are not associated in any union should enjoy equality of vote.

The public organization of the profession will also require the classification of homogeneous groups as well as the establishment in each municipality of professional lists in which are registered all who legally exercise any profession whatsoever. The sum total of registered members will form the profession. The whole profession will be governed by the Guild Council.

(12) Von Nell Breuning, op. cit. 233.
Each Profession, or group of similar professions, will have a threefold council; local, regional, national Guild Council. The structure of each profession will vary according to branches of production or labor. Each liberal profession will be able to form a distinct Guild. The jurisdiction of the local Guild Council will vary according to the numerical strength of the members of the profession in city, district or state. In certain professions whose members are few and scattered, the first Council will be the regional Guild Council.

These Guild Councils will be mixed, that is, composed of employers and employees, or in some cases by the representatives of the stockholders. Representation must be equal on the part of the workers and their employers or stockholders. The difficult of impartial presiding officer presents itself. Should it be someone outside of the profession? It seems that the presiding officer, except in a case of agreement regarding an acceptable candidate, should be a disinterested party. However, under no condition, should he be named by the government, lest the control which the guilds are supposed to exercise independently, pass into the hands of the government.

(13) The plan contained in this chapter is based upon the work of Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Le Syndicalism, l'Organisation professionnelle et l'état
The members of the local Guild Council will be elected directly by the members of the profession. The members of the Local Guild Council will elect the members of the Regional Guild Council, who in turn will select the members of the National Guild Council.

These Councils will enjoy a juridic status since as we have pointed out, the Professional Guild is an "official and public body". Since these Guilds are to exercise regulatory and jurisdictional power over the whole profession, it is necessary that they have a juridic power and authority and be recognized as public bodies. The state, therefore, must grant to the Guilds a juridic status, and an extensive autonomy in the management of its professional affairs. However, since the state is the organ of society which has as its purpose the attainment of the common good, it will be necessary for it to protect the interests of consumers and the common good. The best method of conciliating the liberty and autonomy of the Guilds and the unity of the state will depend upon the political organization of each country.

The authority of the Guild Councils will be exercised in two spheres; the social, i.e. questions which are concerned with the relations between employers and employees, and the economic, i.e. questions of production.
I. Activities of the Councils in the Social Sphere.

In the social sphere, the Guild Councils will have a twofold power, that of regulation, and that of jurisdiction. The Councils will have the regulatory power to fix the working conditions of the profession. Once these conditions have been discussed and approved by the various mixed councils, they take the form of collective labor agreements. Since these councils will have recognized legal powers, the collective labor agreements, thereby become official and binding upon all the members of the Guild. Since there is a hierarchy of authority within each Guild, it seems that any agreement made by a Local Guild Council would have to be subject to the approval of the Regional and National in Guild Councils, in order that uniformity may prevail with the profession.

This regulatory power of the Guild will not suppress entirely the collective agreements of the unions. There are some decisions which the Guild Council will not think necessary to impose upon the whole profession due to local conditions and circumstances. These may be left to local agreement on the part of the local union or guild.

The Guild Council will, moreover, constitute a permanent council of arbitration and conciliation to prepare and
regulate the collective labor contracts which have been made. It will have the power of applying the laws and regulations of the profession. It will also have the power of regulating employment and dealing with questions which concern apprenticeship and instruction. It will also have the power to organize and supervise various social services of the profession such as insurance of various kinds, e.g., unemployment, Old Age, disability, etc.

It is evident from the above that the government will thereby be freed from a number of activities which properly do not belong to it but which it has been obliged to assume due to the lack of such professional organizations.

II. Activities of the Councils in the Economic Sphere.

The activity of the councils in the economic sphere is concerned with all the phases of production e.g., purchases, sales, prices, credit etc. According to Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, in the local councils only the employers groups are competent to decide economic questions but in the regional and national councils, the entire group of employers and employees will decide everything but with certain necessary restrictions. The regulatory power of the councils in the economic sphere will be limited. "They will codify
the practices of the profession, standardize production by unifying types of manufacturing, fix the conditions of delivery, shipping and sale of goods, regulate the use of credit, prohibiting such commercial practices as are unfair; but excepting perhaps in periods of economic crisis, the corporate organs will not intervene in the fixing of prices, or in the limitation of production, or in the allocation of markets.

Moreover, the Guilds will be charged with the supervision of the ethical standards of the profession. They will have a disciplinary power regarding those who are guilty of unfair practices etc. They will be the arbiters in disputes which may arise regarding individual or collective contracts which have been made by employers. In this case the regulatory powers will pertain only to the employers section of the Guild Council.

II. Relations of Regional and National Guild Councils and the State.

In order to express the unity, both social and economic which belongs to a region, and in order to coordinate the various professional interests, and thereby maintain order among the various professional Guilds, it will be necessary to establish regional economic councils.
These regional councils will be composed of the delegates of the Regional Guild Council, and the interprofessional organisms, to which would be added the representatives of capital, bondholders. In addition there should be delegates of the consumers, the users of public services and finally the representatives of the interests which are common to that territory, e.g. cities and states.

In this way the Regional economic council would truly represent the interests of the region. The purpose of this body would be to study those questions which are of interest to the region, not from the point of view of the professional group or of one locality but from the point of view of all the groups in all the sections of the region. This council would propose measures to the government and act as a liaison between the Guilds and the territorial groups.

These regional inter Guild Councils would be formed into a national organization, called the National Economic Council, which would be charged with the economic and social interests of the whole nation. It would be composed of the delegates of the Guild Councils, the inter Guild Regional Councils, and a number of specialists, e.g. economists, sociologists etc.
This National Council will have a twofold function. First, it will coordinate the various regional Guild Councils and secondly it will serve as a link between the various professions and the state. In regard to the Guilds, the National Council will settle disputes between the professions and the regional Guild Councils, will establish a labor court to settle disputes regarding collective agreements, and finally orientate all the professions towards the common good.

As regards the state the National Council will be qualified to represent the interests of all the Guilds. It will counsel and advise the state in regard to the solution of problems which affect the social and economic life. In a word it will serve as an advisory council for the state in all important questions which concern the economic order.

There are among writers a twofold opinion regarding the position of the National Council in the state. According to the first system the National Council would serve merely as a purely advisory body entrusted with the study of the various economic questions of the state and would then give its opinion and advice regarding the best solution and mode of procedure to the state.

The second system would have the National Council participate in the legislative power of the state. The advocates of political corporatism base their believe upon
the following principles. First, they say, we are in a democracy. But in a democracy, all the forces of the nation, collective as well as individual should be represented. But they say the Guilds represent the collective forces of the nation and hence should participate in the legislative authority of the state. (10)

Moreover, they point out that the constitution of the professional Guilds seems logically to lead their being integrated in the political structure of the state. They argue that if these Guilds enjoy the public power to make laws for their own interests, how, in a democracy, can they be refused the right to participate, in Parliament or Congress, in the regulation of general questions in which their interests are implicated? (11)

Thirdly, they say, these social groups, not being regularly represented in the political structure of the country, might take their revenge more or less irregularly by putting pressure upon the Congress or Parliament by public demonstrations, the threat of strikes etc. This would weaken the liberty and authority of the state. It seems that the best means to safeguard this liberty and authority would be to allow the Guilds to become part of the Congress or Parliament. (12)

(10) Organization Corporative, (Montreal 1937) l16.
(12) Ibid.
Finally they claim that corporative and social suffrage, being more valuable and important than individual suffrage, is an excellent means of correcting certain deficiencies which are at present found in the legislative bodies based on individual suffrage alone. Such a body as the National Council, they say, which is composed of the best representatives of the moral, intellectual and economic forces of the country, would exercise a great influence in establishing a more human and moral political life and would put economics in its proper position in the civil life of the nation.

The advocates of public representation give three methods by which this professional representation might be organized. First, a legislature which is composed exclusively of the Guilds. Secondly, there might be two Chambers in Parliament or Congress. The one, the Legislative Assembly, representing individuals, the other, the Professional Senate, representing the social groups or Guilds. This is the opinion of M. Eugene Duthoit, President of the Semaine Sociales de France. Thirdly, there might be one assembly, composed of delegates representing both individuals and the social groups. A certain number of these delegates would be elected by universal suffrage and the remainder by Guild or social suffrage.

(13) *Organization Corporative*, 1171
Those who believe that the National Economic Council should be distinct from the political structure of the nation point out that the Council is neither competent, nor interested, nor responsible in purely political problems and also in a number of other problems, such as national defence, academic liberty etc.

Moreover they say the Guild must remain subordinate to the state. But if the civil power were composed of the representatives of the Guilds, the authority of the state would be constituted by an ensemble of organisms which must be subject to this authority. The Guilds, therefore would be at the same time "the master and the servant, the leader and the subordinate."

This distinction of the Guilds and political authority does not mean, however, that they are separated. The Guilds are autonomous but they are not independent and the public power retains the eminent domain of the economic government of the nation. On the other hand, the intervention of the public power does not authorize it to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Guilds, nor upon the autonomous government of the professions by the members themselves.

(15) Ares, op. cit. 34.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
183.

In conclusion we may summarize the relations of the Guilds and the State as follows:

1. **The Guild presupposes the organic concept of society.** The nation has an organic structure, formed of partial societies which have their proper and natural functions. The family, the municipality, the various states and the Guilds are its natural organs.

2. **The Guild does not demand any determined form of government.** Social corporatism is compatible with every type of government which is not contrary to the natural or divine law. By that fact it is distinguished from;
   
   a. **political corporatism,** according to which the Guilds become part of the legislative authority of the nation.
   
   b. **corporatism of the state,** i.e. that which is imposed by the state upon the professions, and is used by the state as an instrument in the direction of the economic life of the country.

The encyclical Quadragesimo Anno says nothing regarding political corporatism. But the corporatism by associations, which the encyclical proposes neither requires nor recommends it.
Catholic sociology, however, is unanimous in its rejection of state corporatism since it is only a means and an instrument by which the totalitarian state is able to control the socio-economic life of the nation.

3. The Guild demands that the state fulfill its proper function but nothing further. These functions are summarized by the encyclical as follows: "directing, watching, stimulating and restraining, as circumstances suggest or necessity demand." The state power, therefore must leave to individuals and intermediary groupings those functions which they are able to perform themselves. It must, however, second their efforts, guide them toward the common good and intervene when it is a question of the inability of individuals or groups to perform their proper functions. This supplementary function of the state separates and distinguishes the Christian concept of the state from totalitarianism of all kinds, from any policy of centralization and on the other hand, of liberalism.
IX. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GUILDS.

Pope Pius XI has stated that the "aim of social policy must be the reestablishment of vocational groups." (1) We may divide our consideration regarding the establishment of the vocational groups or guilds into two parts: First, the work of preparation and secondly, the actual establishment.

1. Preliminary Requirements For the Establishment of the Guild Order.

The principal conditions which must precede the establishment of a Guild Order may be reduced to the following;

a. The formation of unions of employers and employees wherever necessary.

b. The preparation of public opinion.

We have already established the legitimacy and necessity of professional organization. We have pointed out the advantages and disadvantages of the present day trade union and showed that it is necessary as a base of the Guild Social Order. "The free syndicate in an organized profession."

(1) "In reficiendos igitur "ordines" ars politica socialis incumbat necesse est." Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, A.A.A. XXIII, 204.
Since the trade union constitutes the primary element of professional organization, the basis of the future Guild, it is necessary that as many such unions as possible be formed in all branches of activity, whether cultural, intellectual, artistic, professional or industrial. These associations create first of all a feeling of solidarity and secondly, are potential instruments of cooperation between capital and labor. For that reason their formation should be encouraged, subject to course to the usual requirements of Catholic Social teaching regarding the type and conduct of these unions.

During the past few years there has been a noteworthy increase in the number of industries which are being organized and despite the difficulties of safeguarding the proper control of these unions there have had the salutary effect of preparing men's minds for the gradual formation of true Guilds. This is particularly true of the industrial unions since they group whole industries and consequently are suggestive of the future organization of the whole industry and profession.

The second necessary condition which is preliminary to the formation of the Guilds in this country, is the preparation of public opinion. This involves two things, the training of leaders in the Catholic Social Movement and propaganda.
It seems that the training of leaders can best be accomplished by establishing courses of Social Study within our Catholic Seminaries and colleges, the forming of study groups or cells throughout the nation which will make a study of the social question in the light of Catholic social teaching as put forward in the encyclicals, and by the formation of Workers Colleges, such as now exist in many of our American cities. These Workers Colleges are usually sponsored by some Catholic College, and are intended primarily, though not exclusively, for the training of trade unionists in Catholic social principles.

It seems that the teaching of the Holy Father regarding the reestablishment of the vocational groups was not thoroughly grasped in the United States due to the lack of a Catholic Social Movement as existed in other countries. However, the present indications of more widespread knowledge of and spreading of, the Papal program are very encouraging.

Propaganda for the establishment of a Guild Order involves the use of our present instruments of propaganda, newspapers, magazines, the radio and the lecture platform. The present time seems very opportune for the presentation of this solution of the social question because there are indications, both on the part of labor and capital, of a desire for some form of mutual collaboration and cooperation.
There seems to be in industry a growing demand for the formation of an advisory body, which will serve as an industrial economic council which will serve as a liason between government and industry and collaborate with the government in the regulation and planning of the economic life of the country.

This of course brings up the question of the now defunct N.I.R.A., The National Industrial Recovery Act which was enacted on June 16, 1933. The main features of this act were summarized in an article by John Maurice Clark in the American Economic Review for March 1934:

"The basic structural feature is the setting up in each industry and trade of representative organizations which are taken into partnership with the government in carrying out the purposes of the Act. They are to adopt codes subject to public approval while the President has the power to prescribe the code if no acceptable one has been formed by the industry itself. A temporary re-employment agreement or blanket code was drawn up, to which employers were urged to subscribe pending the formation of specific codes for their specific industries. A basic requirement for the codes was the provision protecting collective bargaining and forbidding coercion in favor of company unions.....

"Under the scheme a massive structure of boards has been set up, including code authorities, advisory boards for industry, labor and consumers, compliance boards and labor boards. Employers complying with this act are granted the use of the device of the "blue eggle"; and purchasers are urged to trade with those displaying this device.

"The main objectives sought by the use of this machinery are:
(1) Work sharing is brought about by limitations of hours in the standard working week. This is done under provisions aiming to force the employer to take on additional workers, insales or service employments where total hours of service might be shortened or the desired
result otherwise circumvented.
(2) Co-ordinate with the reduction of working hours is the attempt to prevent total dollar earnings per worker from falling with the shortened week; and in particular the setting of minimum wage rates for the lowest paid occupations.
(3) Prohibition of child labor is extended.
(4) The trades are given the opportunity to prevent destructive and anarchistic competitive practices by setting up codes of fair competition, free from the prohibition of anti-trust laws, but subject to government approval.
(5) As to prices, the hope and purpose has been that the trades should at least temporarily absorb the increased costs imposed by the labor features of the codes, hoping to be compensated by the gains from increased output.

Points of similarity between the N.I.R.A. and the Papal program for reconstruction are evident. At the time Monsignor Ryan pointed out that "if the code organizations would permit labor to assist in making the code and help in its authority, then the codes would approximate what Pope Pius XI had in mind when he spoke of the occupational groups." This was the principle shortcoming of the N.I.R.A.

It is true that it was largely a matter of government intervention to induce industry itself to provide the basis elements of a planned economy. For that reason, since it was administered on the plane of voluntary cooperation, it represented a constitution of limited self government by trade groups subject to Government supervision.

It was however at most a quasi partnership between Government and industry. Dr. Ryan pointed out at the time

(2) John Maurice Clark, American Economic Review, March 1934.
the need of a third partner in the process, namely, labor, urging that the workers in each vocational group should have a share in the ownership, management and profits of the corporation operating within a definite industrial sphere.

The second defect of the N.R.A. was concerned with the interpretation and application of section 7 which was meant to guarantee the right of collective bargaining. Organized labor held that this section meant the abolition of company unions and the unionization of all industry. The big non union employers led by the Chamber of Commerce held the opposite view.

Moreover the consumer was not protected against unduly high prices, due to the fact that the Consumers Advisory Board did not have sufficient power and no adequate standards were set up.

The N.I.R.A. was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935, declaring that the Congress had exceeded its powers in delegating to the President such sweeping legislative functions as were embodied in the code making.

Many of the best features of the N.I.R.A. have been revived by constitutional legislation such as the Wagner Labor Relations Act, the Wages and Hours Bill etc.
Since it seems that at the present there is a desire for a system which will bring peace to capital and labor, and since there seems to be a feeling that a certain economic council of some kind should be formed which would serve as a liaison between government and industry, and also in an advisory capacity to the government, it follows that the Guild Order can and should be more publicised.

This proposal of course will meet with opposition on the part of many employers because of their refusal to allow the workers to share in the management, planning, and regulation of the industry. This was noticeable while the M.I.R.A. was in effect. There will be opposition, too, on the part of the trade unions which will see in the Guild system the suggestion of Fascism. This is particularly true in regard to the expressions corporate state or corporatism which are used by so many writers and lecturers to describe the program of Quadragesimo Anno.

The similarities between the corporatism advocated by the encyclical and that of Fascist Italy, therefore will present one of the greatest difficulties to the proponents of the Papal program. This will necessarily involve the insistence upon the democratic character of social corporatism, the fact that it comes from below rather than being imposed from above.
II. The Establishment of the Guild Order.

There are three necessary factors in the establishment of the Guilds; private initiative to form the Guild organization, the action of civil authority to give the Guild a juridic status in the nation, and the action of the Church in encouraging the formation of such an order.

We insist upon the spontaneous character of the formation of the Guilds because it is the more democratic form of organization and hence more natural and more likely to be accepted by the trade unions. This method spares those concerned from any external compulsion to which they would not readily submit and which might provoke resistance on their part, since it would be interpreted as a species of Fascism.

This method is slower and more gradual than "corporatisme d'etat" but it allows the corporative regime to be adopted more easily to special circumstances etc. Moreover, the process would not be quite as slow as first impressions might indicate. We already have in existence a large number of associations and organizations which could form the starting point of a Guild Order. We already have many trade unions, associations of employers, the Chamber

of Commerce, the Medical Association, the Bar Association, the Newspaper Guild, the various theatrical and musicians Guilds etc. We might say that corporatism is actually developing and very little would be required to coordinate and systematize these spontaneous developments of the natural rights of association.

The state has a twofold role in regard to the establishment of the Guild Social Order. Negatively it must not impose an artificial and mechanical corporative structure. Positively, it should aid and supplement private initiative which is attempting to establish Guilds and grant those things which are necessary in order that the Guilds fulfill their proper function. This involves the granting of a professional charter, the establishment of each profession as a juridic personality and finally, their incorporation in the body of public law which invests them with regulatory power in regard to the professions.

After the Guilds have been established the state must recognize their right to self-government and autonomous function, with the restriction, however, that their activities do not conflict with the common good. This follows both from the end of the state, which is the common good of the members, and the organic concept of society according
to which the state power must harmonize and coordinate the various members/societies towards the attainment of the common good of all.

CONCLUSION.

Since order, as we have seen, involves the use of a thing according to the purpose for which it was intended, we can say that a Christian Social Order is one which makes adequate provisions for the attainment of the purposes of life and extends the opportunity of realizing these aims to all the members of the community.

Such a social system cannot be constructed arbitrarily but must be bases upon the inherent tendencies of human nature and must take into account the natural moral law. It must envisage man as a totality, considering him both as an individual and as a social being, without unduly exagerating one of these aspects.

We have seen that the social system of St. Thomas is an external expression and concrete embodiment of that solidarity which binds men together by the bonds of mutual interdependence and identity of purpose. It does justice to the individual and to society, because it proceeds from the essential truth that each human being, a person endowed with all the dignity and value of a human personality, is by nature destined to be a member of a social group. Consequently, his personality cannot be developed except by
proper harmony between the individual and social aspects of his nature.

Human nature prompts man to live in society, due to his own physical and spiritual insufficiency. This insufficiency leads man to unite his efforts with others in order to supply his own deficiency in the pursuit of the common good.

The various needs of man give rise to different societies. Of these, three, the family, the community and the profession are fundamental. These various societies form a moral organism, which is known as the state society and is coordinated by a principle of authority, the state power.

This corporative concept of society was supplanted by the atomic concept, as a result of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the two Revolutions, the Rational and the Industrial. The result has been that society has become a mass of individualized and detached atoms. As a result of the separation of these units into capital and labor, society is in a strained and unnatural condition.

The remedy for this condition is the restoration of order to society, the formation of societies, known as vocational groups or Guilds, which group men of similar profession or vocation, according to the function they perform in society. This Guild Order, being a mean between Individualism and totalitarianism, alone envisages man as an individual and a social being. It is the solution to the social problem.