INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.
THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE WORKS OF MARX AND ENGELS

by

Sister Mary Thaddeus Mullowney, R.S.M.

Thesis presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Ottawa, Canada, 1964
INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis was prepared under the supervision of Reverend Henri Saint-Denis, O.M.I., B.A., D.Ph., D.Th., B.Ped., of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa. Gratitude is hereby expressed for his kind interest and many helpful suggestions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Freedom of the Will</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Freedom of Autonomy</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Effect of External Conditions on Freedom</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Determinism and Freedom</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Freedom and Self-Determination</td>
<td>xvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Freedom and the Nature of Man</td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART I**

I.- THE HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CLIMATE IN WHICH MARX AND ENGELS WROTE

| 1. Scientific Discoveries                                             | 1    |
| 2. The French Revolution                                              | 2    |
| 3. Hegel and Feuerbach                                                | 3    |
| 4. The Industrial Revolution and Marx's Mission                       | 4    |
| 5. The English Economists                                             | 6    |
| 6. Materialism and Socialism                                           | 7    |

II.- THE MARXIAN MAN.

| 1. Man's Relationship with Nature                                     | 9    |
| 2. The Effect of Work                                                 | 11   |
| 3. Society and the State                                              | 14   |
| 4. Religion and Morality                                              | 15   |
| 5. Mental Activity                                                    | 17   |
| 6. Man's Destiny                                                      | 18   |

III.- THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF NATURE

| 1. Nature                                                             | 19   |
| 2. Work                                                               | 19   |
| 3. Division of Labour                                                 | 21   |
| 4. Private Property                                                   | 28   |

IV.- THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF HISTORY

| 1. Through the Years to Capitalism                                   | 31   |
| 2. Bourgeois Society                                                 | 39   |
| 3. Religion and Morality                                             | 43   |
| 4. Freedom in the Future                                             | 49   |
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>THE FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN PRODUCT OF LABOUR.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Extent of the Influence of the Productive Forces</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Evolution of Society</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Passivity of Man</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Activity of Man</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Attempted Reconciliation of Passivity and Activity</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. The Need and Extent of Necessity</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Religion, an Effect of Determinism</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Possibilities of Freedom</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>THE FREEDOM OF THE COMMUNIST MAN.</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. The Attainment of Freedom</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Communism</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Conditions of Freedom</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Nature of Freedom</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PART II</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>A JUDGEMENT OF MARXIAN FREEDOM IN THE LIGHT OF SAINT THOMAS</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Consistency in Marxian Freedom</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Freedom and the Person</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Freedom and Necessity</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. The Exaltation and Degradation of Man</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Freedom in Real Life</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. A Possible Reason for the Poverty of Marxian Freedom</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CONCLUSION.</strong></td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY.</strong></td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Appendix</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. ABSTRACT OF The Freedom of Man in the Works of Marx and Engels</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Men of all ages have claimed for themselves freedom in theory or in practice. Those who in their speculative thinking have denied freedom to all mankind have nevertheless acted as if possessed of that freedom. Man, a rational creature, composed of a body and a soul, hence partly material and partly spiritual, is because of his rationality and spirituality capable of free acts.

Through the use of his reason man exercises freedom. Animals may form judgments, however, "not from reason, but from natural instinct".¹ Man, on the other hand, through the use of his intellect, knows, judges, and reasons; and by means of his will decides and acts. Not only can he reason about his course of action but, since he always acts for a purpose, he can also pass judgment on his own decisions. He is not determined to one way of acting but may choose which course he is to follow. "And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free will."²

Freedom results from the spiritual nature of the soul's faculties. Because the intellect is a spiritual power, it is able to know universals. Man can compare a

¹ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 83, a. 1.
² ibid., I, Q. 83, a. 1.
particular good with universal good and, depending on the point of view from which he desires a particular good, he will accept or reject this particular good, or prefer it to other particular goods, or prefer another particular good to it. Consequently, he is determined not by the object but by himself. Since the universality of will and intellect depends upon their spirituality, man is a free being precisely because he is a spiritual being.

1. The Freedom of the Will.

Although the term freedom is used with a much wider meaning than freedom of the will or freedom of choice, nevertheless any freedom worthy of the name has its source in the notion of free will. A man may choose his mode of action or he may choose to act or not to act, because he is endowed with free will.

Since the adequate object of the will is the good, the will desires the good, good in general, not necessarily any particular good. Therefore, when a number of partial goods, particular goods, are presented to the will, the will is free to choose among these. "The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose."³

³ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 83, a. 3.
Free will has its source in the indetermination of the intellect. Concerning particular goods which are lacking in some good and may even be considered as non-goods, the judgment of the intellect is indifferent. Should the intellect present to the will an object which is good from every point of view, is perfect, and is, therefore, lacking in nothing, then the will must tend to it of necessity. But for all particular goods the will may choose freely to act or not to act, or it may choose this particular good in preference to other particular goods.

And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it. (...) Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view. 4

Moreover, while the will is moved by the intellect in respect to the object, the will moves itself in the exercise of its act.

The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. 5

Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. 6

4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q.10, a.2.
5 Ibid., I-II, Q. 9, a. 3.
6 Ibid., I, Q. 53, a. 1, ad 3.
INTRODUCTION


Finality in the world around us is a self-evident fact. Beings below man are directed to their end by instinct and laws inherent in their nature. Man through the exercise of his freedom may set up various goals for himself and then choose the means to achieve his purpose. Man's freedom of choice is not an end in itself but a means to an end.

Free Will is indeed the source and spring of the world of Freedom: it is a datum of metaphysics; we inherit it with our rational nature; we do not have to achieve it; it appears within us as an initial form of Freedom. But this metaphysical root must grow and develop (...)7

Through his freedom of will man may rise to a higher and nobler freedom, which will enable him to achieve the perfect happiness for which he was created. Freedom in this latter sense does not imply doing what one pleases but doing what one ought.

Hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin.8

8 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 62, a. 8, ad 3.
Choosing to do what one ought lessens one's power of choice but increases one's freedom. "Hence there is greater liberty in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin." 9

It is to be noted, however, that while men may practice this higher form of freedom and do what he ought, during his sojourn in this world he still possesses freedom of choice and may prefer an apparent good to the real good and so do what he ought not. 10

Freedom in the sense of the desire, and the satisfaction of the desire, for self-realization or self-perfection is applied by Dondeyne to "a certain maturity of mind and personality arising from the fact that one has become a master in one or other domain of life". 11 The craftsman who has mastered his trade, the surgeon who has acquired the skill required for the most delicate operations, the engineer experienced in the intricacies of mining operations have each acquired "that internal and

---


10 "An act is not of more value in morals because it contains a greater measure of freedom; on the contrary to act for the mere pleasure of acting, solely to exercise one's sense of freedom, is apt to be a sign of moral debility." Jacques Maritain, *Freedom in the Modern World*, p. 32-33.

INTRODUCTION

external autonomy, that self-possession and profound freedom of mind, which stamps everything he does with the seal of his personality. It is by doing as one ought that this 'freedom of autonomy', to use Maritain's expression, is obtained. Freedom of autonomy, however, is especially associated with sanctity.

Thus it is in sanctity that the perfect freedom of autonomy is found. For sanctity embraces the Freedom (...) of always choosing the Good, and for this reason, since it thus becomes ignorant of evil, one might also call such freedom the Freedom of Innocence.

3. The Effect of External Conditions on Freedom.

All human beings are endowed with free will, which implies freedom of choice and the possible use of that freedom in such a way as to bring each individual to a realization of his potentialities as a person destined for the Beatific Vision. However, rights involve obligations. Although A has a right to the exercise of his freedom, he may not infringe upon B's freedom. Consequently A may be somewhat limited in the exercise of his freedom.


14 Ibid., p. 34.
INTRODUCTION

government steps in, whose duty it must be to guarantee the greatest amount of freedom to all while safeguarding the rights of the individual. Under this aspect, which Dondeyne calls "the sum total of the economical, social and political conditions that are necessary for the concrete exercise of freedom", 15 may also be included limitations imposed by physical privations, e.g., blindness, deafness, as well as limitations of environment, e.g., education, opportunities and conditions of work. Such influence and may limit the exercise of freedom but do not destroy it.

If freedom is viewed negatively "as an absence of constraint rather than as a right to choose the good", 16 the result is extreme individualism, which has led to excessive liberty on the part of the few who can attain it, at the expense of a great sacrifice of freedom with reference to the majority. The reaction to this egotism has been the rise of dictatorships where the state takes to itself "the right to ignore the individual by absorbing him into the race, the nation, and the class and by destroying freedom of choice". 17

17 Ibid., p. 17-18.
External conditions do affect freedom with regard to the acts of other powers that come under the control of the will. Concerning those acts that proceed directly from the will--the elicited acts of the will--man always remains free. Coercion may and does at times extend to the body and its members, but it can never control the movements of the will.

4. Determinism and Freedom.

In spite of the evidence of experience, which indicates that man does exercise freedom of choice, various groups maintain that, instead of freedom, determinism holds sway in man's activity.

Physical determinists claim that man acts as does the rest of the universe by the force of necessary laws. They do not recognize any essential difference between man and lower forms of life. Natural agents, it is true, are directed to their ends by laws inherent in their nature, but man, because of the immateriality in his nature, is a free agent who can perform acts outside the domain of the material. An argument based on the relative uniformity and constancy of graphs of human behaviour in various fields is sometimes put forward in support of the claim that acts considered to be the free acts of men are as subject to laws as physical events. That this uniformity does exist
may be accounted for very often by the fact that many of man's acts are not free acts because of lack of the thought and reflection that such acts require. This does not detract from man's ability, through the use of his intellect and will, to perform free acts. Moreover, "the constant and uniform action of men certainly allows us to deduce laws akin to physical laws, but as their actions are free they are called by the special name of moral laws".¹⁸

Closely allied with the physical determinists are the physiological determinists, among whom may be classed the behaviourists, who claim that all vital action is nothing more than a physico-chemical reaction to stimuli. Human activity is reduced to the inflexible consistency of a reflex arc. The will is reduced to matter. There is no recognition that man is a composite being, body and soul, with a wide range of operations in keeping with vegetable, animal, and intellectual life, and that his higher powers, which are independent of matter, are not governed by the same laws as his lower powers, which operate in matter.

Both classes of determinists already mentioned have denied freedom to man because of their failure to grasp

the essential nature of the will. The psychological determinists, of whom the most outstanding is Leibniz, recognized a certain freedom as belonging to man, but a theoretical freedom that does not seem capable of having any practical value. The will is a tendency to what one finds good, and since it must have a sufficient reason for its own action, it is determined by what seems good to it. Confronted with two goods, it must necessarily choose that which seems the better. Consequently, the will is always determined by the strongest motive, by the greatest good offered to it. A degree of freedom seems to be present from the fact that it is possible to conceive of a man's acting in a manner different from the way in which he does act, even though at any given moment he cannot choose to act other than as he does. Nevertheless, while the will must have a sufficient reason for determining the intellect, this sufficient reason cannot determine it absolutely, for the will tends of its nature towards the complete, the absolute good. Partial goods may incline the will with great force to act or not to act, but they cannot necessitate it. "The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because

19 The motive which determines the will to act in reference to any particular good is at any given moment relatively sufficient not absolutely sufficient since the range of the will is universal,
good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.\textsuperscript{20}

Theological determinists, likewise, have no place in their teaching for the freedom of man. This group includes the leaders of the Protestant Revolt, Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, as well as Jansenius. They hold that man's will is determined by God, and that, because of the corruption of human nature by original sin, it is radically ordered to evil. Man may think he has freedom but in reality he has none.

While God is the cause of all being and, therefore, the first cause of our free acts, nevertheless, as First Cause He in no way destroys the freedom of the second causes, who remain free causes. God acts in accordance with the nature of man's will so that He will not bring into being in man a free act unless it be determined freely on man's part.

Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act.\textsuperscript{21} God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologica}, I, Q. 82, a. 2, ad 1.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, I, Q. 83, a. 1, ad 3.
Moreover, when one particular good is presented to the will, while there is no freedom of choice, there is still freedom of exercise, for the will can choose to act or not to act.

But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval. 22

5. Freedom and Self-Determination.

All forms of determinism are incompatible with freedom since man's freedom rests upon the indifference, the indetermination of the judgment which precedes and guides choice. The intellect, knowing the good, is indifferent when confronted with particular goods, which are not totally devoid of evil. This undetermined judgment cannot determine the will which accordingly remains free. The intellect of itself judges in the abstract, while the will is concerned with what is desirable here and now. The will of itself cannot know what is desirable. The will determines the practical judgment, making it concrete concerning the here and now, and at the same time the will is determined by the intellect. It is one and the same act of the will but under different aspects.

The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. 23

Man, then, is free through the action of both intellect and will. He may accept a particular good or turn it aside. In this way he determines himself, but by so doing he remains master of himself and, consequently, is free. Even though forces from outside him act upon him in such a way as to compel activity contrary to the decision of the will, no amount of coercion can bring about the inner compliance of the will with an act that the will has rejected as undesirable. Freedom, then, rests in self-determination.


We have see that man's claim to freedom proceeds from his nature as a composite being of body and soul, the latter possessed of the spiritual faculties of intellect and will. If we reject the existence of man's spiritual soul and consider him as a purely material being, to what extent will it be possible for him to enjoy freedom, and

23 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 9, a. 1, ad 3.
what will be the nature of that freedom? We shall seek to find an answer in the writings of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.

In Part I we shall begin by considering briefly the various forces that influenced Marx and Engels in adopting their materialist philosophy, with such severe repercussions for man and his freedom, and continue by summarizing the main characteristics of the Marxian man. Then we shall endeavour to find out what freedom Marx and Engels assign to man (i) as a product of nature, (ii) as an inhabitant of this earth through the course of history, as referred to by Marx and Engels, (iii) as a member of the classes that evolved through the development of the productive forces, (iv) as a member of communist society.

Part II will be a critique, in the light of Saint Thomas, of the freedom set forth in Part I. Marxian freedom will be examined concerning (i) consistency within the Marxian system, (ii) its relationship to true freedom, (iii) its compatibility with the nature of man, (iv) its possibility of realization, and (v) its roots, through the Marxian nature of man, in Dialectical Materialism.
INTRODUCTION

No attempt will be made to deal separately with the thought of Marx and Engels. This would be impossible since some of their works are the joint product of both, and when they wrote separately one approved of what the other had written. Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science, which is considered the most complete exposition of the philosophy of Marx and Engels, was largely the work of Engels, but Engels read the whole manuscript to Marx, who approved of it as a statement of their common views.

24 It may be noted that, although Marx and Engels reached the same position, they did so by different ways. While Engels' communism was economic, Marx's was philosophical and metaphysical. Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, London, Geoffrey Bles, 1938, p. 28, using the work of M. August Cornu, in Karl Marx, de l'hegelianisme au materialisme historique, Paris, Alcan, 1934.

PART I
CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CLIMATE IN WHICH MARX AND ENGELS WROTE

As an approach to a consideration of a system of thought, or even of one phase of it, as, for example, the place of human freedom in Marxism, it may be helpful to make brief reference to the various factors that contributed to the formation of that system. Marx reached his decisions concerning the nature of man because of his attitude towards, and his interpretation of, various developments in his own and preceding centuries, as well as because of his awareness of the possibilities and popular attraction of the methods of certain thinkers.

1. Scientific Discoveries.

To the Christian, man is spirit and matter. For Marx and, of course, Engels, the world of the material alone existed. The discoveries of the preceding centuries, especially those of Copernicus and Newton, had revolutionized man's position in the universe. While this planet, the dwelling place of man, was just one of many material objects moving around the sun, it was man's mind that had discovered nature's laws.
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CLIMATE

Man was not really a little creature, a wayfarer in a world that was alien to him, yearning for the reunion with God that would bring him peace. Man was a dignified creature, one of great capacity in his own right, living in a world that was understandable and manageable by him, and in which he might install himself with quite adequate comfort.¹

The result was a relegation of God and the spiritual to the side lines and the stage was set for a completely materialist interpretation of man and the universe.

2. The French Revolution.

The French Revolution, with its emphasis on liberalism, had occurred just a generation before the birth of Marx. In the period following the Congress of Vienna, the so-called new liberties struggled for survival against the reactionary policy of those in high places. A fundamental principle of this new liberalism has been stated as follows:

It is contrary to the natural, innate, and inalienable right and liberty and dignity of man, to subject himself to an authority, the root, rule, measure, and sanction of which is not in himself.²

Man has ceased to recognize any power outside himself.

3. Hegel and Feuerbach.

Marx entered the University of Berlin at a time when all German universities, but especially Berlin, were dominated by the philosophy of Hegel. Both Marx and Engels, while rebelling against the idealism of Hegel, were strongly influenced by him. "And in most of their later writings they unhesitatingly paid tribute to the man from whom they admittedly borrowed so much."  

Marx could say: "I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, (...)".  

Hegel claimed that all reality is capable of explanation in terms of the rational. Therefore, God being reality must be within the comprehension of the finite mind of man. Obviously, "Hegel attempted the impossible. A complete synthesis of reality in terms of reason is possible only to an infinite mind".  

Man, in claiming the mind of God, failed to understand his own nature, and so Marx, with the use of the hegelian dialectic, could develop the socialist environment for man and then cut man to fit it.


HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CLIMATE

Marx and Engels welcomed with open arms the publication of Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*. Idealism gives way to materialism. "Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence." Man is, therefore, the centre of the universe.

Marx's chief debt to Feuerbach is the idea of humanism. This humanism, the struggle to free humanity from oppression, led Marx to socialism. Feuerbach is also the source of the notion of anthromorphism, which Marx (...) was to apply not only to philosophy and religion, but also in the social field."

4. The Industrial Revolution and Marx's Mission.

Marx, and his collaborator Engels, although born in the bourgeois class and destined not to engage in manual labour at any time during their lives, very early in life became the champions of those whom they considered the oppressed. As a result of the Industrial Revolution the condition of the workingman had deteriorated, or

---


HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CLIMATE

a new self-conscious class had come into being in Europe—the proletariat, a propertyless class created by the factory system who were the disinheriters of the earth. They were the men who sweated and toiled in the factories, who froze and starved in their tenements, who had no homes or gardens, no possessions but their precarious jobs.8

To Marx, man was the proletarian. The only men having claim to any rights were the members of the proletariat. Since these were lacking in a voice to plead their cause, he was determined to be their spokesman.

To get a hearing Marx had to speak in the language of his day—scientifically. The English economists had already formulated laws governing economic activity, and Darwin had propounded his theory of natural selection in terms of a struggle among living things. Marx therefore aimed at a scientific analysis of social conditions and a scientific remedy for existing evils with a view to changing the destiny of the toiling masses.

(...) if he wanted to be heard, he must use the magic words of science, he must be realistic and hard, he must consider struggle and violence as inevitable, he must be thoroughly materialistic. He must, in short, be the Darwin of the social sciences if he would command the respectful ear of Europe in Darwin's day.9

Marx and Engels make repeated reference to the scientific nature of their work.


9 Ibid., p. 286.
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CLIMATE

The leading points of our theory were first presented scientifically (...) in my Misere de la Philosophie, (...)10

This account of the course of my studies in political economy is simply to prove that my views (...) are the result of many years of conscientious research.11

Here (...) just as in the realm of nature, it was necessary to do away with these fabricated, artificial interconnections by the discovery of the real ones; a task which ultimately amounts to the discovery of the general laws of motion, which assert themselves as the ruling ones in the history of human society.12

5. The English Economists.

In the attempt to treat scientifically man and his environment, Marx and Engels show the influence of the English economists. Man is made subject to scientific laws which allow him "no leeway to wander and err as human beings are wont to do".13 While the whole nature of man is adapted to the environment that Marx prepares for him, the Marxian man bears a strong resemblance to Ricardo's man.

11 Ibid., p. 15.
12 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 48.
Marx's Proletarian, in the last analysis, is nothing more than Ricardo's Economic Man with dirty hands. He is a wage earner who is determined by Marx to follow his selfish, materialistic interests as logically, as intelligently, and as ruthlessly as Ricardo's entrepreneur had followed his interests. (...) Neither Ricardo nor Marx will allow their respective heroes the right to be human beings, to exercise free will, or to make any mistake other than that of miscalculation. 14

The Marxian environment, the product of the dialectic and the evolution of society, is quite different from the static surroundings of the Economic Man.

6. Materialism and Socialism.

While Marx and Engels claim to have produced a new form of materialism in their application of Hegel's dialectic to matter, Marx himself, in tracing the development of English and French Materialism, shows the close connection between the previous materialism and communism or socialism.

There is no need of any great penetration to see from the teaching of materialism on the original goodness and equal intellectual endowment of man, the omnipotence of experience, habit and education, and the influence of environment on man, the great significance of industry, the justification of enjoyment, etc., how necessarily materialism is connected with communism and socialism. 15

14 Thomas P. Neill, Makers of the Modern Mind, p. 289.

HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CLIMATE

To the French socialist Proudhom is attributed the supplying of Marx with the idea of applying the dialectic to society and economics. "Proudhom is the inventor of the central lever in the Marxist system."\(^\text{16}\)

Marx and Engels were men of their times. In a certain sense they may be said to have been before the times. By 1850, they had formulated most of their teachings, whereas history records the period following the failure of the Revolutions of 1848 as the era when Realism dominated European thought. What mattered was not so much whether an idea was right as whether it would succeed. "In basic philosophy the new mental toughness appeared as materialism, holding that everything mental, spiritual, or ideal, was an outgrowth of physical or physiological forces."\(^\text{17}\)

In this setting Marx and Engels set about to formulate the nature of the environment. Then they proceed to condition man to this environment.

---


CHAPTER II

THE MARXIAN MAN

Marx saw the human race broken apart into a number of classes. Consequently, he was little concerned with man as an individual but rather viewed him as a member of a social group. Man, as such, is never separated from society. The person, with his peculiar hopes and desires, is of no importance. The real nature of man is "the totality of social relations". ¹

Man, much as he may (...) be a particular individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real individual social being), is just as much the totality—the ideal totality—the subjective existence of thought and experienced society present for itself; just as he exists also in the real world as the awareness and the real enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality of human life-activity. ²

1. Man's Relationship with Nature.

There is no clear-cut distinction between man and the universe. Man and Nature are one.


History itself is a real part of natural history, of the development of Nature into man. Natural science will one day incorporate the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate natural science; there will be a single science.3

Nature, as it develops in human history, in the genesis of human society, is the real nature of man; thus Nature, as it develops through industry, though in an alienated form, is truly anthropological Nature.4

Man has no origin distinct from Nature. The appearance of life is simply a leap in the evolution of Nature, apparently the result of chemical action.

With regard to the origin of life, therefore, up to the present, science is only able to say with certainty that it must have risen as a result of a chemical action.5

In spite of all intermediate steps, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change (...) this (...) is (...) clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemistry of albumen which is called life.6

The appearance of man is just another step in this process of evolution. Engels devotes several pages to showing the

3 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 111. Translation as in Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, p. 70.

4 Ibid., p. 111. Translation as in Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, p. 73.


6 Ibid., p. 75.
importance of labour in bringing about the transition from ape to man. 7 By a demonstration of his own form of argument Marx points out the inconsistency of inquiring about the origin of the first man.

Your question is itself a product of abstraction. (...) When you ask about the creation of nature and man, you are abstracting, in so doing, from man and nature. You postulate them as non-existent, and yet you want me to prove them to you as existing. Now I say to you: Give up your abstraction and you will also give up your question. Or if you want to hold on to your abstraction, then be consistent, and if you think of man and nature as non-existent then think of yourself as non-existent for you too are surely nature and man. 8

Not only is man the result of a process of evolution in nature, but various natural forces are continually acting upon him. Man, therefore, is a human product of Nature.

2. The Effect of Work.

Man, the animals, the material world around us are all Nature. There is, however, a special distinguishing mark that sets man apart from the animals. The animal may


8 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 113.
collect its requirements, but man produces the necessities of life. The way in which he works gives man a certain superiority to the animals. Work is the distinctive characteristic of man.

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence. 9

And what do we find once more as the characteristic difference between the band of monkeys and human society? Labour. 10

Work can become a form of enslavement for man, when the product of his work passes from him to another man in the form of private property. "Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence of alienated labour, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself." 11

Work constitutes man a social being, a member of society.


11 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 80.
Activity and consumption, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social consumption; the human essence of nature first exists only for the social man; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with man— as his existence for the other and the other's existence for him—as the life-element of the human world; only here does nature exist as the foundation of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural existence become his human existence, and nature become man for him. Thus society is the consummated oneness in substance of man and nature—the true resurrection of nature—the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature both brought to fulfilment.¹²

It is by no means essential that this work be performed in association with other men. What is important is that the individual works for society, or, at least, for himself as a member of society.

But again when I am active scientifically, etc., when I am engaged in activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others—then I am social, because I am active as a man. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.¹³

Man and society are one.

¹² Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 103-104.

¹³ Ibid., p. 104.
3. Society and the State.

Society sets up the state as a means of safeguarding its own rights, of protecting itself against attack. Once the state is in existence, however, it passes out of the control of society, and, in an age of class distinction, becomes the means used by one particular class to maintain a position of dominance.

Society creates for itself an organ for the safeguarding of its general interests against internal and external attacks. This organ is the state power. Hardly come into being, this organ makes itself independent in regard to society; and, indeed, the more so, the more it becomes the organ of a particular class, the more it directly enforces the supremacy of that class. 14

The state, instead of being a tool of man, becomes a means of keeping him in subjection. It is because of the defective condition of society that the state exists. In the classless society Marx envisages the "withering away" of the state.

The working class will substitute, in the course of its development, for the old order of civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will no longer be political power, properly speaking, since political power is simply the official form of the antagonism in civil society. 15

The state, according to Marx's conception of it, will no longer have any reason for existing.

14 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 54.
4. Religion and Morality.

Man, as such, has no need of God. The fact that men in all ages have recognized a Supreme Being indicates a defect in man brought about by lack of the proper relations with nature and with other men. Man has thus been unaware of his true nature. "Religion arose in very primitive times from erroneous and primitive ideas of men about their own nature and that of the external world surrounding them."\(^{16}\) The possibility of this type of error will no longer exist in the truly communist society.

Since, however, for socialist man the whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labour, and the emergence of Nature for man he therefore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins. Once the essence of man and of Nature, man as a natural being and Nature as a human reality, has become evident in practical life, in sense experience, the search for an alien being, a being outside man and Nature (a search which is an avowal of the unreality of man and Nature) becomes impossible in practice.\(^{17}\)

Man is a product of Nature. As a result of work, Nature becomes a product of man. "(...) the worker creates

---

\(^{16}\) Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 56.

\(^{17}\) Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 113-114. Translation as in Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Philosophy, p. 246.
everything; (...) The worker creates even man". Thus man creates even man.

There is no absolute standard of morality. True and false, good and evil have only a relative validity. What is true today may be false tomorrow or certainly at some time in the future. Similarly what is evil this year may be good next year.

(...) one no longer permits oneself to be imposed upon by the antitheses insuperable for the still common old metaphysics, between true and false, good and bad (...) One knows that these antitheses have only a relative validity; that what is recognized now as true has also its latent false side which will later manifest itself, just as that which is now regarded as false has also its true side by virtue of which it could previously have been regarded as true. 19

Moral laws vary with the class that happens to dominate society. If there seems to be any degree of permanence in the laws, it is simply because the different classes have certain factors in common. This situation is not destined to continue, for with the coming of the classless society there will be what Engels calls a "really human morality".

19 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 45.
And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality was always a class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or, as soon as the oppressed class has become powerful enough, it has represented the revolt against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed. (...) A really human morality which transcends class antagonisms and their legacies in though becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class contradictions but has even forgotten them in practical life.20

5. Mental Activity.

Marxist philosophy, immersed as it is in materialism, has no place for a spiritual principle. Spiritual activities are the products of material things.

But if the further question is raised: what then are thought and consciousness, and whence they come, it becomes apparent that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of Nature, which has been developed in and along with its environment; whence it is self-evident that the products of the human brain, being in the last analysis also products of Nature, do not contradict the rest of Nature but are in correspondence with it.21

The acquisition of knowledge, however, requires effort. "The art of working with concepts is not inborn and is also not given with ordinary everyday consciousness, but requires real thought."22

20 Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolu-
tion in Science*, p. 105.

21 Ibid., p. 42-43.

22 Ibid., p. 19.

Man, in keeping with his nature, has no claim to immortality. Engels explains men's belief in immortality as an attempt to find a solution to the problem of disposing of the soul after death in the days when there was still complete ignorance of the structure of the human body.

Not religious desire for consolation, but the quandary arising from the common universal ignorance of what to do with this soul (once its existence had been accepted) after the death of the body--led in a general way to the tedious notion of personal immortality.23

Man will have his heaven on earth in the full development of communist society. His happiness will be in his work. This will have become so much the satisfaction of a desire that, since each will work according to his ability, society will be able to apply the rule: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"24

23 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 20.

CHAPTER III

THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF NATURE

For Marx and Engels all reality was continually in a process of development. From Nature the first forms of life had emerged. Then man, through the process of labour, gradually evolved to his present condition. The tools of labour, the means of production, ever changing themselves, had brought about a continuous movement forward in society. The process of class development, because of the antagonisms that resulted from the concentration of private property in the hands of a minority, must go on unimpeded until the classless society of the communist era is achieved. Freedom for man must advance through a similar state of development.


Man, as man, exists only in union with nature and by means of work. The relation of man to nature is controlled by work.

(...) the celebrated 'unity of man with nature' has always existed in industry and has existed in varying forms in every epoch according to the lesser or greater development of industry, just like the 'struggle' of man with nature, right up to the development of his productive powers on a corresponding basis.1

1 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 36.
THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF NATURE

As man develops more and more skill in the use of his hands, nature is brought to a greater extent under his control so that he may be said to have achieved a certain mastery over nature. This consists in a greater knowledge of the laws of nature, which makes it possible for man to act with a view to achieving certain results.

The mastery over nature, which begins with the development of the hand, with labour, widened man's horizon at every new advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown, properties of natural objects.2

But step by step with the development of the hand went that of the brain; first of all consciousness of the conditions for separate practically useful actions, and later, among the more favoured peoples and arising from the preceding, insight into the natural laws governing them. And with the rapidly growing knowledge of the laws of nature the means for reacting on nature also grew; (...)

(... man by his changes makes nature serve his ends, masters it.4

The further men become removed from animals, however, the more their effect on nature assumes the character of a premeditated, planned action directed towards definite ends known in advance.5

Since man acts with a view to a certain end, evidently he can choose the means to achieve his purpose.

3 Ibid., p. 18.
THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF NATURE

Although he is dealing with laws of nature, where a certain means may be depended upon to produce a given result, nevertheless the results are not always what are desired. This seems to indicate a certain amount of choice and the possibility that the best choice is not always made. Engels' explanation rests on the possession of knowledge of how to act.

Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other beings of being able to know and correctly apply its laws.6

2. Work.

Man's relations with nature are established by means of work. He fulfills the purpose of his existence, not however, as an individual but as one of the species. The objects of his activities are outside himself in his own species or in other species. This gives him a universality of action with which Marx associates freedom.

---

Man is a species being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species as his object (his own as well as those of other things), but—and this is only another way of expressing it—but also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being.

(...) The universality of man is in practice manifested precisely in the universality which makes all nature his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity.

In work man has the means of bringing all nature under his control. His efforts are directed especially to the well-being of the race rather than to the good of a particular individual. In this way, through the proper relations of man with nature and with other men, the individual in society and through society, and society itself can reach the realization of their potentialities. "The whole character of a species—its species character—is contained in the character of its life-activity; and free, conscious activity is man's species character."  

Marx states that in the process of work man acts 'of his own accord' to bring the forces of Nature under his control and to adapt them to his wants.

---

7 Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 74.

Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his wants. 9

Freedom, then, is lack of interference in the realization, through the instrumentality of work, of the potentialities of the race and of the individual as a member of the race.

At the same time that man by means of his work is achieving some degree of freedom through his mastery over Nature, other factors enter into the work process in such a way as to weaken and nullify, as it were, that freedom. Man, through the very distinguishing mark that makes him human, is estranged from himself, deprived of the realization of his true nature. The more he produces the greater is the opposition with which the products of his work confront him.

The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him; it means that the life he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien. 10


10 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 70.
He no longer gets any satisfaction from his work. His labour does not belong to his essential being. It is no longer the spontaneous expression of his nature, but a task imposed upon him. He is no longer free.

(...) in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels outside himself. (...) His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague.11

As a result, therefore man (the worker) no longer feels himself to be freely active in any but his animal functions—eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal.12

While the above passage would seem to indicate that labour as the free human activity of the worker is the satisfaction of a need, obviously it is not the satisfaction of a physical need, for Marx goes on to say that the animal "produces only under the domination of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free

11 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 72.

12 Ibid., p. 73.
from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom.\textsuperscript{13} Freedom, therefore, implies man's unhindered opportunity to find self-expression in work, or rather, the self-expression of the species in work.

When this freedom no longer exists, man's whole nature becomes completely reversed. Work constitutes man as man. Now, through his consciousness man uses his work merely as a means to his own existence, that is, to the existence of the individual and not to the existence of the species.

Man makes his life-activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. He has conscious life-activity. (...) It is just because of this that he is a species being. Or it is only because he is a species being that he is a Conscious Being, i.e., that his own life is an object for him. Only because of that is his activity free activity. Estranged labour reverses this relationship, so that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life-activity his essential being, a mere means to his existence.\textsuperscript{14}

In estranging from man (i) nature, and (2) himself, his own active functions, his life-activity, estranged labour estranges the species from man. It turns for him the life of the species into a means of individual life.\textsuperscript{15}

Marx declared that this unnatural situation has developed because the product of labour has passed from the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{13} Karl Marx, \textit{Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844}, p. 75-76.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 75.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 74-75.
\end{flushright}
control of the worker himself into the hands of some other man. It is a quality of work to bring satisfaction to somebody—if not to the worker, then to some individual into whose control the work, or the product of the work, passes.

If the product of labour does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, this can only be because it belongs to some other man than the worker. If the worker's activity is a torment to him, to another it must be delight and his life's joy. (...)  

(...) Thus, if the product of his labour, his labour objectified, is for him an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of him, then his position towards it is such that someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him. If his activity is to him an unfree activity, then he is treating it as activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion and the yoke of another man.16

This unhappy state-of-affairs has been developing ever since the division of labour first made its appearance in human history.

3. Division of Labour.

Division of labour, as such, has existed only since mental labour was distinguished from material labour. The possibility that certain individuals may be engaged in mental labour while others are engaged in material

16 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 79.
production brings a whole host of contradictions into human relations. Moreover, individual interests are likely to come into conflict with the common good, whereas to Marx man is truly man and able to enjoy the freedom typical of man when he works for the good of the whole, the good of the species.

(…) the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man lives in natural society, that is as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long therefore as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him.17

The division of labour made rapid strides as a result of the Industrial Revolution, and undoubtedly did cause a great deal of dissatisfaction to workers who were employed for long hours at tedious tasks which denied them the joy of seeing a completed product, the work of their own hands.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the simplest, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack that is required of him.18

17 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 22.

In communist society man will come into his own. The division of labour will take on a new relation to man. Individual freedom of choice with regard to occupation is apparently a possibility.

(...) in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. 19

It is difficult to see much efficiency in this rapid change from one type of activity to another. It may, however, merely apply to hobbies which fill in the time saved from essential work because of the perfect organization of communist society.

4. Private Property.

The division of labour results in private property. In fact, the two are "identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity". 20 To private property Marx ascribes all

19 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 22.
20 Ibid., p. 22.
the evils to be found in the life of the worker. The product of his labour passes from the hands of the worker into the hands of another, the capitalist, in the form of private property. For Marx and Engels the restoration of the true nature—and so, the freedom—of the worker is not to be achieved by turning the private property back to the worker so that everybody will possess some property, but by abolishing all private property.

When society seizes the means of production and thus brings about the abolition of private property through the establishment of communal property, man’s human qualities will be restored to him. All conflicts will disappear.

Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus, the real appropriation of human nature, through and for man. It is therefore the return of man himself as a social, that is, really human, being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development. (...) It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and Nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species.21

Men will no longer have to worry about their material needs, their physical and mental development, or the opportunity to make use of their special abilities. Life in communist society guarantees to all members of society a fully sufficient material existence as well as "the free development

21 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 102. Translation as in Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, p. 243-244.
and exercise of their physical and mental faculties". 22

Man is, therefore, unhindered in rising to the best of which he is capable.

It is only in communist society that man becomes in reality 'lord of Nature'. It is only in communist society that his social relationships come under his control.

The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of Nature, because he has now become master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social action hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of Nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man's own social organization, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by Nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. 23

Hitherto man has acted mainly because of necessity, now, at last, necessity gives way to freedom. The passage from the domain of private property to communism is "the assent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom". 24 In this kingdom of freedom the less restraint man (the species) undergoes in bringing to actuality the potentialities of his nature, the greater the degree of freedom he possesses.


23 ibid., p. 140.

24 ibid., p. 141.
CHAPTER IV

THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF HISTORY

In the centuries man has lived upon this planet, the organization of human life has taken on several forms. During the corresponding historical periods mankind enjoyed various degrees of freedom. While Marx and Engels are primarily concerned with the age in which they lived, that is, with society as dominated by the bourgeois or capitalist class, they have something to say concerning preceding periods.

1. Through the Years to Capitalism.

In the early stages of human existence men is simply a victim of determinism.

(...) the identity of nature and man appears in such a way that the restricted relation of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and their restricted relation to one another determines men's restricted relation to nature, just because nature is as yet hardly modified historically; and, on the other hand, man's consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all.1

Men live in society. This society Marx defines as "the sum of the relations in which these individuals stand to one another", 2 or "the product of men's reciprocal activity". 3 The members of society cannot voluntarily shape the type of society in which they live.

Are men free to choose this or that form of society for themselves? By no means. Assume a particular state of development in the productive forces of man, and you will get a particular form of commerce and consumption. Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce and consumption and you will have a corresponding social order, a corresponding organization of the family and of the ranks and classes, in a word a corresponding civil society. Presuppose a particular civil society and you will get particular political conditions which are only the official expression of civil society. 4

The type of society to which Marx is referring here is one in which division of labour and class distinction are found.

Just as the nature of society is independent of the control of its members, so is the condition of the state.

2 Karl Marx, Economic Manuscripts 1857-1858, in Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, p. 96.


4 Ibid., p. 7.
The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they are effective, produce materially, and are active under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.\(^5\)

Engels would seem to indicate some degree of voluntariness on the part of society in the setting up of the state. Very likely, however, all he means is that society forms the state for its own purpose, even though it must form it in a certain way in keeping with the nature of society.

Society creates for itself an organ for the safeguarding of its general interests against internal and external attacks. This organ is the state power. Hardly come into being, this organ makes itself independent in regard to society; and, indeed, the more so, the more it becomes the organ of a particular class, the more it directly enforces the supremacy of that class.\(^6\)

The existence of the state is an indication that defects have found their way into the organization of society.


\(^6\) Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 54.
THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF HISTORY

The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; (...) Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it is clef into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms (...) might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society became necessary (...); and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state.7

Using the findings of the American anthropologist, Lewis H. Morgan, Engels makes certain statements on early forms of society. Marx had already made an "Abstract of Morgan's Ancient Society", and this was available to Engels. Concerning freedom, Engels leads us to believe there was some, at least where property was held in common. Through quotations used by him lauding conditions among the Iroquois, with whom property was held in common, he makes it evident that he agrees with the author.8 Freedom and equality are inseparable, so that one seems to imply the other.


THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF HISTORY

All the members of an Iroquois gens were personally free, and they were bound to defend each other's freedom; they were equal in privileges and in personal rights, the sachem and chiefs claiming no superiority; (...) 9

There can be no poor and needy--the communist household and the gens know their obligations towards the aged, the sick and those disabled in war. All are free and equal--including the women, 10

The similarity in the meaning of freedom and equality is seen in Engels’ reference to the position of woman in the family. When property was held by the tribe, the woman occupied first place in the family, but as soon as the individual man owned property and provided the livelihood, the position of woman was so degraded that Engels speaks of the need of emancipation. But he associates the two--emancipation and equality.

Here we see already that the emancipation of women and their equality with men are impossible and must remain so as long as women are excluded from socially productive work and restricted to housework, which is private. The emancipation of women becomes possible only when women are enabled to take part in production on a large, social scale, and when domestic duties require their attention only to a minor degree. 11


10 Ibid., p. 230.

11 Ibid., p. 282.
THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF HISTORY

When woman takes care of the home, she is limited in the kinds of work she can do. Apparently this is a limitation of freedom.

Engels speaks of the personal freedom of the Frankish peasants before they surrendered their land in return for protection, and became tenants on the land they formerly owned. "Once driven into this form of dependence, they gradually lost their personal freedom; after a few generations most of them became serfs."12 Personal freedom seems to be associated with the possession of land. Only the landowners are free. Each individual will have opportunity of personal freedom only in the community (the classless society).13 "Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible."14

Personal freedom, evidently, is the opportunity of cultivating one's gifts, one's capabilities, to the


14 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, p. 74.
THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF HISTORY

The greatest possible extent. Up to the present state of development of society and the means of production, whether a person received this opportunity or not has depended largely on chance. Consequently Marx defines personal freedom in terms of chance.

This right to the undisturbed enjoyment, under certain conditions, of fortuity and chance has up till now been called personal freedom; but these conditions are, of course, only the productive forces and forms of intercourse at any particular time.\textsuperscript{15}

Not every time Marx and Engels describe a person as free do they mean to concede the existence of freedom. Very often they use the adjective 'free' to describe man at various stages in human society, when all they mean is 'not forming a part of the means of production', 'not possessing property', 'without', or 'unrestrained by'.

(...) free labourer, free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale, (...)\textsuperscript{16}

The transition from handicraft to manufacture presupposes the existence of a number of free workers--free on the one hand from the fetters of the guild and on the other from the means whereby they could themselves utilise their labour power.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, \textit{The German Ideology}, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{17} Frederick Engels, \textit{Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science}, p. 115.
Free labourers, in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen &c., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own.  

The peasant proprietors are not to be considered free, for here property establishes a direct relation between rulers and servants. If the state, not the ruler, is a private landlord, then, strictly speaking, there is no private ownership of land but both private and common possession of land.

It is furthermore evident that in all forms, in which the direct labourer remains the 'possessor' of the means of production and labour conditions of his own means of subsistence, the property relation must at the same time assert itself as a direct relation between ruler and servants, so that the direct producer is not free. (...) If the direct producers are not under the sovereignty of a private landlord, but rather under that of a state which stands over them as their direct landlord and sovereign, then rent and taxes coincide, (...) The sovereignty consists here in the ownership of land concentrated on a national scale. But, (....), no private ownership of land exists, although there is both private and common possession and use of land.  

Private property is so much the antithesis of freedom that if it exists in any form there must be a negation of freedom.

19 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 918-919.
2. Bourgeois Society.

With the decline in feudalism there grew up in Europe a new industrial middle class, the bourgeoisie, which came into possession of a large section of the world's wealth. This class was largely responsible for the French Revolution in which it won recognition of its own rights.

The Constitution of 1793 defines liberty as "the power which belongs to man to do everything which does not injure the rights of others," and states that the right to property is "the right of every citizen to enjoy and dispose of as he likes his goods, his income, the fruit of his toil and of his industry". Marx links freedom and property when he states: "The practical application of the right of man to freedom is the right of man to private property". However, he makes it evident that this is not what freedom means for him. Man must be free within the community, never as an individual separated by his private interests from the community.

20 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Karl Marx, Selected Essays, p. 75.
21 Ibid., p. 74.
22 Ibid., p. 74.
Far from regarding the individual as a generic being, the generic life, Society itself, rather appears as an external frame for the individual, as a limitation of his original independence. The sole bond which connects him with his fellows is natural necessity, material needs and private interest, the preservation of his property and his egoistic person.

It is strange that a people who were just beginning to free themselves, to break down all the barriers between the various members of the community, to establish a political community, that such a people should solemnly proclaim the justification of the egoistic individual, separated from his fellows and from the community, (...)\textsuperscript{23}

Marx's disapproval of laws passed by the state guaranteeing freedom in the exercise of certain rights seems to indicate that freedom, instead of giving man the opportunity to exercise choice in his activity, should rather relieve him of the obligation and responsibility of having to choose.

The individual was therefore not liberated from religion; he received religious freedom. He was not freed from property; he received freedom of property. He was not freed from the egoism of industry; he received industrial freedom.\textsuperscript{24}

On the other hand, however, limitation in the exercise of a given right is contrary to freedom. The freedom of one individual or group must not be limited by the rights of another. Although the Constitution of 1793 guaranteed individual freedom and, based upon it, the freedom of the press, in reality, when the liberty of the press came into

\textsuperscript{23} Karl Marx, \textit{On the Jewish Question}, in Karl Marx, \textit{Selected Essays}, p. 76.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 82.
conflict with public liberty, the freedom of the press ceased to exist. Political life was consequently defective, and should cease to exist since it no longer fulfilled the purpose of its existence.

While the indefinite liberty of the press (1793 constitution art. 122) was guaranteed as a consequence of the right of man to individual liberty, the freedom of the press was completely destroyed, for liberty of the press could not be permitted when it compromised public liberty. (...) This means that the right of man to liberty ceases to be a right as soon as it comes into conflict with the political life, whereas, according to theory, the political life is only the guarantee of the rights of man, and should therefore be surrendered as soon as its object contradicts these rights of man.25

Undoubtedly, Marx was influenced in favour of unrestrained freedom of the press by his own difficulties in getting his writings printed.

To Marx, free will, as exercised by the capitalists, is a form of constraint. In the marketing of commodities in capitalist society, buyer and seller enjoy freedom because they are forced to trade "of their own free will". A man does not become a capitalist unless he finds somebody compelled to become a wage-worker "of his own free will". In theory man may have freedom of choice. In practice he must work or trade to live.

25 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Karl Marx, Selected Essays, p. 78.
There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by their own free-will.26

(...)

Moreover, free will is merely an abstraction of the will. Marx speaks of the "illusion that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis--on free will".28

As a result of the Industrial Revolution, the division widened between the bourgeoisie, who, with the development of big industry, were known as the capitalists, and the working class or proletariat, who no longer possessed any property but worked for a daily wage. Civil society with its class distinctions is the height of slavery under the appearance of freedom, since it permits the individual the exercise of rights which are incompatible with the true nature of man.


27 Ibid., p. 839.

28 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 60.
Precisely the slavery of civil society is in appearance the greatest freedom because it is in appearance the perfect independence of the individual. Indeed, the individual considers as his own freedom the movement, no longer curbed or fettered by a common tie or by man, the movement of his alienated life elements, like property, industry, religion, etc., in reality, this is the perfection of his slavery and his inhumanity. 29

Man does not know the true nature of freedom and so he takes the counterfeit for the genuine.

3. Religion and Morality.

In the sphere of religion the only freedom there is, is freedom from religion. Religion has no place with man. The fact that men of all ages have recognized a Supreme Being, or several beings higher than themselves, to whom they paid homage, is accounted for by man's inadequate knowledge of his own nature. "Religion arose in very primitive times; from erroneous and primitive ideas of men about their own nature and that of the external world surrounding them." 30 Different religions represent "different stages in the development of the human mind." 31

All religions indicate man's unawareness of his essential nature. Religion is "the expression of the


30 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 56.

31 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Karl Marx, Selected Essays, p. 43.
THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF HISTORY

separation and the alienation of man from man". It "is the self-consciousness and self-feeling of man, who either has not yet found himself or has already lost himself again". The recognition of God detracts from the nature of man. "The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself."

The presence of religion indicates a defect in the nature of the State. When this is remedied, man will come to a recognition of his true nature and will be automatically freed from religion.

The abolition of the state religion, and the recognition of the right of each individual to choose his own form of religion indicate a step forward and are as much as can be achieved under the existing conditions in society, but they do not represent true freedom.

Political emancipation from religion, is not a thorough-going and consistent emancipation from religion, because political emancipation is not effectual and consistent human emancipation.

---

32 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Karl Marx, Selected Essays, p. 67.

33 Karl Marx, Towards the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Basic Writings on Politics & Philosophy, p. 262.

34 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 70.

35 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Karl Marx, Selected Essays, p. 51.

36 Ibid., p. 52.
Political emancipation at least represents important progress; while not the last form of human emancipation generally, it is the last form of human emancipation within the existing world order. 37

Morality, like religion, varies with different stages in the development of society. There is, therefore, no absolute standard of morality. Engels forcefully rejects all possibility of an immutable moral law.

We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and forever immutable moral law on the pretext that the moral world too has its permanent principles which transcend history and the differences between nations.38

This does not mean that each age is free to set up its own moral code to its own convenience. "We maintain on the contrary that all former moral theories are the product, in the last analysis, of the economic stage which society had reached at that particular epoch."39

Although the principle of all morality is enlightened self-interest, and although experience shows that men do not act according to this rule, they are not exercising freedom when they choose among different ways of acting. To Marx, freedom consists in the assertion of one's true

37 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Karl Marx, Selected Essays, p. 58.


39 Ibid., p. 105.
individuality, and this means becoming the best of which one is capable as a social being. If an individual chooses a way of acting contrary to his best interests, then the anti-social environment is to blame. In other words, man is determined by his environment.

If enlightened self-interest is the principle of all morality, it follows that the private interests of men ought to be made to coincide with human interests. If man is unfree in the material sense—that is, is free not by reason of the negative force of being able to avoid this or that, but by reason of the positive power to assert his true individuality, then one should not punish individuals for crimes but rather destroy the anti-social breeding places of crime, and give every person social room for the necessary assertion of his or her vitality.40

Bourgeois morality, however, claimed that for complete responsibility for his actions a person must possess full freedom of the will. Moreover, freedom of contract, a characteristic of the relations between capitalist and worker, presupposed persons who could freely dispose of their persons, actions, and possessions and who met each other on equal terms. Freedom and equality are again linked. "To create such 'free' and 'equal' people was precisely one of the tasks of capitalist production."41

40 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy Family, p. 176. Translation is from Appendix to Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 92. Marx is pointing out the necessary inter-connection of materialism with communism and socialism.

THE FREEDOM OF THE MAN OF HISTORY

It is evident that Marx and Engels do not rate very highly the freedom they considered capitalism provided. Engels recognizes the existence of a kind of freedom with regard to contracts, for with reference to marriage he goes on to say: "But if real freedom to decide was demanded for all other contracts, why not for this one?" 42 and later "Marriage remained class marriage, but, within the confines of the class, the parties were accorded a certain degree of freedom of choice". 43 Freedom in the choice of a partner in marriage was a right enjoyed by the proletariat to a greater extent than by the bourgeoisie. Among the capitalists the voluntary marriage is the exception.

Thus, full freedom in marriage can become generally operative only when the abolition of capitalist production, and of the property relations created by it, has removed all those secondary economic considerations which still exert so powerful an influence on the choice of a partner. 44

In existing economic conditions, because of the position of man as the breadwinner, woman is lacking in freedom in the family and in society.


43 Ibid., p. 217.

44 Ibid., p. 218.
The modern individual family is based on the oped or disguised domestic enslavement of the woman; and modern society is a mass composed solely of individual families as its molecules.\textsuperscript{45}

To bring about the emancipation of women, Engels would establish social equality between man and woman by "the reintroduction of the entire female sex into public industry",\textsuperscript{46} and by the abolition of "the quality possessed by the individual family of being the economic unit of society".\textsuperscript{47}

Another characteristic of marriage partly the result of economic conditions is the indissolubility of marriage.

The indissolubility of marriage is partly the result of the economic conditions under which monogamy arose, and partly a tradition from the time when the connection between these economic conditions and monogamy was not yet correctly understood and was exaggerated by religion.\textsuperscript{48}

The freedom of men and women is limited by the laws of church and state with regard to marriage. Church, state, marriage—all are the product of economic relations. But what is the nature of the freedom man should have?


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 212.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 212.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 218.
Undoubtedly, "the positive power to assert his true individuality". Will this mean doing as he likes or doing as he ought?


It is evident, then, that in the present organization of society man is by no means free. Private property is largely responsible for this, but private property will have disappeared in communist society. The state, too, is an obstacle to freedom, and must not continue to exist as it is.

Changes in the state are essential. "Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinate to it." Moreover, the first condition of all freedom is "that all officials should be responsible for all their official acts to every citizen before the ordinary courts and according to common law". With the proletarian revolution and the establishment of the classless society, the state will no longer have a purpose to serve and will gradually disappear.

49 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy Family, p. 176.


51 Ibid., p. 38.
Marx and I, ever since 1845, have held the view that one of the final results of the future proletarian revolution will be the gradual dissolution and ultimate disappearance of that political organization called the State; an organization the main object of which has ever been to secure, by armed force, the economical subjection of the working majority to the wealthy minority. 52

The old bourgeois society will have given place to "an association in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all". 53

Freedom, then, is the equal opportunity for all to reach the limit of their capabilities.


53 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Basic Writings on Politics & Philosophy, p. 29.
CHAPTER V

THE FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN PRODUCT OF LABOUR

To Marx man is first and foremost a worker. This is what exalts him above the animals. "(...) the worker creates everything; (...) The worker creates even man; (...)". Since the worker has no need for a Creator, but has taken upon himself the prerogatives of the First Cause, it would seem that he should also be in complete control of his destiny. We have seen, however, that the conditions of labour, or the productive forces, strongly influence the form of society, the nature of the state, even the development of religion. Does this mean that, in spite of whatever claims man may advance for freedom, he is actually determined by the evolution of the productive forces?

1. Extent of the Influence of the Productive Forces.

In explaining the materialist conception of history Engels leads us to believe that the division of society is determined by the state of production, and any social and political changes that come about have their ultimate foundation in changes in the means of production. He

1 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy Family, p. 30.
emphasizes the supremacy of the productive forces over the minds of men.

The materialist conception of history starts from the principle that production, and with production the exchange of its products, is the basis of every social order; that in every society which has appeared in history the distribution of the products, and with it the division of society into classes or estates, is determined by what is produced and how it is produced, and how the product is exchanged. According to this conception, the ultimate causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in the minds of men, in their increasing insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the mode of production and exchange; (...)²

History is not the product of a collection of haphazard events but a process of unfolding which takes place according to definite laws which are at the very foundation of history.

Engels assigns to Marx the responsibility for the discovery of these laws.

It was precisely Marx who had first discovered the great law of motion of history, the law according to which all historical struggles, whether they proceed in the political, religious, philosophical or some other ideological domain, are in fact the more or less clear expression of struggles of social classes, and that the existence and thereby the collisions, too, of these classes are in turn conditioned by the degree of development of their economic position, by the mode of their production and by the form of exchange resulting from it.³

---


THE FREEDOM OF THE HUMAN PRODUCT OF LABOUR

It is to be noted that the thought of Engels is rendered into English by the word 'conditioned'. Man could be conditioned by economic circumstances without being determined. Marx himself points out that the relation of man with man is brought about by the condition of the mode of production independently of their wills. Moreover, all that goes to make the superstructure of society, such as the state, religion, philosophy, is determined by the economic conditions.

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.4

2. Evolution of Society.

When the productive forces (the relation between men and things) cease to be in accord with the productive relations (the relation between man and man), a social

4 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 11-12.
revolution occurs. As the economic foundation changes, the whole ideological superstructure changes also. However men may account for this change in the superstructure, the real explanation rests in the conflict between productive forces and productive relations.

At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or (...) with the property relations within which they had been at work before. (...) Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic -- in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based upon what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of production.5

It is not possible for men to bring about changes in the existing social order according to their own desires. Whatever they may think themselves, any developments in the superstructure are the result of corresponding developments in the productive forces. Although the development of the

5 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 12.
social order cannot be measured with the precision that is possible for the productive forces, nevertheless, before the old gives way to the new, all the productive forms of which it was capable must have been developed, and the new must not come into existence until the material conditions for its arrival are fully prepared.

No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces, for which there is room in it, have been developed; and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society. 6

Marx leaves us in no doubt that he considers that the productive forces and all relations associated with them develop in a determined way.

Is it not sufficient to say that the mode of production, the relations in which the productive forces are developed, are nothing less than eternal laws, but that they correspond to a determined development of men and of their productive forces, and that any change arising in the productive forces of men necessarily effects a change in their condition of production? 7

Engels confirms this in a preface to the Communist Manifesto.

6 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 12.

7 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 133.
The 'Manifesto' being our joint production, I consider myself bound to state that the fundamental proposition, which forms its nucleus, belongs to Marx. That proposition is that in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch; (...)⁸

3. Passivity of Man.

The whole history of society is explained in terms of the class struggle. Each age has seen the oppressor and the oppressed. As the result of the conflict between the two, other classes have developed until, in the nineteenth century, we have the bourgeoisie in control of the wealth and, at the other end of the scale, the proletariat completely devoid of property. Undoubtedly, social injustice exists, but the property owners are unable to do anything about it, even if they had the desire. They are, as it were, carried along in a tide from which they are powerless to free themselves.

Private property as private property, as wealth, is compelled to maintain itself, and thereby its opposite, the proletariat, in existence.⁹

⁸ Frederick Engels, Preface to the Communist Manifesto, 1888, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Basic Writings on Politics & Philosophy, p. 4.

⁹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy Family, p. 51.
Indeed private property, too, drives itself in its economic movement towards its own dissolution, only, however, through a development which does not depend on it, of which it is unconscious and which takes place against its will, through the very nature of things; (...) 10

The development of the productive forces seems to control with an iron power all other developments in the history of men. It is not surprising, therefore, that over and over again Marx and Engels emphasize lack of freedom of choice concerning the productive forces.

It is superfluous to add that men are not free to choose their productive forces -- which are the basis of all their history -- for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of former activity. 11

Moreover, Marx goes on to point out in the same letter that not only is man strongly influenced by the state of development of the various circumstances in which he finds himself, but at certain stages in the development of the productive forces he is compelled to change the structure of society.

10 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy Family, p. 52.

The productive forces are therefore the result of practical human energy; but this energy is itself conditioned by the circumstances in which men find themselves, by the productive forces already acquired, by the social form which exists before they do, which they do not create, which is the product of the preceding generations.

(...) in order that they may not be deprived of the result attained and forfeit the fruits of civilization, they are obliged, from the moment when their mode of carrying on commerce no longer corresponds to the productive forces acquired, to change all their traditional social forms.12

While the use of the word 'conditioned' could leave an opening for some measure of freedom, the content of the passage obviously indicates determinism.

4. Activity of Man.

So far men seem to be passive human beings acted upon by influences over which they have little or no control. But there are times when men must take an active part in the shaping of their destiny.

History does nothing, it 'possesses no immense wealth', it 'wages no battles'. It is man, real living man, that does all that, that possesses and fights: 'history' is not a person apart, using man as a means for its own particular aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.13

---

12 Karl Marx, "Letter to P.V. Annenkov", Brussels, 28 December, 1846, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 40-41.

Men may be active, but they are by no means in full control.

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. -- real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. 14

We set out from real active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process. (...) Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. 15

Man is active in as much as he works. Work is his life. His work establishes his relations with nature and with other men. The whole ideological structure is erected upon these relations as foundation and is conditioned or determined by them so that man is not free to erect the superstructure as he wishes.

5. Attempted Reconciliation of Passivity and Activity.

Material production exerts an all-important influence over every aspect of man's life. In spite of this, Marx and Engels assert over and over that men make their own history. Engels explains how this happens. Each man acts with a view to achieving his own purpose, but what actually occurs is the result of the interaction of the activities of the various individuals.

Men make their own history, whatever its outcome may be, in that each person follows his own consciously desired end, and it is precisely the resultant of these many wills operating in different directions and of their manifold effects upon the outer world that constitutes history.16 What actually results may be the opposite of what is intended. Moreover, the will does not act freely, but is determined by passion or deliberation which, in its turn, is determined by certain other factors.

The will is determined by passion or deliberation. But the levers which immediately determine passion or deliberation are of very different kinds. Partly they may be external objects, partly ideal motives, ambition, 'enthusiasm for truth and justice', personal hatred or even purely individual whims of all kinds.17 Various forces, from within and without, act upon man and determine him in the way he is to act.

16 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 49.

17 Ibid., p. 49.
The mind would seem to be not much more than a recording station for the various factors that come to bear upon man. "Everything which sets men in motion must go through their minds; but what form it will take in the mind will depend very much upon the circumstances." The circumstances never fail to be the nature of the productive forces at the given period. Even when it is conceded that other influences do have a part in the development of history, economic causes nevertheless hold sway.

We make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions. Among these the economic ones are ultimately decisive. But the political ones, etc., and indeed even the traditions which haunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive one.

To man is attributed the making of history in as much as his will brings about activity even though it does not decide the direction of that activity.

But from the fact that the wills of individuals—each of whom desires what he is impelled to by his physical constitution and external, in the last resort, economic circumstances (either his own personal circumstances or those of society in general)—do not attain what they want, but are merged into an aggregate mean, a common resultant, it must not be concluded that they are equal to zero. On the contrary, each contributes to the resultant and is to this extent included in it.20

Even though men act with consciously desired aims, the results may not be what they intend, or if they get the hoped-for results, there will be consequences that they have not foreseen. On the surface chance or accident seems to reign, but in reality "the course of history is governed by inner hidden laws".21

Historical events thus appear on the whole to be governed by chance. But where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws and it is only matter of discovering these laws.22

6. The Need and Extent of Necessity.

While men remain ignorant of the laws directing the course of history, they are not able to bring them under their control and use them to their advantage.


21 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 49.

22 Ibid., p. 49.
Consequently, they live in a society which is actually governed by necessity while outwardly accident reigns. This necessity, of course, is economic necessity.

The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces operating in nature: blindly, violently, destructively, so long as we do not understand them and fail to take them into account.23

Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan or even in a definite, delimited given society. Their aspirations clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, the complement and form of appearance of which is accident. The necessity which here asserts itself a fresh accident is again ultimately economic necessity.24

Marx and Engels, following Hegel, who because of his idealism does not have the same success in this regard, combine necessity and accident or contingency in one dialectical unity. Each presupposes the other and each transforms itself into the other. "This inner connection between necessity and contingency resides in the fact that the contingent represents a manifestation, or as Engels put it, a completion of necessity."25


It would seem from letters written by Engels after the death of Marx that Engels thought too much emphasis was being given by the followers of Marx to the importance of economics in shaping the course of history.

According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase.26

Although economics occupies a necessary place in the movement of history, the superstructure has an important part and may at times predominate in determining the form which class struggles take.

The economic structure is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure -- political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas -- also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (...) the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary.27


27 Ibid., p. 498.
The superstructure has its foundation in economic conditions, but the various elements of the superstructure react upon one another and upon the foundation.

It is not that the economic situation is cause, solely active, while everything else is only passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself.28


Engels gives us a clear account of the evolution of religion in keeping with the development of the productive forces. Here there is no place for revelation from outside the world of the material, neither is there room for any independent action on the part of man, at least, while man remains under the control of the productive forces. Religion is merely a form of reaction on the part of man to natural and social forces which continue to dominate him.

All religion, however, is nothing but the phantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces. In the beginnings of history it was the forces of Nature which were at first so reflected, and in the course of further evolution they underwent the most manifold and varied personifications among the various peoples. (...) But it is not long before, side by side with the forces of Nature, social forces begin to be active; forces which present themselves to men as equally extraneous and at first equally inexplicable, dominating them with the same apparent necessity, as the forces of Nature themselves. The phantastic personifications, which at first only reflected the mysterious forces of Nature, at this point acquire social attributes, become representatives of the forces of history. At a still further stage of evolution, all the natural and social attributes of the innumerable gods are transferred to one almighty god, who himself once more is only the reflex of the abstract man. Such was the origin of monotheism, (...) In this convenient, handy, and readily adaptable form, religion can continue to exist as the immediate, that is, the sentimental form of man's relation to the extraneous natural and social forces which dominate them, so long as men remain under the control of these forces.29


There is hope for man as soon as he gets from "under the control of these productive forces". In the meantime, while man's ideological notions must of necessity be built upon the economic foundation, possibly the actual erection of the superstructure will give some opportunity for the exercise of freedom.

29 Frederick Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science, p. 344-345.
(...), one more point (...) Marx and I always failed to stress enough in our writings and in regard to which we are all equally guilty. That is to say, we all laid, and were bound to lay, the main emphasis, in the first place, on the derivation of political, juridical and other ideological notions, and of actions arising through the medium of these notions, from basic economic facts. But in so doing we neglected the formal side—the ways and means by which these notions, etc., come about—for the sake of the content.  

What are the potentialities of these ways and means, we are not told. Moreover, Marx may have overstressed his point. It is possible that, since he revealed much of his thought in controversial attacks on those who held opinions contrary to his own, he may have exaggerated his position on those points he wished to emphasize. "No doubt, in his eagerness to make his point, he said at times more than he consistently held. His polemical purpose often made him exaggerate."  

There is no doubt, however, in Lenin's mind that Marx and Engels were thorough materialists and claimed that all phases of life were as they were because of economic conditions.


31 A.D. Lindsay, Karl Marx's Capital, London, Oxford University Press, 1925, p. 38.
Marx and Engels were materialists. Regarding the world and humanity materialistically, they perceived that just as material causes lie at the basis of all the phenomena of nature, so the development of human society is conditioned by the development of material, productive forces. On the development of productive forces depend the relations which men enter into one with another in the production of the things required for the satisfaction of human needs. And in these relations lies the explanation of all the phenomena of social life, human aspirations, ideas and laws. 32

Man can bring the means of production under his control. Knowledge is needed, but knowledge alone will not bring about this drastic step forward. Such a change in man's state of existence will be accomplished by a great social act through which man will shake off the fetters of the forces of production and will become free. 33

Mere knowledge, even if it went much further and deeper than that of bourgeois economic science, is not enough to bring social forces under the control of society. What is above all necessary for this, is a social act. 34

Man will accomplish this "by taking possession of all means of production and using them on a planned basis". 35

---


33 Once man has freed himself from the forces of production, religion will disappear -- only then "will also vanish the religious reflection itself, for the simple reason that there will be nothing left to reflect". Frederick Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science, p. 346.

34 Ibid., p. 345.

The call to this act is evident in the closing words of the Communist Manifesto, "WORKINGMEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!". With the limitations imposed upon man by the nature of the productive forces, will he have sufficient freedom to be capable of this act? Or if the productive forces and society will evolve, independent of man's will, to the stage where this act occurs of necessity, is there need for such a call?

36 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Basic Writings on Politics & Philosophy, p. 41.
CHAPTER VI

THE FREEDOM OF THE COMMUNIST MAN

Man, the being of Nature, who has raised himself above animal life by acquiring the ability to work, alienates himself in the process of work because something that is his -- the product of his work -- passes from him to another man. This, of course, is the result of the present condition of the productive forces and of the relations between men which grew out of them. In short, because of the institution of private property, man loses something of himself and is not free to attain the perfection of his nature.

While some degree of freedom is claimed by man at all stages in the history of the race, and while Marx and Engels do apply the words 'free' and 'freedom' to describing conditions during the various phases of the evolution of society, nevertheless, men by their misunderstanding of the nature of the productive forces, do set up institutions and ideologies which interfere with the full exercise of freedom.

Actually, as a result of man's failure to grasp the nature of the economic forces which act upon him, men find themselves, while they attempt as individuals to
direct the course of their own history, led along in a whole process of class development and class struggle which they seem powerless to control.

1. The Attainment of Freedom.

This state of affairs will not continue, however. The capitalist mode of production, by its very nature, is bringing about the very conditions that will necessitate a revolution in society.

By more and more transforming the great majority of the population into proletarians, the capitalist mode of production brings into being the force which, under penalty of its own destruction, is compelled to carry out this revolution.¹

As the proletariat reaches full maturity with the further development of capitalism, it will of necessity be forced to free itself. This act of establishing its own freedom will also be carried out under compulsion.

(…) since man has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through urgent, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative need— that practical expression of necessity—is driven directly to revolt against that inhumanity; it follows that the proletariat can and must free itself. (…) The question is not what this or that proletarian, or even the whole of the proletariat at the moment considers as its aim. The question is what the proletariat is, and what consequent on that being it will be compelled to do.²

² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy Family, p. 52.
"The proletariat", consequently, "seizes the state power, and transforms the means of production in the first instance into state property". 3 By so doing it brings about its own dissolution, for it abolishes class differences and class antagonisms and establishes the classless society. This process of change will extend over a period of time.

2. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

During the change-over from capitalism to communism, there will be a transition period when the state will be the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. 4

In this period, which Marx describes as 'the first phase of communist society', when society has just emerged from capitalism, there is common ownership of the means of production, consequently there is not the alienation of man through his work since "individual labour no longer exists in an indirect fashion but directly as a component part of

the total labour". The receipts of each individual from society is in proportion to the amount of labour supplied, therefore all do not receive the same income.

This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labour. It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowments and thus productive capacity as natural privileges.

Obviously a defect exists, but it has to be present because of the influence of the economic structure. Men are not free to remove it, but it will disappear with further improvement in the conditions of labour.

When the state will have fulfilled its function of transferring the means of production from the capitalist proprietors to society, it will disappear.

The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole--the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society--is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not 'abolished', it withers away.

---


6 There is an equal standard of measurement for all—labour.


THE FREEDOM OF THE COMMUNIST MAN

After this has been accomplished, man will enjoy freedom from the state. In the meantime, the state will not be a means of freedom and will not be used by the proletariat in the cause of freedom. Engels declares that

(...so long as the proletariat still uses the state, it does not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist.\(^9\)

The proletariat will exist some time as a class while it is making those who are not yet of the proletariat members of that class. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not yet the classless society but "leads to the abolition of classes".\(^10\)

In interpreting the thought of Marx and Engels, Lenin stresses the lack of freedom during the dictatorship of the proletariat.

But the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of crushing the oppressors, cannot result merely in an expansion of democracy. (....) the dictatorship of the proletariat imposes a series of restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists. We must crush them to free humanity from wage slavery; their resistance must be broken by force; it is clear that where there is suppression, where there is coercion, there is no freedom and no democracy.\(^11\)

---


The dictatorship of the proletariat is, therefore, an instrument of tyranny directed towards those who are not of the proletariat.

3. Communism.

Clearly the evolution of society will have to progress to the state of communism before there will be freedom for all. Then, at last, the knowledge of the nature of the productive forces will have been applied in such a way that the anarchy of social production will have been replaced by "a socially planned regulation of production in accordance with the needs both of society as a whole and of each individual".\textsuperscript{12} Man will have become truly human; he will have become in reality the master of Nature, capable of shaping his own social organization, and so will, at last, enjoy freedom.

\textsuperscript{12} Frederick Engels, \textit{Herr Eugen Dürhring's Revolu-
And at this point, in a certain sense, man finally cuts himself off from the animal world, leaves the conditions of animal existence behind him and enters conditions which are really human. The conditions of existence forming man's environment, which up to now have dominated man, at this point pass under the dominion and control of man, who now for the first time becomes the real conscious master of Nature, because and in so far as he has become master of his own social organization. The laws of his own social activity, which have hitherto confronted him as external, dominating laws of Nature, will then be applied by man with complete understanding, and hence will be dominated by man. Men's own social organization which has hitherto stood in opposition to them as if arbitrarily decreed by Nature and history will then become the voluntary acts of men themselves. The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history, will then pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by man. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom. 13


Freedom will be achieved when men will no longer be compelled to work because of necessity.

In fact, the realm of freedom does not commence until the point is passed where labour under the compulsion of necessity and of external utility is required. In the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of material production in the strict meaning of the term. 14


Throughout the various stages in the growth of civilization, men have been dominated by necessity in their struggle to satisfy their needs. Freedom of a kind is possible only in as much as men in society bring nature under their control and use it rationally. True freedom will come when men will be able to develop their human powers as an end in itself and not simply to bring about the satisfaction of their material needs. Such freedom will become possible in a state of society which will have evolved from conditions where necessity held sway. Consequently, this freedom will have its foundation in necessity.

The freedom in this field cannot consist of anything else but the fact that socialized man, the associated producers, regulate their interchange with nature rationally, bring it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power; that they accomplish their task with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most adequate to their human nature and most worthy of it. But it always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its basis.16

Essential to this freedom is more time freed from the obligation of work. "The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premise."17

15 The field where men must work to satisfy their material needs.
17 Ibid., p. 955.
THE FREEDOM OF THE COMMUNIST MAN

In the more advanced stage of communist society man will have taken on a new attitude towards work. The division of labour will have disappeared, and with the advances in the productive forces and the full development of the individual, material goods will be in plenty for all. Man will no longer have to work; he will want to work.

In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. 18

His freedom will find expression in work.


Freedom for Marx and Engels will never mean the disappearance of necessity. If freedom has its roots in necessity, it must owe its existence to necessity and be supported by it. Engels, following Hegel, defines freedom as the appreciation of necessity. Not knowledge is freedom, but knowledge used in a definite way.

Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in knowledge of these laws; and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external nature and to those which govern the bodily and mental existence of men themselves -- two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in reality. 19

Since man is to use the knowledge which he possesses to reach definite ends, there will be the problem of using the means to reach these ends. But if the knowledge is perfect, the most effective means will stand out above all others, and the individual will be compelled by necessity to use it.

Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with real knowledge of the subject. Therefore the freer a man's judgment is in relation to a definite question, with so much the greater necessity is the content of this judgment determined; while the uncertainty, founded on ignorance, which seems to make an arbitrary choice among many different and conflicting possible decisions, shows by this precisely that it is not free, that it is controlled by the very object it should itself control. Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of historical development. 20

Man's whole history is the record of his advance towards freedom; "each step forward in civilization was a

---


step towards freedom". The summit will be reached with the establishment of the perfect communist society where there will be no class distinctions or worries over the means of subsistence, where "there can be talk of real human freedom and of an existence in harmony with the established laws of Nature".

Only when communist society has been established will the nature of this human freedom be clearly understood. Marx tells us very little about future society because the material conditions under which this future society would exist were not fully prepared.

(...) mankind always takes up only such problems as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation.

This much, however, is certain. The communist men will act in such a way as to bring about the complete development of his human powers. He will do this because, possessed of exact knowledge of the nature of the productive forces as well as of the nature of men as social and natural beings, he will know the best of all possible ways to act, and he will act in that way.

21 Frederick Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolu-
tion in Science, p. 126. The discovery of fire was man’s greatest step.

22 Ibid., p. 126.

THE FREEDOM OF THE COMMUNIST MAN

Now the obligation of having to work a fixed number of hours each day for a factory owner or some other employer detracts from the freedom of men. In the perfect society of the future, when man’s relation to work will have been completely revolutionized, he will no longer consider himself forced to work but will want to work.\(^\text{24}\) Work will have become "not only a means of life but life’s prime want".\(^\text{25}\) Freed from the struggle to sustain life, since the motto of society will be "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"\(^\text{26}\) -- and there will be plenty for all -- man will be able to devote himself to achieving the perfection of his nature. In this, freedom will consist.

Man will then enjoy freedom from religion. This will not come from a positive act of rejection of God and religion. Man in communist society will have become aware of his true nature, consequently there will be no need for a Supreme Being.

\(^{24}\) "(...) after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished". Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 23.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 23.

\(^{26}\) Ibid., p. 23.
THE FREEDOM OF THE COMMUNIST MAN

Once the essence of man and of Nature, man as a natural being and Nature as a human reality, has become evident in practical life, in sense experience, the search for an alien being, a being outside man and Nature (a search which is an avowal of the unreality of man and Nature) becomes impossible in practice.27

Since the moral code is not immutable but varies with the stage of development of society, it is difficult to see the need of a moral code in the perfect communist society. Moral laws may possibly supply some of the knowledge necessary for the exercise of freedom, but man will have become so aware of his nature that he will always act in accordance with this nature. Engels does not see any need for the precept "Thou shalt not steal" in a society where property is held in common because man will have lost the incentive to steal.28 The same would apply to any other moral law if men, because of their perfect knowledge, will always do as they ought.

According to the freedom of the knowledge of natural necessity, there will be no question of what a man ought to do and what he ought not to do. "(...)

27 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p. 113-114. Translation as in Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, p. 246.

them to do will have disappeared."

No influence from outside will exist to deter him from the proper course, for he will be living in perfect society. From within he will be so conditioned by the knowledge of natural necessity that he will act in keeping with his nature. He will have reached perfection.

The freedom of the knowledge of natural necessity -- the only freedom worthy of man -- exists only in the perfect communist society. It is the type of freedom enjoyed by the perfect man in the state of the perfect.

---

CHAPTER VII

A JUDGMENT OF MARXIAN FREEDOM IN THE LIGHT OF SAINT THOMAS

For the proponents of Dialectical Materialism, freedom, like matter, is in a state of motion -- a motion which is a process of evolution. Man, in society, moves along from one set of social conditions to another as the economic foundations determine. In spite of this, Marx and Engels assure us that "real active men" are in a position to alter "their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking".¹ Is it possible to reconcile these two contrasting attitudes concerning freedom?

1. Consistency in Marxian Freedom.

Freedom is considered in two domains: the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. The realm of necessity belongs to all those eras preceding the coming of communism, when man is dominated by the productive forces. The realm of freedom is the perfect communist society.

In the first, determinism largely holds sway. Man may act as if he has freedom of choice, but he does not

get the intended results, for "each person follows his own consciously desired end", but "many individual wills active in history for the most part produce results quite other than those intended -- often quite the opposite".  

Man, therefore, cannot act with a view to an end, at least he cannot attain the purpose for which he acts, unless, having become aware, or having been made aware, of the interconnection of the laws of production, society, and history, he pulls with the tide of history to bring about a more rapid approach of the ideal society -- communism. This is the goal of the Marxian appeal presented so strongly in The Communist Manifesto.  

Marx and Engels seem involved in contradiction when they claim interaction between the ideological superstructure and the economic substructure, and maintain at the same time the domination of man by the productive forces.

2 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, p. 49.

3 "WORKINGMEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!", Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Basic Writings on Politics & Philosophy, p. 41.
If man is to be in any real sense the master of his destiny, it can only be through his ideas and opinions. But these belong to the superstructure, and are ex hypothesi generated by the productive forces of the substructure the operation of which is determined by the dialectic. (...) once an interaction has been conceded the whole thesis is undermined, since we are no longer dealing with a purely economic factor, but with one which has been in part determined by non-economic factors. Economic factors, we may conclude, make man what he is. Man thus determined sets up the superstructure.

When the realm of necessity gives way to the realm of freedom, man will enjoy what is for the followers of Marx the highest form of freedom. Because of the establishment of the classless society, the destruction of private property, and the withering away of the state, man will have become master of the conditions of his existence and will be able "to make decisions with real knowledge of the subject". Since he will act in accordance with his knowledge of natural and historical laws, he will obtain the desired results.

Man is not a person; he is merely an individual, a unit in the collectivity of individuals. Men "exist only in so far as they have a part in society and belong

---


A JUDGMENT OF MARXIAN FREEDOM


7 Ibid., p. 300.
A JUDGMENT OF MARXIAN FREEDOM

The individual exists for the good of society, and therefore is subject to what the good of society requires. In himself he has no rights. He is a means to an end, and that end the perfection of society in which alone he is fully man. Now this is plain slavery; (...)\(^8\)

While man is a social being who seeks perfection in the companionship of other human beings, he is more than just an individual, distinguished from all others by material characteristics. He is more than just a product of Nature, owing his superiority to other forms of Nature merely by his ability to produce the means of his subsistence. Each man is a person, a being endowed with reason, a "unity of a spiritual nature endowed with freedom of choice and so forming a whole which is independent of the world, for neither nature nor the State can invade this unity without permission".\(^9\) Man, consequently, "is master of his own life and destiny, since has has reason and will to guide him in his actions".\(^10\)

3. Freedom and Necessity.

Because of the spirituality of his nature, man possesses freedom of choice. He may decide to act or not

---


to act, or to follow one way of acting in preference to others. He can never be satisfied with the Marxian freedom of the will which "means nothing but to make decisions with real knowledge of the subject".\(^{11}\) Purely material beings, the animals, which know only singulars, are determined to one way of acting, but man, who, because of his spiritual intellect, can know universals, remains undetermined and so free to choose.

\(\ldots\) just as in natural things there is form, and an inclination towards form, which is called the natural appetite, from which action follows; so in man there is an intellectual form, and an inclination of the will towards the form apprehended, from which exterior action follows; but there is this difference, the form of the natural thing is form individuated through matter whence the inclination towards it is determined to one, but the intellectual form under which many can be understood is universal; accordingly since acts pertain to singulars, none of which equals the power of the universal, the inclination of the will remains indeterminate, with respect to many different things: \(\ldots\)\(^{12}\)


\(^{12}\) Thomas Aquinas, *De Malo*, Q. 6, a. 1: \(\ldots\) sicut in rebus naturalibus inventur forma, quae est principium actionis, et inclinationi consequens formam, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis, ex quibus sequitur actio; ita in homine inventur forma intellectiva, et inclinationi voluntatis consequens formam apprehensam, ex quibus sequitur exterior actio: sed in hoc differentia, quia forma rei naturalis est forma individuata per materiam; unde et inclinationi ipsam consequens est determinata ad unum, sed forma intellecta est universalis sub qua multa possunt comprehendi; unde cum actus sint in singularibus, in quibus nullum est quod adaequat potentiam universalis; remanet inclinationi voluntatis indeterminate se habens ad multa: \(\ldots\)
The will, of course, from its very nature tends to good, therefore its choice is concerned only with particular goods, in which there is some evil. Towards the absolute good, in which there is no evil, man's will is determined. This we call the natural inclination of the will.

(... in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect of evil; and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, (...)

Is it possible that in the perfect communist society, where for Marx and Engels freedom will reach its climax, there will always be some good so completely devoid of evil that man's will cannot but seek it?

All necessity is not opposed to freedom. St. Thomas speaks of two types of necessity, necessity of force and necessity of natural inclination. The former, although it cannot affect the initiation of an act of the will, can prevent the performance of the act willed. The latter, the necessity of natural inclination, follows from the nature of the will.

A JUDGMENT OF MARXIAN FREEDOM

(...)

necessity is of two kinds: (1) the
necessity of force; and this can by no means apply
to the will; and (2) the necessity of natural in-
clination (...); and with such necessity the will
necessarily wills something.

Accordingly what the will necessarily wills,
determined to it by a natural inclination, is
the last end, happiness, and whatever is included
in it: to be, knowledge of the truth, and the like.
But it is determined to other things, not by a
natural inclination, but by so disposing itself
without any necessity.14

Marxian freedom is freedom of the knowledge of
natural necessity. Now, natural necessity may be intrinsic
to the will -- that which arises from its very nature.
Such is St. Thomas' necessity of natural inclination. It
is quite evident, however, from the Marxian context that
natural necessity is not just the necessity which follows
from man's nature or the nature of his will but is, to a
much greater extent, the necessity imposed upon him by
forces outside him.

Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but
the capacity to make decisions with real knowledge
of the subject. (...) Freedom therefore consists
in the control over ourselves and over external
nature which is founded on knowledge of natural
necessity.15

(...)

the true realm of freedom (...) can
flourish only upon that realm of necessity as
its basis. The shortening of the working day is
its fundamental premise.16

14 Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, Q. 22, a. 5.
15 Frederick Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolu-
tion in Science, p. 125.
Coercion and freedom are mutually exclusive, since coercion cannot bring about any activity of the will.

It is therefore evident that the will does not will anything necessarily with the necessity of force, yet it does will something necessarily with the necessity of natural inclination.17

4. The Exaltation and Degradation of Man.

If, in the world of Marx and Engels, the individual man has a goal, it is the full realization of his potentialities as a social being, as a product of nature. This can be nothing more than the complete devotion of himself to bringing about the perfect communist society and maintaining it in a state of perfection. Such a purpose is a degradation of the nature of man whose true goal in life is superior to the purpose of society.

Civil society is essentially ordered (...) to a common good of the temporal order which provides the true earthly life of man and which is not only material but also moral in its scope. And this common good is intrinsically subordinated to the eternal good of individual citizens and to the achievement of their freedom of autonomy.18

Freedom of autonomy is the realization of man's potentialities, but its superiority to Marxian freedom rests in its harmony with the true nature of man -- a being

17 Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 22, a. 5.
of body and soul with an eternal destiny. Moreover, while it is the perfection of freedom for man to seek the fulfilment of his purpose in life, he is always free to choose an apparent good in preference to the real good and so fail to attain the end for which he was created.

Confirmation in doing what is right is in itself superior to being able to choose, and thus choose evil.

(...) it comes of the defect of liberty for it (the will) to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of the will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin.19

Marx seems to be parallelizing the freedom of man with that of the angels. The angels, because of their completely spiritual nature, merited beatitude by one act and were thus confirmed in good. Man, with a completely material nature, by his great social act of establishing the classless society will merit the beatitude of communism and so be confirmed in the good of the freedom of natural necessity. Otherwise, man, who has abolished God, is taking to himself the prerogative of God, since God alone is perfection. All others must attain to perfection.

"Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, (...) It remains, then, that both man and angels merited their beatitude."20

19 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 62, a. 8, ad 3.
20 Ibid., I, Q. 62, a. 4.
Marx, who seems to raise man so high, nevertheless very much underrates him. Man's needs are only economic. That the satisfaction of certain economic needs are important for the exercise of freedom we do not deny.

(...) it is an undeniable fact that, normally, freedom cannot develop in all its fulness unless a number of economic presuppositions are satisfied. A man, for instance, who is struggling against hunger, or who is threatened with the possibility of having to face hunger in the near future, could not very well develop all the potentialities of his freedom and apply them in the fields of religion, ethics, culture, in the enjoyment of family life or in the activities of public life. Those men who are forced to apply themselves to a purely mechanical and monotonous activity in the economic field run the risk of carrying that attitude of passivity over into other fields. On the contrary, a worker in the economic field, who is in a position to use personal initiative, will be likely to carry the taste thus acquired for responsibility, and its anxieties, to other sectors of his individual and social life.21

That all men's needs are economic and can be satisfied by economic adjustments we cannot but dispute. Nor are economic needs all important in determining man's spiritual activities.

(...) it is a nonsense, to take a material conditioning factor, however real it may be, for the prime determining reason (...) of a spiritual activity; and as that which above all reveals that activity's significance for human life.22


22 Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, p. 42.
5. Freedom in Real Life.

Marx and Engels wrote much of what they have to say about freedom with a view to future communist society. We shall, therefore, consider briefly the realization of that freedom in the society which has followed rather closely the Marxian way of life for more than forty years.

The dictatorship of the proletariat shows few signs of evolving into the realm of freedom. The electrified barbed wire fences and the armed guards are evidences that men will risk their lives to seek freedom, not within, but without the communist pale. Although man must have an opportunity for self-expression, for the realization of his capabilities, no lyric poetry was produced for years in Russia because of "the general critical condemnation of all subjective emotion, or whatever kind, whether doubt, irresolution, private joy or private sorrow". The world is well acquainted with Soviet reaction to the freedom of expression of Pasternak. Man will do as he ought, yet a single news despatch in 1962 stated that "at least 10 Soviet citizens, including two high government officials, have been sentenced to death

for bribery, currency speculation and fraud". 24 Father Braun speaks of "the chorus of tragic pleas for justice coming from millions of Russians still held in Communist concentration camps". 25

It would seem that the very nature of man must be changed to fit the freedom of communism. The system is not made to fit man, so man must be cut to the system.

That at least some of the followers of Marx were aware of this is evident from the words of Lenin: "(...) but the great Socialists, in foreseeing its arrival, presuppose (...) not the present ordinary run of people". 26

6. A Possible Reason for the Poverty of Marxian Freedom.

Marx was not primarily concerned with the true nature of man. He was very conscious of the difficulties that confronted the labouring classes of his day. Just as to him the only reality was matter, so the quality most typical of man was his ability to do meaningful work.


26 V.I. Lenin, Marx-Engels-Marxism, p. 356.
This, Marx would use deterministically for the realization of human betterment. Although the task would be assigned particularly to the downtrodden, the proletariat, nevertheless to those who had forgotten or never known the true purpose of human life Marx would give a goal. But at what a price!

Communism (…) strips man of his liberty, robs human personality of all its dignity, and removes all the moral restraints that check the eruption of blind impulse. There is no recognition of any right of the individual in his relations to the collectivity; no natural right is accorded to the human personality, which is a mere cogwheel in the Communist system. 27

Work, we agree, is essential to man. His activity as a social being is very important since he reaches the full development of his personality in society in relation with other creatures. The growth of his personality implies, however, the development of his spiritual powers and the exercise of his freedom in keeping with the freedom of others. With freedom come responsibilities and rights.

In a people worthy of the name the citizen feels within him the consciousness of his personality, of his duties and rights and of his own freedom along with the freedom and dignity of others. 28


Marx and Engels recognized the existence of the spiritual activities — thought, conscious knowledge, reason — and their source in the human intellect, but for them these were merely superior material activities proceeding from matter. Without the spirituality in man, there is no foundation for freedom; without freedom man can have no rights; and — what is most serious for him — he has no claim to the dignity of a human person. When Marx was concerned about the alienation in man's nature, an alienation which he attributed to the conditions of production — private property and the division of labour, as well as to man's recognition of God, may he not have recognized, had he admitted the existence of the spiritual, that the conflict within man's nature may have been due to man's longing for, and his separation from, the infinitely perfect God. "Marx touched upon the true negation of self which is required for the possession of God — although probably without realizing it." 29

Marx saw in private property a deterrent to freedom. And undoubtedly the concentration of property in the hands of a few lessens the freedom of the majority. Had Marx

rightly understood man's nature, surely he would have seen that a more even distribution of property would have increased man's opportunities of exercising his freedom. Human experience testifies to the close relationship between private ownership of property and the exercise of freedom.

Further, history and experience testify that in those political regimes which do not recognize the rights of private ownership of goods, productive included, the exercise of freedom in almost every other direction is suppressed or stifled. This suggests, surely, that the exercise of freedom finds its guarantee and incentive in the right of ownership.30

Marx did not know human beings as they are. Consequently, he both underrated and overrated them. Marx did not see in man the tendency to evil which would make his utopian dream of communism impossible of realization. Nor did he estimate the yearnings of the human soul, which could never be satisfied merely by the material conveniences of even the perfect communist society.31

According to Marx, man derives his nature from matter, not just ordinary matter, but matter in motion, and motion in a direction. This motion is not from


without, but from the very heart of matter itself. There is, therefore, no need of a First Cause, a Prime Mover.

(...) for the Dialectical Materialist, evolution is the development of matter from within, environment helping or hindering but neither originating the evolutionary process, nor capable of preventing it from reaching its inevitable goal. 32

Man is matter; man is society; man is the plurality of individuals, moving forward to freedom.

Man's freedom, as a result of the effects of the energizing power inherent in matter develops into what we have set forth as the freedom of man in communist society. In contrast, man's freedom could be the freedom of choice inherent in his spiritual nature, with the possibility of maturing into the freedom of the just or the freedom of autonomy, which is man's choice of the best means to reach his eternal destiny in the Beatific Vision. Marx has thus impoverished human freedom because of his "determination to fit the entire universe into a materialistic mould" 33 -- Dialectical Materialism -- which would free the world, so Marx hoped, from the need and the providence of its Creator.

32 F.J. Sheed, Communism and Man, p. 35-36.

CONCLUSION

Men understand freedom in proportion as they understand the nature of man. If man is a product of Nature, as Marx and Engels would have him, his freedom is a freedom immersed in matter, following fixed laws similar to those evident in nature where natural causes produce certain effects (or, in the nineteenth century, were thought to do so) in accordance with scientific laws. Since Man's human characteristics consist in his being a worker and a social being, his freedom -- the full development of his potentialities -- finds realization in his doing his utmost towards the perfection of society. Just as society evolves along deterministic lines, so does man progress towards complete freedom, until the process of change ceases with the coming of the perfect communist society. With the advent of the perfection of freedom, man will do as he ought, but the motive will never be higher than the good of society. Only a recognition of the spirituality in man's nature will permit him the true freedom which is essentially freedom of choice.

The freedom set forth in the works of Marx and Engels is largely a theoretical freedom. The perfection of Marxian freedom can come only in communist society,
which has not yet evolved into existence. Since this freedom, moreover, does not fit man as he is, the nature of man will have to undergo a radical change with the advent of communism. The suppression of freedom in the dictatorship of the proletariat -- which is the only form of communism yet in existence -- may be an attempt to bring about this change in man.

For a true appreciation of man's rights -- among which is his claim to freedom -- it is necessary to take man as he is, not as we would like him to be. Once Marx insisted on explaining all reality in terms of matter and dialectics, he was no longer free to recognize man as he is.¹

Freedom has quite a different meaning for the followers of Marx from what it has for those who appreciate the true dignity of man. Words have value in as much as they represent concepts in the human mind. We and the adherents of Marxism speak a language composed of the same words but with a vastly different signification. In reality, Marxist freedom is no more than a negation of human freedom.

CONCLUSION

Man is what God made him to be; he is not the purely material being that Marx would make him, not even the material being that he might think himself to be.² The Marxian concept of man is an error. Adherence to that error does not change the nature of man.³ Man does not make man what he is. Nor does he make man's freedom what it is. He may refuse to respect the dignity and freedom of man, but he cannot invade the inner sanctuary where each person is master of himself. Man's freedom is, accordingly, not the freedom of the knowledge of natural necessity, but the freedom proper to created beings endowed with intellect and will, in whom are united the spiritual and the material.

---

² It is possible for man, through the use of his reason, to come to a correct knowledge of his own nature.

³ "A man who has fallen into error does not cease to be a man. He never forfeits his personal dignity; (...)", Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, Encyclical Letter, translated into English in The Pope Speaks, Vol. 9 (1963), p. 45.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Works of Marx and Engels


BIBLIOGRAPHY


---------, *Selected Works*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951; London, Lawrence and Wishart, (no date), 2 Vol., Vol. II.


Other Works


APPENDIX 1

ABSTRACT OF

The Freedom of Man in the Works of Marx and Engels
APPENDIX I

ABSTRACT OF

The Freedom of Man in the Works of
Marx and Engels

According to the Thomistic concept of freedom, human freedom has its source in freedom of choice, which may be used for the development of man's spiritual and temporal potentialities in keeping with his eternal destiny. Man, who always seeks some good, must seek the perfect good. This is the only necessity or determination that affects man's will.

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx became concerned about the lack of freedom for the worker in the increasingly industrialized society that resulted from the Industrial Revolution. With the collaboration of Frederick Engels, he took upon himself the task of improving the lot of the toiling masses. This was to be accomplished by a combination of economic laws, materialism, and the dialectic, in such a way as to supply a complete way of life for man.

1 Sister Mary Thaddeus Mullowney, R.S.M., master's thesis presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Ottawa, Ontario, March, 1964, xix-113 p.
Since man is a product of Nature, a completely material social being existing for the good of society and destined solely to the achievement of the perfect communist society, man's freedom depends upon his mastery over Nature. Although this is accomplished through work, man finds himself, in his work, divided in his nature, estranged from himself and his fellow men as a result of the division of labour, and private property. The former causes man to work for his own individual interest rather than for the common good. Because of the latter, the product of his labour passes from his hands into the hands of another, the capitalist. With the establishment of communism, man will become again a social being and the real lord of Nature.

Freedom has varied with the development of human history. As man emerged from nature, he was largely determined by the productive forces as to the condition of society and the form of state. Common ownership of property was indicative of freedom. For women freedom meant equality with men in work. Personal freedom, the development of one's capabilities to the greatest possible extent, has been very much a matter of chance. The freedom of the French Revolution was freedom of choice among defects in society, not their removal. Complete freedom
of opportunity will come only with the disappearance of
the state and private property.

History evolves according to fixed laws. The condi-
tion of the productive forces determines the state of
society. The ideological superstructure owes its mode of
existence to economic conditions. Change will come only
when the productive forces are ready. Men will achieve
freedom when, by a great social act, they bring the means
of production under their control and use them on a planned
basis.

The development of history must continue. Capital-
ism must bring the proletariat to the stage where it will
seize the means of production and establish common ownership
of property. The proletariat will use the state to estab-
lish the classless society. The state will then disappear,
and man will be living in free communist society. A
desire of work will replace the obligation to work. Man
will have perfect knowledge of the laws governing nature,
society, and history, and will act according to these
laws. Doing as he ought will be the perfection of freedom.

In communism, Marx ascribes to man the freedom
enjoyed by those confirmed in beatitude. Such freedom for
man on earth would require a change in his nature. Other-
wise, the freedom of the knowledge of natural necessity
is a denial of freedom.
APPENDIX 1

Freedom of choice is essential to the spirituality in man's nature. Marx failed to assess correctly human freedom because of his lack of understanding of man's nature and his attempt to fit man into his theory of Dialectical Materialism. The marxist and the Thomist both speak of freedom but with a vastly different signification.