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DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND CANADA

by Haven Chiang

Thesis presented to the Faculty of Social, Economic and Political Sciences of the University of Ottawa as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Ottawa, Canada, 1958
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INTRODUCTION

Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations roughly may be divided into three periods: The first began from 1909 when the Chinese Imperial government posted its first Consul-General in Ottawa on the eve of the Republican Revolution of 1911 up to the outbreak of the Second World War; the second covers the whole war years; and the third covers the post-war period up to the present.

Before the first period began, relations between them existed in three channels; namely, trade, Chinese immigration to Canada and Canadian missionary activities in China. The contacts in these respects constituted the main phases of early Sino-Canadian relations and paved the way for later political relations which were developing while both China and Canada were attempting to obtain independent political status.

In comparison with their respective relations with other nations, the relations between them developed slowly for many reasons: firstly, they were separated by the vast Pacific Ocean which made their early contacts impossible; secondly, Canada's settlers, coming from another side of the world, were completely different from the Chinese; and thirdly, each of them had its own partners and the direct
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relations between them were neither stimulated nor urgent. Besides these, Canada is rather an Atlantic than a Pacific state even though it is washed by both. China, on the other hand, was regarded as a typical Asian continental country. Enjoying traditionally the agricultural sedentary life with relative self-sufficiency, the Chinese rarely attempted any oversea adventure. Even today, Canada's main relations are with the United States and the member states of the Commonwealth of Nations. China, on the other hand, thinks Canada not as its indispensable partner in peace but a necessary ally in case of a war.

Sino-Canadian relations, both political and non-political, were created through their common contacts with the British Empire which, since the mid-eighteenth century, had been holding the world political hegemony. For Canada, Great Britain was her parent country and the influence upon her was naturally great. China was also influenced or even dominated, if not alone, by the British. Historically, China's relations with Great Britain shaped its fate and position among the nations. This situation, practically speaking, was only changed after the First World War when Canada virtually obtained its independence in external affairs in 1926 and when China was gradually recognized by foreign powers as an international political entity with relative unification and independence.
INTRODUCTION

Generally speaking, during the first period, the relations between China and Canada were rather indirect than direct, non-governmental than governmental, and economical than political; and most of their relations existed as part of their relations with Great Britain. It was in the second period that their diplomatic relations were formally established as a result of the demand for wartime collaboration; and even following that, there were considerable contacts between them concerning United Nations Mutual Aid and economical and financial assistance to China. During that period, indeed, their mutual understanding and friendship were greatly improved. During the third period, with the political change in China and the outbreak of the Korean War, Sino-Canadian relations took a new turn; questions concerning recognition of Communist China, status of Formosa and Chinese representation in the United Nations became testing issues to their relationship; and because of these issues, their relations were relatively strained. At present, Sino-Canadian relations are at a standstill pending a further clarification of the world situation.

The purpose of the present study is to analyze and criticize, if necessary, the many factors of the diplomatic relations between China and Canada. True enough, both in the past and at present, between China and Canada there have been certain special problems regarding immigration, trade,
missionary works and recently and notably, the question of recognition of Communist China and the question of Formosa. These problems are rather unique in nature and significant enough to reflect the general situation of the world.
CHAPTER I

INCIPIENT POLITICAL RELATIONS

1. The Beginning of Contacts

Prior to the end of the First World War, relations between China and Canada were relatively slight. Immigration was the only important issue of Canada's relations with China. As part of the British Empire, Canada was a party to all the early treaties, conventions and agreements concluded between the Empire and China. Diplomatic correspondence between them had been carried on through London for a considerable number of years.¹ The participation of the Chinese diplomatic officials in the settlement of Vancouver riot of 1907, the establishment of a Chinese consulate in Ottawa in 1909 and the negotiations for a draft agreement with respect to immigration in the same year constituted the only points of contact between them.

On the part of China, the major event at that time was the Republican Revolution of 1911 which was generally regarded as a milestone in China's history. To the Canadians, this event was virtually unimportant. They only hoped that the political change could bring a better life to the Chinese

people and would put an end to the Chinese immigration to Canada. Their wishful thinking was not vindicated and the Chinese immigration continued to flow in as a result of the hardship following the Revolution.  

The next event with which both China and Canada were concerned was the First World War (1914-1918). Although China and Canada were nominal allies, there was no direct and official contact. The only casual event was that a Canadian Member of Parliament, Mr. G. B. Nicholson, had proposed the importation of Chinese labourers to meet the labour shortage in Canada. This proposal was killed by the British Columbian representatives.  

Nor did China and Canada have any direct contact at the Paris Peace Conference even though the Conference had world-wide entanglements. China and Canada entered into war in different circumstances and with different motives. China's chief purpose for joining the war was to seek a say in the forthcoming peace conference. She hoped to get rid of certain treaty capitulations which the western powers imposed upon her prior to the War and free herself from foreign oppression. Especially, she hoped to recover the German holdings in Shangtung province. Canada, on the other hand, could not

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2 Ibid., p. 102.
3 Ibid., p. 104.
stay out of the war when the Empire joined it. But unlike the other powers which had the ambition of territorial expansion or political influence abroad, her primary purpose for joining the War was to support its parent country and at the Paris Peace Conference, was to obtain a distinct national status in world affairs.\(^4\) Her chief issue was still the problem of immigration.\(^5\)

At the Paris Peace Conference, China's main opponent was Japan which, during the course of war, had repeatedly pressed for concessions from China culminating in the Twenty-one Demands in 1915. The controversy at the Peace Conference arose out from the questions as to the disposition of the former German holdings in Shangtung Province. Great Britain and France had previous secret agreements with Japan, promising the latter to obtain the German holdings.\(^6\) The Canadian delegation, as being part of the British delegation and as being bound by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911, could not depart from the British policy or deny its obligation of supporting Japan under the Alliance. The Shangtung issue was

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\(^5\) Ibid., p. 13.

not harmoniously settled and the Chinese were profoundly dissatisfied with the settlement. 7

The First World War and the Paris Peace Conference brought China and Canada into contact first of its kind. The dominion, as a colony in origin, showed for the first time as a relatively independent state, and China had also for the first time a say in an international conference. Both of them were hurried into the participation of world affairs.

2. Relations regarding the Anglo Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference

Nevertheless, Canada had closer relations with Japan than with China. At the Paris Peace Conference, Japan had demanded the inclusion of an article into the League Covenant proclaiming the racial equality and abolition of discriminative measures against other nations. On that occasion, Canada joined with other western nations in refusing Japan's demand. This, of course, did not hurt their relations to a serious extent.

Canada's relations with Japan had been established as early as 1889, five years before the first Sino-Japanese War. Since then a series of treaties, conventions and agreements had been concluded between them concerning trade and immigration. Both Canadian Government and people had repeatedly

7 Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 163.
asserted that their relations with Japan were closer and more important than that with China. More important was Canada's participation in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Canada adhered to the Alliance of 1905 in 1906 and associated herself with the new Alliance of 1911 in 1913. The purpose of the Alliance was to resist Russian Far Eastern expansion, particularly in Manchuria; but its actual affects were far more greater than that. It affected the Far Eastern situation in general and China in particular. During the first quarter of the present century, its clear results were Japan's promotion in international politics, her grasp of interests in China and her expansion in the Pacific. It helped Japan to defeat Russia in 1905, it encouraged her to demand for German holdings in Shangtung and undoubtedly it nourished her strength in the Sino-Japanese conflict and the Second World War. Britain had incurred much odium both in China and the United States on account of it. 8

No matter whether the Alliance was important to Canada or not, her participation in this Alliance enveloped her in the Far Eastern politics and affected her policies towards other powers, especially the United States. It was generally believed that Japan had become a new encroacher upon Chinese sovereignty since the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894. During

the First World War, she had been expanding in China at German expense and with support from other powers. After the First World War, she became a great naval power in the Pacific. Her conflicts with China had already been acute at the Paris Peace Conference. And China had been under the pressure of Anglo-Japanese action for a number of years. With regard to the United States, the growth of the Japanese navy had been a menace to her security and a vital factor if any conjecture of circumstance should combine Japan with Great Britain, though the terms of the 1911 Alliance expressly precluded the British assistance in the event of an American-Japanese war. This American uneasiness was heightened during the wartime in which the relations between the United States and Japan had been badly strained on several occasions.  

In Canada, the increasing Japanese population in British Columbia constituted a straining factor despite the fact that the Japanese fleet had come to patrol the Vancouver coast when German warships appeared there during the War.

The Alliance had drawn much resentment from the Pacific powers, especially China and the United States. Even the British position was weakened. Since the conclusion of the Alliance, the dependence of British security upon the Japanese navy had kept the British naval strength in a declining state.

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9 Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 166.
At the end of War, the British naval strength was under proportion to that of the Japanese.

More important was the fact that the Alliance had endangered the relations among Canada, the United States and Great Britain. It broke the "White men's solidarity" and prevented the British from joining American protests on many occasions. Thus, during this period, the whole Pacific situation was complicated by the existence of the Alliance. These developments were fully realized in Great Britain. The British were aware that Japan made use of British preoccupation elsewhere by embarking on dismemberment of China. But owing to its long-established friendship with Japan and the importance of British interests in China, Great Britain still favoured the renewal of the Alliance in 1921. Both China and United States were definitely hostile to it.

All of the Pacific powers were concerned with the undue Japanese expansion, but they were far from agreeing with each other as to how to combat this threat or as to what their relative strength should be. Both China and the United States could not effectively reverse the situation. Canada was not concerned with its security in the Pacific but with the relations between the United States and Great Britain; because of that, American opposition to the renewal of the Alliance re-

10 Ibid.
ceived more attention in Ottawa than in London.\textsuperscript{11}

Emerging from the War and acting rather as a sovereign state than as a colonial entity, Canada was working towards a place in international affairs. She, as an interpreter and intermediary between the United States and Great Britain, was in a better position to influence British policy.

The Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Meighen, was to avoid that policy which would put the Dominion in a complicated position in a conflict in the Pacific should the United States and Great Britain be not on the same side.\textsuperscript{12} He felt that the renewal of the Alliance would imply toleration towards Japanese aggression in the Far East and stood boldly against the renewal of the Alliance with the contention that "such entanglements were incompatible with the League of Nations idea and both the United States and China would regard such treaty with mistrust, as implying benevolent neutrality towards Japanese aggression", and that "good Anglo-American relations were the touchstone of British policy and the hope of the world".\textsuperscript{13} A good Anglo-American relationship was important to Canada


because Canada depended upon it for security. Besides this, when Japan's power was growing, it was generally felt that the Alliance had outlived its purposes and was not in accord with the post-First World War international situation.\textsuperscript{14}

Canada's stand against the renewal of the Alliance was not wholly based upon its dislike or distrust of Japan; moreover, Canadian-Japanese relations were friendlier than ever chiefly because of their trade relations.\textsuperscript{15} Mr. Meighen, who recognized the Pacific as a compelling centre of international attention, advocated a three-or four-power conference in which Japan, the United States, the British Empire and possibly China would participate. He was successful in the second proposal.

The Alliance was finally terminated and its termination was an historical milestone of Pacific relations. It also affected the Pacific situation in general and China in particular. It discouraged Japan from expansion and aggression and mitigated Japan's pressure upon China. Canada and her statesmen must be credited with the termination of the aggressive Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the suggestion of the Washington Conference. China particularly benefited by such actions. A further renewal of the Alliance might lead the second world war to a catastrophe on the side of the Allies and the world situation would be completely changed.

\textsuperscript{14} Woodsworth, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 170.
\textsuperscript{15} W. Strange, Canada, the Pacific and War, Toronto, Nelson, 1937, p. 36.
The abrogation of the Alliance was followed by the Washington Conference which brought China and Canada into a further contact. The Conference made a brave attempt to secure peace and stability in the Far East by ensuring that each power should be supreme in its own sphere of influence. The Treaties were also designed to maintain the territorial integrity of China. The main purpose of the Conference was to limit the naval strength of great powers in the Pacific. In this respect, both China and Canada were secondary roles, but they were signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty which was to protect the integrity of China and maintain the Open Door Policy. Sir Robert Borden signed it on behalf of Canada but as a member of the British Delegation. The Canadian representative had also participated in the discussion of granting tariff autonomy to China. Acting for the British Empire delegation, Sir Robert Borden took a prominent part in the negotiations, but Canada was not represented in the subsequent conferences at Shanghai in 1922 and at Peking in 1925.

The Peace Conference and its subsequent events, notably the foundation of the League of Nations, the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference affected China greatly. In China, the National Government proclaimed its establishment in 1927. The Chinese people had also possessed certain sense of national unity. Its relations

16 Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 179.
17 Ibid., pp. 179 and 185.
with Japan continued to be tense, but its relations with Great Britain came to a new turning point. During the period of 1925-1927, many unhappy events happened between them which almost drove them to the verge of war. During the period of civil conflicts in China, a few Canadians had urged League intervention. In 1925, Mr. J. S. Woodsworth warned the House of Commons that the world was witnessing a "recrudescence of militarism" and reminded the Government that Canada should refuse to take any responsibility for Britain's policy in China and should press for peace through the League of Nations. In 1927, he denounced the dispatch of British troops to China as a violation of the Covenant and the Washington Treaties. These voices received little support but actually, British policy towards China was in a period of change.

Since the establishment of the National Government, China was embarking upon a policy of securing tariff autonomy and abolishing extraterritoriality. Realizing that the National Government had firmly controlled central China and regarding Nationalism as a new leaven of regeneration of the decaying and disintegrating body politic in China, the British Government had in December, 1926, issued a memorandum to define its policy towards China as hoping for a strong and united


II. The National Government of China also made certain changes in its attitude to Great Britain. This was the turning point of the Sino-British Relations. Since 1928, their relations were improved and within one or two years their relations were fairly good.

In December 1928 and after the fall of the Peking Government, China and Great Britain signed a treaty under which all provisions handicapping the Chinese tariff autonomy were abrogated and which extended the most-favoured-nation to all British goods to China. By an exchange of notes with the National Government, Canada renounced the rights she benefited by the old treaties and received the most-favoured-nation treatment to her goods to China. This treaty became effective since February 1, 1929.

3. Canada's Attitude in the League of Nations - Towards the Sino-Japanese Conflict -

Since the end of the First World War, China and Canada were signatories to Paris Peace Conference, members of the League of Nations and Parties to the Washington Treaties. All of them had more or less improved their relations. As mentioned above, Canada had associated herself with other powers.

20 Teichman, op. cit., p. 51.
21 Ibid., p. 52.
22 Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 186.
in extending tariff autonomy to China and at the same time joined with other nations in according recognition to the National Government of China.\textsuperscript{23} Canada had even seriously considered diplomatic representation to China in 1927.\textsuperscript{24} It was discussed again when the Canadian Legation in Japan was established. The large number of missionaries stationed in China had for many years created a keen interest among the Canadian population. The Canadian Minister to Japan was instructed to keep in touch with Affairs in China and certain affairs were put in the care of the British Embassy in China. The establishment of a legation in China had been considered again in 1932 and 1935 but no action was taken.\textsuperscript{25}

China must appreciate Canada's considerate opposition to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921. No matter what Canada's really intention might have been, Mr. Meighen had on several occasions considered China's interests. But it was understandable that China was not happy at the Exclusion Act of 1923, and Canada's attitude towards the Sino-Japanese conflict in the early 1930's deserves serious evaluation and careful interpretation since, following the Exclusion Act, it constituted a main phase of Sino-Canadian relations.

\textsuperscript{23} Woodsworth, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{24} Debate, \textit{House of Commons, Canada}, 1926-1927, pp. 1946-47.

\textsuperscript{25} Woodsworth, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 186.
and reflected the general tendency of world powers in the eventful era.

The Sino-Japanese conflict began with the rise of Japan's power in the Pacific and her design upon China. As it turned out, the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Treaties did not discourage Japan and support China so effectively as had been expected. While the powers were supporting the status quo and were preoccupied with their home affairs, Japan was to have a free hand in Asia. The Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria was simply a revelation of Japan's long intention of occupying that territory.

Canada, prior to 1930's, had emerged as a nation in her own rights. With both China and Japan she had treaty relations.26 Her contacts with the Far East were affected by the following: as a member of the British Empire, she was affected by the Empire and other dominions; as a member of the League of Nations, she was subjected to the responsibility and obligation under the League Covenant; as a North American state, her policy must suit her neighbour; and as a Pacific state she desired a peaceful and stable Pacific order and was bound by the treaties concerning that area.

After the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Canada had undertaken a new orientation of its policy towards

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26 They were bound by the Paris Peace Treaties and the Washington Treaties.
Japan. Due to its close commercial relations with Japan, in the long run Canada was more pro-Japanese than pro-Chinese. Even in April, 1930, when Japan's conduct at the London naval conference and her continued activities in China were arousing general speculation as to her ultimate intention, the Canadian Government was still concerned with its commercial relations with Japan, little with the political development; meanwhile, the Canadian representatives to the London Naval Conference even remarked that "the Empire of Japan" was "our nearest Pacific neighbour".

Prior to the outbreak of Mukden incident, Canada was relatively detached from the Far Eastern political development. Its main concern was still the safety of the missionaries there. After the Incident, Canada had been closely watching the development of events. China, under Article XI of the Covenant, appealed to the League and requested the United States to help in preserving the Far Eastern peace. The major League powers were in constant but hardly effective consultation on the Manchurian dispute and were aware of the danger involved. When Japanese forces were advancing in Manchuria,

27 Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 178.
28 Debate, House of Commons, Canada, 1930, p. 2559.
29 Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 197.
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the American Government issued the famous Stimson Doctrine. 30 Japan, on the other hand, denied the violation of the Covenant and further charged China with aggression.

In Canada, the Manchurian crisis came up for the first time in the House of Commons when Mr. Woodsworth asked for a statement of government foreign policy on February 10, 1932. On that occasion Prime Minister Bennett declined to make an answer. 31

Canada's attitude towards the world situation was well expressed by Sir George Perley in the disarmament Conference of February 13, 1932. He said:

The time has now come for a general limitation for disarmament. . . . We think further that this organization of peace can best be achieved at this time by emphasizing the prevention of conflict, rather than the punishment of aggression; by building up machinery for conciliation rather than providing for sanctions; by using the League of Nations as a channel through which international public opinion can express itself, 32 rather than by developing it into a super-state.

The ideas implied in this speech were quite different from that of the Chinese representatives who thought that the time


31 Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 190.

had come for League members to honor their pledges under Articles X and XVI and that sanction and punishment were more imperative than mere arrangement for prevention or reconciliation of conflicts. 33

Concerning the Sino-Japanese conflict, Sir George Perley enunciated three principles: The first was that "we should stop further bloodshed and bring about a real and effective armistice," apparently relying upon the sanction of public opinion. The second implied that Japan had rights in the case but enforcing wrongly. The third, intended to protect China, was based upon a fragment of Article X supported by the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition. 34

Canada at that time was facing the Depression at home and Fascist menace in Europe and could not go any further than that. When all powers were preoccupied with their own home troubles, Japan's action was never in their consideration and was never molested.

After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, Canadian public opinions manifested themselves as pro-League; but the Canadian Government seemed to take a different line. When the League Assembly met to consider the Far Eastern situation

34 Woodsworth, op. cit., Appendix A, p. 298.
on December 6, 1932, some twenty-two nations gave their opinions and condemned in a variety of degrees Japan's action. Only Great Britain and Canada spoke with uncertain voice, keeping respectfully on the side of law but by many an identical phrase, reference or interpretation, giving aid and comfort to Japan which was accused of aggression.\textsuperscript{35} The British delegate, Sir John Simmon, had skilfully used the Lytton Report to make a "forensic defence of Japan" and to show that China was almost entirely responsible for what had happened.\textsuperscript{36} Mr. C. H. Cahan, Canadian delegate, as a conservative and imperialist, was exposed to the influence of British policy. He followed the British line and was inclined to view the Japanese adventure as the national desire of a strong and orderly nation to impose order on a weak and turbulent neighbour.\textsuperscript{37} He criticized China's weakness and disunity and then concluded:

"It is doubtful to my mind whether the National Government of China has yet been in a position to comply fully with these conditions"\textsuperscript{38} for the League membership. Concerning the origin of Manchukuo he declared:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{35} A.R.M. Lower, \textit{Canada and the Far East-1940}, New York, 1940, p. 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Woodsworth, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 192.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Lower, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Woodsworth, \textit{op. cit.}, Appendix F, p. 303.
\end{itemize}
INCIPIENT POLITICAL RELATIONS

It seems to me that this Assembly may not wholly disregard the emphatic statement made by Mr. Matsuo... that the Japanese Government has at any time allowed itself to be connected with the independence movement in Manchuria, that it did not then and does not now want Manchuria, but that it only desires the preservation of its rights and interests therein. 39

Mr. Cahan pledged strongly for reconciliation and compromise and attempted to suggest a solution. He stated:

The Assembly should first exhaust the possibilities of reconciliatory settlement.... Any discussion of sanctions or actions against a party unwilling to accept settlement would be out of place at this stage of our proceedings. 40

Cahan's speech which was designed to follow the British line of support for Japan and was not well received either in Canada or abroad. Actually, the speech hurt China's position as well as Canada's reputation. In China, this Canadian attitude was interpreted as supporting Japan's aggression in Manchuria. The Chinese representative at the Conference delivered a strong rebuttal. 41 Throughout Canada, the press considered Cahan's speech as an encouragement to Japan to defy the League of Nations and as harmful to the relations between China and Canada. 42 In Parliament, this speech aroused a wide criticism of Government policy in respect of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The strong reaction to Cahan's

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39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 193.
42 Lower, op. cit., p. 20; also, Woodsworth, op. cit. p. 194.
speech represented that the Canadian opinions were definitely anti-Japanese. Mr. Cahan was probably right in believing that the Canadian Government and people would not contribute either manpower or funds for any international intervention in the Far East; but clearly he had forgotten the moral capacity Canada could and should play. His speech directly contradicted the spirit of the Nine Power Treaty to which Canada was a party.\footnote{Concerning this, Article 1 (b) of the Treaty reads: "To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." Cf. "Treaty Regarding Principles and Policies to be Followed in Matters Concerning China", in International Legislation, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1931, Vol. II, p. 825.} He seemed to go too far to follow the British line, and his effort made at Geneva caused a very unfortunate impression in Canadian opinion that required him to make explanation from time to time.

When the League met again to consider the Report of the Committee of Nineteen, Canada reversed its attitude as expressed previously by Cahan. A well-prepared speech stated that the Canadian Government supported every effort to secure its solution by peaceful means and withheld all judgments in order not to prejudice any possibility of reconciliation and believed that the Committee's recommendations formed a solid basis for peaceful settlement.\footnote{Woodsworth, op. cit., Appendix F, p. 306.}
Later the Committee was enlarged to Twenty-one and became known as the Far Eastern Advisory Committee. Canada was a member of the second Sub-Committee charged with the duty to work out a practical implication of non-recognition of Manchukuo. Upon this the Canadian Government had returned to the point from which it started and the whole thing was quietly forgotten. Since then, Canada's policy towards the events in the Far East was strict neutrality.

However, in spite of the extreme complexity of the Manchurian problem, it seems fair to say that for the first eighteen months (from September 1931 to February 1933) of the dispute the spokesmen for Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom showed themselves too opportunist and insufficiently devoted to the fundamental principles of the Covenant; in other words, they were in effect too favourable to Japan and too unfavourable to China and thus encouraged the aggressor to on its way. These British powers felt no premonition that Japan's aggression against China would be "the first campaign of the Second World War".

But it must be pointed out that during that period most western powers, including Canada, were confronted with two important issues. Internally, they were faced with the

46 Eastman, op. cit., p. 25.
Depression; unemployment, bankruptcy and general economic misery were of more immediate concern to most peoples, including Canadians, than was the conflict in the remote Manchuria. Internationally, they had to meet dictators’ challenges demanding new settlements of world order. It was also under this condition that Japan was to have a free hand on the Asian Continent.

4. Canadian public opinions regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict

Since the outbreak of conflict in 1931, Canadian relationship with Japan had run in two channels. Throughout the period, official relations, based upon strict neutrality, had never varied. Public opinions had not run parallel to this. So far as China is concerned, China hoped that all powers should carry out economic sanction against Japan and grant their moral support to China in order to restore peace in the Far East. In the world of the early 1930’s, China’s appeal could not produce any effect.

As the Oriental scene became more agitated, Canadian opinion as a whole became more vocal and more angrily anti-Japanese. For this, there were many reasons. The Canadians intuitively gave their sympathy to the weaker party. As a result of the prevailing anti-Japanese feeling in the United States, Canadian resentment against the Japanese was increased.
In British Columbia, the anti-Japanese feeling was traditional. Finally, the fear of Japanese was so strong that it became a factor of importance.

However, Canadian opinions were various; some saw in the Japanese invasion the beginning of a reign of "law and order"; others thought of Japan as a bulwark against Communism; and a large number of imperially-minded Canadians who sensed and accepted the pro-Japanese sympathies of Sir John Simon and his right-wing supporters in Great Britain were defenders of Japan in 1931-1932. But generally, as the methods and results of Japanese invasion were clearly recognized, even the most stubborn defenders became disillusioned. Canadians began to understand that the Japanese began to use force as an instrument of national policy and that Japan's activities in China were not in accordance with the letter and spirit of her international engagements.

Throughout the uneasy peace during the years of 1932 to 1937, Canadians became more critical of Japan's activities in China. This was mainly due to the increasing chauvinism in Japan itself, the ousting of foreign interests in her occupied areas and her encroachment upon British interests in China. In China the whole nation was prepared for the life-and-death resistance against Japan. In November 1935, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek enunciated China's foreign policy towards Japan in these words:

INCIPIENT POLITICAL RELATIONS

We shall not forsake peace until there is no hope for peace. We shall not talk lightly of sacrifice until we are driven to the last extremity which makes sacrifice involuntary.48

When China was exerting every effort to preserve peace with other nations and to secure internal unity, the "limit of China's endurance" was reached by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident launched by Japan on July 7, 1937. China "must throw every ounce of energy into the struggle for national existence and independence."49 When the world situation became more tense, China had repeatedly appealed to other powers to apply sanctions against Japan and tried to ally herself with other powers for the common cause.50

With respect to the Sino-Japanese conflict, Canada was in a special position. She had earlier and closer relations with Japan than with China; she had sentimental ties with Japan as created by the previous Anglo-Japanese Alliance;51 she had previously excluded Chinese immigration; and she had casually favoured Japan's actions in Manchuria. But more important was Canada's possession of a number of war materials,


50 Rosinger, op. cit., p. 100.

51 Mr. Cahen described Canada as "a life-long friend of Japan". Cf. Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 194.
especially nickel of which Canada was a leading producer. Since the outbreak of war, Canada's export of these materials, including nickel, copper and scrap iron, had been greatly increased.\textsuperscript{52} From 1933 onward, attention was repeatedly drawn to the increasing export of nickel to Japan and Germany.

When hostilities broke out again in 1937, Canadians had already believed the worst of Japan and the Japanese. Anti-Japanese actions soon began to develop. Active organization of sentiment in favour of economic pressure against Japan was commenced. Throughout Canada, public meetings were held in the presence of prominent personalities for the purpose of waging economic war and urging boycott against Japanese goods. By March 1938, the voluntary boycott became nation-wide. But despite this anti-Japanese feeling in Canada, the Canadian government refused to depart the official strict neutrality. This government policy towards the Sino-Japanese conflict had only become an issue of debate in Parliament. There was criticism of the government passive attitude towards the export of war materials to Japan.\textsuperscript{53} On February 1, 1938, Mr. Angus MacInnis introduced a resolution asking for an immediate embargo on the export to Japan of "certain commodities necessary to the production of war supplies." The resolution declared that Japan's invasion of China was "a threat to the peace of

\textsuperscript{52} Lower, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 29-31.
the world", and that "the export of certain commodities from Canada makes us a party to Japanese aggression". Mr. Woodsworth declared that by permitting shipments of war materials to Japan Canada was "assisting an aggressor nation to kill men, women and children in China." The Prime Minister replied that the government would not prohibit the export of munitions to Japan until other nations took similar steps and that the government was particularly concerned with the welfare of the Canadian people and its main object was to avoid being drawn into the world conflict. 54

In May, 1938, the Committee of Twenty-one of the League of Nations presented two reports which declared that Japan's action in China was an unjustifiable breach of her treaty obligations and requested the member states to extend moral support and aid to China and the Nine Powers to examine the situation. Canada supported these two reports but admitted that the resolution had been of little assistance to China. Canada also supported the declaration of the Brussels Conference condemning Japan's breach of treaty obligation and the use of force, but she did not take any active part at the Conference. 55

As the war between China and Japan was going on, the picture of the Pacific area was changing. The Chinese coast was blockaded by the Japanese fleet, and all Chinese provinces

55 Ibid., p. 206.
along the coast were under the Japanese control. All foreign interests in China were either endangered or taken over by the Japanese. During this desperate period, China repeated its appeal to foreign powers to apply economic sanction against Japan, since there was no doubt that "the sale of war materials to Japan makes it possible for her to continue her cold-blood mass murder of innocent Chinese civilians and to menace foreign lives and property in China." But in Canada, the Government's strict neutrality seemed to encourage the export of war materials to Japan and the exports were virtually increased after the renewal of the War. The campaign of urging economic pressure upon Japan had passed its height in mid-1938 and died down after that. It lost its value as "news" and by 1939 little was being heard of. The drop of the campaign reflected nothing other than the hopelessness of reversing the government trade policy based upon neutrality which, in the final analysis, implied the toleration to Japan's aggression.


57 Chiang Kai-Shek, op. cit., p. 257.


59 Lower, op. cit., p. 31.
CHAPTER II

RELATIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1. Common Concerns in the Pacific

Security in the Pacific was undoubtedly indivisible. The common interests and concerns in this area were relatively great. Prior to the First World War, the Pacific was a barrier of communications, but during the 1930's it became a centre of compelling interests of adjacent powers as Mr. Meighen had realized when the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance came up for consideration. The growing of the power of Japan and the disunity and unstaffability of China were main causes of the crisis. This fact had been perceived by the United States Government as early as 1889 when it issued the Open Door Policy. The termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the next indication and the Washington Treaties were further steps to check Japan's strength and to support China's stand no matter whatever the actual results might be.

What was the real common concerns of China, Canada and of other Pacific powers? The more precise answer to this question is that Japan had become one of the three world military powers during the 1930's. The situation in the Far East

1 MacKair, op. cit., p. 133.

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was so critical that, as Professor Toynbee remarked, "Japan can take possession of the whole eastern half of continental Asia at any time she chooses", and she "was challenging the English-speaking people". Observing in 1934, Professor Toynbee thought the situation in the Pacific was more unstable than that in Europe.³

The real menace was Japan's aggressive military power. It is not necessary here to stress Japan's aggression in China. Conceivably, a peaceful Pacific was vital to all peace-loving nations; but to China it meant more; she needed a peaceful period for her home reconstruction; she needed friendly relations with foreign powers and tranquillity at home for her material improvement and the betterment of her People's livelihood. When the Pacific was on the verge of a storm, all hopes and objectives of the National Government of China were out of the question. Moreover, Japan's design upon China meant a life-and-death struggle to China.⁴

Canada's sense of Pacific security was virtually different from that of China and other Pacific powers in both meaning and degree and naturally Canada held a different attitude towards Japan's menace. The Canadians thought that they


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were living in a fire-proof house far from the conflagration of Europe and that their Pacific coast was more secure than that on the Atlantic. When the Washington Treaties were signed, they had never thought of any possible menace coming from beyond the Pacific. Only when Japan invaded Manchuria did Canadians come to feel the need for their Pacific defence, yet even this remained a desire only.⁵ Even as late as 1939 when the Far Eastern War had already been two years old, the Canadians still dismissed any doubt as to the possibility of being attacked by the Japanese.⁶ Undoubtedly, they based their national security on good relations with the United States and the United Kingdom; when either of them was involved with war, Canada could probably not stay out and vice versa. Canada was only concerned with the possibility of a war between Japan and the United States since the latter was the main foe of Japan in the Pacific. This idea had been alive in Canadians' minds until the war broke out.

Canadians hoped for an Asia of "order, peace and prosperity" which meant the expansion of trade which, in turn, meant Canada's industrial expansion. Upon this assumption, Canada had joined with other powers in stabilizing the Far Eastern situation. No doubt, an Asia of "order, peace and

⁵ Lower, op. cit., p. 94.

⁶ Ibid., p. 110.
prosperity" would provide for more markets for Canada's goods, but Canada did not fail to continue its business during the war. In the early period of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Canada's exports of war materials to Japan were ever increasing. In summing up, Canada's interests in the Far East were purely economic. Its foreign policy with respect to that area was based upon two considerations, the safety of the missionaries and the expansion of trade. This had been clearly recognized by Prime Minister King in his reply to Mr. MacInnis and Mr. Woodsworth's inquiries as to foreign policy. It is not wonder that a nation generally based its foreign policy upon economic interests, but it is more true in the case of Canada.

However, Canada's interests in the Pacific were virtually different from those of Great Britain and the United States. Great Britain, as a naval, merchantile and colonial power, was more involved with Far Eastern politics. Canada on the other hand was not a naval power and had no extra-territorial possessions. Her share of trade with the Far East was also smaller than Britain's.

As to the United States, she had a large number of possessions in the Pacific and most of them were directly linked with military consideration. She could not refuse to accept the responsibilities which her national strength and

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7 Supra, p.25.
8 Cf. Strange, op. cit., pp. 156 and 162.
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possessions imposed upon her. As a great power, she was virtually concerned with high politics. Whether she had special interests or not she would have to intervene in such questions as the fate of China. She could not escape the consequence of her own role and she must take part in solution of questions in the Far East, if for no other reason than that the balance of power in the Pacific was of vital importance to her. The United Kingdom and the United States had successively assumed the leadership in the Pacific. History could not put that fate upon Canada because of the fundamental difference in her national interests in the Far East.

However, the government leaders of the English-speaking powers were slow to realize Japan's ambition and had underestimated Japan's strength. It was only in late 1939 when the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed and when Japan came to make deal with the European dictators that the western powers began to understand the immediate danger of Japan.

The failure of cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States was generally recognized as one of the most unfortunate facts in the Post-WWI period. British opinions were various; some admiring Japan for doing what the British had done and others regarding Japan as an international law-breaker. 10 Canada was an autonomous state but she could not

10 Strange, op. cit., p. 191.
be free from sentimental and economic ties with the United Kingdom and the United States. These ties obliged Canada to rise and fall with them.

But nevertheless, the renewal of the Japanese aggression in July, 1937, had compelled the Canadian Government to appropriate $35 millions in 1937 and $34 millions in 1938 for its west coast defence.\textsuperscript{11} Not long ago, the Canadians did not think their west coast defence necessary, but now they realized that War in the Pacific world would be very possible.\textsuperscript{12} However, Canada undertook to establish its west coast defence militarily but adopted a strict neutrality politically. She would like to see Japan's military force crippled, but did not see that Japan's military force was an immediate and serious menace to Canada's security in the event that Japan should succeed in China.

Actually, at that time, Japan was advancing on the road from which Imperial Britain was withdrawing. She had barred the entrance to Continental Asia and expanded southward. Britain who then had no territorial ambition and was preoccupied with the Fascist and Nazi menace in Europe could not be counted on to bar Japan. The only resisting force was the United States. Canada had feared a war between Japan and the

\textsuperscript{11} Woodsworth, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 200.

\textsuperscript{12} Lower, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 107.
United States because such a war would endanger its west coast and destroy its trade with the Far East. Canada's consideration in this respect apparently prevented her from taking any active action against Japan.

2. The Change of Canada's Attitude

Since the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, the United States and other powers had protested repeatedly against Japan's breach of international obligations arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Washington Treaties and the Pact of Paris. But these feeble protests, on the contrary, convinced Japan of a right opportunity for expansion. In December, 1934, Japan terminated the Naval Treaty of 1922. In 1936, Japan made a common cause with Hitler and Mussolini by joining the anti-Communist Pact. Since July 1937, Japan launched a large scale offensive against China proper. After the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, in September, 1940, in which the Axis pledged mutual recognition of their respective "new order" and mutual assistance against any intervening power, it became clear that the European and Pacific conflicts were combined into one and had become indivisible. All these and the subsequent Japanese advance into southeast Asia convinced the western powers that Japan's menace was immediate.

As mentioned above, Canada's interests in the Far East were relatively small, but these interests would be endangered
when Japan was in expansion. After 1939, hostility to Japan and to the people of Japanese origin was increasing in British Columbia. The increase of export of war materials to Japan on the west coast provoked many a question as to the wisdom of trading with an ally of the Axis.\textsuperscript{13}

Regarding the incidents affecting Canadian interests in China, the Canadian government could only make representation to the Japanese government. As early as 1937, in accordance with the Japanese request, the Canadian government had advised its nationals in China to furnish information concerning their occupation and locality. Furthermore, the Canadian government had made it clear to the Japanese government that the latter would be held solely responsible for any injuries and damages suffered by Canadian nationals in China as a result of the latter's aggression in that country.\textsuperscript{14} Despite these arrangements, Canadians in China suffered injuries and damages from time to time and the Canadian government consequently had to advise its nationals to leave China.\textsuperscript{15}

The handling of the Canadian-Japanese relations was a serious problem to the Canadian government during the early war period because there was no actual desire for war with


\textsuperscript{14} Lower, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{15} Dawson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 274.
Japan. It was true that Canadians had been condemning Japan's action for about ten years but had never taken any concrete measure. A deep and vital factor in determining Canadian policy was the concern for the welfare and strength of the United Kingdom which was to have a war on two fronts, one in Europe and the other in the Pacific.

By virtue of geographic location, Canadians themselves enjoyed a relatively high degree of security despite the fact that wars had been raging in Europe and Asia for years. This security did not make her become a hermit nation. In case of war, Canada's responsibility was immediate. After the renewal of hostility between China and Japan in 1937, the government strict neutrality became more and more subject to question. With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, all questions which troubled the Canadian-Japanese relations became more acute. When Japan entered the formal alliance with Germany and Italy in September, 1940, the situation became even dangerous.

To the Chinese, the outbreak of European war in 1939 was a significant event which confirmed their belief that world peace was indivisible, appeasement meant war and that the outbreak of the European war was mainly due to the failure of the West to deal with Japan in the Far East and with Italy in Africa. The war in Europe had moral and psychological effects upon China. The main issue of Chinese foreign policy was
how to carry on a war of protracted resistance in the face of the new situation in Europe.\textsuperscript{16} The Chinese government watched the development of world events closely. After the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in 1940, the World was divided sharply into two blocs. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek declared that China would do her best to resist aggression but expressed China’s hope for aid and assistance from friendly powers.\textsuperscript{17}

Although Japan was a non-belligerent partner of Axis, Canadian policy was to endeavour to treat her, as circumstances permitted, as neutral. Prime Minister King had in February, 1941, defined the policy in these words: "We have to try to avoid any provocation or offence... We have followed the development with forbearance and restrain."\textsuperscript{18} Mr. King was in a difficult situation in trying not to outdistance either London or Washington in resistance against Japan and at the same time to satisfy the demand in Canada for a firm stand on the Japanese Question.\textsuperscript{19}

But on the whole, Canada did not fail to see the possibility of war. Early in 1938, Canada's status in time of war was for the first time discussed in Parliament. The

\textsuperscript{16} Chiang Kai-shek, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 326.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 603.
\textsuperscript{18} Dawson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 273.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 278.
bill reads: "Canada shall not assume the status of belligerent otherwise than by declaration of war made by his majesty with specific reference to Canada and only on the advice of his majesty's government in Canada." 20

When the Pacific storm was in formation, United States-Canadian cooperation for defence was also considered. In August 1936, Roosevelt declared that the United States would defend its neighbour as well as itself against aggression. 21 Again in Kingston in 1938, the President declared that "the People of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire". 22 In the same year, the construction of Washington-Alaska highway was considered and in late 1940, the United States-Canada Perma-

nent Joint Board on Defence was set up in accordance with the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 17, 1940. The Board was instructed to make immediate studies relating to the sea, air and land defence. Other steps were taken at once to strengthen coastal batteries, air bases and military installations. These arrangements were mostly made with reference to the Pacific situation.

20 F. H. Soward, and others, Canada in World Affairs, Pre-War Years, Toronto, Oxford, 1941, p. 286.

21 Ibid., p. 34.

22 President Roosevelt's speech at Queen's University, Kingston, August 18, 1938; Cf. Soward, Ibid., p. 271.
The war in the Far East compelled the Canadian government to re-examine its attitude towards the Japanese population which was then regarded as a threat to Canadian security and towards the trading policy of exporting war materials to Japan which was also a subject of criticism. It watched closely its position vis-a-vis Great Britain. In September, 1939, when war broke out in Europe, Canada stopped its shipments to Japan of iron, steel, nickel, zinc, aluminum, which became essential for the Allies powers. Copper export was made subject to government permit in October, 1940, wheat and wheat flour in February, and timber in March 1941. 23

Canada's cessation of the export of war materials to Japan had long been expected by suffering China and it produced profound effect upon the Chinese fighting spirit against the Japanese who were materially superior over the Chinese. The embargo did not only mean encouragement to the Chinese but also the exhaustion of Japan's supply of strategic materials. Its detrimental psychological effect upon the Japanese morale was great. Since that time, Canada's action was somewhat in favour of China.

In January, 1941, the Canadian government required all Japanese population to be registered, put them under supervision and later evacuated them from the defence zone along

23 Dawson, op. cit., p. 276.
the Pacific coast. In July and August 1941, Canadian-Japanese relations became increasingly tense. Both Great Britain and the United States gradually became unyielding in their attitude towards Japan and when in July 1941, the newly-created Japanese Cabinet secured bases in French Indo-China from a compliant Vichy they abandoned any effort at appeasement. They and Canada simultaneously announced the freezing of all Japanese assets. Meanwhile, Canada, following the British lead, terminated the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1913 in so far as affected the Dominion. Thereupon, the Canadian Steamship Company closed its office in Japan.

All these measures seemed ineffective in checking Japan's ambition. Both Churchill and Roosevelt had sent their warnings to Japan not to overstep. In Canada, Prime Minister King had, on November 3, 1941, pointed out that all developments of Axis aggression "have combined to destroy the myth of American isolation", and "a recognition of interdependence and combined action... is necessary. during these

25 Dawson, op. cit., p. 86.
28 Debates, House of Commons, Canada, November 3, 1941, pp. 4054 and 4056.
months, Canada's attitude was clear that she might join any war to which Great Britain was a party.

The attack upon Pearl Harbour of December 7, 1941 came like thunderbolt to most people of the world. The United States, Canada and Great Britain had no choice but war. Canada's participation in the war against Japan was not extensive. The defence of North America was naturally a joint enterprise in which the policy of the United States was dominant. The only military action that Canada took was to send two battalions of infantry troops to defend Hong Kong which fell shortly after their arrival.

3. Wartime Collaboration

The Pearl Harbour Incident was an historical event and no doubt, it was a decisive factor in China's war against Japan. Many observers had predicted that the War between Japan and the English-speaking nations in the Pacific was inevitable and it was only delayed by the Sino-Japanese conflict which had been going on for about four years then. When the Pacific storm was gathering, President Roosevelt had announced the U.S. intention to assist China and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent messages to the United States and England appealing for unity and collaboration. He agreed with Mr. Churchill's idea that "united we stand and divided we fall." He also
extended welcome for British partnership in the ordeal of resisting Japan. 29

The event of war against the common enemy mechanically drew China, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom into an alliance. Following the Pearl Harbour Incident, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent messages to all Chinese overseas asking them to cooperate with the governments of their resident states. Meanwhile to the nation he stated:

up to now our sacrifices have been made to the end of merely driving the invaders from our own soil. Henceforth we shall be fighting shoulder to shoulder with Great Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia and other friendly countries in a united endeavour to suppress the enemies of civilization. 30

As war was going on, the collaboration between China, the United States and the United Kingdom was also being improved. Shortly before the Pearl Harbour Incident, President Roosevelt had revealed that the British, American and Chinese governments had come to an understanding upon cooperative measures, military and others, in the event of a Japanese cut of the Burma Road. 31 In late 1941, visits of military missions were exchanged between the British and Chinese units in the China-Burma-India area, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had

30 Ibid., pp. 642 and 644.
31 Quigley, op. cit., p. 272.
stated that China, the United States and the United Kingdom had completed plans for a united front.\textsuperscript{32}

As mentioned above, Canada did not have any active purpose in the war against Japan and its main duty was to fight in Europe. In the Orient, China was the only ally of Canada between and the relations in them were virtually influenced or dominated by those existing among China, the United States and the United Kingdom. Even though, these relations were created through war yet the military and strategic cooperation between China and Canada were relatively slight. Their relations were mostly political and economical. To China, Canada was an important ally in consideration either of wartime politics or of postwar economy. To Canada, China was a reliable ally and "was fighting Canada's war."\textsuperscript{33} The common cause of fighting against the Axis powers naturally inspired their thinking of a closer relationship.

Before Pearl Harbour, Canada's diplomatic representation was limited to Japan. She had no other contact with China than that through the Foreign Office in London and later through the Canadian and Chinese representatives in Washington. Yet Canadian missionary, educational and commercial relations with China had been considerable. During the Manchurian crisis, Canada sympathies were definitely with China and this

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{33} Lower, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 119.
feeling of good-will was increased after the outbreak of the undeclared war against China in 1937. 34 During the whole course of war the Chinese population in Canada had generously contributed to China an approximate amount of $6.5 millions for medical and other supplies through the Canadian Red Cross and the Chinese War Relief Fund. Since December 7, 1941, China and Canada had become fighting allies. The common membership in a war alliance had led to an increase in matters of common interest but the absence of diplomatic representation provided no adequate means of contact and consultation for the solution of common problems. Besides these, Canada was a substantial supplier of war materials for China and other allied powers. The contacts between China and Canada through their representatives in Washington were not sufficient to meet the situation. Under such circumstances, the Chinese government promptly suggested the exchange of diplomatic missions. 35

The agreement to exchange diplomatic missions was reached in August 1941, between the Chinese Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador in Chungking. In his note to the Chinese Foreign Minister Dr. Quo Tai-chi, Sir Archbald Clerk Kerr, British Ambassador to China, expressed the hope and belief that the establishment of the Canadian Legation "will

35 Ibid.
promote the maintenance and development of cordial relations not only between China and Canada but also between China and the whole of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Dr. Quo stated that the Chinese shared the sentiments expressed in the Ambassador's note. Mr. Liu Shih-shun was appointed as the first Chinese Minister to Canada. He presented his credentials on February 26, 1942. Incidentally, he was the first new Minister to arrive in Ottawa from the allied governments. In the following year, his rank was raised to ambassador.

Although Canada had expressed its intention to reciprocate, no action was taken for sometime. After a very long delay, on November 4, 1942, the Prime Minister announced the appointment of Major General Victor Wentworth Odlum, the former Canadian High Commissioner to Australia, as the first Canadian Ambassador to China. The delay, the Prime Minister explained, was occasioned by the difficulty of securing personnel for the new legation due to the pressure of work on the Department of External Affairs. Ambassador Odlum arrived at Chungking on April 30, 1943.

The exchange of diplomatic missions was a milestone in Sino-Canadian relations. As mentioned above, before then China and Canada had no formal diplomatic relationship between

36 China handbook, 1937-1945, p. 162.

them and almost all diplomatic matters were conducted through London or their representatives in Washington. Only in 1909 did China appoint its first Consul-General in Ottawa and later in Vancouver, Winnipeg and Toronto. As also mentioned above, there was slight political relationship between them. The Chinese consular service in Canada was only charged with Chinese overseas affairs and additional commercial matters.

During the 1909-1942 period, the Canadian government had for several times considered the establishment of a diplomatic mission in China but such a project was only realized at the suggestion of the Chinese government when the Pacific war was impending. This diplomatic relation was created through the demand for collaboration in a war against the common enemy. In addition to this immediate demand for collaboration, both governments had also hoped that they would have to cooperate in peace negotiations in the post-war period. The direct representation in each other's capital at least signified two more things: first, China, like any other country, had come to recognize the importance of Canada's role in international politics and looked forward for more contacts in the post-war world; second, Canada had regarded China as a possible future giant in Asia after Japan's defeat and its cooperation was also important.

38 At present, China has embassy in Ottawa and Consul-General in Vancouver. Canada did not post any diplomatic mission to China since 1942.
to post-war Canada. Not only Canada but many other countries looked upon China in that way and such hopes were logical and reasonable during the wartime despite the abrupt political change in China shortly after the war.

Sino-Canadian relations were further strengthened by their common adherence to the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942, at Washington in which twenty-six countries pledged themselves "to employ its full resources, military or economic, against members of the Tripartite Pact and adherents with which each government is at war" and "to cooperate with governments signatory hereto and not to make any separate armistice or peace with the enemies."39 The Alliance may be viewed as the culmination of a process of growing cooperation under the impacts of events.

In the summer of 1943, when Madame Chiang Kai-shek visited the United States she also visited Canada before she returned to China. She was invited to address the Canadian Parliament and it was the first time in Canada's history that a woman addressed Parliament. The Canadian leaders never concealed their admiration for China's fighting spirit and the hope for strengthening ties between the two countries. In the introductory speech, Prime Minister King stated that

"the people of Canada have unreservedly joined with the people of China in putting their utmost effort

to destroy the evil forces that now seek to dominate the world" and "Canada, in common with all the United Nations, is increasingly conscious of the debt that freedom owes to the unconquerable spirit of China."

Since 1941, the war in Asia had been mounting to its climax. The Japanese launched their large scale offensive in the China-Burma-India area and China in those campaigns won her reputation among nations with her daring fighting spirit. When Japan's military strength was declining and the final victory of the Allies was more in hope, the big powers came to recognize the inescapable fact that China would have a rightful position in a post-war world. With a view of this, Great Britain and the United States on October 10, 1942, announced their voluntary relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China, usually termed as the unequal treaties by the Chinese and which the Chinese had been striving to get abolished for decades of years. To substitute the old treaties, the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had on January 10, 1943, concluded new treaties with the Chinese government based upon the principles of equality and reciprocity. The relinquishment of these extraterritorial rights had not only improved Sino-British relations but encouraged the Chinese to advance more confidently. It was a centenary milestone since the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 and was

40 Debates House of Commons, Canada, 1943, p. 3718.
generally regarded as the first gain of China's war resistance.\textsuperscript{41}

Following the British and American lead, the Canadian government by an exchange of notes signed on April 14, 1944, relinquished its extraterritorial rights in China. The terms of the agreement paralleled those contained in the treaties which China had previously signed with the United States and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{42} In announcing the agreement, Mr. King said that it forged "yet another bond with our great ally, China, which has so long resisted the common enemy". He explained that it left the way open for negotiating, within six months after the termination of hostilities, "a comprehensive modern treaty of friendship, commerce, navigation and consular rights."\textsuperscript{43}

4. Canadian Mutual Aid and Subsequent Economic Assistance to China

Due to the coastal blockade by Japan, in the last three years of war China had been virtually cut off from physical contacts with the outside world. The blockade caused serious financial and economic difficulties in Free China.

\textsuperscript{41} Chiang Kai-shek, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 734.

\textsuperscript{42} Treaty Series, Canada, 1944, No. 11.

\textsuperscript{43} Debates, House of Commons, Canada, April 17, 1944, pp. 2065-2066.
The government and people of China faced these difficulties with fortitude and were confident of their ability to stand the strain until material assistance from abroad became feasible. Canada and the United States, spared from enemy occupation and war destruction, were virtually suppliers for China’s demands.

In May 1943 the Canadian government passed the United Nations Mutual Aid Pact which empowered the government to spend in the current fiscal year $1 billion on war supplies, including military equipments and food, for any United Nations member which was "essential to the defence and security of Canada and the cause of world freedom". 44

China, of course, fell into this criterion. As early as May 1943, Mutual Aid had already been extended to China. 45 On March 22, 1944, Canada and China had signed the Mutual Aid agreement under which China had during the whole course of war received aid amounting to the value of $26.597 millions. The materials which included guns, shells, ammunition small arms and automobile equipments were flown in over "the Hump" through India. 46

The incoming of those supplies from China’s allies undoubtedly relieved her material thirst which had been existing

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44 Soward, op. cit., p. 74.
45 Lingard, op. cit., p. 220.
46 Soward, op. cit., p. 79; also, Treaty Series, Canada, 1944, No. 9.
for years. As early as December 7, 1942, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Pacific War in a message of greeting Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had praised Canada's war effort both in the field and in war production.\textsuperscript{47} This material assistance naturally strengthened the friendship between the two countries.

Generally, during the course of war, the relations between China and Canada were ever being improved. After having formally relinquished its extraterritorial rights in China in 1944, the Canadian government had considered its relations with China in respect of immigration. In April 1944, Prime Minister King informed the House of Commons that the Government had submitted to the Chinese government a draft immigration treaty which was designed to supersede the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923 under which the Chinese had been forbidden to enter into Canada as settlers.\textsuperscript{48} Negotiations for a new immigration treaty were protracted and while they were still in progress the Canadian government on May 14, 1947, took action to repeal a part of the Act of 1923.\textsuperscript{49}

A further gesture of friendship was the modification of the stringent regulations established after the "Exclusion

\textsuperscript{47} Chiang Kai-shek, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 731.

\textsuperscript{48} Statute of Canada, 1923, Chapter 38.

\textsuperscript{49} The main modification was the repeal of Article 8; see Statute of Canada, 1947, Chapter 19.
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Act" and enactments which governed the transit through Canada and the entry of Chinese for temporary visit and the registration of legal Chinese residents in Canada who went abroad on visits.\textsuperscript{50} These gestures of friendship and the material benefits of the Mutual Aid might have stimulated the telegram of cordial greetings and best wishes which President Chiang Kai-shek sent to Prime Minister King on the third anniversary of Pearl Harbor (1944). President Chiang Kai-shek expressed again the "deep admiration" of the Chinese people for the "remarkable achievement of your armed forces" and the great inspiration which China received from "your strong resolve not to sheath the sword until the common enemy is utterly destroyed."\textsuperscript{51}

When the war reached its climax, the allied governments did not neglect the task of reconstructing the post-war world. The exploitation by the enemy and the ravages of modern war in the occupied countries would necessarily entail tremendous efforts to restore their economic function. Such task was far beyond the strength of any individual country and must be achieved by collective action. The main burden of this task naturally fell upon those which were spared from enemy occupation and war destruction and possessed necessary economic and

\textsuperscript{50} Soward, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 323.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid.}
financial strength. The allied governments had agreed to bring the relief to the victims of war as soon as their liberation was effected and to set up a special organization, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, for this purpose.

Both China and Canada were members of this agency and the latter totally contributed $254 millions worth of grain, canned foods, clothing, automobile equipment, farm machinery, machines and other daily life necessities for relief to the war-torn countries. This programme had been in operation for three years, from November, 1944, to November, 1947. China received one of the largest allotments of about $517.8 millions worth of supplies of which about $20 millions were contributed from Canada. 52 Although this was relatively small in terms of China's enormous needs yet the UNRRA programme in China was one of the largest mass relief and rehabilitation programmes in human history.

Canada's contribution to UNRRA's China programme undoubtedly strengthened the friendship between the two countries. Unlike the foregoing Mutual Aid supplies which were purely for military purposes, the UNRRA materials reached the masses of the Chinese people and created certain impression of Canada upon their minds. Notably, a number of Chinese scholars and

52 MacNair, op. cit., p. 648; and Angus, op. cit., p. 22.
technicians were sent to Canada under the UMRRA programme, being the first of its kind in the Sino-Canadian relations.

Yet at the end of war, China and Canada had further economic cooperation—China made a first yet probably the last loan from Canada. When Japan signed its terms of unconditional surrender, it had been made known that the Mutual Aid programme was to terminate but Canada's allies might be eligible for further assistance under the Export Credit Insurance Act which was introduced by the Minister of Trade and Commerce on July 28, 1944, as "a measure to facilitate and develop trade between Canada and other countries." 53 Under this Act, the Minister was authorized to guarantee the obligations or their agencies for the purchase of Canadian goods up to ¥200 millions. He could also make loans or purchase of government securities up to ¥100 millions for the same purpose. 54

While the Canadian government was negotiating with the Governments of the Netherlands and Norway, the Chinese government expressed the same wish. The negotiations were begun in September, 1945, when Chinese Premier T.V. Soong visited Ottawa. It was completed in February, 1946, with the establishment of a credit of ¥60 millions. By the terms of the agreement, ¥12 millions would be spent in cash and ¥25 millions was

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53 Soward, op. cit., p. 99.

54 Ibid., p. 102.
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to be applied for the purchase of military supplies and equip-
ment of about ¥3.5 millions originally ordered under the pre-
vious Mutual Aid Agreement but not delivered by V-J. day; for
goods in production at September 1, 1945 which were surplus to
Canadian requirements; and for used industrial equipment. The
balance was to be available for post-war reconstruction. China
agreed to pay the loan with interest at three per cent per
annum over a period of thirty years commencing on December 31,
1948. Up to the end of the fiscal year 1946-47, the total
orders placed by the Chinese government amounted to slightly
more than ¥28 millions and when the agreement expired on
December 31, 1948, orders amounted to slightly over ¥51 mil-

Under the Export Credit Insurance Act, the Canadian
Government also guaranteed a loan of ¥12.75 millions by three
Canadian Banks to King Sing Industrial Company of Chungking
for the construction in Canada of nine specially-designed ves-
sels to serve on the Yantze.

A further effort to stimulate trade between the two
countries was the exchange of notes in Nanking on September 26,
1946, between the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Canadian
Ambassador to China agreeing to a commercial Modus vivendi.

55 Treaty Series, Canada, 1946, No. 20.
56 Angus, op. cit., p. 22.
57 Treaty Series, Canada, 1946, No. 37. In 1946, Cana-
da’s export to China amounted approximately to ¥43 millions
and import from China to ¥2 millions.
It is clear that the relations between China and Canada had entered a new era with the outbreak of the Pacific war. The event of war and their common cause of war had driven them into a common fate. In the pre-war period, the information about China was always at minimum in Canada. The great gap in Canadian knowledge concerning history, life and culture of China was at least given a hope to be filled up by the exchange of diplomatic missions. Psychologically, the exchange of diplomatic missions had paved the way for future development and had induced the desire of Canadians for understanding China better. Canadians understood very well that China's burden in a war against the common enemy was disproportionately heavy and they were very willing to assist such a reliable ally like China.

58 Skilling, op. cit., p. 253.
CHAPTER III

RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

1. General Far Eastern Situation After the V-J Day

With the dropping of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima, the Allies' victory came abruptly and the victorious parties met unpreparedly with a scene quite similar to that of the post-WWI era. The primary problems of the Allies were restoration of peace, consolidation of security, punishment for the vanquished and readjustment of world order.

In the Far East, the development of events was marked with the Chinese civil war, collapse of Japan as a military power, outbreak of the Korean war, and the armed conflicts in Indo-China. All these problems were woven together and none of them could be solved alone.

In China, the event of civil war brought the Chinese people again into chaos and despair. Economic rehabilitation programmes planned with the Allies' assistance were soon out of operation. Political stability was also in danger. With help and assistance of Soviet Russia, the Chinese Communists finally gained the control of the mainland, and, consequently, the National Government had to move its capital to Taiwan (Formosa). The fall of the mainland to the Communists was
an historical tragedy and was the beginning of a new Far Eastern crisis.

In Canada, the situation was described as very different from that existing in many other countries. Canada had no problem of restoration from enemy occupation, no serious handicap of economic rehabilitation and no dispute on territorial adjustment. Moreover, Canada at that time was relatively free from the direct Soviet attack. The industrial expansion stimulated by war had enabled her spontaneously to go ahead with economic expansion and foreign trade.

In the post-war world, both China and Canada had to alter their policies to meet the new world situation. China, with the loss of the mainland, became bitterly opposed to the Soviet Union. When the war ended, she needed peace and security more than ever and resolutely supported the United Nations which was designed to maintain world peace and security and promote human rights and cooperation. Also, because she needed foreign economic assistance to develop her natural resources as a means of improving her people's livelihood, she had ever sought friendship and cooperation from foreign powers, including Canada. Thus, it is clear that the post-war foreign policy of the Chinese National Government was to support the United Nations, to promote international cooperation on a basis of friendship and equality, moreover, in alliance with other democratic countries to resist Communist imperialism.
Canada, on the other hand, was on her way to prosperity. But her government and people did not fail to realize the danger arising out of the conflicts between democracy and communism. In the Canadian view, the three or four years of post-war history were generally seen as a disturbing sequence of Soviet expansion, Communist subversion, diplomatic deadlock and the abuse of veto in the United Nations. The Ignor Gouzenko story was a clear indication of Russian conspiracy in North America. The profound sympathy and sincere admiration for the USSR during and immediately after the war in Canada were liquidated in the course of a few years. When the cold war started, the Canadian attitude was also in a period of change. The Atlantic Treaty Organization of which Canada is a member met with general approval. "Our policy is based upon the reality and dangers of the existing situation. One of these is the Communist menace." These words were employed in the Speech from the Throne on January 26, 1949. Again, in the opinion of Mr. St. Laurent, "totalitarian Communist aggression constitutes a direct and immediate threat to every democratic country, including Canada. It endangers our peace and freedom." Furthermore, Canadian foreign policy, which, as

2 Angus, op. cit., p. 106.
3 Ibid.
Mr. St. Laurent stated, was guided by the principles of the belief of political liberty, observance of rules of law and respect for human rights, is basically irreconcilable with Communist political doctrines and way of life.  

The Canadian Prime Minister did not attempt to adopt the policy of isolationism to meet the world-wide communist expansion, but rather based Canada's security on collective action. "The establishment of peace and security is the greatest problem we face today," he stated. "The last war proved conclusively that isolationism is no guarantee of security... The choice we face today is a choice between isolationism with its certain weakness, and the hope, through collective action, of preventing another war." In the post-war world, Canada cannot act singly and neutrally. She needs the cooperation of her traditional partners. Mr. St. Laurent stressed that the ties with the United Kingdom were ties of interest. With the United States, Canada's relationship grows steadily closer because of their common destinies. Moreover, Canada's security depends largely upon acceptance by the United States of the responsibility for world leadership and


7 Ibid., pp. 356 et seq.
upon how that responsibility is discharged.8

Thus, generally, Canadian foreign policy may be summed up as being based upon: first, the assertion of distinct political status in international affairs; secondly, protection in alliance with her traditional partners against world Communist menace; and thirdly, economic consideration in connection with the development of natural resources and maintenance of foreign trade. In turn, the execution and practice of these principles depend largely upon world peace and cooperation.

Despite the fact that China and Canada were allies during the war, so far their policies in international politics can hardly be regarded as harmonious. Arising out of the post-war Far Eastern situation, there are certain problems which are testing issues to their relationship. These problems include the recognition of Communist China, the Peace Treaty with Japan, the so-called "question of Formosa" and the Chinese representation in the United Nations. These concern not only China and Canada but also a majority of the countries over the world and are basically linked with their national policies.

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2. Recognition of Communist China and Peace Treaty with Japan

As mentioned above, the Far Eastern crisis was begun with the emergence of the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland. The so-called Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic proclaimed its establishment on October 1, 1949 at Peiping, control being held by the Chinese Communist Party. The new regime had invited recognition from foreign powers on the basis of equality, friendship, respect for territorial integrity and withdrawal of recognition of the National Government of the Republic of China. The Soviet Union and its satellites accorded recognition soon after its proclamation. 9

To the Canadian government, the issue of recognition was an important one. In April 1949, the Canadian Ambassador to Nanking, Mr. T. C. Davies, returned to Canada and left the limited conduct of affairs in the care of his Consul-General at Shanghai. 10 His return was a clear indication that Canada's attitude towards China waited pending a further clarification of the situation. At the Colombo Plan Conference of 1950, the attitudes of the participating governments were divergent:

Four of them, those of the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan and

9 Harrison, op. cit., p. 165.
10 Ibid., p. 243.
Ceylon, had decided to recognize the new regime. India took a peculiar view. She looked with sympathy upon the nationalist elements in the Chinese Communists and believed that the Chinese Communists would use nascent nationalism to direct xenophobia against the West yet suffer Soviet interference with complaisance. At the Conference, her representative not only expressed her decision to recognize the new regime but also urged other governments to do so and strongly opposed support for the Republic of China.¹¹

The British government, in hoping to clear its title to property, to save its investment in the mainland, to protect its interests in Hong Kong and to further its trade, had on January 6, 1950, recognized the new regime as the de jure government of China.¹² At the same time, it withdrew its recognition from the National government of the Republic of China.

The Canadian government appeared undecided and waited in uncertainty with Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and, above all, the United States. During this wait-and-see period, events moved rapidly. In 1950, the first year of the new regime's existence, there happened a few incidents which aroused international concern. The new regime mistreated diplomatic


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personnel and confiscated foreign property, particularly of the United States. This proved the new regime lack of sincerity and ability of observing international rules of conduct. Also in 1950, the new regime despatched "volunteers" to support North Korean Communists against the United Nations forces.

The world witnessed that Communist strategy had passed from the use of subversion to the use of armed aggression. Following the neutralization of the Formosa Strait, the new regime charged the United States with "armed aggression against Taiwan".

The new regime also tied itself militarily with the Soviet Union by a so-called Sino-Soviet Treaty. In 1952, the United States representative introduced a resolution in the General Assembly condemning the new regime as aggressor in Korea.

Furthermore, the United States Congress had successively passed resolutions opposing the admission of this regime to the United Nations.

The attitude of the United States was one of the influences which determined Canadian foreign policy. Washington's allies, including Canada, could be certain of one thing, that the United States would not recognize the Chinese Communist regime. In this case, it was doubtful whether Canada would follow the United States or follow the United Kingdom and India.

The American attitude was that collective security must be preserved and that the Korean war was part of a world-
wide test of strength between the free world and Soviet Communism. Since Red China had tied its economic political and cultural life to that of the Soviet Union, the American government did not believe that there was any chance to win back Communist China from the Soviet Union, that that regime was unalterably the ally and satellite of Soviet Russia and that her adherence to the Communist cause had disastrously altered the balance of power in the Pacific and in Asia. She had to be checked in Korea and her power had to be countered by maintaining the threat of Formosa, restoring Japanese military power and forming a system of Pacific alliance.\textsuperscript{13}

There were many reasons for the United States not to recognize Communist China and not to permit its being seated in the United Nations: the unsolved conflict over Korea and the Korean armistices, the refusal to settle the Taiwan issue with peaceful means, the holding of the American citizens and the shabby treatment of British recognition. Recognition would not imply approval but would acknowledge Red China as a leader in Asia and the acceptability of Communism.\textsuperscript{14} Recognition would encourage Communist activities in Indo-China and Malaya where nationalism could hardly be distinguished from Communism.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Keirstead, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 55.


\textsuperscript{15} Harrison, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 191.
"From a realistic standpoint, the recognition of Red China would mean the liquidation of free China", American Under-Secretary, Mr. Robertson stated. "Our entire political position in that area would be deteriorated, and it is quite likely that the present military deterrent provided by the Republic of China on Taiwan would be weakened or lost."16 Recognition would carry the implication of admitting Red China's representation in the United Nations and its claim to Formosa. The recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations would seriously affect the morale of anti-Communist Chinese.17

In Canada, opinions concerning this issue were divergent. To the CCF's, the strategy needed to arrest the Communist aggression was that of social salvation, since, as Mr. Coldwell told the House of Commons, the Chinese Communists won power by giving promises of improving the people's condition in exchange for their freedom of thought, speech and worship. In his opinion, the government should grant recognition at an early date and the only way eventually to defeat Communism was to offer better livelihood to the people concerned. He also thought that recognition did not imply approval of its political system and urged that the government must consider its

16 Saturday Evening Post, Editorial, February 26, 1957.
17 Taylor, op. cit.
position if Canada’s contacts with China needed to be maintained. 18

Another CCF member, Mr. Stewart, thought that recognition was part of the strategy of the cold war and for that reason to withhold it might mean a surrender by default to Moscow of leadership which the West might give in Asia. 19

On the other hand, Mr. Drew, leader of the Conservatives, opposed immediate recognition. He doubted the ability and sincerity of the new regime to fulfil three conditions for recognition set forth by the Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson. 20 He pointed out that any hasty recognition would carry with it the obligation of handing over Formosa to the new regime. The activities of Chinese Communists on their southwestern borders must also be taken into consideration. The Chinese Communists supported the Viet Minh by supplying arms. Mr. Drew thought, Canada was under no compulsion to act hastily and there was no reason why Canada should follow the United Kingdom to recognize the new regime. 21

Government policy was vacillating. The Minister had begun to consider the issue of recognition as soon as the new

20 For the three conditions, see below.
21 Harrison, op. cit., pp. 246 et seq.
regime was established. On October 25, 1949, Mr. Pearson told the House of Commons that the government seeking recognition must not only exercise control over the territory it claimed and the territory be reasonably defined, but the government must have shown itself independent of external control. "If and when these requirements are met, then, consideration should be given to the recognition of the government in China".  

22 On March 7, 1950, the Minister told the House of Commons that the matter of according or withholding recognition was before the government. Mr. Pearson hinted strongly that the Government might recognize the new regime. He pointed out that Canadians rejected the Marxist-Leninist principles but could not reject the facts. He thought recognition did not imply moral approval but simply was an acknowledgement of a state of affairs. If the Chinese Communists effectively controlled China and their regime was accepted by the Chinese people and was able to discharge its international obligations, then, in due course and after consultation with our friendly governments, Canada would have to recognize the facts.  


24 Harrison, op. cit., p. 165.

Only three weeks after Mr. Coldwell made his last appeal for recognition, the Korean War broke out. After that,
the Canadian government would not in any way recognize the new regime.

There were a few factors which prevented Canada from following the British and Indian example. Canada did not have much business transactions with Communist China and since the friendly services of other Commonwealth Nations were available, recognition for trade was not an urgent reason.25 The mistreatment of Canadian missionaries in China by the Communists was another reason. They denounced the missionaries, detained them and took over their orphanages. Some of them were even charged with crimes, tried and sentenced or even expelled from the mainland.26 These inhuman acts made the Canadian government and people more cautious in considering the recognition issue. Furthermore, Canada would not incur the same humiliation and loss of prestige as the United States by according full recognition to the new regime and accepting it as a member of the United Nations entitled to a seat on the Security Council, and abstaining from interference in what may be called as China's civil war.27

Conditioned by these considerations, Canada did not accord recognition. Indeed, the case against recognition was immensely strengthened after the Chinese Communists despatched

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25 Angus, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

26 Angus, *op. cit.*, pp. 95 et seq.

"volunteers" to Korea.

It may be that had the Korean War not broken out Canada might have followed the British and Indian example. Mr. Pearson said that, though Canada might yet deem it proper to recognize the new regime, it was not felt that the time or occasion was propitious for such recognition.\(^{28}\) After the outbreak of the Korean War, the issue of recognition became a matter of high politics. Powers, including Canada and Communist nations, linked the recognition issue with the so-called "question of Formosa", Chinese representation in the United Nations and, of course, the Korean armistice.

Mr. Pearson had thought that these problems might be solved in a comprehensive settlement, if Chinese aggression in Korea ended and if a settlement were reached with the United Nations.\(^{29}\) Canadian policy and opinion favoured the negotiations of a cease-fire to be followed by a discussion on the whole Far Eastern situation. However, arrangements like these would not be acceptable to the United States government and the government of the Republic of China.\(^{29}\)

\(^{28}\) Keirstead, op. cit., p. 59.

\(^{29}\) Angus, op. cit., p. 41.
Concerning the issue of recognition, the government of the Republic of China which still claims its sovereignty over the whole territory of China could by no means affect Canada's national policy. As seen from the foregoing chapters, the relationship between the two countries is not so solid and intimate as to afford one country a position strong enough to affect the other. Moreover, the question of recognition, though international in character, is usually decided domestically in the light of a nation's own interests in the current world situation. At the present, the Republic of China still maintains its diplomatic mission in Ottawa and Consul-General in Vancouver as a symbol of friendship, dealing mostly with Chinese overseas affairs and limited trade matters. Canada withdrew its diplomatic mission from Nanking in 1949 and since then she has not posted diplomatic representative to either the Republic of China or Communist China; however, Canada still recognizes the National government as the lawful and legitimate government of China. Their contacts are undoubtedly slight.

It is conceivable that the government of the Republic of China, contending as a legitimate government, does not wish to see the Communist regime recognized in any way because, as it has stated repeatedly, the regime seized power through violence and subversion with support from Soviet Russia, the regime is not accepted by the Chinese people, moreover, the
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regime is simply a satellite of Soviet Russia, advocating aggression and international expansion. These, no matter how true they are, will not be well considered and wholly accepted by the Canadian government which traditionally bases its policy upon realism.

At the present, Canadian official policy is very cautious and obscure. Government spokesmen have never said that Canada would not recognize Communist China but carefully keep the door open for eventual recognition and firmly oppose any disposition on the part of the United States to extend war with Communist China. The Canadian Government believes that the regime is the de facto government of China and must eventually be recognized as such, but that premature recognition would produce certain unfortunate effects upon the joint efforts in Korea and even upon the North Atlantic Treaty Pact. However, it predicts also that as long as the state of war exists in Korea, Communist China can hardly expect the recognition from those United Nations members whom the regime fights against in Korea.30

The issue of recognition of the Communist regime was inevitably related with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. The political change in China complicated the situation in respect of negotiations. The powers were concerned

30 Cf. Ibid., p. 44; Keirstead, op. cit., pp. 59 and 235.
with the future of Japan whose importance was enhanced by the emergence of Communist China. Its position, potential strength and its respective relations with the West and the Communist bloc could determine the fate of Asia.

It was evident that China had a special interest in the affairs of Japan because China was in particular subjected for many years to Japanese aggression. Neither would the Soviet government neglect the status and policy of Japan. In Canada, Secretary of External Affairs, Mr. St. Laurent, had stated that the absence of a Japanese Peace Treaty was one of the causes of uncertainty and that its indefinite postponement might produce dangerous consequences. He thought, the settlement with Japan, inevitably of great consequence to all Pacific states, should embody the views of the countries particularly interested and should be the work of a representative conference. On November 15, 1949, in the House of Commons, Mr. Pearson repeated Mr. St. Laurent's views and recognized of the difficulty arising out the "emergence/a Communist government in China."32

To the Canadian government, the important objectives of the Peace Treaty should be security against future aggression and the restoration of normal economic intercourse. The Treaty should not be one that would arouse bitter resentment.

31 Harrison, op. cit., p. 165.
32 Angus, op. cit., p. 57.
in Japan. Reparations should be demanded, but only in so far as they could be paid without prejudice to Japan's economic revival.\textsuperscript{33}

In China, the National government had repeated its intentions to conclude a fair and just peace treaty with Japan ever since the end of war. The Chinese government thought that Japan should be a new stabilizing force but not an aggressor in Asia. She must be deprived of her potential military strength and her militarist war crimes should be punished. Japan must pay a certain amount of reparations not exceeding its economic capacity. She must also be transformed into a democratic country under the nominal rule of the Emperor. Generally, the Chinese views were similar to those of the Canadians.

When the Peace Treaty was signed at San Francisco, on September 8, 1951, China was not represented at the Conference. At that time, some of the governments which had been at war with Japan had shifted their recognition from the National government to the Communist regime. The parties at the Conference were not agreed among themselves as to which government should represent China. The Canadian government, like some others, did not shift its recognition but did not support the National government either and presumably favoured

\[ \text{33 Ibid., p. 58.} \]
the Communist participation. The representation problem was a testing issue to the relations between these two countries. The National Government had been contending for representation to the peace conference, and the Canadian government, on the other hand, regarded the National Government as being not a government-in-being in China. The repeated statements of the Canadian government showed that Canada wished to support the Communist regime but she could not do so because, firstly, the regime had not yet been recognized by Canada; secondly, there might be opposition from other governments, and after all, the regime was in an alliance with Soviet Russia. Being in this disability, the Canadian government joined with other Commonwealth governments in favouring a peace treaty without participation of China.

3. Canada's Attitude Towards the Question of Formosa

The so-called "question of Formosa" was another issue with which Canada was not primarily concerned but on which she was bound to take a stand. The Canadians had a relatively faint idea about Formosa and the Pescadores and had long regarded the status of these islands as ambiguous. The Canadian

34 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Twenty-five Years of Canadian Foreign Relations, CBC Publication Branch, Toronto, 1952, p. 45.

35 Keirstead, op. cit., p. 125.
government had not yet recognized that these islands are legally possessed by the Government of the Republic of China.36

The return of these islands to China was agreed upon at the Cairo Conference, confirmed at Potsdam, accepted by the USSR and solemnized in the surrender terms by Japan on the one hand and the principal allies on the other, including China. In 1946, the Chinese Government made them a province by law. Under the Peace Treaty with Japan signed at San Francisco, Japan renounced all rights and title to these islands. The Treaty did not specify whom the renunciation was in favour of. But the Chinese usually asked: "who else possessed more legal grounds and political reasons to claim Formosa and the Pescadores than the Government of China?" Moreover, under the Treaty of Peace signed between the Government of the Republic of China and that of Japan, Japan had formally recognized the Chinese jurisdiction over these islands.

The question was raised when the Chinese Communists intended to "liberate" Formosa, and, after the Korean War, when they demanded its surrender as a price for the cease-fire in Korea. The country most concerned with Formosa is the United States. After the fall of the mainland, the United States returned to its old "Open-Door" policy which calls for inter-

national respect for territorial integrity of China. Based upon this policy the United States attempted to maintain the status quo of these islands through diplomatic and economic means, but not military intervention. Soon after the Korean war, President Truman expressly recognized its importance to the Pacific and the United States security and "ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa" and called upon "the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland." 

Canada was not concerned with the status of Formosa but feared the spreading of war. This fear naturally drove Canada to support United States neutralization of the Formosa Strait. But some of the CCF members interpreted United States neutralization policy as being tailored with the idea of antagonizing Communist China and warned that Canadians might be involved. Consequently, neutralization led the Chinese Communists to charge the United States with "armes aggression against the territory of China and a complete violation of the United Nations charter." As it happened, Mr. Pearson contemplated whether or not there was any more comprehensive action to deal with the Formosa issue.

37 J. W. Ballantine, Formosa, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1952, p. 120.
38 Ibid., p. 128.
39 Ibid., p. 127.
40 Harrison, op. cit., p. 237.
41 Ibid., p. 238.
It is hard to determine whether Mr. Pearson's suggestion of a comprehensive action to deal with the Formosa issue is a gesture or not, but it is generally believed that Mr. Pearson was one among those who had made their best efforts to talk the Communists into a cease-fire with an unrevealed intention of making concessions in the Formosa issue. He had repeatedly stated that Canada did not have any obligation or commitment towards Formosa. This kind of attitude undoubtedly implied certain appeasement towards the Chinese Communists.

On December 4, 1950, when there were general discussions as to whether the United Nations forces should fight a "limited war" in Korea or should bring the war to Manchuria, Mr. Pearson remarked that the risk of war transcended immeasurably over all other questions and that, if war in Korea could not be localized, there might be a general war with Communist China and the Soviet Union.\(^{42}\) The next day, he suggested the initiation of negotiations with the Chinese Communists, and later, the three-man cease-fire group of which he was a member informed the Chinese Communists that "once a cease-fire arrangement had been achieved", negotiations should begin for a "peaceful settlement of existing issues", including the questions of Formosa and Chinese representation in the United Nations.\(^{43}\)

\(^{42}\) Ibid., p. 303.

\(^{43}\) Cf. Angus, op. cit., p. 50; Harrison, op. cit., p. 311.
Mr. Pearson's view appeared to be coincided with that of the Chinese Communists, different only in technique. The Chinese Communist representative, Mr. Wu, who was invited to the United Nations to discuss the volunteers' action in Korea had also proposed the combined debate of Formosa and Korea and later expressed the idea that his government would be willing to try to advise the "volunteers" to desist in Korea with the condition that the foreign troops in Korea be withdrawn, Formosa be abandoned and Communist China's admission to the United Nations be granted. These were the price for a cease-fire in Korea. In this respect, Americans looked at the problems from a different angle and their attitude was different from that of the Canadians. They thought that to bargain Formosa and a seat on the Security Council for a Korean truce would be to reward aggression in one area with concession in another.

After the outbreak of the Korean War and before the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between China and Japan in April, 1952, there was general speculation as to the future status of Formosa. Questions which arose were these: whether Formosa had any strategic importance to the defence of the free world; whether the National Government of the Republic of China had a legal claim to the sovereignty over Formosa; -

44 Harrison, op. cit., p. 307.
whether the United States should further support the Republic of China; whether recognition of Communist China implied the acknowledgement of its legal claim to Formosa; moreover, whether the Republic of China should be protected in case of a Communist attack. Opinions pertaining to these questions were various and even confused. Naturally, when the Communists posed as a threat, military considerations prevailed over all others. President Truman's decision to interpose the Seventh Fleet between the mainland and Formosa was a direct result of this consideration. As a matter of fact, when the powers talked about Formosa in combination with Korea, the National government and its people strongly doubted whether or not the powers would accept the Communist terms and make a peace at the expense of the Republic of China. This doubt was well founded since there were some neutral nations, such as India, supporting the Communist stand. Canada's attitude was also in doubt. As mentioned above, Mr. Pearson had repeated his proposal of a comprehensive settlement of the Korean War, the question of Formosa and Chinese representation in the United Nations. Whatever his real intention might be, his proposal, once carried out, would greatly damage the prestige and worsen the position of the Republic of China.

Since the fall of the Chinese mainland, the American government had several times altered its policy towards Formosa,
from the policy in terms of "Open Door", non-intervention or "Hands-Off" to active support for defence by treaty. The "Hands-Off" policy was ended with the outbreak of the Korean War. Subsequently, the United States had in May, 1951, commissioned a Military Advisory and Assistance Group in Formosa with the purpose of reorganizing and training the Nationalist forces and executing the military assistance programmes.

Furthermore, on December 2, 1954, a Mutual Defence Treaty was signed between the United States and the Republic of China. Since then, American policy towards Formosa became concrete: to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, including the off-shore islands if necessary. 45

There had been considerable controversies over American policy towards Formosa. Arising out of the assumption that the Communists would sooner or later invade Formosa and the Pescadores, the general feeling was that this policy would involve the United States in the Chinese civil war and might initiate a general war in the Far East, thus, would eventually draw her allies into the same conflict.

On the other hand, there were also many prominent personalities, like General MacArthur, General Van Fleet, Mr. Knowland, Mr. Dulles and many others, who thought that Formosa

45 See below.
and the Pescadores must and should be kept in the Free World, thus, must be protected.

Canada had strongly wished to have Formosa neutralized. On November 15, 1952, Mr. Pearson stated: "we will be prepared to support... any appropriate resolution which would authorize the continuance of this neutralization of Formosa." But only one month later, President Eisenhower announced that the United States Seventh Fleet would not "continue to shield" the mainland from the Nationalist attack. This announcement aroused general concern among the American allies. In Canada, Mr. Pearson stated that "we do not think the defence of Formosa which has not been assumed by the United Nations should be confused with the defence of Korea which has", that "our consistent position has been that this island should be neutralized so far as possible while hostilities continue in Korea" and that "the final disposition of Formosa should be subject to be discussed at a conference on Far Eastern problems which should be held when the fighting ceases in Korea."!

Concerning this, the press in Canada lost no time in expressing their comments. The Globe and Mail of Toronto stated editorially: "The suggested new Formosa policy carries the danger of a third world war; and it is not surprising that

46 Angus, op. cit., p. 46.

the nations allied to the United States have shown some alarms at the Washington report."\textsuperscript{48} The Financial Post editorial stated: "Canada cannot be expected to applaud or approve, though we have nothing for it but to acquiesce."\textsuperscript{49} The Calgary Herald stated editorially: "Canada wants no part in any incident cut Formosa."\textsuperscript{50}

After the Korean truce, the obvious intention of Communist China was to shift its armed forces towards Formosa, and consequently, the United States and the Republic of China had, on December 2, 1954, signed a Mutual Defence Treaty under which "Each Party recognizes that any armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger."\textsuperscript{51} By this Treaty, "The United States are firmly committed to the defence of Formosa and the Pescadores."\textsuperscript{52} Following that, the United States Congress had passed a resolution authorizing the President to use American forces "as he deems necessary

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Article V of the Treaty.
for the specific purposes of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack." 53

Canada was shocked by these actions. Mr. Pearson commented that the war in and around Formosa and the coastal islands might spread to this continent by a reaction on the part of Communist China's ally--the Soviet Union. "If that reaction took place as a result of a local conflict in China... we would be asked to undertake the commitments which we have accepted as members of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." The leader of the CCF party expressed the same fear. 54

Canada's fear of war and her unwillingness to accept obligations were clearly implied in these statements and they generally reflected Canada's attitude towards the National government of China.

Connected with the so-called Formosa question are controversies over the off-shore islands--Matus and Quemoys. Concerning this, there are two divisions of thought. The one urged the surrender of these two islands to Red China in return for a cease-fire or a pledge not to attack Formosa and the Pescadores because, geographically these islands are close to the mainland, militarily they are small to be of any great


strategic value to the free World and politically the Chinese Communists should be entitled to them. As seen from statements of the Canadian government, Canada seems to be in this group. The other believes that Chinese Communists are faithful disciples of world Communism bent upon the pursuit of aggression and that any further yielding of free territory to them will be appeasement of the worst kind and such would be a heavy blow to the morale of the anti-Communist Chinese. To offer these islands in exchange for the acceptance of a ceasefire appears to be not well founded since the Communists will never give up their intention to attack Formosa and the Pescadores whether these off-shore islands are to be offered or not. These off-shore islands are out-posts of the Nationalist forces and provide easier access to the Formosa Strait and a useful springboard to jump on Formosa and the Pescadores.


The next meeting ground of China and Canada was in the United Nations and its agencies. In 1949 when China charged the Soviet Union with treaty breaking and violations of the United Nations Charter, Canada appeared to be a supporter of China, but later, after the Soviet refused to participate in

debate, Canada had ever abstained from voting of any resolution concerning the Chinese charges. The first resolution on which Canada abstained from voting was to propose that the Chinese charges be referred to the Intrim Committee for continued study. The reason given by the Canadian representative was that the political situation in China was in doubt. 57

On November 17, 1950, when the Chinese delegation introduced a draft resolution calling for the appointment of a United Nations Commission of Enquiry to look into the case, the Canadian representative stated that Chinese charges made in 1949 and 1950 were "indeed an eloquent accusation of bad faith in the conduct of the Soviet government towards a state to which it was bound by an agreement of friendship and alliance", but he opposed the new Chinese proposal with an explanation given in the following words: "We are not proposing that all accusations and evidence be buried. We are merely saying that little practical result can come from surveying them once again before a commission formally established by the United Nations." 58

The charges were eventually debated in the General Assembly on January 26, 1952. Subsequently, a resolution declaring that the USSR had failed to carry out the Treaty of

57 Angus, op. cit., p. 44.

August 14, 1945, was adopted on February 1, 1952. Canada again abstained from voting. The reason given was that Canada considered that the atmosphere of debates of "legalism divorced from reality" so long as "the Chinese Government which, at the present time, is in effective control of the mainland of China" did not support the charges and no change in the condition of the Chinese people could be brought about by adopting the resolution.\textsuperscript{59} Since 1950 especially after the United Kingdom and India had recognized the Communist regime, Canada was to withdraw its active or even moral support for the Chinese position in the United Nations.

China is one of the original members of the United Nations and holds veto on the Security Council. Since 1949, the Communist regime has never competed for the right to represent China in the United Nations, and thus raised the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{60} The situation was involved. Some of the United Nations members had shifted their recognition to the Communist regime and most of them still recognized the government of the Republic of China. To this situation, no provision of the Charter was applicable.

\textsuperscript{59} Angus, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{60} The proposal of admitting it to the United Nations was defeated in the Security Council on August 1, 1950, by a vote of 8 to 3 and in the General Assembly on September 19, 1950, by a vote of 33 to 16.
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The issue was for the first time raised in the sixth session of the General Assembly by a Soviet proposal to put on the agenda "The representation of China in the United Nations." The Assembly rejected the proposal and adopted a resolution postponing consideration of a further proposal either to exclude representatives of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Communist regime. Ever since then the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations has been raised in each session either by the Soviet Union or by India.

From the legal point of view, the issue of representation in the United Nations is not connected with the issue of recognition, but from the political point of view, these two issues are inevitably tied together. Among the powers, the attitudes of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States were divergent on this issue. The Labour Government of the United Kingdom did accord recognition to the Communist regime and its Foreign Minister, Mr. E. Bevin, had stated in the House of Commons that "it would be better for us to help to shepherd China into the United Nations rather than to oppose

61 Angus, op. cit., p. 43.

62 In a reply to Mr. Coldwell who thought that the United Kingdom had supported Communist China into the United Nations, Mr. Pearson stated that the United Kingdom, while recognizing the Peking government, had not at any time supported the application of that government for membership in the United Nations. Cf. External Affairs, May, 1955, Vol. 7, No. 5, p. 162.
her entry and cause unnecessary frustrations", 63 but actually it did not actively support Communist China's representation in the United Nations. 64 The Conservative Government kept silence on this issue. However, the British press made it plain that British opinion would not oppose the admission of Red China and that there was a feeling that the Chinese might be happy to have other external relations and become less dependent on the Soviet Union. 65

American opinion was bitterly critical of such attempts and the government attitude was unyielding to the admission of Communist China into the United Nations. 66 In 1953, United States Senate passed a resolution opposing the admission of Chinese Communist representation to the United Nations. The House of Representatives reaffirmed their resolution in the following July. In the United Nations, the American representative also stood firmly. In September, 1954, when Foreign Ministers of Scandinavian powers called for admission of Communist China "within the near future", the American delegate, Mr. James J. Wadsworth, replied that the United States was "unalterably opposed to Communist China's entry into the United Nations in the near future or at any time as long as the regime

64 See above, p. 88.
65 Keirstead, op. cit., p. 235.
66 Ibid.
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continues at war with the United Nations and in flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter." 67 Ambassador Lodge even went so far as to attempt to use the veto to keep the Chinese Communists away from the United Nations. The successive Republican majority leaders, Mr. W. F. Knowland and Mr. L. B. Johnson, had announced that they would favour withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations if Communist China were admitted. 68

The attitude of Canada, as explained by Mr. Pearson in the House of Commons, was that "the United Nations would have more chance of dealing effectively with the situation that then existed in the Far East if the Chinese Communist Government... were represented in its deliberations; the United Nations would be a healthier organization if dissenting views were stated within rather than without the Organization." On the other hand, as he admitted, it was difficult for governments which had not yet recognized the Peking regime to see representatives of that regime seated in the United Nations. It even became far more difficult after the outbreak of Korean war. 69


68 Ibid., p. 18.

69 Debates, House of Commons, Canada, February 2, 1951, Vol. I, p. 84.
Canada did not support the Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations mainly because she did not yet recognize that regime. From statements of Mr. Pearson, it is evident that the Liberal Government would support the Communist representation in the United Nations once Canada had recognized that regime.

Both the CCF and Conservative looked at the question from different angles and their divergence in this respect is the same as that on the recognition issue. In 1954, Mr. Coldwell had strongly advocated recognition because the Korean war had come to a truce. In 1955, he urged the Government to admit the Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations.

The Conservatives who, on the other hand, had strongly opposed the recognition of Red China were also opposed to the admission of Communist representation in the United Nations. Mr. Diefenbaker said: "My belief is that no international thug should be allowed to shoot its way into the United Nations." Mr. Fleming stated: "The Peking regime is not eligible to be

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70 Ibid.
admitted to the United Nations." Mr. Drew put his idea in these words: "There is a great difference between expelling a nation (Soviet Russia) already a member and permitting a nation (Communist China) to enter." 

Being influenced by those feelings, the Canadian Government could not but be cautious. The question at issue is that there are many problems existing between Communist China on the one hand and the United Nations and its members on the other, particularly the Korean armistice and unification; moreover, Communist China, once admitted, would contend for a permanent seat on the Security Council which holds veto power and would stand on the Russian side in antagonizing the powers of the free world. The Communist regime seeks for membership in the United Nations for many reasons: to balance its prestige at home and abroad, to distinguish its diplomatic dependence upon Moscow, and to eliminate the Nationalist representation from the United Nations, an act which would strengthen its political hand at home and abroad and undermine the political role of Nationalist China as a rallying point of the free Chinese. If Red China's entry into the United Nations is succeeded by the removal of Nationalist China, there would be disastrous effects upon the balance of power in the United Nations and the United Nations would be paralyzed by such an antagonizing factor.

74 Ibid.
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Looking back upon Sino-Canadian relations of the past fifty years, one has a confident feeling that there are more changes in their respective internal politics than in their relationship. The only friendly relations created through wartime cooperation against the common enemy are neither intimate nor solid and may be interpreted as an emergency collaboration. In the past fifty years, the world order has been completely revised, yet the general principles of their respective policies and relative positions among the powers have changed little. So far as Canada is concerned, the general principles of Canadian foreign policy towards the Far East in general and towards China in particular remain the same as those of some twenty-five years ago when Japan was a main threat to the peace and security in the Pacific and Asia. The only change is that Communist China and Soviet Russia have taken the position of Japan as a new threat. The United Nations seems to function more actively and effectively but the net result of its action seems still far from being satisfactory to us. So far as China is concerned, though she has undergone an historical change in both political and economic fields, her position among the powers have become no better. The Republic of China has retreated to Taiwan and relies upon
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foreign assistance; and Communist China, as a totalitarian regime and a close ally of Soviet Russia, is barred from the normal society of nations. The controversy over Formosa constitutes a world problem as did the Manchurian crisis.

However, while all broad lines remain the same, there are certain important changes which should not be overlooked. Generally, both China and Canada are peace-loving nations, and the understanding of each about the other has been improved by the flow of time and the common experience of war. Both of them have grievously learned the lessons that peace is indivisible and that an acceptable peace can only be maintained through collective action based upon military strength. Canada has deplored the tragedy in China and has resolutely despatched troops to Korea. Who could expect such action during the Manchurian crisis? Chinese immigration problems have been a matter of bitter controversy in both Dominion and provincial governments. Today, the echo is very faint. Saskatchewan and British Columbia had disfranchised Chinese Canadians, but today there is even a Member of Parliament of Chinese origin. It seems right to say that basically the feeling between China and Canada has been improved to a certain extent.

It is a hard fact that China and Canada have seldom stood closely and harmoniously though both of them are peace-loving nations. The reason for this is that both countries
are established on different foundations, ethnically and culturally, and carry on their national policies with different beliefs, politically and economically. Their relationship in the past is a kind of normal but superficial contact and between them there is neither bitter enmity nor cordial friendship. Each seems indifferent to the interests and affairs of the other. This is easily realized when China is in disaster and the world is in crisis. True enough, Canada had deplored the Japanese invasion in Manchuria, yet it was also a Canadian representative, Mr. Sahak, who supported Sir John Simon in emphasizing the strong points of the Japanese case.

Practically speaking, China and Canada are in different groups of nations so far as the national ideal is concerned. The general principles of Canadian national policy are undoubtedly influenced by the British tradition which is mostly based upon realism. On the other hand, the Chinese, though they have experienced so many changes in the past four thousand years, still advocate idealism. The Republic of China is devoted to the practice of the "Three Principles of the People" in a hope to create a peaceful, wealthy and just world. Communist China naturally bases its political belief upon Communism and hopes to build a Communist world. Canada does not have such political doctrines or principles (of course, they are not necessary), and the only principles to
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... guide her national policy are the observance of the democratic way of life and the improvement of the people's welfare. In other words, the Chinese pursue their national policies in terms of National ideals, while Canada does not.

It seems in this point that the distinction between the principle of the Chinese foreign policy and that of the Canadian has been made. The Chinese seem seldom to give up their ideals and goals and the Canadians rarely their national interests no matter what the real situation may be. The present clash between the Republic of China and Communist China is a clash of two ideals or of two political doctrines. This kind of ideological conflict seems not necessary and wholly acceptable to the Canadians who have a natural tendency to base their national policy on reality and tend to think national interests prevail over the international and even moral.

Based upon this assumption, Canada, comparatively speaking, paid little attention to the interests of China and the fate of the Chinese people in the past, and now a considerable number of Canadians advocate the recognition of Communist China since, they think, recognition does not imply moral approval and is not necessarily related with the ideological dislike, yet would pave the way to trade. Based upon the same assumption, a considerable number of them cherish the two-China idea and usually ask why there can be no possibility of twin Chinas.
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Obviously, a certain number of them misunderstand the true nature of Communism and underestimate the ambition of Communist China. They usually think "Canada does not care because Canada is growing up" and cherish a certain idea of "co-existence with Communist China" and, of course, they neglect the ultimate goal of world communism. Indeed, Canada so far remains unaffected seriously, but the Canada-does-not-care idea seems not a safe way to true world peace. At present, Canada seems to isolate herself to a certain extent from the affairs of China and at the same time expects a profitable trade with Communist China. It seems fair to say that so far as Canadian foreign policy towards China is concerned, Canadians, like their neighbours during the 1920's, are economically internationalists and politically isolationists.

Writing in 1940 of the period immediately before the Second World War, Professor Lower was able to say that "Canada finds itself in the strange position of being a power of the first rank economically but of the second rank politically or diplomatically."¹ These words need little alteration in describing Canada today. True enough, at present, Canada cannot avoid playing certain role in international affairs and since the end of the War Canada has been striving to assert her political influence among nations and indeed,

¹ Lower, op. cit., p. 98.
internationally, both her prestige and influence have greatly been increased, but these were mainly the consequences of her economic strength.

Canada's ties with the Far East in general and with China in particular have revolved around her relationship with the United Kingdom and the United States in terms of collective action or collective security. She has qualified her support of the United Kingdom by claiming either a voice in the formation of a common policy or the recognized right to a separate policy. At the same time, she cannot stand apart from her powerful neighbour upon whose strength she depends for security.

China's foreign relations, too, were chiefly with the United Kingdom before the 1930's and with the United States after the outbreak of the Second World War. Unlike Canada, however, China has continued to exist by her own struggles and by the agreements of balance of powers among nations. She has never had any aggressive political or military alliance. (Communist China is an exception). During the past century, the main purposes of her foreign policy have been to achieve political independence and territorial integrity which can hardly be regarded as the essence or chief objectives of Canadian foreign policy.

Canada's role in international politics seems not so important in the consideration of the Chinese, and of course, vice versa. Since the end of the War, the major efforts of
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Canadian foreign policy have been said to be directed to the promotion of peace and welfare, establishment of collective security and the resistance to Communist expansion. Unfortunately, Canada's zeal for the cause of world peace and collective security has not so far been matched by her practical action. This may be seen from her passive attitude toward certain important treaty organizations in the Pacific area, such as SEATO and ANZUS. Since the outbreak of the Korean War, Canada has attempted to march in steps with the United States, but after the Chinese Communists despatched "volunteers" to Korea, Canada has tended to passively recognize certain facts and acknowledge the Communist success.

While cooperating with the United States to the utmost, Canada will not let herself be in the position of a camp follower. Mr. Pearson stated in the House of Commons that the fundamental and long-term aims of Canada and the United States are similar although Canada may differ on occasions in her approach to specific issue and as to how these long-term aims can best be achieved. With regard to the Asiatic problems, Canadian foreign policy deviated from both that of the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada did not follow the United Kingdom in recognizing Communist China and also refused to accept a pledge from the United States to defend Formosa. When the United States pressed for the condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor in Korea, Mr. Pearson com-
mented this move as "premature and unwise". Public opinion in Canada has seriously questioned the rightness of American policy towards China.

On the China problems, the difference of their policies seems to lie in their basic concept and also in their technique but not in their goals. The majority of Canadians think that the fall of the Chinese mainland is a result of the development of Chinese nationalism, that the Chinese Communists are simply argarian reformers and that Communist China will sooner or later fall away from Soviet Russia. This kind of concept seems to have been influenced by that of the Indians who usually looked at the problem in that way. On the other hand, majority of Americans usually think that the Chinese Communists are nothing other than "Communists international". Following this difference, their general attitudes and technique in dealing with the Chinese Communists are also different.

The difference and contradictions of the policies of the western powers have been heavily exploited by Soviet Russia and Communist China with success. They use these weak points of the West in an attempt to split the Western solidarity. Many of the United States allies have been jockeyed and have come to believe that if Communist China is recognized, if Formosa is handed over to Communist China and if Communist China is admitted to the United Nations, then all existing
problems will be solved and there will be peace again in the Far East and Mao Tse-tung will become a Tito of China.

The United States, on the other hand, has come to believe that if that regime is not recognized, if it is kept out of the United Nations and if the free Asians are maintained effectively to resist Communist aggression, then the West can effectively frustrate Communist expansion. Furthermore, the United States tends to use military action to answer Communist military attempts. It is true that the relative stability of affairs in the Far East since the division of the Viet-Nam is almost entirely due to the presence of American military forces in that area.

Communist China has been imposing a heavy strain upon relations among the Western powers. Canadians have realized that Communist China may cause trouble between the United States and Canada. This has been proved by Communist China's successive gestures aimed at the promotion of trade between Canada and Red China. These gestures imply more than appear on the surface. Trade is first related to the effectiveness of the embargo of war materials which the West has imposed upon that regime; extensive trade would be able to undo the whole purpose of the embargo measure. Besides this, experience shows that Communist trade is usually followed by political penetration. Red China knows very well that Canada is a strong and close ally of the United States and desires foreign
trade for economic expansion. Yet only in this case, Communist China attempts to get contact with Canada through trade first.

Canada looks the Far East as affording natural opportunity for profitable trade. Although Canada's chief trade partner in the Far East has been Japan, Canada hopes that, through China's future strength and wealth, trade will be expanded. Unfortunately, the development of events has not vindicated this hope conceived during and immediately following the Second World War. It must be pointed out, however, that trade with China, irrespective of what political party is in power, is limited by China's lack of foreign exchange. Before the Second World War, China's balance of payments presented a peculiar problem and was supplied only by the remittance of the Chinese overseas. At present, Communist China has revised its original economic system, changed its trade partners, and shifted most of its trade to the Communist countries directed by Soviet Russia. It is hard to say whether—even with recognition of Communist China—the situation will change.
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