Beyond the Prairies: The Basis of Reform Support in Ontario and its Implications for the Canadian Party System

A Masters Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science University of Ottawa

by

Christa Scholtz
Ottawa, Ontario
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Au Professeur François-Pierre Gingras,
Pour son enthousiasme et son encouragement.
Par ses critiques constructives, il a su me garder dans la bonne voie.
Tout en me laissant la liberté de m'exprimer à mes risques et périls:

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Laura, who showed me that a thesis can be completed against all odds, (so
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Wenn man den Willen hat es zu tun."
Abstract

The title of the Master's thesis submitted and accepted by the University of Ottawa is Beyond the Prairies: The Basis of Reform Support in Ontario and its Implications for the Canadian Party System. The thesis explores three questions: On what basis were Ontario voters courted during the 1993 federal election by the Reform Party of Canada? What are the political, economic, and demographic predictors of Reform support in Ontario? What are the implications of Reform support in Ontario for the Canadian party system? The thesis proceeds to structure the exploration of these questions within three schools of thought: post-modernism, political party systems theory, and theories regarding the emergence of collective behaviour. The thesis explores these questions using a variety of methodologies, including re-examinations of electoral data in order to control for rural, sub-urban, and urban effects, demographic and economic data garnered from Statistics Canada, and a questionnaire completed by Reform Party candidates in the 1993 federal election. The thesis explores the effect of previous federal, provincial, and referendum voting patterns on Reform Party support. The thesis concludes that: 1) the Reform Party vote in Ontario is the vote of the ideologically-committed right wing, 2) the Party's support is concentrated in mid-sized urban Ontario and defies a rural description, 3) the support is that of the economically secure who are facing declining opportunities, 4) the politicization of citizen alienation through the themes of parliamentary reform and populism has been key in developing activism in Ontario, and fiscal conservatism is a solidifying agent of this conversion. The thesis explores the implications of the Reform Party's success in Ontario, particularly whether the party can escape the inherent difficulties between populism and parliamentary democracy. The thesis concludes with a discussion of whether the party is the harbinger of fundamental change in the Canadian political party system.
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Chapter 1: Beyond the Prairies

The 1993 general election marked the arrival of the Reform Party on the federal political scene as a force to be reckoned with. The party has successfully continued in the venerable line of Western political parties made good, fuelled at least in part by the mix of prairie populism, discontent and the potent feeling of exclusion. If Reform is rooted in the third party tradition of the Progressives\(^1\), the Social Credit\(^2\), and the CCF\(^3\), it is poised to leave it behind. The particular circumstances of the 1993 election - the collapse of the Conservative and New Democratic parties and the electoral success of the Bloc québécois\(^4\) - indicate that Reform is well placed to assume a much more dominant position than its third party status would indicate.

It seems that the future ability of the Reform party to "pierce" the barriers of the Canadian political party system and become one of the dominant parties in a historically stable two-party-plus system\(^5\) rests in part on its success in expanding into Ontario and translating that expansion into electoral gains. Given Ontario's preponderance in the House of Commons, the province commanding 99 of the chamber's 295 seats, the importance of gaining the province's political favour is clear. The Reform party must translate its growing popularity in the province into substantial electoral gains if its goal of assuming office is to be realized. The party's future in Ontario is also critical in light of Reform's electoral chances in Québec. With only a marginal showing in Ontario and a strong presence in the Western provinces, Reform's chances of assuming the mantle of government lie in winning seats in Québec. A serious expansion effort into Québec would require the party to confront contradictions in its policies towards the province:

> The official languages policy of the Reform Party's 1988 platform called for a "recognition of French in Québec and English elsewhere as the"

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\(^1\) See Morton, W.L.: *The Progressive Party in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 1950


\(^4\) Refer to Table I.1

\(^5\) The first period of Canadian party competition at the federal level was characterized by the dominance of the Liberal and Conservative parties. The election of the Progressives to the House of Commons in 1921 indicated the beginning of a transition to a two-party-plus system, with the CCF-NDP establishing themselves as the most serious third party contender in the wake of the Progressives' eventual decline. Until the 1993 federal election, this three-way pattern of party competition generally held fast.
predominant language of work and society"... To support the language rights of English Quebeckers might not be a bad policy in itself, but it is at cross purposes with the territorial bilingualism that Manning says he advocates, and is a definite barrier to attracting francophone supporters for the Reform party in Québec. Manning will have to sort out these problems if he ever hopes to expand into Québec...Manning's move into Québec is beset with so many difficulties that one may wonder whether it is worth the effort.  

As well, a consideration worthy of note is whether the present membership of the party would welcome a strong Québec wing. While the 1994 Assembly welcomed their Québec delegates with some enthusiasm, Western delegates did not hesitate to express their displeasure about the party diverting its financial and human resources in the interests of a serious Quebec expansion. While the public face of the party has become more Québec-friendly than ever before, further study shows that the originally non-compromising attitudes of the party faithful have not changed appreciably. The evidence for this is not merely anecdotal. In one study of 1993 electoral data, it was found that "...a voter at the anti-French extreme was four times as likely to vote Reform as a voter at the other end. None of the growth in the Reform share came from francophiles...Reform...must have attracted francophobes across the board, not just from the old Conservative bloc."  

Barring the event of Canada's dismemberment, Reform's chances at government depend on its ability to expand its base, an event which could strengthen the national credibility of the party while potentially compromising its current stronghold.  

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7See Cardozo, A.; "Reform is Here to Stay"; The Canadian Forum; Vol.74, No. 835. December 1994; p.8

8This statement is based on my observations on the floor of the Ottawa Assembly on October 13, 1994.

9For a preliminary look at potential conflicts between Reform delegates on the basis of provincial origin, see Faron Ellis; "Constituency Representation Issues in the Reform Party of Canada"; paper prepared for presentation to the 1994 annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, June 1994


11Johnston, R., N. Neville, H. Brady; "Campaign Dynamics in 1993: Liberals, Conservatives, and Reform"; paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, 1994 (unpublished); p.20
difficulty does not only present itself in respect to Québec. With Ontario holding more seats in the House of Commons than all the western provinces combined and hence more riding associations and delegates of the party originating from Ontario, it is clear that the party will have to deal with issues of the very domination in its own ranks against which it campaigned so forcefully in 1988. The expansion of the party outside its strictly western base thus holds untold implications, not just for the party system, but for the unity of the party as well.

The expansion of the Reform party outside its regional base necessitates that the strictly regional message of the Reform party used in the 1988 election campaign be rejected in order to garner support in Central Canada. Through a detailed content analysis of articles appearing in the party's main communications tool, their newsletter The Reformer, it has been demonstrated that the party has tailored its message from a regional to a national preoccupation, broadening its intended audience.12 This strategic re-tailoring of the Reform message has been confirmed through subsequent writings.13 The need to rid the Reform message of its western cast does not necessarily indicate which particular messages were chosen to court latent Reform support in Ontario, however. It is unclear on which rhetorical basis Reform is courting potential voters on the grass-roots level in Ontario.

I. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS

This thesis will attempt to answer the following questions:

1. On what basis are Ontario voters courted by Reform?
2. What are the predictors of Reform support in Ontario?
3. What are the implications of Reform success in Ontario for the Canadian party system?

I have identified three schools of thought which will provide an operating and theoretical framework for the study, as well as provide a basis for informed hypotheses.

The application of post-modernist analysis to the rising politics of the new right, too often associated with the new politics of resentment, is as yet limited enough to be readily accessible. In his work on the rise of resentiment politics in the united Germany, Hans-Georg Betz14 draws a link between the social and economic changes brought on by

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12 For a look at the content of the Reform party's message in its first years of operation, see Scholtz, C.; “The Reform Party of Canada: The Transmission and Evolution of a Nationalist Message”; presented to the New York State Political Science Association Annual Meetings; Albany, New York; April 1994

13 See in particular Flanagan, T.; Waiting for the Wave: p.69-72

fundamental social and economic restructuring and the rise of the radical right. The rise of the radical right is seen as a backlash against the rise of left-libertarian values and the realities of social pluralism and fragmentation in modern post-industrial societies. Betz argues that the acceleration of economic and social modernization has left considerable segments of the populations of advanced capitalist societies materially, or culturally or politically marginalized. These right-wing movements are interested in discrediting or at the very least depoliticizing those left-libertarian and pluralist values of post-modern societies. Sigurdsdson makes a convincing link between postmodernism and the Reform Party in Canada, identifying the party as a vehicle for the disaffected. Casting the Reform Party in its context as a response to a postmodernist condition differentiates the party from its third party precursors. If this is indeed the case, it would be interesting to see whether the Reform Party, unable to rely on the loaded buzz-words of Western alienation and regional discontent in Ontario, deliberately taps into the well-spring of marginalization and disorientation.

The second school of thought which offers important answers and directions to this project is that of the political party systems theorists. The literature of postmodernism and that of political party systems in Canada coincide at a very basic and functional level. Betz expresses deep concerns over the viability of integration politics in Germany. Betz makes a connection between the inability of the two dominant bourgeois parties in Germany to make the most of their "enormous integrative powers" and the rise of the radical right wing. While the comparison between the Reform Party and the German radical right should not be pushed too far, their relationship to the breakdown of the integrative function of political parties generally is a point worthy of pursuit. A discussion as to whether political parties can sufficiently aggregate a variety of interests in light of their increasing fragmentation is particularly relevant for the Reform Party, who has attracted an economically and demographically narrow stratum of Canadians to its activist ranks.

An examination of the integration function of political parties leads one to consider how the Canadian party system’s functions, be they manifest or latent, have changed and how these changes have placed the Reform party in its present enviable position. Carty

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15 Betz, H.-G.; Postmodern Politics in Germany: The Politics of Resentment; p.15

16 Sigurdsdson, R.; "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada"; Canadian Journal of Political Science; Vol. 27, No.2 (June 1994); p.249-276

17 Betz, H.-G.; Postmodern Politics in Germany: The Politics of Resentment; p.90

18 See Archer, K. and Ellis, F.; “Opinion Structure of Party Activists: The Reform Party of Canada”; Canadian Journal of Political Science: Vol.27, No.2; June 1994; p.277-308. In this article, the authors confirm that party activists are disproportionately male, middle-aged or older, and come from higher socio-economic levels. It is stressed, however, that most studies have shown party activists, of any stripe, to be unrepresentative of the norm.
posits that party system change — determined by a fundamental change in the way that system is able to fulfil both manifest and latent functions — stems from changes in the institutional arrangements for governing within which political parties have had to operate. The failure of the Meech and Charlottetown Accords in 1990 and 1992 respectively would indicate that the process governing the building of consensus is no longer adequate for a majority of Canadians.

In his study of Réal Caouette’s Social Credit in Québec, Pinard draws heavily on the work of Smelser. Key to both Pinard and Smelser is the dual conditions of societal strain and structural conduciveness in the emergence of collective behaviour, to which the rise of alternative, populist parties are included. Possible indicators of such strain, such as economic restructuring of the manufacturing and service sectors, or a change in the migration or demographic patterns within Ontario, may prove to be determinants of Reform support. Indeed, a central theme in Sigurdson’s appraisal of Reform support is the importance of “economic dislocations related to the transformation to a postindustrial economy” which has “fuelled the flames of discontent”. Elements of structural conduciveness, such as the collapse of the Conservative and New Democratic parties, may also correspond to patterns of Reform support.

II. HYPOTHESES

This preliminary scan of the literature leads one to the following hypotheses:

1. That during the 1993 election campaign the message of the Reform party in Ontario at the riding level exploited to an appreciable degree the perceived citizen-elite cleavage. This citizen-elite cleavage represents a vehicle the party has used to take advantage of citizens’ marginalization and alienation from the political process.

A political party has the option of appealing to voters on various bases, prioritising some over others, excluding others from the terms of electoral battle. The politicization of certain issues is indeed the recognized prerogative of political parties in a competitive party system: "...political parties forge collective identities, instill commitments, define the interests on behalf of which collective actions become possible, offer choices to

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22 Sigurdson, R.; “Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada”; p.263
individuals and deny them." The bases on which parties attempt to enamour voters is selected from a universe of questions present in a given political "issue space". A party in a competitive system attempts to establish itself as the most desirable and credible option, at least for a fraction of the electorate, with regards to certain elements of this issue space. While the diversity of issues and questions included in the realm of political discourse is extensive, the range of issues which become pertinent and determinant in elections is relatively circumscribed. Some elements of the issue space are marginalized during the period of electoral battle, with the resultant effect being the diminution of attractive bases of electoral debate. The restriction of the electoral issue space is a reflection of the success of parties to turn electoral debate around those issues on which the parties feel confident they can garner enough political support. It is therefore the task of political parties to limit the breadth of salient bases of electoral support, and to establish primacy over the most salient issues.

In 1993, the Reform party had the task to evaluate which electoral issues would endear the party to the most voters as possible nationally without compromising party principles. It also had to establish these issues as important issues within the campaign. The leader and the central electoral machine of the party would conceivably be responsible for this task. On the riding level, candidates were constrained by necessity to respect the discursive boundaries established in Calgary, but are nonetheless free to respond to those issues, or "bases" of electoral discussion, according to those concerns most deeply held by constituents. The most favoured messages selected by the Reform Party to woo voters are thus chosen from a universe or a set of issues. Based on the history of the party and the policy platforms it has chosen to present to the public, I consider the following categories as the constituent elements of Reform’s issue universe: 1) fiscal/economic, 2) citizen marginalization/alienation, 3) regional discontent/geographical inequity, 4) public safety/criminal reform, and 5) social disintegration.

It is expected that the general framework of the Reform message in Ontario will be structured primarily around the three themes chosen by the party early in 1993 to form their national electoral platform: tax relief through fiscal reform, safer streets and homes through criminal reform, and more accountable politicians through parliamentary and democratic reform.

On a district level, the Reform message would have greater opportunity to emphasize

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24 The categorization of issues will be further defined in Chapter IV of this thesis.

25 The planks of the election platform were so outlined in the Reform publication the Mini-Reformer, Vol.6, No.1, January 1993.
the alienation and marginalization of the voter from the elites of Canadian society. District-level campaign would conceivably afford candidates greater opportunities to exploit particular messages which are not necessarily emphasized by the national campaign literature. The issue categories of citizen marginalization/alienation and social disintegration are two such messages. There are indications that the strain of alienation, or feeling "left out" of the democratic process was a particular concern of those Reform activists who organized the first riding associations in the province.\textsuperscript{26} While the theme of alienation is expected to loom large, it is not expected that it will be cast in regional terms. Firstly, the penetration of the party in Ontario coincided with the strategic decisions of the party to extend itself past any particular regional designation, and cast itself as a national party with national interests. The party, from 1990 onwards, shifted its rhetoric of "exclusion" from a regional, core versus periphery, argument to the "exclusion" of the average citizen from the democratic process seemingly governed by unrepresentative parties captured by "special interests".\textsuperscript{27} This is not to say that regional disparities are not a concern of Ontario voters; rather, that these regional questions have largely been contained in the sphere of provincial politics, with little spill over to the discourse of federal politics. It is expected that this would be reflected in the local appeal of the Reform Party.

This first hypothesis calls upon one to demonstrate the basis on which Reform courted Ontario voters in the federal electoral campaign of 1993. The courting of the potential Reform voter, as alluded to earlier, conceivably occurs on two main levels: 1) the national campaign content and direction as determined by the leader and the party's central electoral "machine", and 2) the local-level, constituency tailored message of the Reform candidate. While the national campaign message indicates a certain estimation by party officials of the strengths of the party and certainly an evaluation of its support base, the national campaign content is by necessity a homogeneous one. Local-level message manipulation can be instructive of Reform candidates' evaluations of which issues or factors have particular resonance in their particular areas. Further, local partisan activity might prove more informative of perceived Reform support at the riding level.

In order to determine the basis on which Reform voters were courted at the riding level, a questionnaire, appended to this thesis, was developed and distributed to Ontario's Reform candidates in the 1993 federal elections. The main body of the survey attempts to determine, from the candidate's perspective, those issues which dominated the local campaign and which strategies were employed by the Reform organization to maximize their success in the riding. This includes which messages the candidates prioritized in his/her bid for electoral office. This technique also allows one to explore, via the opinions and perspectives of the candidates, the relative importance of certain factors—

\textsuperscript{26}Manning, E.P.; The New Canada; Toronto: Macmillan; 1992; p. 266

\textsuperscript{27}Sigurdson, R.; "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada"; p.261
discursive, political, or socio-economic—on the ridings' electoral decisions.

2. That a hierarchy of predictors of Reform support in Ontario can be established, where political predictors are more significant than socio-economic predictors.

The decision to prioritize political predictors over socio-economic predictors is based on a number of sources. Firstly, Pinard found that while a number of social and economic factors provided the requisite strain, the structural conduciveness of Québec's federal party system was paramount. In Québec's case, the dominance of the federal Liberals and the corresponding weakness of the Conservatives allowed for the eventual rise of the Créditistes. Pinard does explore the impact of economic strains, concluding that conditions of relative deprivation and unrealistic expectations play a key role in the rise of third parties; however, economic strains were secondary to the peculiarities of the province's party system.

The greater importance of political predictors in the rise of third parties can be established by taking a step back to Neil Smelser's original arguments. Smelser, of course, was interested in outlining a theory as to how collective behaviour—in whatever form—manifested itself. Electoral choice constitutes a form of collective behaviour, since patterns of vote choice reflect a society's general approval or more likely disapproval of its political leadership. Although Smelser's arguments pertain to how uninstitutionalised collective action arises, his arguments have merit when considering how collective behaviour is incorporated within the political sphere. In order to effect change in the political system, the strains induced by postmodernism, as they have been identified here, need to be channelled into the structures of representation the political system has recognized as legitimate. These structures are divided into what Smelser terms structures of interest articulation—pressure groups, status groups—and interest aggregation—legislatures, bureaucracies, political coalitions. Political parties are interesting mechanisms in that they serve both aggregation and articulation functions, although while in opposition, the articulation function is paramount—while in government, the aggregation function is the more important of the two. The articulation function is

\[\text{Studies show that Canadian voters are more likely to punish incumbents for unfavourable conditions, rather than bestow electoral rewards for more favourable outcomes. As such election results are more instructive on the reasons for one party's loss rather than another party's gain. See inter alia Archer, K. and M. Johnson; "Inflation, Unemployment and Canadian Federal Voting Behaviour", Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXI:3 (September 1988); pp.569-584; Clarke, H.D. et al; Absent Mandate; The Politics of Discontent in Canada; Toronto: Gage Publishing Ltd.; 1984 and Clarke, H.D. and A. Kornberg; "Support for the Canadian Federal Progressive Conservative Party since 1988: The Impact of Economic Evaluations and Economic Issues", Canadian Journal of Political Science; XXII:2 (June 1989); pp.29-53.}\]

\[\text{The reader is reminded that while Smelser does not refer to postmodernism in his work, his arguments have been incorporated within a postmodern rationale for the uses of this thesis.}\]

\[\text{Smelser, N.; Theory of Collective Behaviour; p.278-280}\]
particularly acute for opposition parties when they are distant from the centre of the ideological spectrum, since it is the ideological margins which tend to escape the breadth of a government’s brokerage ability. The discontented of the right tend to perceive that the structures of interest articulation (pressure groups, status groups) have been largely monopolized by the left-libertarian “special interests”. Structures of interest aggregation were in the case of legislatures controlled through political parties and the electoral system; and in the case of the federal bureaucracy, it was in the service of the government and other established interests and therefore incompatible with their interests:

One reason for a new national party, according to Manning, is that “special interest” groups have infiltrated the bureaucracy and have managed to get the established parties to bend to their wishes. Manning’s antibureaucracy rhetoric feeds off the perception that the state is expanding enormously in accordance with the new demands placed upon it by essentially pro-bureaucracy interest groups representing small, self-interested minorities.\(^{31}\)

Therefore, at least before the 1992 Charlottetown Referendum, the lack of alternative channels for expressing dissatisfaction made the vehicle of the political party seem the only viable channel available. In other words, since the socioeconomic basis of right wing discontent is potentially wide, therefore fragmented, the structural conduciveness of the vehicle for that dissatisfaction (the political party and the party system) is the stronger determinant of the movement’s success.

The prioritization of political predictors over their economic counterparts is also due to the curious relationship between economics and voting choice in the 1993 election. Although the rhetoric of the electoral campaign was replete with economic concerns, be they debt or deficit, unemployment or continental economic integration, the link between economics and voting choice is not so easily discerned. Przeworski and Sprague write that “the relation between economic conditions and political behaviour is indirect... partly because economic conditions acquire social meaning only in social interactions”.\(^{32}\) For the same reason class politics has never taken hold in Canada—class was not imbued with political salience or “social meaning”. What is curious in the 1993 election is the evidence that despite the attention paid by the political combatants to economic conditions, “no economic item appears to have [had] a discriminating impact on vote intentions across Canada”.\(^{33}\) Turcotte expands on this finding of the 1993 electoral data:

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\(^{31}\) Sigurdson, R.; “Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada”; p.261


\(^{33}\) Gingras, F.-P. et al; “Setting the Record Straight About the 1993 Federal Election”; 1994; p.15
This is not to say that there is no link between economic evaluations and vote choice...However, the link between primary issue concerns and voting intentions, although significant, remained weak throughout the period...Hence, this study leads to a cautious rejection of the economic voting hypothesis.\textsuperscript{34}

This might suggest that while the credibility of a political party was evaluated according to its ability to occupy an economic issue, voters did not vote for the party of their choice because of economics, despite the inordinate attention paid to economic issues by politicians on the campaign trail; other considerations brought the voters home.

2a. Among the political predictors, the strength of the No vote on a riding basis for the Charlottetown Accord is the strongest predictor, followed by the configuration of previous party support in the riding.

1) Referendum on the Charlottetown Accord 1992

Several authors have remarked on the importance of the citizen-elite cleavage which manifested itself in the months preceding and during the Charlottetown referendum campaign. The event was heralded as a fundamental vote against Canada's ruling political elite, the No verdict an irrevocable act of electoral defiance.\textsuperscript{35} The feeling amongst Reformers is described as the following:

Many Reformers believe that the process of public consultation they witnessed during the lead up to the Charlottetown Accord did not adequately solicit public opinion. Rather, the process simply expanded the role of elites within the old process of special interest accommodation.\textsuperscript{36}

Given the significance of the Charlottetown referendum in the political crystallization of marginalization described concerning the first hypothesis, and the importance of marginalization and anti-establishment sentiment in the Reform movement,\textsuperscript{37} vote

\textsuperscript{34}Turcotte, A.; "Economic Voting in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election"; paper presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association; University of Calgary, Calgary, June 1994; p.27, 28. The period under study is February to October 1993.

\textsuperscript{35}See Nesbitt-Larking, P.; "Patterns of Protest in the 1992 Referendum and the 1993 Federal Election"; paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, Alberta; June 1994; p.3

\textsuperscript{36}Ellis, F.; "Constituency Representation Issues in the Reform Party of Canada"; p.7

\textsuperscript{37}For another look at anti-elitism and its link with the Reform Party, see Laycock, D.; "Reforming Canadian Democracy? Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project"; Canadian Journal of Political Science; Vol.27, Vol.2 (June 1994); p.213-247
results in October 1992 could be considered a barometer for Reform vote shares in Ontario one year later. I hypothesize that there will be a strong positive correlation between the two. The ill-fated Charlottetown Accord illustrated how widespread and how considerable the opposition between citizens and elites had become in Canadian political discourse. The referendum also represented the major alternative channel on the national level, aside from the standard electoral process, to register their discontent of politics and politicians. Another significant event for the course of Reform's fortunes was the participation of the NDP in the "elites' " endorsement of the Accord. Whatever legitimate reasons led the NDP to lend its support to the Accord, in doing so the party effectively vacated the political high ground as the alternative to the "old-line" parties. This, combined with the criticized tenures of provincial NDP governments, neutralized the NDP from responding credibly to Reform's claims that only Reform was the "outsider" capable of representing the disenchanted in Ottawa. Said Rick Anderson, the Reform party's 1993 Campaign Director, "...We are saying that if you are satisfied with what you have then vote for any of the other parties but if you want change and a new vision then we are that alternative". Preston Manning echoes this sentiment further:

The old parties will present you with predictable policies and promises not significantly different from what they have offered before... "They are all reformers now", but we intend to show you the difference between real Reformers and burned-out reformers (like the NDP), reluctant reformers (like the Conservatives), and phony reformers (like the Liberals...). This election should be about reform...substantive alternatives to the way Canada has been run in the past-not the fluff and empty promises that characterize old-style traditional politics.\textsuperscript{39}

Pinard's work is useful here as well, as he concludes that when established parties are "driven into a coalition by a crisis, it creates conditions of conduciveness for the subsequent rise of third parties".\textsuperscript{40} The Reform party was able to benefit from the anti-coalition feeling as it developed and gained potency.

\textbf{ii) Federal Party Competition}

A key element in the rise of third parties, as shown by Pinard, are certain peculiarities of the party system. Pinard showed that the most decisive factor in the rise of the Social Credit in Québec were patterns of party dominance and weakness. He identified a

\textsuperscript{38} Wilson, J.; "Reformers Counting on Voter Frustration with Elites": The Hill Times; September 16, 1993

\textsuperscript{39} as written "Let the People Speak", speaking notes by Preston Manning to Reform Meetings/News Conferences during the opening week of the 1993 federal election campaign.; September 8, 1993; (Provided by Prof. Tom Flanagan, University of Calgary).

\textsuperscript{40} Pinard, M.; The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics: p.64
pattern of one-party dominance in a two-party system to be particularly conducive to the rise of third-party protest. Pinard also includes within his model that two-party-plus systems are also conducive to the rise of third parties if the new party represents a rejection of all other parties. Unlike Québec, Ontario has maintained pattern of three-way party competition during the present stage of development of the federal party system. For example, during the 1988 election the Conservatives remained a competitive force, while the Liberals managed to hold a plurality in the province. Also, the New Democrats maintained a stable presence in Ontario, winning around one vote in five, making their representation in Ontario on par with its national vote share. According to Pinard, this pattern of party competition at the federal level would be conducive to the appearance of third parties if the new party rejected all other alternatives. The dynamics in 1993 seem to have changed past patterns of partisan competition. The implosion of the federal Conservatives and the New Democrats, when one looks at their representation in the House of Commons, is nothing short of spectacular; the effect is less shocking when considering their respective vote shares:

<p>| Table 1.1 Vote Results for Federal Political Parties, 1988 and 1993 Federal Elections for Ontario and Canada |
|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| % of valid votes                                | number of seats                        |                                               |               |               |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>RP</th>
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<th>L</th>
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<td>ONTARIO</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>n/c</td>
<td>n/c</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>n/c</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>n/c</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>n/c</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*n/c indicates no candidate
**While the Reform Party did not elect a Member of Parliament in the 1988 election, the by-election later that year in the Alberta riding of Beaver River returned Reformer Deborah Grey to the House of Commons. In 1990, Reformer Stan Waters was appointed by the Prime Minister to the Senate after Albertans elected Mr. Waters in a provincial ballot.


41See Carty, R.K.: Canadian Political Party Systems: A Reader; Toronto: Broadview Press; 1992. In this volume, R.K. Carty presents the thesis that Canada has seen the emergence of three particular federal party systems, each of which is examined according to its respective political environment, structure and organization of the parties, leadership, financing, and the critical interplay between parties and the media. According to Carty, Canada is presently involved in its third distinct party system.


43Ibid.; p.62

12
Table 1.2 Vote Results for Federal Political Parties, 1988 and 1993 Federal Elections for Ontario and Canada (by % of voter participation and % of eligible voters)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of voter participation</th>
<th>% of eligible voters</th>
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<td>L</td>
<td>PC</td>
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<td><strong>ONTARIO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>35.5</td>
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<td><strong>CANADA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*n/c indicates no candidate


Obviously, the peculiarities of Canada's electoral system are at play, incommensurately rewarding the Liberals and the Reform Party, while devastating the Conservatives.\(^\text{44}\) With approximately the same vote share, the Reform Party rose to 52 seats, the Conservatives lost all but two. The seat tally makes it extremely difficult for the Conservatives to maintain or even increase their vote share, since their removal from the House renders them virtually invisible to the Canadian voting public. The Reform Party, of course, now has the base and resources to reinforce their electoral victory, and to form the political agenda in their electoral interest. Their position is advantageous as well because while the Bloc Québécois holds the title of Official Opposition, the Reform Party assumes the de facto mantle and hence visibility of the office in English Canada.

Given these results, the level of federal party competition in Ontario may have been overstated, with disaffected voters "parking" their vote with their previous choice, only to vote Liberal and Reform in 1993. There may be some congruence between the degree of weakness of the Conservative and New Democratic parties and the tendency for the Reform party to place second or third in electoral standings. Although Ontario elected

only one Reformer, the Reform party placed second in 57 of Ontario's 99 constituencies, and it stood second in terms of percentage of valid votes cast.

iii) Provincial Party Competition

It is likely that provincial electoral dynamics will produce predictors of Reform success. Pinard concludes that 1) voters move towards third parties in a two-step process, exhausting traditional party alternatives before putting faith in the newcomer, and 2) that those who switched allegiances at the provincial level were liable to opt for a new party at the federal level. These two conclusions are based on the observation that "the individual mechanism through which political change is conducive to further political change" is a previous switch of partisan allegiances. "Once a political attachment has been broken, a readiness to further breaks is developed". In keeping with these conclusions, possible predictors of Reform support lie in the dynamics of provincial party competition in Ontario. One clue to Reform support in Ontario would be the volatility of voters in the 1990 provincial election. For instance, in the three provincial elections preceding 1990, marginal candidates managed to poll between 1% and 2% of the popular vote. However, during the 1990 campaign period, survey data show that while the marginal vote intention began at its usual level, it had increased to approximately 7% by election day. Voting results show that marginal candidates closed at 6.6% in the 1990 election. In three ridings, marginal parties polled over 20% of the popular vote; in two of these ridings, the marginal candidates represented the Confederation of Regions Party.

While Canadian voters are notoriously fickle in their partisan allegiances, Reform support may have been predicated by a more than average amount of vote change in previous provincial elections. With the election of the Ontario Liberals in 1985, the

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47 Ibid.: p.76


49 For a review of the literature on Canadian voting studies, including an overview of Canadian's partisan loyalties, see Gidengil, E.; "Canada Votes: A Quarter Century of Canadian National Election Studies"; Canadian Journal of Political Science: Vol.25 No.2 (June 1992); p.219-248
further collapse of the Conservatives in 1987\textsuperscript{50}, and finally the unforeseen election of the New Democrats in 1990, Ontario has undergone more electoral upheaval in the last nine years than in the previous fifty. In testing four hypotheses, Gingras concluded that "since 1985, Ontario has been undergoing a significant realignment of long-term electoral forces within a three-party system".\textsuperscript{51} Combined with the voter volatility indicated by support for marginal candidates provincially in 1990, patterns of Reform support may be evident. There is also some preliminary evidence which shows that Preston Manning sought to increase support in Ontario by encouraging voters to "break with tradition" and abandon previous voting affiliations.\textsuperscript{52}

The verification of the hypotheses concerning the federal and provincial voting patterns, as well as the effect of the constitutional referendum on Reform strength in the province utilize aggregate electoral data provided by Elections Canada and Elections Ontario. Electoral data from the elections of 1984, 1988, and 1993 are analysed in order to understand the effect of past federal partisan competition on the electoral outcomes garnered by Reform at the party's first opportunity at Ontario's polls. The analysis of how Ontario's provincial politics since 1985 also proceeds with the use of electoral data gathered and published by Elections Ontario. The difficulty with comparing provincial patterns of partisan support with federal electoral outcomes, however, lies in the non-comparability of provincial and federal electoral boundaries. In order to avoid this difficulty, electoral results are re-configured to ensure that federal and provincial results are analysed according to the same geographic area. This difficulty does not arise when considering the electoral data of the constitutional referendum, since the referendum was administered by Elections Canada according to federal electoral boundaries. The analysis of the referendum thus proceeds in the same spirit as the consideration of federal party competition and its effect on Reform support in Ontario's federal ridings.

\textit{Socio-economic predictors}

\textit{2b. That sector-level economic predictors, such as the overall economic stability or instability of the region, are significant in determining the strength of Reform support}

The hypothesis above is based on the economic analysis presented by the postmoderns and the lack of relevance economic indicators have had on the outcome of voter choice

\textsuperscript{50}The provincial Conservatives polled 25\% of the popular vote in the 1987 election, in comparison to 37\% in 1985. Conservative losses in 1987 were picked up almost exclusively by the Liberals.

\textsuperscript{51}Gingras, F.-P.; "The 1990 Ontario Election: Testing Four Hypotheses About a Three-Party System"; p. 5

\textsuperscript{52}Archer, K. and Ellis, F.; "Reform: Electoral Breakthrough" in Alan Frizzell, Jon H. Pammett and Anthony Westell (eds); \textit{The Canadian General Election of 1993}; Ottawa: Carleton University Press; 1994; p.69
in 1993, which was alluded to earlier. The core of Reform's activist support has typically been drawn from narrow ranks. "Historically, activists have disproportionately come from high socio-economic status groups, with higher than average levels of income and education, from relatively prestigious occupational groups, and were likely to be middle aged and male". Survey data during the 1993 electoral campaign confirm this demographic for those intending to vote Reform. However, it is reasonable to postulate that Reform has managed to build in Ontario a wider electoral base that the narrow profile of its activist core would suggest.

Firstly, it appears that the Reform leadership had chosen to pursue a campaign strategy, particularly after expansion, capitalizing on the growing "citizen-elite" cleavage. The party has situated itself as the partisan first choice of the "common people", the champion of those who feel disconnected from politics. Betz indicates that "...growing dissatisfaction with traditional politics and [its] growing distance from the citizenry" leads to a political reaction; featuring "dealignment and realignment, unpredictability, freedom, delegitimization and distrust". Apparently, Reform did "tap a purely anti-political impulse" in the last elections. The political party which successfully taps this disenchantment has the potential to build a coalition based on insecurity among different socio-economic groups:

These right-wing sentiments are especially pronounced among unskilled or semi-skilled workers, those living on small pensions, skilled workers, small self-employed persons, and farmers fearful of economic and social downward mobility, lower level employees and civil servants without promotional opportunities, and particularly among unqualified youth. This list suggests a much greater diversity among right-wing supporters than is the case with left-libertarianism.

The potential for Reform to build a broader electoral base in keeping with Betz's postmodern analysis is reinforced by some patterns of electoral support explored by

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53 Ellis, F.; "Constituency Representation Issues in the Reform Party of Canada"; paper prepared for presentation to the 1994 annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association; Calgary, Alberta, June 1994; p.11

54 Gingras, F.P. et al; "Setting the Record Straight About the 1993 Federal Election"; p.14

55 Betz, H.-G.; Postmodern Politics in Germany: The Politics of Resentment; p.160

56 Johnston, R., N. Nevitte, and H. Brady; "Campaign Dynamics in 1993: Liberals, Conservative, and Reform"; paper presented to the Annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Calgary, June 1994; p.14

57 Betz, H.G.; p.164. The groups mentioned in this paragraph are those attracted to the right wing in the German case.
Pinard. Pinard argued that third parties can draw support from sectors of society not usually thought to be ideologically "suited" to the movement. Pinard writes that:

"...as far as the unincorporated masses are concerned, the support of a new movement does not entail much congruence between the movement's and its followers' ideology or belief system...but simply requires the development of a generalized belief which identifies the sources of strains in the system and envisages an overall cure...the lower classes when faced with an acute crisis, are likely to follow the first available political movement". 58

It seems that Reform could have built a coalition across class lines; evidence does show, however, that ethnicity—if this is the basic determinant of in-group and out-group status—remains a unifying aspect of Reform support. On the whole, the most important aspect of Reform support nationally (outside of Québec) in the 1993 election, and the basis along which Conservative and Reform support remained divided, is a negative attitudes towards out-groups. 59 There is reason to expect that ethnicity, including language, is the most significant social predictor of Reform support in Ontario. It is potentially the most important social determinant distinguishing Reform and Liberal support in the province, considering it is the issue which polarizes the two rivals the most. 60

One theme which has arisen time and time again is the importance of discontent and uncertainty in the rise of Reform. Sigurdson identifies the root of this uncertainty in the somewhat ephemeral transition from an industrial to a postindustrial economy:

For those who feel left out—either economically, culturally or politically—from the postindustrial economy or the postmaterialist ethos, right-wing parties are an attractive alternative...the transition to a postindustrial economy has led to a climate of uncertainty, weakened the national government, impaired primary and secondary industries and thereby threatened the viability of many established jobs and the credibility of political parties that are responsible for the economic policies that, presumably, got us into this mess. 61

The difficult in testing whether economic stability or instability at the sectoral level has:

58 Pinard, M.: The Rise of a Third Party; p. 96-97


60 Ibid.; p.19

61 Sigurdson, R.; "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada"; p.251, 253
any effect on Reform voting is how to operationalize what is meant by such stability or instability. This thesis will consider as the basic measure of sector-level economic stability the aggregate measure of those employed in the industry over the most recent period of time observable, which is dependent on the data available. Fortunately, sector-level employment data, including other demographic data on other population characteristics such as language, immigration, and income, are available through Statistics Canada. Fortunately, this data is available through the census survey, and have been organized according to the federal electoral district of the respondent. Given the availability of aggregate-level data which is organized by district, a regional analysis of these variable is made possible, and leads to an understanding of how regional-level variables affect Reform differently across the province.

III. CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis is not only to focus on the particularities of the Reform Party and its adherents, but to explore the implications of its present success and future potential for the Canadian political party system. This type of task is at once theoretical and speculative. It is theoretical because if the hypothesis linking marginalization, alienation, and fragmentation to a politically salient cleavage represented by the Reform Party is confirmed, the ability of political parties to function as aggregators of diverse interests is questionable. This entails an examination of Canada’s structure of partisan competition, as was alluded to at the outset of this proposal. It is also speculative, since Reform is a new partisan phenomenon. It has made remarkable electoral gains, but as yet remains untested in government and unimpressive in opposition.

Each school of thought explored here has its own contribution to make to this discussion, and several themes reoccur. One theme which draws together the party systems and the postmodernist schools is the theme of fragmentation and its impact on how political parties interact not only with the electorate, but with their competitors as well. If one accepts that the post-industrial era has brought with it a fragmentation of the body politic or what Sigurdson terms "...the advancement of an eclectic and amorphous pluralism"62, one must wonder whether the vehicle of the political party can hope to aggregate enough of these interests in order to govern effectively, or even to articulate coherently a coalition of these interests in opposition. The dilemma for representation and party system is that the task of representation has been fragmented, weakening the party’s claim to be the primary intermediary between society and state. The representation of electoral interests organized through a geographically-based, single-member constituency system presided over by parties has not been able to successfully compete with functional representation, whose structures of communications—interest groups or otherwise—have proven far more effective. Or in other words, the representative functions of the political party are distorted by institutional and environmental factors which do not constrain their competitors. "Thus representative

government gives way to functional representation, and politics goes underground". The concern for democratic government becomes acute when segments of society feel alienated from the party system and are not represented by alternative mechanisms.

If the question of representation is posed with some trepidation to "the dominant catch-all parties of the centre-left and centre-right" as does Sigurdson in the Canadian context and Betz in the German, it must also be confronted by the Reform Party. Can parties effectively act as brokers of competing interests especially when these interests become increasingly fragmented? The rise of the Reform Party is arguably the result of the weaknesses of brokerage politics, and the party's emergence "...has laid bare the myth that the old-line parties are truly national organizations capable of accommodating all interests". While the Reform Party may have been born out of this fragmentation, it is not immune to its vices. The party now vaunts itself as a national organization, aiming to convince Canadian voters that the party can better represent their interests than their competitors, and in doing so the party encounters the same essential difficulty. If Reform support is indeed unified on the basis of real or perceived marginalization, it is a tenuous foundation at best. Reform's distinction as a catch-all party of the alienated might prove as fallible as the catch-all bourgeois parties which have dominated Canada's political history.

The importance of testing whether the Reform Party has chosen to court Ontario voters on the basis of this marginalization is very much tied into how political identities are formed. Sigurdson writes that the importance of Reform lies not in its odds for forming the government, but in the cultural meaning it brings to the electoral process. Elections are the periodic mechanisms through which political identities are formed, where divisions within society are imbued with political significance or relegated away. Political identities and hence electoral behaviour have been formed over time in this manner, with certain social divisions elevated to political cleavages. What elevates political cleavages is their politicization, mobilisation, and organization. In other words, "...social distinctions become cleavages when they are organised as such". Without concluding that the much touted "citizen-elite cleavage" has taken its place among Canada's time-worn ethno-linguistic or regional cleavages, it can be said that the Reform Party's manipulation of the citizen-elite discourse has challenged the hegemony of these more familiar Canadian fault lines. If political identities are indeed malleable, and the conditions now exist in Canada where previous bases of political identity no longer are

63 Pross, P.A.; "Space, Function, and Interest: The Problem of Legitirnacy in the Canadian State", in Dwivedi, O.P. (ed); The Administrative State in Canada; Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 1982; p.108

64 Ibid.


sufficient to contain electoral volatility, the Reform phenomenon might well prove truly significant. How well Reform can ride the post-Meech wave of citizen-elite antipathy is thus worthy of our attention.

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Chapter 2: Political Predictors

The previous chapter outlined a series of hypotheses concerning how political factors impacted on the Reform Party's electoral results in Ontario in 1993. Briefly, the hypotheses were, firstly, that political factors, particularly the competition between political parties, will provide the most pertinent information on the rise of Reform in Ontario, a hypothesis in keeping with Pinard's work on third parties and Smelser's more general work on collective behaviour. Secondly, that the particular context of Canadian politics in the 1990s has been one of citizen-elite alienation and marginalization and hence that the success of Reform in Ontario can best be predicted by the pattern of the No vote in the October 1992 constitutional referendum. Thirdly, that patterns of federal party competition would be followed in degree of importance by patterns of provincial party competition. In the arena of provincial electoral combat, it is hypothesized that voter volatility in Ontario since 1985 would correlate positively with Reform support among electors in 1993.

The following chapter will examine in detail how the political factors outlined above impacted on the Reform Party's support in Ontario. The data on which the observations are based and conclusions drawn are exclusively aggregate. While the weaknesses of bivariate regression analysis using aggregate data as a way to predict individual voting behaviour is recognized, one should consider Eagles and his colleagues when they write that "...we are more interested in exploring the determinants of constituency-level results than in accounting for the behaviour of individual voters". While individual data, usually survey data, is undeniably valuable in fine-tuning political observations, the data at my disposal tend to measure reported information, such as vote intention, rather than the actual political decisions made by an electorate. As well, survey data is rarely organized on the basis of the constituency, causing difficulties in the direct comparison of data.

I. THE 1992 CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM

One of the lasting legacies of the Charlottetown constitutional reform proposals is of course its final electoral outcome. Whatever the complex reasons that might lie behind its rejection at the polls on October 26, 1992, the failure of the Accord is looked upon as an overwhelming rejection of the process which created it and the people who delivered it. This has become, a short three years later, the main message distilled from the referendum experience. The details and specifics of the Accord languish from memory. The Canadian public saw fit to reject a constitutional deal whose hallmark trait was political compromise, brokered between political parties, both government and opposition, entrenched interests and new constitutional

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1 Hanushek, E.A., J.E. Jackson, and J.F. Kain; "Model Specification, the Use of Aggregate Data, and the Ecological Correlation Fallacy"; Political Methodology, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter); 1974; p.89-107

2 Eagles, M., et al; "Ecological Models of Party Support: Pan-Canadian, Regional, and Local Patterns in the 1988 and 1993 General Elections; paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Québec, June 4-6, 1995; p.4
players alike. In his analysis of the demise of the Charlottetown Accord, Lusztig writes that "...the degree of compromise necessary to forge a constitutional agreement at the elite level among different societal groups alienates too many mass supporters of each group....Indeed, critical to the failure of the Charlottetown Accord was that while constitutional elites were prepared to compromise, mass proponents of the competing [mega constitutional orientations] were not." The public at once decried the process on the basis of their own perceived exclusion, and paradoxically perhaps, on the basis of other groups'—Canada's aboriginal peoples, women, francophones—participation. The exclusion felt by the public in the constitutional process was, as LeDuc and Pammett indicate, was visited upon the constitutional players themselves during the referendum campaign; they also indicate that this referendum dynamic is not specific to Canadian referendum woes:

The story of the campaign was in many ways the marginalization of the mainstream politicians from the battle. Darcy and Laver describe a certain kind of referendum dynamic whereby initially supportive elites are pushed in to the background by intense community conflict and hostile campaigns waged against the proposition....the dynamic of the 1992 Canadian referendum campaign was very similar. The referendum marked a fundamental rupture between Canada's public and her "elites", ill-defined and vague that they were. "From now on, Canada's governing elite will be on permanent trial", claimed the media.

The Reform party, by aligning itself against these elites and more importantly perhaps its electoral competitors, was able to make use of this anti-establishment ethos to its advantage. While the party, apparently more at the behest of its leader than its membership, pursued a knowledge-based campaign against the Accord, it did not overlook the citizen-elite cleavage. "Calling the accord 'no final constitutional agreement at all,' Reform argued that a resounding NO vote would demonstrate to the political and special interest elites that Canadians would no longer tolerate constitutional debates dominating the public agenda at the expense of economic and fiscal matters".

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5Gwyn, R.; "The voice of protest is all too clear: it's a growl"; The Toronto Star: October 9, 1993, A1,A8.

6Flanagan, T.; Waiting for the Wave: p.104

The impact of the Reform party's stance on the Charlottetown Accord could be diminished by a few factors. First of all, the campaign of the party itself was apparently not well organized. The difficulties facing the party organizationally were compounded by Preston Manning's use of the slogan the "Mulroney Deal", bringing upon himself charges by his critics as engaging in the same personality-based, mud-slinging political manoeuvring he disdained in his competitors. Reform support in polls showed a steady decrease nationally after the referendum vote. Despite the lull in Reform fortunes directly after the referendum campaign, the utility of the linkage between Reform's constitutional positioning in 1992 and its level of electoral support in 1993 holds because:

..., the referendum results expressed a political configuration that the Reform Party should have been able to build upon... [since] the tendency to vote No was strongly and inversely related to the warmth of one's feeling about politicians.

While Reform was unable to take full advantage of this discontent during the referendum campaign, in the more important arena of partisan combat—the general election of 1993—Reform may have been better able to capitalize on this linkage. The evidence of Reform's use of the citizen-elite cleavage in the 1993 election will be explored in a further chapter of this thesis. Study has shown that there is a link between the tendency of voters to vote No in 1992 and to vote for the Reform party in 1993; this will be explored next.

FINDINGS

Reform, the Referendum, and Ontario

Study has shown that on a national level the tendency to vote NO in the 1992 referendum correlated fairly strongly to the tendency for electors to cast their vote for the Reform Party one year later. For all 220 ridings in English Canada, Nesbit-Larking found a correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) of .61 between these two variables.

The utility of this measurement can be misleading, however, since it does not indicate to what degree the movement of one variable impacted directly on the

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8 Flanagan, T.: Waiting for the Wave: 99-122
9 ibid.: p.99
10 ibid.: p.119
11 Nesbit-Larking, P.; "Patterns of Protest in the 1992 Referendum and the 1993 Federal Election"; p.8. The importance of the coefficient of correlation (Pearson's r) is that it indicates the relative goodness of fit of the line of regression of one bivariate distribution to another. As the closeness of the relation increases, Pearson’s r approaches 1; inversely, as the relationship declines, the correlation approaches zero. See Key, V.O., Jr.: A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.; 1954; p.94
movement of the other. To discover how the movement of an independent variable determined a change in the dependent variable, the coefficient of determination ($r^2$) is more useful. This would indicate that on a nation-wide level, about 37% of the variance of Reform’s support in 1993 was accounted for by changes in the values of the No vote in 1992. This shows that the relationship is fairly considerable.

Taken to a sub-national level, however, we find substantial differences in how the referendum results affected Reform’s fortunes in 1993. Using the 99 constituencies in Ontario, with the dependent variable of Reform support in 1993 measured by percentage of valid votes cast, the No vote played virtually no role in determining Reform vote choice in 1993 ($r^2=0.013$).

![Correlation of No 1992 to Reform 1993](image)

Figure II.1

The lack of any relationship between the No vote in Ontario and its propensity to vote for Reform is particularly noteworthy considering the definite role the referendum played in determining Reform fortunes in the rest of English Canada. From this first look at this question, it seems safe to say that while the citizen-elite cleavage seems a promising basis of support for Reform, its effect may be very marginal in Ontario. The province, as a whole, does not demonstrate the level of marginalization demonstrated by the Western provinces, a self-evident conclusion considering that the history of Reform is embedded in the region’s embattled rhetoric of western alienation. These findings lead to a rather unequivocal rejection of my prior hypothesis.
Further study of the relationship between the No vote of 1992 and the Reform vote in 1993 has shown some surprising results. In their study of pan-Canadian, regional, and local patterns of party support using 1988, 1992, and 1993 data, Eagles et al. found that when a series of geographic dummy variables "...reflecting the geographic patterning of political support above the constituency level"\(^{12}\) were included in their regression model, the robust relationship between the 1992 No vote and the 1993 Reform vote as demonstrated by Nesbit-Larking, failed to contribute to Reform's success. As Eagles et al suggest, "...the opposition to the constitutional reform proposals/process that Reform mobilized was well represented by the provincial/regional dummies".\(^{13}\)

This finding leads to a circular discussion. The success of the party to mobilize the anti-elitist fervour of the 1992 No vote and carry it to the Reform fold in 1993 may have depended on the prior organizational success of the party. The high correlation between the B.C. No vote and B.C. electoral blessing of Reform in 1993 was contingent on the party's prior level of support in the province. The underwhelming correlation in Ontario, while it might reasonably show that Ontario voters are less marginalized than their Alberta and B.C. counterparts, also may be a function of the Reform Party's weaker presence in Ontario prior to the vote. The correlation Nesbit-Larking found to exist between the No vote in the prairie provinces and their electoral fortunes was certainly aided by the time-honoured mechanism by which alienation has been channelled in the region: western alienation. Ontario has yet to develop an analogous mechanism, and as such the Reform Party was unable to capitalize on a comparable existing political theology by which alienation is organized. This echoes what was quoted in the first chapter, namely that "...social distinctions become cleavages when they are organized as such".\(^{14}\)

Urban vs. Rural Voters

While the overall findings for Ontario are clear, Flanagan writes that one has reason to expect that referendum results had more of an impact on Reform support in rural rather than urban areas:

Interestingly, the voting pattern in the referendum also instantiated Manning's original populist hinterland vision of Reform...There was a very obvious split in Ontario between metropolitan Toronto and Ottawa, which went strongly Yes, and most of the rest of the province, which went just as strongly No. This validated Manning's theory that rural Ontario was just as alienated from the centres of power as western

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\(^{13}\) Ibid.; p.23

\(^{14}\) Bartolini, S., and P. Mair; Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985; p.216
Canada.\textsuperscript{15}

Flanagan goes on to link the referendum with Reform's performance in 1993:

Reform did well in western Canada, especially Alberta and British Columbia, and in rural Ontario—all areas where the No vote was strong.\textsuperscript{16}

In an effort to test whether there is a discernable difference between urban and rural voters in this case, voting patterns were discerned for 17 urban areas.\textsuperscript{17} The urban findings were compared to the voting pattern of the rural voters surrounding these areas.\textsuperscript{18}

These data indicate a few factors at work. First of all, once the data excludes Metro Toronto\textsuperscript{19} the strength of the No 1992/Reform 1993 correlation does increase relative

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Flanagan, T.: \textit{Waiting for the Wave}; p.121-122
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid.; p.122.
\item \textsuperscript{17} The following urban centres were selected: Barrie, Cornwall, Hawkesbury, Kingston, Kitchener-Waterloo, London, Niagara Falls, North Bay, Orillia, Ottawa, Pembroke, Peterborough, Sarnia, Sault Ste Marie, Sudbury, Thunder Bay, and Windsor.
\item \textsuperscript{18} The number of votes cast by party in these areas was determined by a poll-by-poll recount. Rural numbers corresponding to these areas were recreated by defining a specific area surrounding the city in question, and determined according to poll-by-poll information. This method is used throughout this thesis when comparing voting data which cross federal and provincial electoral jurisdictions.
\item \textsuperscript{19} The exclusion of Metro Toronto from this analysis is based on two reasons. First, it allows one to determine whether the urban-rural split observed by Flanagan with respect to referendum voting is carried forward into federal and provincial voting once the province's most highly urbanized centre is
\end{itemize}
to the overall provincial data; however, the effect is still marginal, explaining under 10% of the variance in the Reform vote in 1993. Secondly, there is no appreciable difference between urban ($r^2=0.09$) or rural ($r^2=0.07$) voters. This brings a few modifications to bear on Flanagan’s evaluation of Reform support in Ontario.

First of all, it seems that the major difference in how the referendum result impacted on Reform support in Ontario was between the highly urbanized centre of Toronto and Ottawa and the rest of the province. The rest of the province, however, is not bereft of urbanized centres, obviously. What these results show is that outside of highly concentrated core of Toronto and Ottawa, the referendum did not effect Reform’s chances any differently in the medium and small sized urban centres than in their surrounding rural areas. It seems that once you get outside of highly urbanized Toronto, or out of a sufficient threshold of urbanization, any effect that urbanization might contribute to the discussion is eradicated. This would mean that if the party were interested in mobilizing this latent feeling of marginalization, it need not distinguish or tailor its message from rural Ontario to medium sized Ontario. Marginalization is then more widespread in Ontario than just rural polls. If Reform’s electoral support differs significantly between rural and urban centres, this finding suggests that it is not caused by a higher or lower “alienation index”, but perhaps by the organizational channels of partisan competition which allow alienation to be expressed in party politics. The problem is that, since the correlation of determination is still very low, it has not been mobilized either because of organizational problems within the Reform party or because of another reason. As the following section will show, this other reason may be the fact that the Tory organization was still strong rurally than in the smaller cities, and held on to their voters.

II. FEDERAL PARTY COMPETITION

Several correlations were run in order to determine whether support for the Conservatives, Liberals, or New Democratic parties was related in any interesting way with Reform’s support in 1993. Three sets of correlations were run: one using the province-wide electoral data, one using the data for the selected urban areas already described, and another using the corresponding rural areas. For the overall Ontario data, correlations were run for the 1984, 1988, and 1993 elections. The urban/rural comparisons were made for the 1988 and 1993 elections only. This use of past electoral data was used in order to see whether past patterns of partisan support also contributed to how Reform has developed in Ontario. Generally, these correlations pointed out relationships already established; however, a few interesting findings are noted.

removed from consideration. In other words, does the inclusion of Toronto in the data analysis of the urban-rural dynamic distort the analysis of the urban-rural dynamic across the province? The second reason is methodological. The urban-rural comparison made here is based on a geographical dyad: it is the comparison of how voters in an urban centre differ in supporting the Reform party from the rural voters who surround them. The level of urban concentration surrounding Metro Toronto does not allow for the same comparison.
a) Overall Ontario Data

Conservatives

Figure II.4 Correlation between Conservative (1984) and Reform Support (1993) for Ontario \((n=99, r^2 = 0.36)\)

Figures II.4, II.5, and II.6 show how the relationship between Conservative party support and Reform support in 1993 are linked in the province of Ontario. The figures demonstrate a finding which may seem contradictory at first glance with the known outcome of the 1993 election. That is, that there is a stronger relationship between how Reform performed in 1993 with past patterns of Conservative support in the province of Ontario. Comparing the horizontal dispersion of the data points on the three graphs show that while the Conservative party enjoyed a wider range of support, garnering anywhere from 15% to 70% of the popular vote across all constituencies in the province, Reform also found a good deal of support.
Figure II.6, showing the correlation of support between Reform and Tory vote shares in 1993, demonstrates that the Tory vote had entrenched itself since 1988. The lower determination coefficient in 1993 would indicate that the Reform party had gradually whittled at the Tory core, and that while the competition between the two parties is still strong—notice the slightly stronger slope of the regression line in 1993, meaning that with each unit change in Tory support the Reform party gained in support at a greater rate than in 1988 and 1984—most of the Tory vote had already defected. The findings confirm what has been documented elsewhere\textsuperscript{20}, namely that the Reform Party has split the Tory core in Ontario as it has across the country.

Liberals

The relationship between the Liberal and Reform parties produces some of the strongest correlations found to exist among all political parties. It seems that in Ontario the strength of the Liberal Party is more a determinant at this point of Reform's success that the demise of the Conservatives, since the inverse relationship between the Liberals and Reform is stronger than the positive relationship between the Conservatives and Reform—a conclusion which is evident given the overwhelming number of seats won by the Liberals in the province in 1993. The $r^2$ value produced by correlating Liberal and Reform support in 1993 is -0.54, the slope of the line of regression reaching -1.04. These findings are not surprising:

![Graph showing correlation between Liberal 1993 and Reform 1993 support](image)

Fig II.7 Correlation of Liberal (1993) to Reform Support (1993) for Ontario ($n=99$, $r^2=0.54$)

They demonstrate that as Liberal support increased in the province, Reform's fortunes decreased. The slope of the line of regression tells us that with every unit increase of Liberal support, the Reform Party lost a comparable amount of support. Similar correlations between Liberal support in 1988 and 1984 and Reform support in 1993, while always demonstrating a negative relationship, did not show as steep a slope in the regression line (-0.68 and -0.72 respectively). These data demonstrate firstly that the Reform Party and the Liberal Party are drawing from fairly distinct electorates in Ontario, and that these electorates have become more differentiated since the 1980's. The stronger slope of the 1993 data can also be explained in that the Liberal Party managed to draw greater numbers of voters defecting from other parties. The future of Reform in Ontario seems most contingent on the resilience of its main competitor, which is precisely that party which has proven its resilience throughout its long history of governance in Canada.

New Democrats

In trying to establish some type of relationship between the NDP and the Reform Party, I have consistently found that NDP support has very little bearing on the fortunes of the Reform Party. The two parties are appealing to very distinct electorates, a fact which again confirms the widely held assumption that the Reform
Party has established itself as an alternative of right-wing, rather than centrist or left-wing voters. Only one regression held out any relationship, however marginal, between New Democrats and Reformers. In 1993, the $r^2$ value between the independent variable—New Democratic support in 1993 as measured by percentage of the popular vote—and the Reform Party stands at 0.20. This relationship, while weak, is the strongest found between the two parties.

![Graph showing correlation between New Democrat (1993) and Reform Support (1993) for Ontario](image)

*Fig. II.8 Correlation between New Democrat (1993) and Reform Support (1993) for Ontario (n=99, $r^2=0.20$)*

The scattergram also conveys information which the data by themselves cannot. The NDP, judging by the minimal horizontal dispersion of the data points, has been reduced to its very core. The vast majority of Ontario ridings graced the New Democrats with less than 10% of the popular vote. It was only through the continued support of NDP voters in a number of traditionally strong NDP ridings\(^\text{21}\) that a correlation between the two parties could be traced. Essentially these ridings skewed the regression. Outside of these areas, there was no appreciable relationship between NDP and Reform support. The effect of the collapse of the NDP affected Reform only indirectly, since any defectors to Reform were likely not numerous enough to improve their electoral standings, and since the NDP defectors probably bolstered Reform's main competitor in the province, the Liberals. The aggregate data used here cautions those who have spoken of Reform's ability to draw support from across the ideological spectrum. In Ontario, at least, this ability seems overstated.

\(^{21}\)Ridings returning NDP vote shares between 20% and 30% of the popular vote included Sault Ste. Marie, Oshawa, Essex-Windsor, Trinity-Spadina, Windsor-West, Windsor-St.Clair, and Nickel Belt.
b) Urban vs. Rural Data

After examining how the parties interacted on a province-wide level using federal electoral districts as the basic unit of analysis, we now turn to using a selected number of urban centres and their surrounding areas to determine whether the dynamics of party competition are different when rural and urban polls outside Toronto are separated. Again using the coefficient of determination as our primary indicator, the findings are summarized in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIBERALS</td>
<td>0.74 (-)*</td>
<td>0.76 (-)</td>
<td>0.43 (-)</td>
<td>0.49 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVES</td>
<td>0.51 (+)</td>
<td>0.21 (+)</td>
<td>0.67 (+)</td>
<td>0.44 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW DEMOCRATS</td>
<td>0.07 (-)</td>
<td>0.04 (-)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The positive or negative indicates the direction of the slope of the regression line.

The trends regarding the Liberal and New Democratic parties are essentially the same as those indicated by the province-wide data discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Namely, that the fortunes of the NDP did virtually nothing to impact Reform fortunes in a direct manner. For the Liberals, it is evident that Liberal strength was the most important partisan factor which contained Reform success.

There is, however, an interesting trend with the Conservatives. There is an appreciable difference between rural and urban correlations, indicating that the Reform Party has been more successful in wooing Conservative voters in urban and sub-urban areas outside of Toronto than in corresponding rural areas. In both 1988 and 1993 Conservative votes outside of metropolitan Toronto were a better indicator of Reform success in urban areas than in rural ones.

It should be noted here that unlike the data used by Nesbit-Larking and Flanagan, the rural category here is comprised solely of rural polls, as designated by Elections Canada Official Voting Results. It appears that the conclusions of Flanagan regarding Reform strength in rural Ontario are based on polls including both rural and sub-urban polls. The categorization of Reform as a rural party in Ontario, while collapsing suburban with rural voting results, echoes the findings of Maurice Pinard in his study of the Social Credit in Québec. Pinard also described the support of the Créditistes in Québec as "almost exclusively rural", while noting that "...for the lack of a better term, in this study 'rural districts' refer to electoral districts that lie outside the Montréal and Jesus Islands...The Québec City districts are included in this rural
category. The data in Table II.1 indicate that Reform has been less able to dislodge Conservative voters in more traditional settings. What has been considered the geographical base of right-wing third-party activity—a rural base—may be more accurately described as suburban or centred in smaller urban communities.

This information seems to indicate that rural Conservative voters are more stable or traditional partisans than their urban counterparts, and thus have been less willing to champion what is in Ontario the fourth party alternative. The data for the Liberal party in rural areas for both 1993 and 1988 elections indicate, as well, that the traditional alternative to the Conservative party maintained a great deal of support. The finding that rural voters are more traditional partisans has been documented elsewhere:

It is not the attitude of the community on issues of the moment that is maintained by tradition; it is its identification with a party name and allegiance to its symbols...However, the reaction of protest is more likely to take place through the traditional party in the rural community than in the urban...Thus, while traditional allegiance to one party does not preclude political change, it renders very unlikely that this change will take place through a switch to the other major party. In rural areas we may observe both pronounced political stability, relative to urban areas, and changes of entire communities from their traditional party to a third party.

It seems that rather than display the wholesale partisan change accepted by rural Alberta and British Columbia, Ontario’s rural Conservatives have opted to stick it out with their own, rather than opt for a new partisan alternative recently imported and relatively unknown to the province. A factor which did not lend itself to wholesale partisan change 1993 was the continued strength of the Liberal party in Ontario:

The indications are that whenever the opposition party (or strongest of opposition parties) fails to retain at least a third of the votes while in opposition, it tends to be replaced by third parties...Conversely, where there is a strong two-party system, third parties usually fail to make any serious inroads.

The Liberal Party had not languished in opposition with respect to its support in Ontario as it had on the Prairies. In 1988, the mean vote share garnered by the Liberals in Ontario rested at a sound 39%. These patterns of partisan support

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22 Pinard, M.; The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics; p.92


24 Pinard, M.; The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics; p.37

25 Chief Electoral Officer of Canada: Thirty-Fourth General Election: Report of the Chief Electoral Officer 1988, Revised Appendices; Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada; 1988; p.20
indicate that while Reform's good fortune was brought about by the collapse of the Tories, it will be constrained from further gains in the province until the Liberal Party cedes its position as the party of first choice.

III. PROVINCIAL PARTY COMPETITION

What has received little attention in the study of the Reform Party to date has been what if any impact partisan competition at the provincial level has had on Reform fortunes in the arena of federal electoral politics. One reason for this apparent lack of work in this area may be the Reform Party’s decision to remain a strictly federal party, despite promising opportunities to enter provincial politics. The lack of provincial wings of the Reform Party makes the task of linking their strength provincially with their support federally more difficult. The links between the provincial and federal worlds of partisan competition are hence more difficult to discern.

The first task at hand in this study of Reform and provincial politics in Ontario is to examine whether variations of partisan support are related to Reform’s success in the province in 1993. We have seen how competition at the federal level in Ontario is related to Reform’s fortunes. While the NDP seem to have had virtually no impact on Reform, there are clear indications of a relationship between the other two major parties. While Ontario’s provincial Liberals and Conservatives are somewhat dissociated from their federal counterparts, it would be interesting to see whether the same conclusions can be drawn from provincial party competition.

In his study of the Créditistes in Québec, Maurice Pinard found a relationship between political change at the provincial level and the trend to vote for the Créditistes federally. He asserted that “...[his] data clearly support the hypothesis that the political change which had previously taken place at the provincial level affected the rise of the Social Credit at the federal level. Political change does indeed seem conducive to further political change.” Pinard’s methodology was based on excluding from his data both Montréal and Québec City districts, areas which remained impervious to the Créditistes’ assault and which also presented difficulties due to the problems in comparing federal and provincial electoral districts. Also, his designation of whether districts switched partisan labels strongly or weakly is based on the parties’ ability to maintain a threshold of the popular vote. Due to the fact that Québec’s provincial party system was a two-party system, the threshold used was

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25 Note: taken by myself while attending the 1994 Reform Party Assembly indicate that the resolution reading “...[Be it] resolved that the Reform Party of Canada encourage candidates in Provincial elections under a Reform banner” was defeated by 63% of the voting delegates. While the strongest interventions on the floor in favour of the resolution were made on behalf of the Reform Association for Ontario, only 27% of Ontario’s delegates to the Assembly in favour of provincial expansion. A majority of delegates from British Columbia (65%) voted in favour of the resolution.

27 Pinard, M.; p.75
relatively high. As such the volatility of the electorate at the provincial level was determined by the degree of its movement across this threshold.

The difficulties in extending this methodology to the study of the Reform Party in Ontario is not only caused by a similar lack of comparability between federal and provincial electoral districts, but also by the presence of another competitive party in Ontario: the New Democrats. Unlike Québec, Ontario has maintained in the post-war period a stable three-party system, with the NDP polling an average of 23% of the popular vote from 1943 to 1981. The relative stability of Ontario's three-party system allowed the Conservative Party to achieve a position of uninterrupted dominance from 1943 to 1985, during which time it formed the government with an average of 43% of the popular vote. The margin between the reigning Conservatives and the runner-up Liberals from 1967 to 1981 remained quite slim, with only 9% of the popular vote separating the two parties. The paradox here is that the most stable period of Ontario's provincial politics was sustained on slim margins of support. While all parties managed to hold together their respective political bases of support, little movement along this margin could occur, and the period of Conservative dominance continued unabated. Conversely, the significant weakness of any one of the parties could entail small yet important changes along this precarious margin of power.

Ontario's system of one-party dominance came to an end in 1985, with the Peterson Liberals forming the government at Queen's Park. The success of the Liberals in the 1985 and the 1987 elections and the increasing disfavour of the Conservatives indicated that a realignment of partisan forces was underway. The unforeseen win of the NDP in the hastily-called 1990 election indicated that the Liberal Party would not step too easily into the Conservatives' vacated shoes. In a province which had one party form the government for forty-two years, Ontario's voters have in the last four provincial elections adopted three different political stripes. While the NDP win of

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28 For example, a strong showing by the Union Nationale was determined if the Liberals obtained less than or equal to 46% of the vote; conversely, the Liberals were seen to be strong if their vote climbed to 54% and beyond. See Pinard, M.: p.74 (notes to Table 5.1)

29 Gingras, F.-P.; "The 1990 Ontario Election: Testing Four Hypotheses About a Three-Party System"; paper presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Queen's University, Kingston; 1991; p.3

30 Ibid; p.4

31 Ontario's era of one-party dominance is to be contrasted with the one-party dominance experienced by Social Credit and Conservative governments in Alberta. While Ontario's system was characterized by the sustained competition of the Liberals and the New Democrats, the same could not be said of their Albertan counterparts. It has only been since the 1986 provincial election that Alberta has seen anything resembling an opposition, voting in 22 opposition members, an increase of 18 members since the 1982 provincial election. This new interest with opposition (concentrated in Edmonton) brought the Conservative's share of the popular vote down to 51.1% in 1986 from 62.2% in 1982. Clearly, Ontario's governments never had the pleasure of enjoying such overwhelming levels of popular support. See Tupper, A.; "Alberta Politics: The Collapse of Consensus"; in Thorium, H.G. (ed): Party Politics in Canada; 6th edition; Scarborough: Prentice Hall of Canada Ltd.; 1991; pp.451-467
1990 may prove to be an aberration, the recent voting record of Ontarians indicates a certain volatility within the electorate. This indicates that "...Since 1985, Ontario has been undergoing a significant realignment of long-term electoral forces within a three-party system".32 It remains to be seen whether these movements within Ontario's electorate have contributed to Reform's prospects for success in the province.

In order to examine the effects of provincial party competition on the propensity of Ontarians to vote Reform in 1993, this analysis will consist of two parts. First, the election results of the 1990 and 1987 provincial elections will be analyzed using the same methodology to examine the federal data. Rural and urban voting will also be explored. Secondly, the effect of voter volatility on the provincial level will be related to the Reform vote in 1993, by adapting an indicator for electoral volatility developed by Laval University political scientist Vincent Lemieux.33

FINDINGS

a) Reform and Ontario's Provincial Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCIAL PARTY</th>
<th>1990 URBAN</th>
<th>1990 RURAL</th>
<th>1987 URBAN</th>
<th>1987 RURAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIBERALS</td>
<td>0.53 (-)</td>
<td>0.46 (-)</td>
<td>0.27 (-)</td>
<td>0.13 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVES</td>
<td>0.32 (+)</td>
<td>0.16 (+)</td>
<td>0.22 (+)</td>
<td>0.15 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW DEMOCRATS</td>
<td>0.07 (+)</td>
<td>0.06 (+)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison between Table II.1 and Table II.2 leads to some preliminary observations. It is apparent that while the provincial correlations are not inconsiderable, they are consistently weaker than the federal data which is to be expected considering the separation of the two arenas of electoral combat. Therefore, while the effects of provincial partisan competition are secondary to the federal arena, they should not be discounted. The following analysis of provincial party competition and the Reform Party will refer as well to the following table (Table II.3), which indicates popular vote shares obtained by each political party both provincially and in the 17 selected areas of study:


33See Lemieux, V.; Le Parti libéral du Québec: Alliances, rivalités et neutralités; Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l'Université Laval; 1993
Table II.3 Mean Percentage of Popular Vote Obtained for the Province of Ontario, by Provincial Political Party (1990, 1987)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=130</td>
<td></td>
<td>n=17</td>
<td>n=17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIB</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CON</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**LIBERALS**

The switch in provincial vote shares of the Liberals and the New Democrats suggests that disaffected Liberals put the NDP in power provincially in 1990. The Liberals lost 15% overall of their support, while the NDP gained 12%. In our sample of smaller urban centres and their corresponding rural areas, the pattern changes somewhat. While the Liberals lost 15% from 1987 to 1990 in rural areas, they gained almost 18.5% in urban areas outside metropolitan Toronto. When the correlations shown in Table II.2 are taken into account, we see that those rural voters who remained Liberal provincially in 1990 voted strongly against Reform in 1993 (-0.46). In smaller urban areas, where Liberals gained a substantial amount of support, Liberals voted more emphatically against Reform (-0.53) than their rural stalwarts. The importance of the Liberal position in the rural areas since 1990, given their tendency to close ranks against Reform federally, is also increased because there are more Liberals than Conservatives in these areas. Liberals, although they lost ground in rural areas since 1987, also had more to lose than the Conservatives. The whittling away of Liberal support was counteracted somewhat by the fact that their base of support was much larger than that of the Conservatives.

What should be noticed is that unlike Liberal voting patterns at the federal level (see Table II.1), provincial Liberal voters in urban areas dislike Reform more than rural provincial Liberal voters. It seems that rural voters are less likely to embrace the winds of change, whatever their political stripe. Just as rural Conservatives remain relatively indifferent to the acceptance of Reform among urban Conservative voters, rural Liberals remain somewhat indifferent to the displeasure expressed for Reform.
by their urban counterparts. Rural voters, it would seem, while not contradicting the
direction chosen by urban voters, are less enthusiastic in following the urban lead.
What is curious in the Liberal case, is that the drag in voting behaviour among rural
Liberals only occurs when they vote provincially. As Table II.1 demonstrates, the
rural/urban distinction among Liberal voters disappears come federal election time.

Liberal voters tend to close ranks against Reform federally, despite provincial
difference. This would indicate that if Reformers were to target the Liberal electorate,
which they must if they are serious about holding national office, there is no need to
differentiate between urban and rural Liberals, simplifying the communications
exercise. Conversely, the decision of the Reform Party not to compete in the
provincial electoral arena makes it more difficult for the party to exploit potential
weaknesses within the provincial Liberal electorate for the federal Reform gain.

CONSERVATIVES

As mentioned above, the NDP victory in the 1990 election had little to do with
changes in Conservative support. Indeed, the Conservative vote held together
overall, losing only 1.2% of the popular vote since 1987. Referring only to the 17
areas selected for the urban/rural comparison, the Conservatives lost 5% from 1987
to 1990 in the urban areas, with a marginal 2.2% drop in rural areas. The nucleus of
the provincial Conservative party has proven quite cohesive. The inclusion of the
mean popular vote share shows that even with a small drop of support in provincial
Conservative support, these voters voted more strongly for Reform only in the cities.
Rural Conservatives seem indifferent, not opting for Reform federally as much as one
would predict. Table II.3 shows that from 1987 to 1990, the support for the Liberals
in rural areas dropped just under 15%, while the corresponding drop in Conservative
support reached approximately 2%. These data indicate that, overall, rural voters
are more stable than their urban counterparts, and that among rural voters, rural
Conservatives are perhaps the most stable in Ontario. This observation of provincial
Conservative behaviour echoes federal Conservative voting patterns. The reticence
of rural Conservative voters to adopt the Reform placard federally, as well as the
coherence of the Conservative vote at both provincial and federal levels, represents
promising news not only for Mike Harris’s Tories, but for Jean Charest’s troops as
well. The victory of Mike Harris in the 1995 Ontario provincial election, coming from
behind after the surprising amount of support lost by Lyn McLeod and the Ontario
Liberals, suggests that the present premier benefitted from the solid support of
Conservatives and the waver of defection-prone Liberals. Mike Harris’s success
may well be Jean Charest’s gain, as the slim chance of a federal Tory party
rejuvenated by their Ontario wing may still come to pass.

NEW DEMOCRATS

The NDP is obviously the marginal player in the partisan dynamic impacting on
Reform support. Its fortunes have very little impact on Reform’s performance in the
province of Ontario to date, given the very low correlations. However, unlike the
Conservatives and the Liberals, the provincial New Democrats had as much of an
impact as their federal counterparts on the strength of Reform support; the divide
between electoral arenas has little effect. However, upon comparing Tables II.1 and II.2, an interesting observation emerges. What is interesting is that the direction of the relationship between Reform and NDP electorates has changed. In other words, as federal NDP support in 1993 increased, the Reform’s party’s decreased, minimally; data from 1990 show that as the provincial support for the NDP in Ontario increased, so did the support for Reform, albeit at a marginal rate. Federally speaking NDP voters did not choose to defect to Reform; provincial NDP voters in Ontario did to a limited degree. What we see is not necessarily a change in how important the NDP is to Reform’s overall chances of winning more seats in Ontario, but a change in overall trends. The data indicates that a small number of voters who voted for the alternative party in the provincial election of 1990 opted for another unknown federally. Although the aggregate data used here does not indicate whether these NDP supporters were long-standing members of the party or not, it is reasonable to support that they were among the “protest” vote, largely disaffected Peterson Liberals, which brought the Bob Rae’s NDP to power in 1990. This leads some credence to Pinard’s contention that those who break with partisan allegiances are also likely to continue this practice.

b) Electoral Volatility and Reform

The preceding observations regarding the relative stability of rural electorates brings us back to the question of electoral volatility. While this finding seems to have taken hold at both federal and provincial levels, it must be analyzed relative to the period of electoral uncertainty ushered in with the 1985 provincial election. It is outside of the purview of this thesis to see whether these patterns of stability or instability are greater than what occurred during the 43 years of Conservative government. The reader must be reminded that in the province of Ontario, stability was gained through small margins of electoral support; the inverse implies that instability can be achieved through equally small electoral tremors. This volatility brings us back to the points raised by Pinard. If it is indeed the case that change at the provincial level is positively correlated to change at the federal level, the political situation in Ontario this last decade presents Reform with a favourable opportunity to put down roots in the province. Therefore, electoral volatility provincially, particularly in the last three provincial elections, should correlate in a positive direction with the tendency of Ontarians to vote Reform in 1993. The task at hand is to devise a suitable indicator of electoral volatility using aggregate electoral data.\(^3\)

Electoral volatility for our purposes here is to include the amount of vote-switching occurring between political parties. It is recognized that Canadians are notorious vote-switchers, and that the "natural" level of voter volatility in Canada is in fact quite high:

\(^{3}\)It is noted that the use of aggregate data is bound to underestimate that amount of vote-switching occurring on the individual level. See Clarke, H.D. and M.C. Stewart; "Partisan Inconsistency and Partisan Change in Federal States: The Case of Canada"; American Journal of Political Science; Vol.31 (1987); p.386
Using data from their 1974-1979-1980 NES panel study, Leduc and his colleagues were able to show that Canadians do manifest relatively high levels of volatility in their vote choice and that this volatility is accompanied by a similar instability in their party identifications.  

Instable partisanship has also been explained as a by-product of Canada's federal structure of government:

Some provincial parties have only very weak federal counterparts — or no federal counterparts whatsoever — and even when parties of the same name compete at different levels, they do not always stand for the same things. The lack of symmetry in federal and provincial party systems is reinforced by institutional arrangements, with elections at the two levels typically taking place at quite different times and being fought on very different issues.

The relatively high incidence of flexible partisanship displayed by Canadians tends to be strongest in those provinces whose most competitive political parties include parties which have no counterpart on the federal level, British Columbia and Québec in particular. This is logical, given that British Columbians and Quebeckers choosing the Social Credit and the Parti Québécois respectively have had to choose completely different parties federally if they wished to participate positively in federal elections. Ontario is unique in this respect, since it is the only Canadian province where "...the three parties that compete nationally (the Liberals, the Progressive Conservatives, and the NDP) [have found] considerable support in both federal and provincial politics." Past studies based on individual level data have also shown that relative to other Canadian provinces, Ontario displays the largest number of stable partisans outside of Atlantic Canada.

In order to determine whether provincial vote change at the aggregate level correlated to an increased tendency to vote for Reform, the following indicator was constructed for each of the areas selected to study. An illustration is provided below:

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36 ibid.; p.234


38 The creation of the Bloc Québécois in 1991 changed this dynamic for Québec's nationalist voters.

39 Uslaner, E.M.; p.965

40 Clarke, H.D. and M.C. Stewart; "Partisan Inconsistency and Partisan Change in Federal States: The Case of Canada"; p.388
Table II.4 Determination of Voter Volatility during Provincial Elections for Barrie, Ontario, based on Percentage of Eligible Votes Obtained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>URBAN POLLS</th>
<th></th>
<th>RURAL POLLS</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>19.79</td>
<td>22.02</td>
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<td>21.62</td>
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<td>19.54</td>
<td>19.54</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.84*</td>
<td>14.52</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>11.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figures below the dark line are the sums of the differences between the percentage of eligible votes obtained in the three elections in question and the minimum value obtained by the respective party during this time. The mean of these values (in italics) represents the voter volatility of the electorate both in the rural polls surrounding Barrie (RVV = Rural Voter Volatility) and inside of the city itself (UVV = Urban Voter Volatility).

Several correlations were run between voter volatility and the share of votes obtained by parties in the 1993 federal election. The findings were disappointing in that no strong correlations existed between volatility at the provincial level, as measured by this indicator, and the performance of federal parties in 1993, including the Reform Party. This indicates that high levels of vote change in Ontario have not affected Reform except in one instance. Only one result came forward as noteworthy. While volatility across parties had no effect on Reform support, volatility among Conservatives in rural areas was found to have a marginal effect ($r^2 = 0.19$):

![Graph showing correlation](Image)

**Figure II.9** Correlation of Volatility of provincial Conservative Support (1985-1990) and Reform Support in 1993 (Ontario, n=17)

While the relationship between these two variables is marginal, it can be seen from Figure II.9 that it is negative. As volatility in the Conservative vote increased in rural
Ontario polls, the Reform support garnered in those polls also decreased. In the case of the Conservative party in Ontario, volatility is a measure of movement away from the party, since the party went from 37% in 1985 to 23.5% in 1990 of the popular vote provincially, and from 39.8% in 1985 to 19.2% in 1990 of the popular vote in the 17 selected areas used throughout this chapter. This demonstrates that as rural supporters of the Ontario Conservative Party broke with their party provincially, they failed to transfer their vote to the Reform Party federally. The question remains where the rural ex-Conservatives cast their vote in 1993. Further correlations show that these voters also broke their ties with the federal Conservatives ($r^2=0.13, -$) and opted to support the federal Liberal Party ($r^2=0.17, +$). In sum, the defection away from the provincial Conservatives in rural Ontario hurt the Reform Party federally since it bolstered the governing Liberals.

The finding that the volatility in party voters which had any noticeable impact on Reform’s success was among the least volatile of Ontario’s electorate seems paradoxical. The work of Pinard may provide a convincing answer to this dilemma. One of Pinard’s central tenets is that the rise of third party voting is tied to the credibility of the traditional or partisan alternative. Voters would presumably consider voting for the partisan unknown for three basic reasons: 1) if incumbent were discredited, 2) if the traditional alternative were weak or otherwise deemed unsuitable for the task of governing, or 3) if the voter were ideologically predisposed to the third party’s programme. This creates a distinction between the ideological and the traditional voter. The 1993 federal election may have shaken loose the ideological from the traditional voters among the Conservative electorate. Ideological Conservatives satisfied with the incumbent Tories would feel little reason to change loyalties; ideological Conservatives displeased with the Tories would feel at home with Reform; traditional voters displeased with the Tories would have voted for the traditional party alternative, the Liberal party. The volatility of the Ontario rural electorate would be then a reflection of Conservative disenchantment and this ideological/traditional balance. The finding demonstrates that at this point in time, Reform fortunes depend, perhaps disproportionately so, on the party’s ability to consolidate its base among Conservative voters by convincing the most stubborn of Ontario’s voters to make a federal leap of faith.

IV. CONCLUSION

The findings above engender a few remarks. Firstly, it is clear from the lower $r^2$ values that the realm of provincial party politics while having some effect, is only marginally determinant of Reform’s success in Ontario federally. With the decision of the party not to expand into provincial politics in the foreseeable future, the relationship between sub-national and federal politics will continue to be arms-length at best. Secondly, the examination of electoral volatility in the province shows that the Reform Party remains at this point a very localized phenomenon. If the interpretation I have offered as to why only Conservative volatility is a factor in Reform voting holds, Reform is almost exclusively an alternative of the ideologically committed right-wing in Canada, challenging the non-ideological vision of the party.
most preferred by its leader. They have failed to draw support in any significant degree from Liberal and New Democratic ranks, even though it is within this axis the most partisan change has occurred at the aggregate level. This does not mean, however, that the Liberals and New Democrats should rest easily on their laurels. As long as the Liberals remain a credible alternative for traditional voters of the right wing, Reform has little room to move. However, a more profound realignment of the right is bound to occur in the next federal election. As White indicates, "... if a realignment of voter support is to take place, it will begin in the urban, competitive areas and not in the rural areas until future elections." If a right-wing realignment was already underway in the urban areas of Ontario in 1993, 1998 could prove to be a boom to Reform in rural Ontario, if the federal Conservatives are unable to rally back on the winds of Mike Harris's success in 1995.

The importance of the federal configuration of partisan competition to understanding Reform's rise in Ontario is to be contrasted by the lack of importance the Referendum results contributed to our knowledge. The paltry predictive value of the No vote in 1992 in Ontario indicates that alienation is not enough; in order for alienation to have a decided impact on the fortunes of political parties it must be organized. Or put in a different way, alienation can be a factor in party politics when the partisan organizational structure channels it and allows it to rise to the surface. We have seen that marginalization in Ontario crosses the urban-rural divide—the importance it lends to Reform support is dependent more on its mobilization, the key mechanism of which is the party system. The stronger relationship found between Referendum voting and Reform outcomes in Alberta and British Columbia is testament to the organizational worth of the "Western alienation" doctrine, which Reform has successively used to its partisan advantage.

In Ontario, the negligent correlations found between Reform voting and Referendum discontent would indicate that the linkage between alienation and the party system is yet to be built. In Ontario, perhaps, Reform is more a party "comme les autres" than elsewhere, not because the party's literature or rhetoric differs from Kitchener to Kamloops, but because Ontario's partisan structure and political culture have yet to be organized to accomodate populism. Thus the challenge posed by Ontario to the expansion of Reform is greater than what they have encountered to date. The phenomenal growth of the party has been predicated by existence of structures which have facilitated its rise. The next election will determine whether Reform has been able to create similar structures in Ontario.

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41 For an examination of Preston Manning's non-ideological view of populism, see Flanagan, T.; p.22-24.

Chapter 3: Socio-Economic Predictors

After examining in detail how patterns of partisan competition have affected Reform support in Ontario in 1993, the opportunity now arises to examine more closely socio-economic factors which may lead to a clearer understanding of Reform support in Canada’s largest province. To date, researchers in electoral competition have been fortunate enough to make use of public opinion survey or polling data, where individual voters are asked a host of questions designed to yield detailed information as to how and why a citizen casts his or her vote. Such data allows researchers a glimpse inside the very complex process behind the seemingly simple task of marking the electoral ballot. There is a certain difficulty, however, in concentrating on the personal characteristics of the individual voter, at least from a strategic point of view. While the study of the individual voter has yielded a wealth of knowledge on the subject of individual level voting behaviour, it does not necessarily address constituency-level or sectoral dynamics which affect party competition in what must by necessity be more interesting to political parties: how parties win seats. After all, “...in a parliamentary system, the real currency is seats, not votes; votes are important primarily as a means to gaining seats”.¹ Just how economic factors influence constituency-level partisan support, in the case of the Reform Party in Ontario, is the central point of interest in this chapter. The hypothesis which serves as the organizing basis of the following pages is as follows: that sectoral-level economic variables which indicate the overall stability or instability of the region, are significant in determining the strength of Reform support.

The reader is to be reminded of the rationale which serves as the basis for the following exploration of socio-economic data and Reformers’ vote choice. First of all, through close examination of individually-based survey data, André Turcotte concluded that economic issues, such as deficit and unemployment, did little to inform researchers about actual vote patterns in the 1993 election. While not discounting the value of the economic voting model, where voters determine their vote according to a set of economic criteria, Turcotte concludes that in relation to the 1993 general election,

...egocentric-prospective-simple-cognitive evaluations of the economy were statistically significant but weak determinants of voting behaviour...the evidence presented in this analysis suggests that the relatively weak importance of economic evaluations as determinants of vote choice in Canada does not warrant the strategic emphasis given to economic questions by politicians on

¹Johnston, R., A. Blais, H.E. Brady, J. Crête; Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election; Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press; 1992; p.16-17
the campaign trail.²

The literature of post-modernist thinkers has provided another way of looking at how Reform support and economic variables are related. According to this thinking, the growing vigour of right-wing neo-conservative movements is caused in part by the economic dislocation and instability brought on by the era of post-industrialization. The opportunity for new right-wing movements to take advantage of the political tensions brought on by underlying economic difficulty lies in the pervasiveness of the resulting discontent. It stands to reason that an atmosphere of insecurity and alienation will affect those who, at least according to objective criteria, have little reason to feel threatened, either politically or economically. The opportunity for the right lies in mobilizing and organizing under a political banner the diversity of individuals whose alienation and discontent is significant enough to threaten previous parties and identities. The question remains whether Reform has begun to build in Ontario a wider coalition based on citizen disenchantment with politics, and the insecurity brought on by the economic strain of the modern era. The challenge becomes how to put to the test the possible effects macro-level, sectoral changes in the economy have impacted on Reform's level of electoral support.

The following chapter proposes to examine aggregate-level economic changes in Ontario and relate these changes to Reform's success in the province. It will also explore select demographic variables which are of interest here firstly because of their link to economic strain and secondly, because it has been previously demonstrated that they are of particular interest, especially in Ontario. A key aspect of the Reform message has been the withdrawal of the state from what the right-wing would consider an overlarge public realm; the argument for minimalist government is founded in part on the moral virtue of unfettered individual freedom and the economic necessity of keeping the costs of government down. In an era of economic difficulty, the push to keep costs in line connects naturally with the wish to decrease state responsibilities, especially with respect to those policies the right would rather do without. Whether as a result of xenophobia or a genuine consideration of economic limitations—the policy adopted by the party serves either purpose—a key issue which has fallen to this logic in Reform circles is immigration. The party's objection to Canada's current immigration policy has been framed in economic terms, where immigration policies should be "driven by economic demands, rather than by socio-cultural or humanitarian considerations."³ This is clearly illustrated by the questions posed by Reform MP Herbert Grubel to Immigration Minister Sergio Marchi in the following exchange in Question Period:

²Turcotte, A.; "Economic Voting in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election"; paper presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association; University of Calgary. Calgary, June 1994; p.28

³Foster, B.; "The Canadian New Right and Ethno-Cultural Pluralism: Ideologies and the Limits to Public Diversity"; paper presented to the Annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, 1994; p.28
"...This is in the name of Canadians concerned about the country's financial crisis. Next year Canada will admit 111,000 family reunification immigrants. Many of them will be persons of an age where they will be unable to contribute to Canada's social programs...Would the Minister please tell the House what he expects the costs of the medicare services required by these immigrants will be?...Mr. Speaker, may the people of Canada conclude from the minister's answer or non-answer that decisions about Canada's immigration levels are made without regard to the cost which the policies impose on already strained social programs of the country?" 

The link between economic strain and the identification of immigration as a problem is clear. The importance of examining immigration as a predictor of Reform support is not only founded on its ties to economic strain; the concentration of immigrants in a federal electoral district has been shown to have a significant explanatory value for Reform support nationally. The effect of the strength of the immigrant population has generally been found to strongly hinder Reform support. However, recently Eagles et al have found that concentrations of immigrants in some federal electoral districts "...appear to help Reform candidates", leading them to assert that "...it is tempting to interpret this as evidence of a backlash vote among anglophone voters in these settings, a factor that deserves explanation in future work." 

The examination of immigration as an important demographic variable in Reform support will be joined by the linguistic variable, specifically the preponderance of francophones in a federal electoral district. The linguistic variable is similar to immigration in that both issues automatically identify "out-groups" in English-Canadian society, leading to the possibility of scapegoating, especially in the context of economic difficulty. The linguistic policies of the party have not escaped the economic rationale, with Reformers invoking the prohibitive costs of Official Bilingualism.

The explanatory value of the linguistic variable has already received some comment.

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Canada, House of Commons Debates; Tuesday, February 22, 1994; vol.133, no.027, 1st session, 35th parliament; p.1687-1688


Eagles, M., et al; "Ecological Models of Party Support: Pan-Canadian, Regional and Local Patterns in the 1988 and 1993 General Elections"; paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Université du Québec à Montréal, June 4-6, 1995; p.23

For example, a proposed policy resolution presented to the party for its consideration at the 1994 Assembly in Ottawa reads "...The Reform Party advocates that federal funding of language legislation and bilingual bonuses for federal civil servants be discontinued": Reform Party Proposed Policy Resolutions, October 13-15, 1994, p.33
Johnston et al found, based on the 1992-3 Canadian Referendum and Election Study, that

...a voter at the anti-French extreme was four times as likely to vote Reform as the voter at the other end. None of the growth in the Reform share (of vote intentions during the election campaign) came from francophiles. All of the combined-share growth toward the other end came from Reform. Reform thus did two things at once. First, it increased the system's polarization on this dimension. In doing so, it must have attracted francophobes across the board, not just from the old Conservative bloc; but the Conservative bloc, was in fact, where francophobes were disproportionately to be found.8

While the two studies cited comment on national trends affecting Reform's national electoral outlook, this study aims to determine how francophones and immigrants alike have affected Reform's electoral support in the province of Ontario.

I. METHODOLOGY

The following observations are based on Statistics Canada census survey data, including both the 1986 and 1991 censuses. The indicators selected were organized according to federal electoral district, allowing comparisons to be drawn between electoral data proper and socio-economic factors measured according to the same geographical unit.9 The data used here overcome some of the difficulties posed by using opinion poll or other survey data. Such data are rarely organized in units smaller than provinces. As well, the distribution of the sample is rarely consistent across provincial regions. While survey data is useful in determining individual-level vote choice, it does not easily allow comparison to previous and recorded electoral behaviour.

Among economic sectors, the following were selected in order to obtain a reasonable cross-section for the province. The data for each sector are the number of people employed in the sector. Selected sectors were primary industry (PRIMIND), agriculture

8 Johnson, R., N. Nevitte, H. Brady; "Campaign Dynamics in 1993: Liberals, Conservatives, and Reform"; paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, 1994; 18-19

(AGRic86)\textsuperscript{10}, manufacturing (MANU, MANU86, DFMANU\%86)\textsuperscript{11}, communications (COMM, COMM86), finance (FINANCE, FINANCE86) and the public sector (PUBSEC, PUBSEC86, DFPUBSEC\%). Other economic measures for which data was collected are: labour force mobility (MOVE1YR, MOVE5YR, MOVE86)\textsuperscript{12} the unemployment rate (UNEMP, UNEMP86, DFUNEMP), the incidence of low income (LOWINC, LOWINC86, DFLOWINC\%)\textsuperscript{13}, average income (AVGINC, A\%INC86) and median income (MEDINC, MEDINC86).\textsuperscript{14}

The two demographic variables of particular interest here are the effect exerted by francophones and immigrants on Reform's electoral support. The two demographic variables which have been selected for analysis are represented by a number of different measures. The rationale for developing a number of different ways of measuring the effect of language and immigration on Reform voting is based on the fact that it is unclear when these variables are most important to partisan politics. For instance, three measures were selected for the francophone variable: 1) the number of people in the riding with French as their mother tongue (FRE100) in 1991, 2) the number of people in the riding with French as their mother tongue (FRE10086) in 86, and 3) the percentage of francophones in the district's population (FRE100\%)\textsuperscript{15}. The first measure indicates whether it is the size of the francophone population in the district which influences Reform support; it would indicate whether the presence of a Francophone community significantly affects voting behaviour. The second measure would indicate whether it is the size of the francophone population relative to the size of the district's population which is the determining factor. This would allow one to determine whether the francophone community would exert an effect on electoral choice once a certain

\textsuperscript{10}In the 1991 census data, the components of the "primary industry" category were not defined. It is assumed that the following categories from the 1986 were collapsed together: agriculture and related services, fishing and trapping, logging and forestry, mining, quarrying, and oil well industries.

\textsuperscript{11}The coding for the economic indicators is as follows. When the prefix is not directly followed by the number "86", the indicator is derived from the 1991 census. The "86" denotes that the data has been drawn from the 1986 census. When the indicator begins with "DF" and ends with "86%" or "\%", this means the indicator is the measure of growth in employment in the industry as a percentage of the number of people employed in that industry in 1986.

\textsuperscript{12}The mobility indicators measure those surveyed in 1991 by one year mobility status and five year mobility status. The 1986 census did not make this distinction, measuring only mobility status.

\textsuperscript{13}The low income indicators are based on the percentage incidence of low income among all economic families in the federal electoral district.

\textsuperscript{14}The average and median income indicators are based on the household income of all private households in the federal electoral district.

\textsuperscript{15}The language indicators have "100" included in their labels, indicating that the data is based on a 100\% sample of the district's surveyed population, rather than 20\%, which is the case with all of the other indicators mentioned in this chapter.
threshold is reached.

The logic used for the Francophone variable is replicated with the immigration variable. However, a few more ways of measuring the effect immigration could have on electoral choice were developed. The immigrant variable was measured in six ways: 1) the number of immigrants in the district in 1991 (TIMMPOP), 2) the number of immigrants in the district in 1986 (TIMMPOP86), 3) the size of the immigrant population as a percentage of the total population of the district (TIMMPOP%), 4) the percentage increase of the immigrant population from 1986 to 1991 (INCIMM%86), 5) the number of immigrants in the district who arrived within the last 10 years (1981-1991) (RECIIMM), and 6) the proportion of recent immigrants relative to the total immigrant population (RECIIMM%). The rationale behind developing measures of recent immigration is that the cultural composition of Canada's immigrants has changed in the last decade, reflecting a greater racial diversity. The last two measures might indicate whether this aspect of Canada's immigration community affects Canadians' vote choice.

II. FINDINGS

The analysis of socio-economic indicators has resulted in establishing a few generalized findings for the topic at hand. It is recognized that the relationships indicated by the survey data are weak, yet statistically significant. Stronger correlations between specific variables and Reform support are found when the analysis of the non-survey data is reduced to the regional or local level, illustrating how different variables have a greater or lesser impact on Reform fortunes, as one moves about the province.

1) All Ontario

Province-wide trends in the census data are worthy of note. Of the variables studied, the six variables in Table III.1 were found to exert the most effect. The information arising from the data is more clearly discerned when examined in conjunction with Figure III.1. The data illustrates that the strongest economic

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<thead>
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<th>+/-</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.18</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFPUBSEC</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMP</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRE100%</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWINC</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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The correlation coefficients presented in this chapter are selected from all of the regressions run in the analysis. To see all of the regression data, see Appendix I of this thesis.
Figure III.1 Regression graphs of select variables and Reform support (Ontario)
variable lending strength to Reform in Ontario is the growth, represented by labour force employment, of the manufacturing and public sectors. The strongest correlations are found with manufacturing sector, where the number of people employed in 1991, and the percentage rate of growth in the industry since 1986 are both significant. These findings seem to indicate that as economic stability increases, Reform support also increases. Economic security, it would seem, is beneficial to Reform support in Ontario.

This trend is apparently mirrored in the public sector. The finding that the increase of public sector employment aids Reform’s electoral outlook may be the result of two factors. Firstly, those who have obtained employment in the public sector, presumably achieving a level of economic security, have opted to vote for the Reform party. Or, in a second case, in those constituencies where public sector growth has occurred, Reform has been able to win over voters who ideologically object to the increase of government in their backyards.

The three indicators supporting Reform’s rise, while weak, beg the following question. If the rise in the Reform party has been linked to economic dislocation and strain, how is it that economic stability and security figure more positively on Reform’s fortunes? One explanation may lie within the data itself. The 1991 survey data may have underestimated the amount of economic instability brought on by the recession which continued on into 1992. Another may be that strain which has allowed the rise of this new fourth party in Ontario is not perched on a balance of economic malaise at all, but that the professed concern with economic issues of the Party masks an alienation of a different source.

Three variables stood out as detracting from Reform support. The strongest indicator against Reform was in incidence of low income (as a percentage of economic families). Figure III.1 (d) shows that as electoral districts get poorer in Ontario, voters in those districts turn away from the Reform alternative, opting instead to stay within the established party system; or conceivably to abstain from voting all together, although this is outside of the purview of the data. What is interesting is that while unemployment and low income are highly collinear (0.77), low income is a stronger deterrent to Reform voting. Also, it is the condition of having a high proportion of people within the riding itself, and not the worsening of this proportion, which was found to exert an effect.

This contrasts in part with the conclusions of Pinard—whose conclusions, it must be remembered, are based on individual-level voting patterns. He observes that new political parties fail to enlist the support of the poor, an observation supported here while using aggregate data. However, Pinard indicates that the poor will embrace a new movement “...when the poor themselves are adversely affected by changes in their economic conditions”.¹⁷ The data on Reform explored here indicate that further

adversity amongst low income families had not led them to adopt Reform's banner.

Of the demographic variables explored, the linguistic cleavages well-known to Canadians have deterred Reform's acceptance in the province— a result which was entirely expected. The corresponding graph in Figure III.1 (e) shows that as the percentage of francophones increases in the riding, Reform finds less support. The graph also shows that language is a factor in voting against Reform only when the concentration of francophones reaches a threshold of approximately 10% of the population. Once this threshold is achieved, the minimum amount of scatter about the regression line illustrates the cohesiveness of the francophone population in this particular voting pattern.

The trends observed at the provincial level are subject to variation across the province. The size of the province of Ontario and the differences in economic activity across the province would merit a look at how the indicators under scrutiny effect vote outcomes in different parts of the province.

2) Metropolitan Toronto

The findings for the metropolitan Toronto ridings, show in Table III.2, demonstrate that different forces are at work. In terms of variables contributing to Reform support, manufacturing seems to have ceded its place to the communications sector, despite the fact that manufacturing employed 16% of metropolitan Toronto's labour force in 1991, as opposed to 4% for the communications industry. This finding may reflect the growth capacity of the communications industry, especially in the development of the post-industrial, knowledge-based economy. This finding may well confirm the overall trend observed at the provincial level— that is, that economic security encourages voters to opt for the new partisan alternative. However, aside from communications, the sectoral analysis contributed little to our understanding of Reform in the Toronto area. The difficulty with applying a sectoral economic analysis to metropolitan Toronto, linking economic activity and vote choice, is that the number of people working in an industry in a riding does not necessarily equate to the number of people working and living in the riding. This is generally true of any region studied here; however, because of the urban concentration of the metropolitan Toronto area and the number of ridings it contains, the economic dislocation occurring in one riding will effect the economic fortunes, and possibly the voting patterns, of people in a number of different ridings. The possible effect then that economic dislocation might have on voting patterns is obscured because the ripple is muted across a number of ridings. Thus the changes in economic activity in a particular industry would be felt to a much

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<td>MEDINC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMP</td>
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<td>TIMMPOP%</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWTNC</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMMPOP86</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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smaller degree in that same riding than in a region such as northern Ontario.

Perhaps a surprising addition to the variables working in favour of Reform is median income, as opposed to average family income, which was found to have no effect. This may indicate that the average family income is flawed as an indicator because it is subject to inflation due to the inclusion of the sample of a few high-income earners. The stronger relevance of the median income indicator may be a better measure of middle-class support. The fact that Reform’s electoral chances improve as the fortunes of the middle class also improve confirms the observation that Reform is a vehicle of the economically secure. The presence again of the proportion of low income families in the riding as a significant ecological deterrent. Reform success strengthens the impression that Reform has been adopted by the ideologically conservative of Ontario’s middle class.

The greatest factor detracting from Reform’s support in Toronto is, as expected, the concentration of immigrants in metropolitan Toronto. With an $r^2$ value of .40, the size of the immigrant population in Toronto (as measured by the 1986 census) is the strongest socio-economic detractor to Reform’s expansion in Ontario’s capital city. This finding indicates that as the number of immigrants increases in the riding, Reform support also decreases. The second measure of immigration found to exert some effect was the relative size of the immigrant population to that of the federal electoral district, with an $r^2$ value of .21. These two measures would indicate that it is the size of the immigrant population itself which exerts a stronger effect on aggregate voting, rather than its relative size in the riding. What merits further attention is why the size of the immigrant population as it was surveyed in 1986 is more useful to understanding Reform voting in 1993 than the data we have of the immigrant population of 1991. In other words, why is the measure TIMMPOP86 stronger than TIMMPOP? Also, why were the other measures of immigration found to have virtually no effect on Reform voting?\footnote{The findings for the immigration measures for metro Toronto are as follows: 1) TIMMPOP: $r^2=0.11$, 2) INCIM%86: $r^2=0.12$, 3) RECIM: $r^2=0.04$, 4) RECIM%: $r^2=0.00$}

One explanation which would seem to account for the discrepancies found in the immigration measures is the delay from when an immigrant enters the country and when an immigrant is accorded the right to vote.\footnote{An immigrant must be in Canada for a minimum of three years in order to attain citizenship, and hence the right to vote in federal and provincial elections.} In this case, the immigrant population as surveyed in 1986 would be more representative of the voters within the immigrant community in 1993. This delay would also explain why the increase in the immigrant population since 1986 and the presence, relative or absolute, of recent immigrants has little to no effect on the voting tendencies of the immigrant community as a whole.
3) Eastern Ontario

If immigration is one of the key regional factors at play in the Toronto area, some of the factors distinguishing Eastern Ontario as a region and to which voters could be expected to respond are the importance of the francophone community across the region, and the predominance of the public sector. If the public sector is the "core of the Ottawa economy", it is so because of the relatively weak economy of the rest of the region. As Graham White asserts, "...apart from the north, the east is generally the most economically depressed region of the province." This is to be countered somewhat by the development of a vibrant high-tech sector, as "...the Ottawa area is becoming the 'Silicon Valley' of Canada,...home to some three hundred firms in the high-tech/computer fields". The specificity of the region is also characterized by the notable presence of francophones, as the counties of Glengarry, Prescott, Russell, Stormont, and the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton are considered among the principal designated French areas of Ontario, guaranteeing the francophone populations in these areas that provincial government services will be provided in the French language.

In the national capital region and the federal electoral districts of eastern Ontario, Reform confronted the very established presence of the Liberal Party. In the most francophone of Ontario's regions, the Liberal Party was in little danger of electoral upset from the upstart Reform Party. Given the findings of Johnston et al23 that Reform's support on a national level is bolstered by the disproportionate support of francophone voters, it is no surprise that the number of francophone voters in a riding is a strong deterrent to Reform's success, as demonstrated in table III.3. While the Liberal Party remains a credible option for francophone voters in eastern Ontario, this pattern is unlikely to change.

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20White, G. (ed); Government and Politics in Ontario; 4th edition; Scarborough: Nelson Canada; 1990; p.20

21Ibid.; p.23

22Ibid.; p.37

Two other variables proved strong in detracting from Reform’s electoral momentum. The strongest of deterrents to Reform in Eastern Ontario is unemployment—indeed, the effect unemployment has on Reform support is stronger in this region than the rest of Ontario. The strong effect of low income is closely related to the unemployment rate. The overall provincial trend, where those with limited means remain impervious to the Reform alternative, is confirmed. Interestingly, perhaps, while unemployment and low income are strongly but negatively related to the strength of the public sector, public sector stability has no effect on Reform support.

The economic analysis undertaken here has yielded little in terms of beneficial indicators for Reform support, but the analysis has confirmed voting trends observed across the province. Only two variables leant a hand to Reform, both of which are familiar to the reader. As employment in the manufacturing sector increases across the region, and as median family incomes rise, Reform’s electoral position grows stronger. However, what works for Reform runs head on into the much stronger forces which deter it.

4) Northern Ontario

Northern Ontario is a region whose economy is particularly subject to instability, due to the region’s reliance on commodity markets. “The north’s settlement pattern is characterized by isolated resource-based single-industry communities subject to great variations in economic prosperity.” The two largest cities are Sudbury and Thunder Bay, whose economies represent the hubs of the mining and forestry grain transportation industries respectively. A host of other northern communities are tied the extraction of various minerals, such as Timmins, Elliot Lake, Wawa, and Kirkland Lake. This economic profile indicates that instability is a normal characteristic of the region. Aside from this economic profile, northern Ontario distinguishes itself as fostering an important francophone community, with the districts of Cochrane, Temiscaming, Sudbury, Algoma, Nipissing, and the Regional Municipality of Sudbury also being designated as communities where provincial government services are guaranteed in the French language.

In northern Ontario we find some of the strongest correlations yielded in this analysis. The strongest positive variable is the percentage increase in the immigrant population over the five year period from 1986 to 1991. Figure III.2 illustrates that as the ratio of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table III.4 Regression Results for Selected Variables and Reform Support, 1993 (Northern Ontario, n=15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCIMM%86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFPUBSEC%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFANU%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOVEYR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRIC86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFLOWINC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRE 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


55
immigrants relative to the total population in the 15 federal ridings increases, Reform support also increases. This trend would suggest two possible scenarios—first, whether the immigrant population itself has found favour with the Reform Party, and it is lending the party its concerted support, or second there is a backlash occurring against the small immigrant population. The first option seems unlikely, since the size of the immigrant population in northern Ontario is not sufficiently large to reach a threshold where a concerted bloc vote among immigrants would be likely. As well, it does not seem reasonable to suggest that the voting patterns of a small immigrant population, spread over a large geographical area, would cohesively support the partisan unknown. Also, as we have seen with the immigration measures in Toronto, a potentially large proportion of the immigrant population may not have the right to vote. The second option, that of a reaction to a small sector of the population changing at a relatively quick rate, is more credible—especially if one takes into account the economic vulnerability of the region.

The three other variables contributing to Reform support in northern Ontario—the growth of the manufacturing and public sectors and labour force mobility, reinforce once again that economic stability is favourable to Reform’s electoral outlook. A further look at how these variables interact by constructing a correlation matrix is useful:

<p>| Table III.5 Correlation Matrix for Selected Independent Variables (Northern Ontario), 1991 and 1986 Census Data |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FREQ100</th>
<th>INC1986</th>
<th>MOV5YR</th>
<th>AGRIC86</th>
<th>DFMANU%</th>
<th>DFPU86</th>
<th>DFLLOWINC%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FREQ100</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC1986</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOV5YR</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRIC86</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFMANU%</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFPU86</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFLLOWINC%</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The correlation matrix measures the degree of collinearity among independent variables. The closer the correlation approaches 1.00, the greater the relationship between the two variables. Table III.5 demonstrates that the increase in the immigrant population is also
closely related to the increase in labour force mobility and employment growth in the public sector. This might indicate that Reform is not only bolstered by good economic conditions, but also by the suggestion that the jobs available in the public sector are being filled by immigrants coming into the area.

The variables which detracted from Reform support are by now familiar. The number of francophones, just as in eastern Ontario, hinders Reform’s attractiveness to a district’s voters. With seven25 of northern Ontario’s 15 ridings having populations where over 10% are francophones, the Reform Party faces a strong obstacle to its success in the region. What is new among those variables which detract from Reform support is the level of people employed in the agricultural sector. While the effect exerted by this variable is weak, it echoes the findings of the previous chapter—namely that rural Ontario has not embraced the Reform phenomenon at this early stage of the party’s history in the province. It is also noteworthy that it is only in northern Ontario, the least urbanized and least populated of Ontario’s regions, where this variable was found to exert any effect at all.

The contrast remains that in the region where the correlations between Reform support and socio-economic indicators are the strongest is a region where Reform presented little challenge to Liberal candidates in 1993. The Liberal Party is the obvious beneficiary of economic strain in the region—a fact aided no doubt by the Liberal Party’s strategic emphasis on Canada’s employment situation in the election campaign. The question before Reform strategists would be whether they can make themselves more palatable to francophone voters overall, and whether they can force a leap of faith among insecure voters who still find comfort in their partisan standby.

5) Western Ontario

Western Ontario is perhaps one of Ontario’s most stable regions in terms of its economic base. It houses the all-important automobile and auto-parts industry, representing the most important section of Ontario’s and Canada’s manufacturing base. While the manufacturing sector has experienced significant job losses in the last recession, “the industry has remained generally stable and prosperous”.26 The effects of the recession have been mitigated somewhat by the development of an electronics and technology sector in the London-Guelph-Waterloo area. The region is also heavily urbanized, with six of the largest ten urban centres of the province.27 However, the

25 These ridings are Algoma, Cochrane-Superior, Nickel Belt, Nipissing, Sudbury, Timiskaming and Timmins-Chapleau.

26 White, G., Government and Politics in Ontario, p.28

urbanization of the region is contrasted by the importance of the agricultural sector, as
the region also contains the largest portion of the province's prime agricultural land.\textsuperscript{28}

In terms of the political landscape, the west has traditionally been dominated by the
Conservative party in provincial elections, although the realignments in the 1987 and
1990 elections have taken their toll on the Conservative hold in the area.\textsuperscript{29} The
congruence confirmed in the previous chapter between the strength of the Reform base
and prior Conservative support holds true especially in western Ontario, at the federal
level as well. As Flanagan notes, "...Reform did best in Ontario in the outer suburbs of
Toronto, the cottage country of central Ontario, and the Niagara peninsula—all formerly
Conservative bastions."\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, of all the regions under consideration here, Reform
achieved its best electoral results in the west, winning an average of 24% of the popular
vote, with 11 of the 46 ridings achieving between 20% and 29% of the vote, and 5
ridings passing the 30% popular vote mark.\textsuperscript{31}

The results of the sectoral and demographic analysis are easily summarized. Only two
variables were shown to exert any effect on Reform voting in western Ontario. Of all the
variables tested, the proportion of low income families in the riding (LOWINC: r²=0.21)
and the rate of unemployment (UNEMP: r²=0.22) detracted from Reform support, continuing
the provincial trend which has become a familiar aspect of this analysis. Aside from the
continuing indifference of the less fortunate in Ontario, this sector level analysis cannot point to an economic strain or instability which can explain the strength of Reform support in this region. This would lead me to suggest that the more important
determinants of Reform's breakthrough in western Ontario lie solely within the party
system and the configuration of partisan competition.

III. CONCLUSION

The socio-economic analysis undertaken here attempted to discuss how economic
factors present at the regional level affected Reform's electoral support in Ontario. If
there is one trend which arose from the analysis, it is that as the economic security or
stability of the region increases, Reform benefits. The core definition or criterion of this
stability has been the increase of employment within a cross-section of industry types. It
would seem that the objective condition of economic strain, simply the loss of
employment, does not help, but hinders, the rise of Ontario's new partisan competitor.

\textsuperscript{28}ibid.: p.20

\textsuperscript{29}ibid.: p.247

\textsuperscript{30}Flanagan, T.: Waiting for the Wave: p.155. The areas of Ontario mentioned by Flanagan in this
quotation were subsumed under the heading of western Ontario in this analysis.

\textsuperscript{31}The popular vote share in the 46 ridings of western Ontario ranged from 10.1% to 37.9%, the
highest vote electing a Reform Member of Parliament (Simcoe-Centre).
This quickly leads to a consideration of whether the data used in this analysis sufficiently measure economic strain. If one accepts the thesis of Pinard that economic strain is a key condition which facilitates the emergence of a minor party, then the strain which motivates Reform voters increases as the material ability of the Reform voters to meet the needs of themselves and their families also increases. Those facing the strain born of basic economic survival seem to remain impervious to Reform's charms. This finding based on aggregate data is supported by the study of individual-level data, where it can be shown that, in cases where the local rate of unemployment of the respondent is high, Reform garners support from those who are not scared of losing their jobs. The Reform vote, it would seem, is that of the egocentric and the economically secure.

The importance of strain, particularly with respect to the Reform movement, is one of perception rather than direct influence on the lives of Reform voters. The basis of economic strain benefiting Reform has not been discerned by the data used here. The key to the answers sought here would seem to lie in individual-level public opinion data.  

Several authors have pointed out how economic strain, more widely defined, has impacted in a more intangible manner, on the insecurity of Reform's key constituency: the middle class. Patten writes:

"The changing structure of the labour market, the sharp decline in real wage gains over the past decade, the long-term secular upward trend in unemployment, and the phenomenon known as "the declining middle"...has made like more difficult for many "middle Canadians"."

Job anxiety and job insecurity, mounting frustration with increasing marginal tax rates, all are potent aspects of economic strain which cannot be measured solely by examining levels of labour force participation across a region. These types of strain are best discerned through the use of individual-level survey data.

It is perhaps tautological to suggest that by advancing a political and economic agenda favouring the interests of the "average Canadian taxpayer", the Reform party has been able to mobilize this much touted strain. As long as voters see themselves as ordinary and essentially in line with the mainstream, paying taxes at no matter which level, Reform has the necessary basis to win over Ontario's voters. It is perhaps necessary

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32 See Gingras, F.P., B. Gauthier, and F. Graves; "La question du chômage et le caractère distinctif de l'électorat québécoise au scrutin fédéral de 1993"; *Revue québécoise de science politique* (à paraître)

33 Ibid.

34 Patten, S.; "A Political Economy of Reform: Understanding Middle Class Support for Manning's Right-libertarian Populism"; paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, Alberta, June 12-14, 1994; p.21
only to couch the Reform message in these terms, rather than on a more revolutionary message of fundamental conflict between citizens and elites, in order to achieve the same effect.
Chapter 4: Ontario’s Reform Party Candidates

The expansion of the Reform Party outside its western stronghold in preparation for the national electoral contest of 1993 necessitated a change in the party’s mobilization strategy. One obviously could not woo Ontario by trumpeting the call of western distress in Confederation and the ills inflicted by Ontario, wittingly or unwittingly, on the citizens of Outer Canada. The new party had to sell itself to voters nationally. For this reason, the planks of the national campaign must have been selected—fiscal reform, parliamentary reform, and criminal reform—with an eye to make palatable to voters a party whose previous rhetorical positioning cast these same voters in an unfavourable light. The necessity for Reform to make a rhetorical leap to win Ontario voters was clear; the nationalization of the party’s rhetoric and its platform was underway by the time the electoral writ was dropped. The national campaign platform provided the framework in which Reform’s electoral candidates could solicit support irrespective of provincial origin; what remains unexplored is how candidates in Ontario prioritised or tailored the Reform message to bring the voters home.

The previous chapters of this study have explored the political opportunities and economic strains which underlie Reform’s electoral standing in Ontario. While these chapters have been based on constituency-level data and illustrate how political and economic factors relate to electoral outcomes, they cannot comment on how the party achieved these outcomes. The data cannot help us understand the rhetorical bases on which the voters were courted. As such, the statistical and electoral data previously introduced here provide an incomplete view of the Reform party and its effort to achieve national office. Other data sources must fill the void.

It is for this reason that the candidates who ran for office under the Reform banner in Ontario were surveyed. The aim of the survey was three-fold. Firstly and most importantly, the survey was designed to gain a glimpse at how candidates weigh the importance of key issues as a basis for their involvement in the party and as a basis of their task to win electoral support. A guiding principle of this study has been that while national electoral campaigns and the conduct of the party leader are key aspects of

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1Flanagan, T.; Waiting for the Wave: The Reform Party and Preston Manning; Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co., Ltd.; 1995; p.53. Flanagan describes the initial strategic positioning adopted by Manning as a “party of the West”, although it is clear from his writings and from those of Preston Manning that the leader was careful to allow the party the rhetorical room in order to remain credible if expansion did indeed occur. See as well Manning, E.P.; The New Canada; Toronto: Macmillan Canada; 1992

2Scholtz, C.; “The Reform Party of Canada: The Transmission and Evolution of a Nationalist Message”; paper presented to the New York State Political Science Association Annual Meetings; Albany, New York; April 1994. One of the key illustrations of this paper was that through a content analysis of the Reformer, the newsletter of Reform party members, the rhetoric of the party had by 1992 almost completely removed the predominance of the party’s previous regionalist orientation in favour of a more national audience.

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presenting a coherent, viable, and organized campaign, candidates have some discretion with regards to the tailoring or prioritization of the electoral message to suit the perceived interests of their potential constituents. Of interest then, is how Ontario’s voters were courted by Reform’s electoral frontline. In the era of the national media-centred campaign, it is clear that the fate of the candidate is beholden far more to the conduct of the party leader, the voters’ evaluation of the party’s past accomplishments or faults, and the coherence of the national strategy and party programme than by the actions of the candidate himself. Indeed, examination of survey data gathered during the 1993 election campaign shows that these three items were the most important factors in determining the vote intentions of Ontario’s voters. The point of this study is not to determine whether the candidate’s message actually convinced anyone; it is to explore how or whether party activists organized their message to achieve its maximum effect for an electorate largely unfamiliar with fourth-party alternatives, the populist tradition of the West, and the Manning political pedigree.

The introductory chapter outlined the basic categorization of issue areas which the Reform party is expected to use. The categories have been designated as follows: 1) citizen marginalization and alienation, 2) fiscal reform, 3) criminal reform, 4) regional discontent, and 5) social reform and traditional values. The survey devoted most of its attention to the first three items, since these were the issues around which the campaign was built. It has been hypothesized that, since economic factors were found to have an underwhelming effect on vote intentions particularly in light of the attention paid it by the party leaders, the Reform party organized its electoral message in Ontario on the basis of citizen’s alienation from politics generally and their marginalization from the party system in particular. The mobilization of the Ontario electorate and to a wider extent the Canadian public under the cleavage of alienation has interesting implications for the conduct of Canadian party politics.

The second aim of the survey was to develop an understanding of the candidates themselves and the political organization they participated in building. Reform has been familiar to western voters since 1987. The challenge of building a new political party in a province largely unfamiliar with the populist tradition in a short period of time merits our attention. Thirdly, the survey gave candidates the opportunity to evaluate which political and economic factors their experience informed them to be key determinants of Reform support at the riding level. The assessment of these factors from the people directly involved provides an important confirmation of previously determined correlates of support, or may lead us to rethink or reorder the conclusions to which we have already come.

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3 The following percentage of Ontario’s voters surveyed indicated that each respective items most influenced their vote intentions: 1) the party programme: 33%, 2) the party’s past accomplishments: 19%, 3) aversion of other parties: 17%, and 4) the party leader: 10%. See Gingras, F.P., B. Gauthier, F. Graves; “La question du chômage et le caractère distinctif de l’électorat québécois au scrutin fédéral de 1993”, Revue québécoise de science politique, No.27 (forthcoming 1995).
I. METHODOLOGY

The candidate’s questionnaire was developed in the winter of 1994, and after receiving the approval of the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ottawa, it was mailed to Reform candidates in February of 1995. Of the 97 questionnaires distributed, 51 were returned, achieving a response rate of 53%. The candidates were assured that the reporting of the survey results would not be used to identify them personally unless their permission to do so was obtained. In an effort to ensure the highest possible response rate, a letter of introduction and endorsement from Mr. Ed Harper, Reform Member of Parliament (Simcoe-Centre) accompanied the questionnaire. It was originally intended that the results of the survey be analysed not only on a provincial level, but on a regional level as well. Of the 10 questionnaires sent to eastern Ontario, 8 were received (response rate=80%); of the 15 sent to the north, 6 were received (response rate=43%); of the 22 sent to Toronto, 9 were returned (response rate=41%); and finally, of the 51 questionnaires sent to western Ontario, 28 were returned (response rate=55%). While the small sample size of the east and the north may cause difficulties in terms of statistical validity, the high response rate for eastern Ontario in particular does not prevent one from citing responses as typical of the region, if so called for.

The questionnaire itself was composed of four main sections. The first was designed to establish the candidates’ previous community and political involvement. The second called upon the candidates to identify the economic profile of their ridings. The third was the most intensive section of the questionnaire, focusing on the 1993 election period. Candidates were asked to evaluate what they considered to be among the most important political, economic, organizational, and programmatic factors influencing Reform support in their ridings specifically, and the national Reform campaign generally. The last section focused on questions which would allow one to build a profile of the Reform candidate.

II. FINDINGS

A. Issue Areas

The concept of a party’s issue universe is based on the observation that in the given

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4The candidate questionnaire appears in its entirety in Appendix 2 of this thesis.

5The candidate questionnaire, the last section of the survey in particular, borrowed heavily from the survey developed by Keith Archer and Faron Ellis of the University of Calgary in their work specifically regarding the Reform delegates to the 1992 Assembly. I would like to thank Keith Archer for giving me access to his survey. For a look at his results, see Archer, K. and F. Ellis; “Opinion Structure of Party Activists: The Reform Party of Canada”; Canadian Journal of Political Science; Vol.27 No.2 (June 1994); p.277-308
time period of an election, competitive political parties must choose the issues they have the best choice of “winning”, and develop a campaign around those issues. The choice of such issues available to a given political party is constrained to a degree, since the party can choose to highlight its strength from among those issues it has achieved a degree of credibility before the writ is dropped. While the party may speak to a host of policy issues in the party programme outside of election time, it can only afford to focus the public's attention to one or a few key issues during the election period. As outlined in the introductory chapter, the success of electoral debate can be measured by the ability of the party to make the focus of the election period those issues on which the party is strongest.

1. Citizen Marginalization and Alienation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggested Response</th>
<th>Number of candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The leadership of Preston Manning</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was equally dissatisfied with all other political parties</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Reform party opposed the Charlottetown Accord and the elites which endorsed it.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Reform party was the only party which would represent the concerns of my region in Ottawa</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I liked the Reform position on Official Languages policy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I liked the Reform position on deficit reduction</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I liked the Reform position on cutting social programs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I liked the Reform position on immigration</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I liked the Reform position on parliamentary reform</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I liked the Reform position on criminal justice reform</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I liked the Reform position on one other issue. Please specify which issue:________</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I knew other people involved in the party</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above apply.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it has been hypothesized that the issue space of citizen marginalization/ alienation will form the major plank of the candidates’ message, it should be explained further. The cleavage between citizens and the elites has especially in the Reform case taken on the form of the “special interest” dialogue. According to this dialogue, bureaucrats, feminists, environmentalists, homosexuals, racial and linguistic minorities have taken the

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"The question read: If you were to identify THREE FACTORS as the most important reasons why you became active within the Reform party, what would they be?"
policy process hostage, denying the average Canadian a voice in government or society. The marginalization of the citizen is also a key aspect of Reform's push for parliamentary reform. The populist push for referenda and recall are justified because it is only through these measures that the accountability of politicians to their constituents can be assured.

The survey asked several questions which are relevant to how citizen marginalization and alienation fared as a theme among Ontario's Reform candidates. When asked to identify the three most important factors why the candidates became active within the party, the respondents, as illustrated in Table IV.1, chose 1) the Reform position on deficit reduction, 2) the Reform position on parliamentary reform, and 3) their dissatisfaction with all other political parties. When asked to choose the single most important of these factors, deficit reduction was chosen most often. It is interesting to note that "the opposition of the party to the Charlottetown Accord and the elites which endorsed it" was not favoured by Reform candidates who joined the party after the October 1992 Referendum. While one of the reasons cited for Canadians' rejection of the Charlottetown accord was their disenchantment with the political elites, the mobilization value of the agreement, according to these results, is weak. The alienation unleashed and validated by the referendum has not been effectively channelled into the party system. Although the underlying causes of the agreement's failure remain, the referendum itself in this respect seems almost a non-event.

The candidates were also asked to rate the importance of a variety of issues on Reform's popularity in their ridings. Table IV.2 summarizes the results below. Four questions asked related to the marginalization/ alienation issue space. These results of these questions demonstrate a very high consensus among Reform candidates on the importance to the party's popularity of Reform's populist stance against special interests and the perception of its member-driven decision-making hierarchy. These two items were considered the two most important reasons given for Reform's popularity, more important than the unpopularity of the Mulroney/Campbell Conservatives or the leadership of Preston Manning.8

The other two items in Table IV.2 show that the perception of Reform's uncompromising stance vis-à-vis Québec's interests is more important to its popularity in Ontario that the Reform party's stance against the Charlottetown Accord. The direct identification of a special interest seems to increase the relevance of the question to Reform's popularity than the document which was seen to pander to special interests. The results regarding


8The results of the questions pertaining to the leadership of Preston Manning and the unpopularity of the Conservatives are presented in Table IV.8
the Charlottetown Accord indicate that the impact of the Accord was mixed, with approximately the same amount of candidates divided across degrees of importance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>MIDDLE</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Reform’s fight against the influence of special interests in policy making (n=51)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Reform Party’s policy of bottom-up decision-making within the party (n=50)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Reform Party’s refusal to “make deals” with Quebec (n=51)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Reform Party’s opposition to the Charlottetown Accord (n=51)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Candidates were asked to evaluate the electoral platform at both the national and riding levels, by disagreeing or agreeing with a series of statements. These questions allowed the candidate to evaluate what strategies were particularly effective with the campaign and what issues would have received more attention. Of these statements the following are relevant to the issue space of marginalization and alienation:

<sup>9</sup>Respondents were asked to rate the degree of importance of each question on a scale from 1 to 7. Responses from 1 to 3 are considered of low importance, 4 to 5 of moderate importance, and 6 to 7 of high importance.
Table IV.3 Candidates’ Response to Use of Electoral Platform (% of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree/Disagree</th>
<th>Totally Disagree</th>
<th>Moderately Agree</th>
<th>Totally Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Reform campaign did not emphasize enough how people feel excluded from politics (n=50)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. In my campaign, I emphasized that the average voter could not be heard in the other political parties (n=51)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. During my campaign, I found that Reform supporters in my riding felt that the elites were running the country (n=51)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV.3 shows that there is a high degree of consensus among Reform candidates that a cleavage between citizens and elites exists; the candidates also agreed very strongly that the exclusion citizens felt from the party system and these elites was used to sell the Reform option. One of the strongest messages sent to voters in the Ontario campaign was that the party was a vehicle for the politically marginalized. It is also clear that there is little consensus among Ontario’s candidates of whether this exclusion of people from politics should have received more attention, with only 36% of candidates indicating that the attention paid the subject was satisfactory.

Table IV.4 Responses to the question: “Before the 1993 general election campaign, the Reform Party was unfamiliar to many of Ontario’s voters. How did you explain what Reform had to offer the voters in your riding? (N=43)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform Agenda</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Reform/Populism</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Reform/Deficit</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Reform</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic Change</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Citizenship</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Sense of Canadians</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The candidates were allowed the opportunity to outline the terms in which they explained to voters in their riding what Reform had to offer. The responses to this question reflected the three major themes of the national campaign, with the majority of comments dealing with fiscal issues, parliamentary reform, and criminal reform. The candidates had thus remained contained within the discursive boundaries established by
the national campaign. Table IV.4 presents a quick illustration of which comments received the most attention.

What was gleansed from this question was that of all the themes open to candidates to promote the Reform cause, parliamentary reform was the most popular, with 40% of comments made. Fiscal reform and the deficit issues lagged behind at 23% of comments made. The discourse of parliamentary reform is couched in the language of alienation and marginalization, which is clear in the selection of comments below:

- "Parliament has been emasculated"
- "The Charlottetown Accord is an example of how Parliament is accountable"
- "will of the majority must be respected"
- "we have little control over politicians—we need systemic change to make politicians accountable"
- "need democratic reform so that the collective will of Canadians is no longer ignored"
- "populism demands accountability"
- "expressed disgust with the Tories, the Liberals, the NDP, and the bureaucrats"
- "enforce accountability through recall"
- "the government has allowed the moral and cultural fabric to deteriorate to please minorities"

This particular question of the survey is a reflection of what candidates remembered their campaign messages to be. It is retrospective and subject to error. However, this finding would indicate that although deficit reduction and fiscal management were the initial primary motivating factor for the candidates, it is the theme of alienation and marginalization which was used the most to convince voters to vote Reform. One candidate indicated that if he were to change anything about the national campaign, he would have switched the emphasis from deficit reduction to parliamentary reform at the mid-campaign point—to bring the campaign more in line, perhaps, with how the party was being sold on the ground. Given the finding by Turcotte and Gingras et al (1994) that economic issues did not have a "discriminating impact" on vote intentions and that other issues brought the voters home, the emphasis on the Reform party as the vehicle for the disaffected is significant. The populist dimension of Reform, in rhetoric if not in practice, is the most distinguishing ideological factor between Reform and the Conservatives—the difference between the disaffected and the affected of the Canadian right, if you will.

The survey also tapped in the feeling of alienation and marginalization behind Reform’s electoral appeal with the following question. When asked to identify the three most important political factors which the candidates considered most helpful to the Reform party in their riding, the third choice of a majority of candidates was the populist, anti-
elitist nature of the party and its positioning at a time when disgust for the "old-line" parties was high. It is also clear that the populist, anti-elitist aura of the party which is so favoured is seen to be separate from Reform's objection to the Charlottetown Accord—an option presented to the candidates which solicited no support. The Charlottetown Accord, much as the negative referendum vote was touted as common Canadians' rejection of elitism and special interest pandering, has not captured the imagination of Reformers or motivated further involvement in the party. It is ironic perhaps that this be so, considering the Accord offered Canadians a degree of parliamentary reform previously unheard of.

The results of the survey would seem to confirm the hypothesis that Ontario's voters are courted on the basis that they are part of an excluded majority whose only real alternative is the populist Reform alternative. The message is at heart a simple one: the Canadian electorate is divided between the powerful and the powerless, and that the majority of Canadians cannot count themselves among the fortunate powerful few.

2. Fiscal/Economic

The next issue set put under scrutiny is that which seemed to dominate the election campaign for the Canadian right-wing—fiscal reform and deficit reduction—and is a key issues in the Reform rhetorical constellation. As mentioned previously, the Reform Party's position on deficit reduction and fiscal reform proved the most effective in bringing Reform candidates to the Reform fold. It is also the second most important message used by Reform candidates in the election campaign. The rhetoric of deficit reduction holds little surprise. A sampling of the candidates' comments is as follows:

- "the party's over—Reform cuts better now that more debt late"
- "We must live within our fiscal means"
- "Deficit reduction leads to lower taxes, lowers the cost of business, and creates employment"
- "deficit attack to save social programs"

The rhetoric tying the Zero-in-Three deficit reduction plan to saving social programs found support among candidates as well when an absolute majority (55%) indicated that the Reform party's policy on cuts to social program spending was deemed moderately important to Reform popularity, with 21% considering the issue very important. Candidates strongly disagreed (82%) with the statement that the Reform campaign did not emphasize enough the debt/deficit crisis facing Canada. The debt and deficit was also identified by the candidates as the most important economic factor benefitting Reform, along with the tax burden faced by people in the riding. The survey was thus able to confirm that which fiscal reform is an important mobilizing factor among Reform activists and, in their estimation, of their electorate as well; however, the fiscal message cedes its place to the issues of marginalization and alienation in terms of the emphasis accorded it on the ground. The survey also allows one to revisit some of the economic themes explored in the previous chapter.
The general finding of the previous chapter was that as the economic stability of a riding increase, Reform's electoral prospects also increase. The discussion which followed explored the idea that if there is an economic strain which benefits Reform as it increases in strength, it is not directly linked to employment. The strain which turns voters towards Reform is a strain felt by the employed middle class. This is confirmed by the survey through the use of a few questions, as presented in Table IV.5 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggested Response</th>
<th>Number of Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The tax burden faced by people in your riding</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The perception that average Canadians face a decline of opportunities in today's economy</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The huge deficit run up by previous federal governments</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The insecurity people feel about their present employment</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The actual loss of jobs in your riding</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The increasing cost of living in your riding</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Higher interest rates in Canada</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Firstly, when asked to identify from a list of economic factors which most helped Reform support in the riding, the Reform candidates chose in order of importance: 1) the huge deficit run up by previous governments, 2) the tax burden faced by people in your riding, and 3) the perception that average Canadians face a decline in opportunities in today's economy. The items related to employment (the insecurity people feel about their present employment, or the actual loss of jobs in the riding) were considered to be important by only 1 in 5 candidates—and none of the candidates chose the employment-related items as the most important strain helping Reform. This situation is noteworthy as well because the unemployment strain felt by Ontario voters in the recent past is confirmed by the candidates, since 72% of respondents indicated that the riding had experience significant job losses in the past three years. The situation has improved, however, in the last year, with only 40% of respondents indicating job losses. What should be noted as well is that when asked whether the employment prospects in the riding were better, the same, or worse than one year ago, only 25% of the candidates answered that the employment prospects were worse. Of those, no candidate considered the strain of unemployment to help the Reform cause. Even in those ridings where unemployment was a grave concern, this strain did not benefit Reform, but the Liberal Party. Clearly, as the economically secure face the prospect of higher taxes, Reform reaps the electoral benefits.

3. Regional Discontent

The third issue set explored here is that of regional discontent. While the party has
jettisoned its regional message in its drive for national recognition, the opportunity
remained for candidates to revive Reform’s regionalist credentials on the campaign trail.

| Table IV.6 Candidates’ responses to the use of party platform on national and riding levels (% of respondents) |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                  | Totally Disagree | Moderately Agree | Totally Agree |
| Given that it is a new party, the 1993 Reform election campaign was well-organized across the country (n=51) | 18% | 41% | 41% |
| The national campaign platform was effective in rallying Reform support equally across the country (n=50) | 26% | 46% | 28% |
| The Reform campaign did not emphasize enough the regional disparities in Canada (n=47) | 55% | 38% | 6% |
| As the Reform candidate in my riding, I tried to tailor the Reform message to the concerns of my local voters (n=49) | 14% | 24% | 31% |
| Although the Reform party is now a national party, I told voters in my riding that the party would represent the concerns of my region in Ottawa (n=50) | 14% | 20% | 66% |

The results from the survey on the regional discontent issue are at first glance contradictory. Only 16% of respondents chose “the Reform Party was the only party which would represent the concerns of my region in Ottawa” as a factor which motivated their activity in the party; of these, only two people indicated that this was their primary motivating factor. Also, when asked to explain how the candidates presented Reform to their local voters, only one candidate from Northern Ontario made a regionalist comment: “regions have a voice, not just cities”. It would seem that while some regional sentiment does exist in Ontario’s Reform wing, it is only marginal.

Reform candidates, however, are aware of the regional reality of Reform support across the country. The responses outlined in Table IV.6 indicate that Reformers are relatively pleased with the organizational prowess of Reform across the country, with only 18% of respondents indicating their opinion to the contrary. To reverse the statement for the reader’s benefit, the agreement among 55% of respondents that regional disparities were emphasized sufficiently would indicate that the candidates were aware of the organizational challenges faced by the party in laying down roots outside of their
western stronghold, and that they modified their expectations of electoral success accordingly. While a regionalist orientation for the Reform party is rejected by its Ontario wing,\textsuperscript{10} the candidates are not immune to playing a modest regional card, since a majority of candidates (66\%) strongly agreed that they said the party would represent the concerns of their region in Ottawa. As a few candidates freely commented, however, this is the mantra of those pursuing elections, no matter the party stripe. I am hence urged not to overstate the regional flavour brought by Ontario's Reformers to the campaign trail.

4. Public Safety/Criminal Reform

The subject of criminal reform was chosen by the Reform party as its third plank in the national campaign platform, which is understandable since of all political party supporters Reformers were found to be more likely to accord a high priority to the crime and justice issue.\textsuperscript{11} As well, the strength of the post-election criminal reform agenda of the Reform party was clearly illuminated at the 1994 Assembly held in Ottawa, where the assembly hotly debated the “three strikes and you're out” resolution\textsuperscript{12}, as well as affirming the resolution of the party to oppose the granting of voting rights to prisoners.

Results of the candidate questionnaire indicate that Ontario's candidates did indeed flog the criminal reform agenda of the party on the campaign trail. The comments of the candidates indicate, however, that the theme was the least favoured of the election platform, since only 16\% of respondents indicated that the issue received their attention. Unfortunately, the candidates did not describe further how the criminal reform agenda was explained—the party Blue Book and the resolutions of the 1994 Assembly represent the clearest picture of the Reform justice agenda.

Two other questions of the survey applied to this issue set. Firstly, candidates were asked which three factors motivated their participation within the party.\textsuperscript{13} In response, 24\% of Reform candidates indicated that the Reform position on criminal justice reform was an important factor. Secondly, when candidates were asked to choose one factor as the most important for their involvement in the party, only 4\% of respondents chose criminal justice reform, all of whom were from the Toronto area. These results would

\textsuperscript{10}The reader is reminded that the majority of Ontario delegates to the 1994 Reform Party Assembly in Ottawa did not vote in favour of provincial expansion. See Chapter 2, note #26.

\textsuperscript{11}Gingras, F.P., B. Gauthier, F. Graves, and C. Scholtz; "Setting the Record Straight About the 1993 Federal Election"; paper prepared for the Canadian Political Science Association annual meetings, University of Calgary, Calgary; June 1994; p.14

\textsuperscript{12}The resolution read: "Resolved that the Reform party support the addition of a new offense to the Criminal Code of Canada making any person who commits on three or more separate occasions a serious offense be deemed a habitual criminal and subject to life imprisonment without parole".

\textsuperscript{13}Refer to Table IV.1
indicate that while the party espouses a tough-on-crime policy, it is a policy which is a pleasant add-on rather than a critical and determining factor in Reform’s activist support. The importance of the criminal justice issue is likely to increase as Reform support in Ontario’s largest city also increases.  

5. Social Reform/Traditional Values

The last of the issue categories to be discussed here, social reform and traditional values was not expected to form a major part of the Reform campaign message. First of all, the theme was not explicitly chosen by campaign strategists to occupy cramped issue space during the election campaign. As well, there is a certain rhetorical overlap to be made between this category and that of criminal justice reform, since the disintegration of traditional values in society and in the family are presumably related to increased criminal activity. The results garnered from the survey are admittedly thin. Few questions dealt explicitly with the subject, and little in the way of direct commentary was offered. This may be a reflection of the candidates marginal interest in this issue area, or it may be a matter of question unasked, question unanswered.

A few remarks, however, can be made. When asked the extent of their involvement in the community before becoming active within the Reform party, 35% of respondents indicated that they held active membership in a church or religious group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IV.7 Candidates’ responses to Value Questions (% of respondents)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The national campaign did not stress enough that the Reform party stands for traditional family values (n=51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The national campaign did not stress enough how the welfare state has eroded the independence of Canadians (n=51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV.7 shows that there is no significant difference between how church-going

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14 The criminal reform issue was indeed intended for use in urban ridings. See Flanagan, T.: p.136

15 It is recognized that the term “church-goers” may not be an adequate term to describe how the candidates saw themselves to be “active in a church or religious group”, since the attendance of religious services does not exhaust by any means how candidates may evaluate their religious participation. However, for lack of a better term, “churchgoers” will be used as an imperfect means of referring to those
candidates and how other candidates evaluated the emphasis traditional values received in the election campaign.\(^{16}\) It appears that on the whole, candidates would have preferred that the campaign accord more attention to traditional family values, no matter their prior activism across the sacred or secular divide. Further examination of the survey results shows, paradoxically perhaps, that those married candidates where there were two wage earners in the household felt more strongly than their single-wage earner counterparts that traditional values should have received greater attention in the campaign. It is recognized that traditional values implies far more than the simple fact of the mother of the family staying at home to raise children. This finding suggest a direction for further study, but little in the way of a solid conclusion can be made on the basis of this data.

On the statement that the campaign did not stress enough how the independence of Canadians has been eroded by the welfare state, church-goers felt that the emphasis the issue received was more satisfactory than their non-churchgoing counterparts.\(^{17}\) Indeed, there is only a 7\% difference between the two modal categories: those church-goers who felt the emphasis given to this particular consequence of welfare statism was satisfactory (i.e. those who disagreed with the statement), and their more secular counterparts who felt strongly that the issue should have received more attention. One interpretation may account for this difference. As candidates who have involved themselves with the church,\(^{18}\) the church-going may have adopted, to a greater degree than their secular counterparts, a more communitarian or charitable attitude toward the poor. Those who do not profess activism within the church may have adopted a more individualistic frame of mind to those relying on the welfare state, and look for stronger anti-welfare messages to be delivered by the Reform party, the partisan mechanism of their choice.

The examination of Reform's electoral issue space through the retrospective accounts of the party's electoral candidates in Ontario has led to a confirmation of the initial hypothesis. That is, that the dominant message conveyed to voters on the campaign trail at the district level was one which emphasized the alienation and marginalization Canadians feel from the political system. One might be tempted to ask why such efforts were undertaken to come to this conclusion, since is this not what the self-proclaimed populist party is expected to do? The use of the populist rhetoric channelled principally into the issue of parliamentary reform was effective in keeping the dominant message of the party quite broad, appealing to a wider cross-section of the Ontario electorate. The

\(^{16}\)Chi-squared test: \(p>0.20\) (difference is not significant)

\(^{17}\)Chi-squared test: \(p<0.01\) (significant difference)

\(^{18}\) Of the 45 respondents who identified their religion, 89\% identified themselves as belonging to the Christian denominations (Catholic: 22\%, Protestant: 52\%, unspecified Christian: 15\%).

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interplay of the ideologically conservative fiscal reform message, however, determines which voters were attracted to the party initially. The combination of these two messages was politically effective, since populism was the grounds on which Reform could distinguish themselves from the Conservatives while still being able to draw on the Conservative’s traditional base of support. What will be interesting to monitor in the next election is whether Reform will continue to stress the alienation/marginalization message if the demise of the Conservatives proves to be long-term, and the electoral need to distinguish Reform from the Conservatives no longer exists. It might prove difficult, as well, to sell the party on the backs of Canada’s alienated the longer Reform maintains a presence in the House of Commons, and the longer the Canadian public is acquainted with the Manning Reformers not as political outsiders, but as insiders.

B. Candidates and Party Organization

The data gathered from the candidate’s survey does not just allow us to analyse the mobilization aspects of the Reform message in Ontario. It also allows for the construction of a political profile of the party’s organization, the candidates themselves, and a first hand account of those political factors considered the most important to Reform’s strength on the ground. As such, the survey data provides a valuable balance to the data and conclusions presented in chapter two.

The Reform organization in Ontario is, like the party itself, young. The formal decision of the party to expand east of Manitoba was not made until June of 1991, just over 2 years before the 1993 federal election. However, the survey shows that the overwhelming decision of the 1991 Assembly to strike outside of its western base was predicated on existing activity in the province. The results of the survey show that 29% of the respondents’ riding associations were founded by 1990, mostly in Western Ontario, which is also the region where Reform achieved the most support in 1993. The year of expansion saw 60% of the riding associations established, the remainder following in 1992.

Generally, the establishment of riding associations paralleled the involvement of the candidates in the party. 22% of the respondents had joined the party by 1990, 53% by 1991, and 23% by 1992. Again the wave of expansion carried with it the majority of candidates would fight for election in 1993. Fully 58% of the candidates considered themselves to be among the first people to organize for Reform in their riding, while 29% were involved in some capacity—whether it be through contacting the party executive or attending previous Assemblies—to expand the party eastwards. The Reform candidates indicated that prior to the 1993 election period, most had been involved with the party at a variety of levels: 63% of candidates helped raise money for the party, 31% attended a previous Reform party Assembly, and 78% actively recruited potential Reform party supporters (largely through word-of-mouth to family and friends). The picture being drawn here is that while the party has a very short history in Ontario, the candidates who ran for election in 1993 have largely been involved throughout.
The involvement of the candidates within the Reform party is to be contrasted with the lack of partisan political experience brought to their role. The candidates professed very little in the way of partisan involvement, with 73% of respondents indicating no previous active involvement with any other political party. As expected, of those indicating previous partisan experience, the majority were formerly with the federal Conservatives. The evidence also shows that the majority of candidates are consistent Conservative voters, with no less that 68% of candidates voting Conservative in a federal election. The lack of partisan lineage or partisan history among the candidates is compounded by the lack of political involvement expressed by their parents, 72% of whom were moderately interested in politics, but 90% being not very or not at all involved in politics. The lack of partisan experience generally experience by the candidates must be qualified, however, by other electoral experience brought to the table, as a total of 41% of respondents were either previously elected to a municipal or regional government, a school board, or a professional association or chamber of commerce. Only 25% of candidates professed no activity in the community prior to their involvement with the Reform party. The case of the candidates, as with Reform delegates, illustrates that “...the high level of activity in the Reform party represents a new level of highly active political engagement rather than an extension of previous activity”.

The newness of Reform’s political organization and the electoral inexperience of its candidates clearly had an impact on the success of their campaigns. When asked to identify any changes the candidates would make to how the Reform campaign was run in their ridings, the candidates overwhelming indicated that they needed more trained and experienced volunteers and canvassers, more time to develop networks, more money, and a better organizational structure. In fact, the only change consistently suggested by the candidates which did not relate to the organization of the campaign itself, was the wish to have the leader visit the riding. This last suggestion figured largely when the candidates were asked to comment on the national campaign. The majority of comments involved having Preston Manning establish a greater presence in Ontario, and that he devote less time to the “safe” Reform seats in the West. Ontario’s candidates also criticized the centralization of the Reform national office. In their opinion, the local riding associations should have had more money at their disposal to wage the electoral war on the ground. The other key suggestion expressed by candidates was the need to develop a greater national media exposure for Preston Manning, a task considered difficult considering the strongly perceived bias against the party of the national media.

The candidates’ comments clearly indicate that the Reform party must address the internal organizational tensions which arise from a party involved in expanding its base. The importance of Ontario, both in terms of the number of seats concentrated in the province and the resources the party will need to devote to the province in order to

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19Archer, K. and F. Ellis; “Opinion Structure of Party Activists: The Reform Party of Canada”; *Canadian Journal of Political Science*; Vol.27 No.2 (June 1994); p.289
contest future elections, will challenge the ultra-centralization of the party’s administrative structure.\(^{20}\) The populist, grass-roots rhetoric of the party apparently makes it more difficult for Reform to justify a campaign funding structure which, according to the comments of the candidates surveyed, does not fully allow the use of local resources to further the local campaign. Also, it is apparent that the need for the party to concentrate its resources on its western base in order to win seats in the House of Commons at the cost of increasing leader exposure in the less winnable Ontario ridings—understandable given the reality of Canada’s electoral system—is bound to create tensions within the party.

C. Political Factors

Respondents indicated that alienation from the party system was an important contributing factor leading to their involvement with the Reform party. It appears that for a majority of candidates, this dissatisfaction was a precondition for turning their attention to the party, with the fiscal reform issue acting as the premier programme item solidifying their political conversion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IV.8 Reform Candidates’ Evaluation of Importance of Partisan Issues to Reform Support in their Riding (% of respondents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The unpopularity of the Mulroney/Campbell Conservatives (n=51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The leadership of Preston Manning (n=51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dissatisfaction with the Chrétien Liberals (n=51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The unpopularity of Bob Rae’s NDP government (n=51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The candidates’ evaluation of the impact partisan factors which had on the popularity of Reform at the riding level reflects the findings of chapter 2. Table IV.8 illustrates what has been suggested by aggregate electoral data. That is, the perception of the candidates supports the general interpretation that the collapse of the Tories is the single most important partisan factor helping Reform in Ontario. This finding is replicated

again by candidates when they chose the single most important political factor contributing to Reform support in the riding. The perception of the candidates also points to the leadership of Preston Manning as the second most influential political factor helping Reform in the province of Ontario. The importance of political leadership in Canadian federal electoral campaigns has historically been overwhelming\(^2\), perhaps the most enduring aspect of party politics in Canada has been that it is leader driven. However, the fact that more candidates find Manning’s leadership to be moderately important than very important leads me to wonder if the attachment to Manning is stronger in the West, where his political pedigree is most established. Interestingly as well, the leadership of Preston Manning ranked fourth in the list of factors motivating candidates’ involvement in the party; I feel comfortable in speculating that the attachment of Ontario’s candidate’s to Manning is relatively subdued.

The Liberals and the NDP are seen to have less of an impact on the Reform vote, a finding which is confirmed by the electoral data. Candidates reported that while the profile of the Liberal candidate in their riding was not a hindrance of particular importance, the strength of established Liberal networks was a serious stumbling block. The results of the election in Ontario, returning 98 Liberal Members of Parliament and one Reform Member certainly leads credence to this perception.

While the rating of importance given the role of Bob Rae’s New Democratic government is low, candidates did comment that the effect of Ontario choosing a party inexperienced in governing in the 1990 provincial election did have a negative effect on Reform. According to these comments, the combination of the NDP’s unpopularity and the newness of the Reform party did indeed interact to some degree.

III. CONCLUSION

The importance of alienation in the campaign message of the Reform party indicates that the party has made the determination that it can win support by courting the marginalized. The importance of the party’s ability to organize this alienation, which was discussed in the second chapter, is confirmed here by candidates who are aware of the organizational difficulties facing the new party as it jockeys for the political favour of Ontario’s voters. While the populist rhetoric of the alienated serves the Reform party well, in the estimation of the candidates surveyed, the party has attracted an ideologically homogenous group of Canadians to its fold.

The findings of this chapter lead to a consideration of the roles populism and political parties’ electoral posturing play in a broader consideration of Reform in Ontario and in Canada. The political efficacy of the populist marginalization message lies in its ability to appeal to a potentially wide coalition of voters. Any voter who feels unrepresented by

the party system and who feels he or she must reject the traditional alternatives offered during the election campaign will presumably be attracted to the call of the populist Reform party. However, as this chapter shows, Ontario's Reform candidates, representing Reform's activist core in Ontario, are drawn from an ideologically limited base; chapter two showed that Reform's voter base is also ideologically limited, since Reform has not been able to draw any significant support from any party but the Conservatives, and among ideologically-driven Conservatives at that. The examination of how Ontario's Reform candidates perceived the impact of the Reform message and how the candidates subsequently constructed their message on the local campaign trail in Ontario shows that the inclusive rhetoric of populism has been counterbalanced by a fiscal policy message which attracts, as the aggregate voting data explored in chapter two demonstrates, only a certain type of voter. As such, the party's message is politically astute. It embraces in word all those who feel discontented while attracting a support base with few ideological fissures; therefore, the party avoids internalizing within its activist and voter base the ideological conflicts true populism would entail.

The importance of campaign messages and electoral strategy lies not only in the final win-loss tally of parties after the votes have been counted. While this is the overarching interest of the practitioner, the interest in campaign positioning extends to the question of how Canadians' political identities are formed. As parties compete for office, they try to use to their advantage conflicts or cleavages within society and develop a position around these cleavages which will yield partisan advantage. Over the repetition of elections and as these cleavages and conflicts are reinforced by political parties in this manner, partisan identities also develop and are identified with an underlying cleavage structure. The use of marginalization and alienation by the Reform party was thought to be significant in the development of a citizen-elite cleavage in Canadian politics. Whether this cleavage will develop as a result of the Reform party's construction of its message remains unanswered, largely because the process of cleavage development takes time, and the Reform party's longevity is hardly established. One can only speculate as to whether this might occur.

Given the present description of Reform as a haven for discontented Conservatives, without really drawing on the support of the more centrist or left-leaning political parties, the Reform party looks more and more like a replacement of the Conservative party. It has drawn its support from a party with an established history and position on Canada's historic linguistic cleavages. Indeed, the collapse of the Mulroney Conservatives in 1993 could be interpreted as voters' rejection of a party--built on a fragile coalition of francophobes and francophones--which challenged the prior positioning around the linguistic cleavage which allowed the Conservatives to remain a strong partisan competitor, even if this positioning thwarted their hopes for governing. Reform, leery if not hostile to Québec throughout its short history, reestablished this balance. The need for Reform to distinguish itself from the Conservatives necessitates the use and predominance of populism and the exploitation of Canadian's alienation from politics. Whether the use of populism and the alienation message by Reform will continue after the immediate political rationale to do so disappears will determine whether Reform is a
truly significant social phenomenon, or a partisan pretender, like any other, to the Conservative's role in Canadian political history.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

The challenge presented by a conclusion is two-fold. Firstly, it places the responsibility upon the author for the many dips and turns taken to illuminate one or a few central theses. Secondly, it must enlarge the vista of the study at hand, thereby rationalizing the time and attention accorded the exercise by both author and reader by showing how the subject actually informs a larger process. Much as the analysis of Reform of Ontario may have spawned some curiosity in the subject other than my own, the justification of doing so remains remote if no direction is given for further discussion. The difficulty of accomplishing these two tasks is that while some thoughts one might have previously entertained about the Reform Party may have been clarified by this study, there is much which remains untouched. Also, the process of answering a few questions tends to engender even more, resigning the author to the fate of forever remaining inconclusive. I turn, however, to what ground has been covered by this thesis. This entails an examination of the hypotheses presented and the conclusions reached, which I will undertake in the order they were explored. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the implications the Reform party's expansion holds for Canada's political parties and Canada's party system.

The first set of hypotheses examined in this study concerned what Smelser more generally termed the elements of structural conduciveness in his classic analysis of collective behaviour, and what Pinard adopted in his study of the rise of third parties: the party system. The second chapter explored at some length the pattern of partisan competition in Ontario in an attempt to establish the particular factors which have contributed to and which have hindered Reform's expansion in the province. The first hypothesis put forth the assertion that political predictors are indeed more significant to Reform's showing in the 1993 election in Ontario than socio-economic predictors. To the extent that the correlation values of the political variables and the socio-economic variables can be compared, this hypothesis was confirmed. The configuration of partisan strengths and weaknesses at the federal level in particular allowed Reform to forge through the party system to an unprecedented degree, in federal politics, for a new party in Canada's history. When one speaks of weaknesses, the determinant factor was the inability of the federal Conservative party to maintain a concentrated base of support in Ontario or elsewhere. The importance of the Conservative/Reform dynamic was confirmed by the Reform candidates surveyed. Indeed, this finding is a confirmation of what is already known, and should be a surprise to no one. One item shown was that Reform in Ontario has been more successful in courting voters in middle-sized urban areas, and that it defies the categorization of being a rurally-based protest party. Indeed, it appears that the rural voter in Ontario, both Liberal and Conservative, is more suspect of change and resistant to the Reform option than first anticipated. However, if Reform is left without a viable partisan competitor on the right for the next election, the rural ideologically-inclined Conservative voter of 1993 might find he has little choice but vote Reform in 1998.
The possibility of Reform standing alone of the right-wing stage, bolstered only by the Liberals, would be dependent of whether the Conservatives are able to rejuvenate after the victory of the Harris Tories in Ontario’s 1995 provincial election. The possibility of such a rejuvenation is explored by Pinard in his discussion of factors which may curtail the success of third parties:

...there remains the possibility that a weak traditional party could be rejuvenated against all odds to the contrary... the appearance of strong leaders at the head of these weak opposition parties might help account for these deviations. To this mobilization factor, I would like to add another condition conducive to such returns: this is the success of the party of the same political family at the other level of government or else the success of the same party (at the federal level) in other regions of the country.¹

While it remains to be seen whether Jean Charest is perceived to be a strong enough leader to rally the federal Conservative troops, the reality of the Harris victory is clear. As it was argued in the examination of Ontario’s provincial politics, the nucleus of the Conservative vote in Ontario proved strong in the federal election of 1993. Given a viable option, Conservative voters might decide to take a leap of faith, not with the new kid on the block, but with a renewed Conservative party.

The victory of the provincial Tories is also important when one considers that Ontario’s provincial history has been characterized by a stable three-party system, in so far that the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the New Democrats have each remained competitive and their respective status as partisan competitors has not been seriously questioned. Their relative strength and popularity has varied—each party having formed the government at least once since 1985—but the fact remains that, unlike Canada’s other provinces, each party has been a contender for office at one time or another. Reform’s future electoral success in the province may be mitigated by the difficulty this situation poses for new parties. As Pinard states:

...the existence of a strong two-party system at both levels of government, where two parties are of the same families, seems to create an even stronger barrier against third parties than a strong two-party system at one level only.²

The reasoning behind the assertion, of course, is that the voter is not forced through lack of options to engage in flexible partisanship, and hence there is a greater possibility that the voter will develop enduring partisan attachments. The particular influence of


²Ibid.; p.285 (italics in original)
voter volatility at the provincial level on Reform support, as explored in Chapter 2 of this thesis, shows that while Ontario’s electorate provincially has opted for three different governing parties in as many elections, Reform has not benefitted from these realignments. The Liberal-NDP axis, where most voter volatility has occurred, has remained largely impervious to the Reform challenge.

In the case of the constitutional referendum, the hypothesis presented was undeniably rejected by the data. That is, the referendum results of 1992 had little to no predictive value for Reform’s outcomes in 1993. The referendum results may have been testament to a feeling of alienation in the province, but they did not translate into Reform support in the province. As such, the Accord represented little mobilizing value for the Reform party—the relationship between Reform success and Canadian’s rejection of the constitutional accord is not a direct one. The greater interpretive value of the constitutional referendum lies in creating other structurally conducive conditions for the rise of a third party at the level of federal party competition:

There is the situation where, because of a crisis, the traditional opposition party (or all opposition parties) enters into a coalition with the governing party. This of course creates another situation in which large groups opposing the government find themselves without party representation. It should be obvious that, given discontent, such a situation should be very conducive to new parties.  

The constitutional referendum is important, then, not as a barometer of Reform’s support on the ground (at least not in Ontario), but as a political event which forced the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the New Democrats into a partisan coalition which made it easy for the less amenable Reformers to tar all of their competitors with the same brush.

While the examination of political factors allowed one to view the structural opportunities and barriers the party system placed before Reform in Ontario, the examination of socio-economic predictors allowed one to explore the strains which underlie the rise of Reform in Ontario. The hypothesis stated that economic stability or instability, operationalized in this case as measures of employment across sectors and income levels, is also significant in determining Reform support. The sectoral analysis led to the general conclusion that economic stability helps Reform, in so far that the strain underlying the rise of the party in Ontario is that felt by an employed middle class. Consistent constituency-level deterrents to Reform’s rise in Ontario across its regions appear to be the prevalence of low income families and the rate of unemployment in the riding, leading to the observation that those most materially impacted by the economic difficulties of the last recessionary period feel little reason to vote for the new partisan alternative. In other words, Reform has not been chosen as the partisan vehicle of

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3 Ibid.: p.284
discontent by those constituencies most challenged by job losses and decreasing disposable incomes. Reform is a strong vehicle of discontent for those constituencies where the material impact of the recession has been less severe, or where recovery has taken hold to a degree. The finding of this study, supported by individual data, is that Reform is the vehicle of the egocentric and the economically secure.

To this analysis were added two key demographic considerations: immigration and language. The findings of this thesis support what has been remarked upon before—namely that the concentration of immigrants and francophones in Ontario’s federal electoral districts are serious deterrents to Reform support in the province. However, the role the francophone community may have in effecting constituency-level electoral outcomes is related to the community’s relative size; if not sufficiently concentrated, the effect the linguistic variable has on Reform support is of little consequence. The case of immigration illustrated that this effect applies also to Ontario’s immigrant communities. As expected, the size of the immigrant community in Toronto is a very important local deterrent to Reform. What has been confirmed in this study has been that the effect immigration may have on Reform’s electoral outcomes may be perverse—that is, that the concentration of immigrants in a district leads to an electoral backlash, but that this effect is limited to northern Ontario.

The marginal importance attributed to employment-related strains on Reform support was also reflected in the candidate survey, which may counter to a degree the critique of the economic data used in chapter three—namely that the data did not adequately measure strain since the data did not include the last period of the recession. While the place accorded the economic issue space in the party’s campaign rhetoric was an important one, employment difficulties in the candidates’ ridings were not perceived to contribute to Reform’s success. The survey also provided some clues as to the paradox explored particularly in the first chapter. That is, that while economic issues dominated the 1993 electoral campaign, no single economic item has been found to be a determining factor in Canadian’s vote intention during the same period. The survey indicated that while fiscal reform issues were key in attracting Ontario’s Reform activists to the world of partisan competition, the message which candidates’ perceived to be the most effective was that of parliamentary reform and the siren call of populism.

The final hypothesis, that concerning the citizen-elite cleavage and how it was used to court Ontario’s voters was also confirmed, the implications of which will be further explored later in this chapter. Of the three issues selected for primary use in the 1993 election campaign, Ontario’s Reform candidates confirmed that parliamentary reform was the most predominant of the themes presented to voters on Ontario’s campaign trail. As the comments of the candidates also show, it is within the parliamentary reform issue space that the conflict between the unrepresented majority and the elites or special interests is highlighted; the issue of parliamentary reform is also useful to the party because it automatically identifies a “cure” for the apparent difficulty between the citizen and the elite. The identification of parliamentary reform in the Reform campaign message takes us back to Smelser. Parliamentary reform represents a populist solution
to a complex problem; it marks "...the establishment or symbolization of one of the conditions of conduciveness or strain...creat[ing] a sense of urgency and hasten[ing] mobilization for action." Changing the institution of Parliament so that the parties and the individual Members of Parliament within its walls may better reflect the will of an alienated majority clearly has the necessary populist resonance. The decision of the party, as least of the Ontario Reformers, is that this message has great potential in gathering Reform voters and mobilizing them onwards. As such, changing parliamentary conventions in order to facilitate the representation of a forgotten Canadian majority has great symbolic value for the Reform movement, while doing little to rectify underlying sources of strain.

One of the challenges facing the Reform party as a vehicle for those alienated from the political system, especially if this populist orientation is the key factor distinguishing it from the Conservatives and the Liberals, is to maintain the content—not only the rhetoric—of populism once the party has entered the very institutions it wishes to change. The role of "social control" which Smelser develops—where collective action is tempered by agencies or mechanisms of social control—may well be played by the institutional structure in which Reform now finds itself. Until Reform is in a position where it can affect parliamentary reform, the party must function within Parliament's walls and within its rules—much to Reformers' chagrin, perhaps. The social control Parliament exerts may well be one of the reasons for Reform's rise, but the institution's hardness and inimicality to change despite previous attempts at its reform may well prove the party's downfall. The addition of Reform in Parliament does not by necessity mean that the party will challenge those aspects of the party and parliamentary systems which spawned the alienation so touted in its ranks. Parliamentary reform which strengthens the hand of parliament over Cabinet is, after all, oft trumpeted by parties in opposition, but easily left behind by governing parties once they realize that the institutional obstructions placed before the opposition are the very things which allow a government to deliver the policy programme promised earlier to voters.5

The introductory chapter pointed to an inherent difficulty facing the Reform party if it was found to sell itself as a catch-all party of the alienated or the discontented. The difficulty of this lay in the idea that marginalization, while a potent feeling worth tapping into on the campaign trail, provides a tenuous foundation for a political party intent on surviving the rigours of opposition, or more importantly, of government. This would especially be the case if it would have been found that Reform in Ontario managed to cross the ideological boundaries and draw significantly from Liberal and/or NDP support. In that case, the value of a consistent ideology as a unifying factor would have been

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5 Sara-Boume, M.; "Quelques aspects politiques des réformes de la Chambre des Communes"; in Gunther, M., and Winn, C. (eds); House of Commons Reform/Réformes de la Chambre des Communes; Ottawa: Parliamentary Internship Program; 1991; p.9-50

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compromised. The results of the second chapter's examination of electoral volatility would indicate, however, that the only inter-partisan volatility that was detected by the use of aggregate data and shown to affect Reform, was the divestiture of more traditional voters who were not ideologically driven in their voting preferences. This thesis has offered the conclusion that Reform has not built a coalition between disaffected voters of the right and the left. Reform in Ontario, at least as of October 1993, is the party of the ideologically-driven right wing. In this case, Reform can count on ideology as a unifier of its support, not just on the marginalization and the alienation it exploits on its road to electoral success.

One question which arises as a result of the Reform party's populist exploitation of alienation is whether a truly populist party can survive the transition to government given the post-modern challenges posed the vehicle of the political party firstly, and the inherent contradictions of populism secondly. The following discussion is obviously speculative, since Reform has not yet earned the status of government, and since the Liberals under Jean Chrétien have led a fairly popular government to date. Smelser, borrowing from the work of Almond, indicates that political parties can blur the line between those social structures which aggregate interests and those which articulate interests. While in opposition, when the articulation of the "interests, grievances, and desires" of the political party are not challenged by the strictures of governance, the Reform party can more easily vaunt itself as the party which speaks for "the people", or the "common Canadian". When and if opposition parties move on to form the government, the interest-aggregation function—"...[the function] through which articulated interests are combined, weighed, and forged through policy"—clearly must assume more importance than before. A party will of course have developed a policy platform and presented it to electors before becoming the government; however, it is only through the actual implementation of policy that the party truly performs this aggregation function.

The difficulties facing all political parties in aggregating the diverse interests in society have been dealt with in the introductory chapter. In essence, the fragmentation of interests in post-modern society, as well as the rise of competing structures which also can claim to represent interests as well as or better than political parties, renders the performance of the aggregation function by the political party particularly difficult. The fragmentation of civic identities is also reinforced by their politicization within the state.

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8 ibid.

9 ibid.

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which itself is fragmented.\textsuperscript{10} Populism, however, posits that this fragmentation is not real, or at least that it can be overcome by appeals to “the people”:

The notion that “the people” are one; that divisions among them are not genuine conflicts of interest but are manufactured by a few men of ill will; that parties are merely self-serving factions; and that the people will be best looked after by a single unpolitical leadership that will put their interest first—these ideas are antipolitical, but they are nevertheless essential elements in a political strategy that has often been used to gain power.\textsuperscript{11}

Just how well populism as an ideology, or as a methodology—which is how Manning reportedly views the concept\textsuperscript{12}—equips the Reform Party or any other political party to deal with the cleavages and fragmentations of modern society in a meaningful way, is elusive. If one accepts Cairns’ analysis that fragmentation in the structure of government—brought on in part by the reality of the modern administrative state—as well as the fragmentation of civic identities are mutually reinforcing, and that this fragmentation is here to stay because it is nearly impossible to execute real and fundamental change, the promise of populism to execute “the common sense of the common people” seems naïve. Its naïveté is countered only by the potency and incredible political utility it serves. It is too harsh, then, to think that populism, or the exploitation of a citizen-elite cleavage, offers Canadians little more than a band-aid solution to the problems of our time? One author might agree:

Populism as a moral imperative depends on the existence of a popular will discovered by voting.; But if voting does not discover or reveal a will, then the moral imperative evaporates because there is nothing to be commanded...populism fails, therefore, not because it is morally wrong, but merely because it is empty.\textsuperscript{13}

The rise of Reform, despite the internal difficulties with populism, is instructive of populism’s continuing appeal. The party is able to use populism as an effective political tool, unifying all “common Canadians” under its rhetorical banner, while putting forth a policy program which has attracted an ideologically limited cross-section of the population. In doing so, Reform has up to this point been able to adopt an inclusive


\textsuperscript{12}Flanagan, T.; \textit{Waiting for the Wave}; p.23

rhetoric while appealing to an exclusive electorate—a situation any political practitioner could appreciate. It limits the possible divisions within the party’s membership while appealing to a wider audience.

The full importance of Reform to the history of Canadian party politics is, as yet, undetermined. However, some interesting parallels are worthy of note. In his examination of the history of Canadian party systems, and specifically in reference to the transitions between party systems, Carty remarks on the role of third parties:

The Ralliement des créditistes did disrupt party politics throughout the 1960s, generating the same parliamentary uncertainty that had marked the first decade of each of the two previous party systems, but it was essentially a party in protest against the second system’s treatment of its constituency. Like the Progressives of the 1920s, the Créditistes proved to be the harbinger of a new system, but not a part of it.  

Whether Reform continues in this tradition and marks the passing of the old party system to the new, I could not conclusively say. However, Carty’s central thesis is that the change from one party system to another is governed by a change in the institutional arrangements around which political parties work, limiting the parties’ ability to fulfill certain functions and expanding their ability to fulfill others. Or, in other words, party systems change when the functional configuration performed by parties changes. In this manner the first party system passed on to the second, when “civil service reform deprived parties of their state-building role”, and the second system passed into the third when “the nation-building tasks of regional accommodation were absorbed into the system of federal-provincial diplomacy”. Carty identifies as the dominant politics of the third system (1963–) as agenda-building, dominated by electronic politics and the personalization of party politics with the party leader.

If one accepts the suggestion that the forceful arrival of the Reform party on the Canadian party system announces a shift to a new party system, and with it a reconfiguration of the functions parties will fulfill in the new system, then one should try to identify what the trigger for this transition is. In other words, a transition to a new party system begins when “...deprived of the function that had driven them, the parties develop a new style of politics, a new basis for political mobilization”.  

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15 Ibid.; p.583

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.; p.577
parties develop national agendas which seek the support of national constituencies for their various policy initiatives. The dominant politics has been agenda-setting through the use of national media. If one also accepts that transitions in party systems are responses to changes in the institutional framework in which parties must operate, one could look to the changes of recent years for the answer.

The more obvious of institutional changes which has changed the map and the substance of Canadian politics has been the constitution—the Charter of Rights and Freedoms especially. Whatever other effect the Charter might have had, it changed the fundamental relationship between Canadians and their government:

The Charter brought new groups into the constitutional order or, as in the case of the aboriginals, enhanced a pre-existing constitutional, status. It bypassed governments and spoke directly to Canadians by defining them as bearers of rights...The Charter thus reduced the relative status of governments and strengthened that of the citizens who received constitutional encouragement to think of themselves as constitutional actors.\textsuperscript{18}

The Charter gave citizen's groups not only constitutional standing, it gave these groups a rationale and an opportunity to mobilize on behalf of their members in order to set not only the constitutional agenda of the day, but on a more habitual level, the political and policy agenda of the day. The new constitutional relationship between Canadians and the government which Cairns' describes bypasses as well the traditional political intermediary between Canadians' and their political system: political parties. Although there are more factors leading to the rise of interest group pluralism in Canada than this constitutional explanation, the fact remains that the political party is no longer the primary structure which can claim to set the political agenda.

The agenda-setting function of the third party system, like the nation-building function of the second party system, has been incorporated elsewhere in the political system. Post-modern complexities have necessitated the incorporation of interest groups, media, etc in the policy process. Political parties still play a role, but they share the stage with competing modes of representation. The Reform party, especially when one considers the importance accorded the special interest dialogue in their rhetoric, can be seen as a reaction to this erosion of the political parties' role in agenda-setting. Reform does not escape this erosion, either. Will Reform last past this transition? We can only speculate. Carty remarks that the Social Credit, the most direct antecedent of the Reform party, "...did not survive the system which spawned it".\textsuperscript{19} The Social Credit, however, did not


\textsuperscript{19} ibid.; p.573
have the implosion of the Conservative party to ease its way. The one party which has historically survived these transitions and which has been consistently positioned to take advantage of the uncertainty, has been the Liberal Party.

If this discussion of the passing of the third party system is not premature, then perhaps one can wonder what will drive party politics in the next. Whatever the speculation which keeps the political observer entertained, one thing is clear. The importance of the Reform party on the history of party politics will be mitigated if the party does not build on its 1993 electoral success in Ontario in the next election. The gains it has already made have shaken up the political establishment, of that there should be little doubt. Reform's continuing expansion in Ontario will be watched with great interest.
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### Appendix 1. Regression Results for Socio-Economic Variables and the Dependent Variable (Reform Support in the 1993 election in terms of percentage of popular vote)

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*not significant at p 0.1
Appendix 2: Candidate Questionnaire

The following questionnaire represents an important research instrument in the study of the Reform party in Ontario. While observers of Canadian politics have emphasized the Western roots of the party, little research has been conducted on the party in Ontario. This questionnaire tries to shed some light on how the party has established itself outside of its western base since it voted to expand into Ontario and beyond in 1991. Your participation would be most appreciated. This questionnaire will take approximately 45 minutes to complete. If you have any additional comments regarding Reform’s activities in your riding, please feel free to attach them to the questionnaire.

The information collected by this questionnaire will be aggregated to get a better picture of Reform’s support and organization across the province. Personal data collected in Section D of this questionnaire will be used to develop a profile of Reform candidates, and will not be used to identify you personally. Data on the individual level will be kept confidential. However, in the course of my analysis, it may be useful to identify a particular riding as being different from the norm or particularly interesting in its own right. Do you authorize the identification of your riding to this end?

( ) Yes ( ) No

Signature:____________________ Date:__________________/1995

Are you interested in receiving the results of this questionnaire? ( ) Yes ( ) No

SECTION A: PREVIOUS COMMUNITY AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

A1. Before becoming involved with the Reform Party, what was the extent of your involvement in your community? (Please check any which apply):

( ) elected to a municipal or regional government
( ) elected to a school board
( ) elected officer of a professional association or chamber of commerce
( ) active membership in an advocacy group or non-profit organization
( ) active membership in a church or religious group
( ) not active in the community
( ) other. Please specify:__________________________
A2. Prior to becoming the candidate for the Reform Party in the 1993 federal election, were you involved in any of the following activities for the party (Check all which apply):

( ) Helped raise money for the Reform Party
( ) Attended a previous Reform Party General Assembly
( ) Helped establish the constituency association in your riding
( ) Actively recruited potential Reform supporters. If so, specify how:


A3. Have you ever been ACTIVE in another political party?

( ) Yes     ( ) No

If yes, please check any of the following parties in which you were active:

( ) The Progressive Conservative Party of Canada
( ) The Liberal Party of Canada
( ) The New Democratic Party
( ) The Liberal Party of Ontario
( ) The Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario
( ) The Confederation of Regions Party
( ) Other. Please specify:

A4. Have you ever been a member of a political party, but was NOT ACTIVE within the party?

( ) Yes. Please specify which party:

( ) No

A5. When was the Reform Party constituency association founded in your riding? (Please indicate month and year):

A6. Do consider yourself one of the first people to organize for the Reform Party of Canada in your constituency?

( ) Yes     ( ) No

A7. When did you first join the Reform Party (Please indicate year):
A8. If you were involved with the party before June of 1991, did you work to have the party expand into Ontario?

( ) Yes  ( ) No

If YES, please specify how:

_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________

A9. Which party did you vote for in the 1988 federal election?

( ) Progressive Conservative
( ) Liberal
( ) New Democrats
( ) Other party. Please specify: ________________________________
( ) Did not vote

A10. Which party did you vote for in the 1984 federal election?

( ) Progressive Conservative
( ) Liberal
( ) New Democrats
( ) Other party. Please specify: ________________________________
( ) Do not remember
( ) Did not vote

A11. Which party did you vote for in the 1990 provincial election in Ontario?

( ) Progressive Conservative
( ) Liberal
( ) New Democrats
( ) Confederation of Regions
( ) Other party. Please specify: ________________________________
( ) Did not vote because I did not reside in Ontario at the time
( ) Did not vote for another reason
A12. Which party did you vote for in the 1987 provincial election in Ontario?

( ) Progressive Conservative
( ) Liberal
( ) New Democrats
( ) Other party. Please specify:_____________________
( ) Do not remember
( ) Did not vote because I did not reside in Ontario at the time
( ) Did not vote for another reason

A13. Which party did you vote for in the 1985 provincial election in Ontario?

( ) Progressive Conservative
( ) Liberal
( ) New Democrats
( ) Other party. Please specify:_____________________
( ) Do not remember
( ) Did not vote because I did not reside in Ontario at the time
( ) Did not vote for another reason

A14. When you were growing up, how INTERESTED were your parents in politics?

( ) Very interested
( ) Somewhat interested
( ) Not very interested
( ) Not at all interested

A15. When you were growing up, how INVOLVED were your parents in politics?

( ) Very involved
( ) Somewhat involved
( ) Not very involved
( ) Not at all involved
SECTION B: YOUR RIDING

B1. What is the name of the federal constituency in which you ran for office in the 1993 federal election?

B2. How would you qualify this riding, is it:

( ) rural
( ) urban
( ) suburban

B3. What are the THREE most important economic activities FOR THE PEOPLE IN YOUR RIDING?

( ) agriculture
( ) manufacturing of automobiles and/or auto parts
( ) manufacturing of other products
( ) steel industry
( ) high-tech/knowledge-based industry
( ) small business
( ) service sector/clerical
( ) mining
( ) forestry
( ) hydro-electric energy
( ) other energy (for example, coal or petroleum products)
( ) tourism
( ) public sector (for example: public service, health or education)
( ) Other. Please specify:

B4. Of the three economic activities chosen above, which is THE MOST IMPORTANT economic activity FOR THE PEOPLE IN YOUR RIDING?

B5. Of the list of economic activities above, which would you consider THE MOST PROMISING for the people in your riding?
B6. What are the THREE most important economic activities IN YOUR REGION?

( ) agriculture
( ) manufacturing of automobiles and/or auto parts
( ) manufacturing of other products
( ) steel industry
( ) high-tech/knowledge-based industry
( ) small business
( ) service sector/clerical
( ) mining
( ) forestry
( ) hydro-electric energy
( ) other energy (eg. coal, petroleum products)
( ) tourism
( ) public sector (for example: public service, health or education)
( ) Other. Please specify:

B7. Of the three economic activities chosen above, which is THE MOST IMPORTANT economic activity IN YOUR REGION?

B8. Of the economic activities listed, which would you consider THE MOST PROMISING for your region?

B9. Has your riding experienced significant job losses IN THE LAST YEAR?

( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) Do not know

If yes, please indicate why (for example: layoffs, lagging tourism, slump in agricultural prices):

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
B10. Has your riding experienced significant job losses in the last three years?

( ) Yes  ( ) No  ( ) Do not know

If yes, please indicate why:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

B11. Would you say that employment prospects for your riding are:

( ) better than one year ago
( ) the same as one year ago
( ) worse than one year ago

B12. Would you say that there are

( ) not enough immigrants in my riding
( ) just enough immigrants in my riding
( ) too many immigrants in my riding

SECTION C: THE 1993 ELECTION PERIOD

Please answer the following questions based on your experience campaigning for the party in your riding both before and during the 1993 election campaign.

C1. When were you nominated as the Reform Party candidate in your riding? (Please indicate month and year): _______________

C2. Was your nomination contested?

( ) Yes  ( ) No
C3. If you were to identify THREE FACTORS as the most important reasons why you became active within the Reform party, what would they be? (Please check three items. If none of the listed factors apply, please specify any three unlisted factors in the space provided):

( ) The leadership of Preston Manning
( ) I was equally dissatisfied with all other political parties
( ) The Reform party opposed the Charlottetown Accord and the elites which endorsed it.
( ) The Reform party was the only party which would represent the concerns of my region in Ottawa
( ) I liked the Reform position on Official Languages policy
( ) I liked the Reform position on deficit reduction
( ) I liked the Reform position on cutting social programs
( ) I liked the Reform position on immigration
( ) I liked the Reform position on parliamentary reform
( ) I liked the Reform position on criminal justice reform
( ) I liked the Reform position on one other issue. Please specify which issue: ________________________________
( ) I knew other people involved in the party
( ) None of the above apply. The following factors were the most important reasons for my involvement in the party:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

C4. If you were to choose from the factors above, which ONE factor would you choose as THE MOST IMPORTANT for your involvement in the Reform party?
C5. The following are reasons given by some voters for supporting the Reform party. In your opinion, how important are these reasons for the Reform party's popularity in your riding? On a scale of 1 to 7 please indicate how important you consider each reason to be on Reform popularity in your riding, with 1 being of little importance, and 7 being of great importance.

a) The leadership of Preston Manning?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important

b) The Reform party's policy on cuts in social program spending?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important

c) The Reform party's opposition to state-funded day-care?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important

d) The Reform party's opposition to the Charlottetown Accord?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important

e) The Reform party's fight against the influence of special interests in policy-making?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important

f) The Reform party's policy of bottom-up decision-making within the party?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important

g) The unpopularity of Bob Rae's NDP government?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important

h) The Reform party's refusal to "make deals" with Québec?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important

i) The unpopularity of the Mulroney/Campbell Conservatives?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important

j) Dissatisfaction with the Chrétien Liberals?

not very important (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) very important
C6. According to the Mini-Reformer of January 1993, the Reform Party chose three principal "planks" to its electoral platform. These issues would form the three most important messages the Reform party wanted to convey to voters. These issues were:

1) tax relief through fiscal reform
2) safer streets and homes through criminal reform
3) more accountable politicians through parliamentary and democratic reform.

The following are a series of statements regarding the strategic use of this platform on the national level and at the riding level. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements, with 1 indicating you totally disagree, and 7 that you totally agree.

a) The three issues chosen for the national Reform campaign accurately reflect the priorities of Reformers ACROSS THE COUNTRY.

totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

b) Given that it is a new party, the 1993 Reform election campaign was well organized ACROSS THE COUNTRY

totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

c) The national campaign platform played to Reform strengths

totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

d) The national campaign platform was effective in rallying Reform support equally across the country

totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

e) The Reform campaign did not emphasize enough how people feel excluded from politics

totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

f) The Reform campaign did not emphasize enough the debt/deficit crisis facing Canada

totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree
g) The Reform campaign did not emphasize enough the regional disparities in Canada.

    totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

h) As the Reform candidate in my riding, I tried to tailor the Reform message to the concerns of my local voters.

    totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

i) During the campaign in my riding, I only needed to repeat what Preston Manning said.

    totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

j) Although the Reform party is now a national party, I told voters in my riding that the party would represent the concerns of our region in Ottawa.

    totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

k) In my campaign, I emphasized that the average voter could not be heard in the other political parties.

    totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

l) The national campaign did not stress enough that the Reform party stands for traditional family values.

    totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

m) The national campaign did not stress enough how the welfare state has eroded the independence of Canadians.

    totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree

n) During my campaign, I found that Reform supporters in my riding felt that the elites were running the country.

    totally disagree (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) totally agree
C7. Before the 1993 general election campaign, the Reform party was unfamiliar to many of Ontario's voters. How did you explain what Reform had to offer the voters in your riding?


C8. The 1993 election campaign saw the Reform party win close to 1 million votes in Ontario, but win only one seat from the province in the House of Commons. The following section will ask you to evaluate what you consider the most important reasons why the Reform party achieved the level of support it did in your riding.

a) Of the following political factors, which THREE do you think MOST HELPED the Reform party IN YOUR RIDING?

( ) the unpopularity of the Rae/McLaughlin NDP
( ) Reform's objection to the Charlottetown Accords
( ) the unpopularity of the Mulroney/Campbell Conservatives
( ) the weakness of the Conservative campaign in my riding
( ) the leadership of Preston Manning
( ) the "old-time politician" image of Jean Chrétien
( ) the growing separatist threat in Québec
( ) Other. Please specify:

b) Of the three factors chosen above, which ONE do you think HELPED THE MOST?
c) Of the following economic factors, which THREE FACTORS do you think MOST HELPED Reform support in your riding?

( ) the tax burden faced by people in your riding
( ) the perception that average Canadians face a decline of opportunities in today's economy
( ) the huge deficit run up by previous federal governments
( ) the insecurity people feel about their present employment
( ) the actual loss of jobs in your riding
( ) the increasing cost of living in your riding
( ) higher interest rates in Canada

d) Of the three economic factors above, which ONE do you think HELPED THE MOST?

________________________________________________________

C9. Of the following factors, which THREE do you think MOST HINDERED Reform support IN YOUR RIDING?

( ) The strength of established Liberal networks in my riding
( ) The profile of the Liberal candidate in my riding
( ) The newness of the Reform party in Ontario
( ) The Conservatives and NDP split the opposition vote and let the Liberals in
( ) The decision of the Reform party to focus on the deficit instead of jobs
( ) Voters liked the fiscal policies of Reform but not the social policies of the party
( ) Other. Please specify: __________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

C10. Of the factors above, which ONE factor do you think MOST HINDERED Reform support in your riding?

________________________________________
C11. IN YOUR RIDING CAMPAIGN, which of the following media did you use to reach potential Reform voters? (Please check any which apply)

( ) local radio  
( ) local newspapers  
( ) regional newspapers  
( ) local television  
( ) regional television  
( ) Other. Please specify: ____________________________

Of the above media, which did you utilise THE MOST? ____________________________

Of the above media, which did you consider the MOST EFFECTIVE? ____________________________

If you were to run for the Reform party in the next federal election, which media would you use the most? ____________________________

C12. If you were able to change how the NATIONAL Reform campaign was run, what would you change, if anything?

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

C13. If you were able to change how the Reform campaign was run IN YOUR RIDING, what would you change, if anything?

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________

__________________________
SECTION D

This section of the questionnaire contains questions about yourself. Responses to these questions will be used to conduct a statistical analysis of Reform candidates in Ontario.

D1. What is your age?

( ) 25 and under
( ) 26-29
( ) 30-39
( ) 40-49
( ) 50-59
( ) 60 and over

D2. Are you:  ( ) male  ( ) female

D3. Circle the highest level that you attended school (circle one only please)

grade 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
some college
completed college
some university
completed one university degree
completed more than one university degree

D4. Where do you live now?

( ) on a farm

OR in a community whose population is

under 1,000 (rural)  ( )
1,000 to 9,999 (town)  ( )
10,000 to 99,999 (small city)  ( )
100,000 to 499,999 (medium city)  ( )
500,000 or more (metropolis)  ( )

D5. What language do you normally use at home?

( ) English
( ) French
( ) Other. Please specify: ________________________________
D6. Do you think of yourself as belonging to a social class?

( ) Yes  ( ) No

D7. If you had to choose one, to which of the following six social classes would you say you belonged?

( ) upper
( ) upper middle
( ) middle
( ) lower middle
( ) working
( ) lower

D8. To which class did your parents belong to when you were growing up?

( ) upper
( ) upper middle
( ) middle
( ) lower middle
( ) working
( ) lower

D9. What was your total family income before taxes in 1993?

( ) $10,000 or less  ( ) $60,001 to $65,000
( ) $10,001 to $15,000  ( ) $65,001 to $70,000
( ) $15,001 to $20,000  ( ) $70,001 to $75,000
( ) $20,001 to $25,000  ( ) $75,001 to $80,000
( ) $25,001 to $30,000  ( ) $80,001 to $85,000
( ) $30,001 to $35,000  ( ) $85,001 to $90,000
( ) $35,001 to $40,000  ( ) $90,001 to $95,000
( ) $40,001 to $45,000  ( ) $95,001 to $100,000
( ) $50,001 to $55,000
( ) $55,001 to $60,000

D10. Are you a member of a union ( or were you before retirement)?

( ) Yes  ( ) No

D11. Is anyone in your immediate family a union member?

( ) Yes  ( ) No
D12. If you were to describe your job, which one of the following categories would you pick?

( ) owner of a business  ( ) white collar worker
( ) owner of a farm  ( ) blue collar worker
( ) self-employed professional  ( ) homemaker
( ) politician  ( ) unemployed
( ) elected official  ( ) retired
( ) student
( ) other. Please specify:

D13. What is your present occupation (or before retirement)?

D14. (If appropriate), what is your spouse's occupation?

D15. What was your father's occupation when you were growing up?

D16. In the home in which you live at the present time, do you or your family

( ) rent  ( ) own

D17. What is your marital status?

( ) single  ( ) separated/divorced
( ) married  ( ) widowed
( ) Other (please specify):

D18. How many persons (adults and children) are in your household? ___________

D19. How many full-time wage earners are in your household? ________________

D20. What is your religion? ________________________________

D21. In what country were you born? ________________________________