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JEWSH POLITICAL BEHAVIOR-
LIBERALISM OR RATIONAL POLITICAL TRADITION:

THE 1989 QUEBEC ELECTION
AND THE EQUALITY PARTY

by: Irving Gold

A thesis submitted to the
School of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Master’s Degree in Sociology

Director: Victor DaRosa

University of Ottawa

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In Memory of Maurice Gold and Marie Solowey.

To Moira,
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Abstract

Jewish political behavior is generally characterized as liberal. This study advances an alternative conception based on rationality and pragmatism rather than reflexive liberalism. The author argues that pragmatism can dictate either liberal or non-liberal behavior for Jews, and that behavior which departs from liberalism need not be treated as a departure from an historical trend but can be regarded as a continuation of a long tradition of pragmatism. The 1989 Quebec election, which saw the election of four Equality Party of Quebec candidates, serves as the case study. The support given to the Equality candidates by the Montreal Anglophone Jewish community is examined by way of a content analysis of several pre-election editions of The Suburban, a Montreal English weekly newspaper. The Suburban is demonstrated to have been extremely supportive of the Equality Party and overwhelmingly Jewish in content and orientation. It is argued that The Suburban served as a tool for direct and indirect Jewish support for the Equality Party.
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Introduction

On October 23rd, 1989, Gordon Atkinson, Neil Cameron, Richard Holden, and Robert Libman entered the Quebec provincial legislature for the first time. The four were elected under the banner of the Equality Party of Quebec, a party which had been created only six months prior in order to voice opposition to Bill 178 and to advance the cause of anglophone rights. As reflected in the party’s membership and leadership, this relatively conservative party was, to a certain extent, a Jewish phenomenon.

The following thesis is the culmination of practical experience and observation combined with academic inquiry and research. It addresses issues pertaining to both political sociology and ethnicity. While much has been written on the political behavior of world Jewry, most of the literature supports the view that Jews are consistently more liberal than others. This study will advance another conception of Jewish political behavior, one based on the idea that Jews behave politically in a rational way. It will be argued that while historically, pragmatism has often dictated liberal political behavior for the Jews, it may equally dictate illiberal behavior. Jewish illiberal behavior need not be treated as an anomaly, as a departure from an historical
trend; it can thus be regarded as a continuation of a long tradition of pragmatic political behavior.

It is within this perspective that we will present the case study for this thesis. the 1989 Quebec election. We will examine the link between the Montreal anglophone Jewish community and the election of the four Equality Party members. Specifically, we will show that the in supporting the Equality Party, these Jews engaged in pragmatic, illiberal political behavior. Once again, it will be argued that such behavior does not represent a rupture from a longstanding liberal tradition, but the continuation of a tradition of pragmatic political choice.

My personal interest in the subject matter, and ability to undertake this study stems from both the fact that I was, for a time, an extremely active member of the Equality Party, and am a member of the Jewish community. My involvement during the electoral campaign and in the months which followed the election enabled me to gain a unique perspective, one not available to most. As a campaign organizer for one of the successful Equality candidates, I dealt frequently with the Anglophone press. Indeed, one of my primary tasks was to monitor press coverage of the election, and to organize events and distribute press releases which would ameliorate our exposure.
As such, I was given the opportunity to view the major variance in political coverage that occurred between *The Montreal Gazette* and *The Suburban*.

As a member of the Jewish community, I was able to understand this variance. *The Suburban*, while not explicitly stating so, is a major voice for Montreal Anglophone Jews. It is where upcoming Bar-Mitzvahs, Shivas, and other Jewish events are announced. While it is by no means the sole voice for Montreal's Jewish community, it often serves as a resource, an important source of information regarding events and a forum for the concerns of the community. As will be evidenced in this thesis, *The Suburban* was the English media outfit which was most supportive of the Equality Party. It will be argued that the Montreal Anglophone Jewish community supported the Equality Party, both directly and indirectly through the pages of *The Suburban*.

In the first chapter of this thesis, several theoretical considerations will be examined. The first task will be to operationalize some key terms: conservative, liberal, radical, pragmatic, Jewish, and political participation. Having developed workable definitions, we will examine the issue of political participation, in particular, several theories which attempt to explain variances in participation rates among different ethnic groups. Next, the issues of Jewish participation rates and the
phenomenon of Jewish liberalism in social attitudes, voting behavior, political party affiliation, and political activism will be studied. Several problems with measures which are frequently used to identify these phenomena will also be discussed. Lastly, we will address the major theories which have emerged, purporting to explain seemingly persistent Jewish liberalism.

In the second chapter, the major problematic of this thesis will be developed. It will be shown that while claims for a coherent Jewish liberalism are often made, there has always been major political variety within the international Jewish community. Jewish integrationists, nationalists, and orthodox will be cited as but three examples of the several distinct and often opposing Jewish political currents which can be identified. In so doing, we will advance a theory which runs counter to those already discussed, one which sees Jewish liberalism as merely one possible form of political behavior. It will be demonstrated that the Jews, at various times and in various places, have engaged in activity which may be considered as antithetical to liberalism. Citing historical as well as current political trends among the Orthodox, Hasidic, and Israeli Jewish populations, it will be argued that the Jews are neither strangers to right-wing political thought, nor are they always opponents of it. It will be posited that Jewish political behavior is a function of external and internal
circumstances, as the result of rational thought and the weighing of pragmatic political and social objectives.

The third chapter will present the case study of this thesis. First, the political climate in Quebec preceding the creation of the Equality Party will be described. We will then turn to a discussion of the foundations of the Equality Party. It will be shown that the Equality Party advanced a position which is best described as conservative. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that the party's founders and organizers were mostly Jewish. Finally, it will be argued that the Jewish community supported the party, not only in terms of votes and organization but also by way of *The Suburban*, a newspaper oriented towards the Montreal Anglophone Jewish community.

The fourth chapter addresses the methodological concerns of the case study. The chapter begins with a discussion of content analysis as a methodological tool, including the various goals of content analysis and possible research designs. A detailed discussion will then ensue concerning the step necessary to conduct a content analysis. In the fifth chapter, the methodological considerations previously discussed will be factored into the present case study. The findings of our analysis will then be presented, and their implications discussed. In conclusion, the sixth chapter will
summarize the findings of the content analysis and will situate these findings within the broader theoretical framework presented in this thesis.
Chapter I: Theoretical Framework

1. INTRODUCTION

A central issue in the debates regarding ethnicity revolves around the question of political behavior. Simply stated, while some believe that ethnicity is an important determinant of political attitudes and behavior, others maintain that ethnicity only plays a role in first, and perhaps third generation immigrants, and that this effect is quickly replaced by class and socioeconomic factors. For those who believe that ethnicity is a minor factor in the formation of political ideologies and behavioral trends, ethnic groups such as the Greeks, Italians, and Scottish are the main focus. For those who are convinced that ethnicity is often the most important determinant of political behaviors, it is often the political behavior of the Jews that is detailed. This is hardly surprising since, at least at first glance, the Jews seem to vote and support political causes which go against their class interests. In fact it is the existence of a persistent "Jewish Liberalism" which is cited as the major anomaly, and posited as a demonstration of the existence of ethnic factors in the shaping of political ideals.
Conventional wisdom is that Jews tend to support parties to the left of the political center. Jewish parliamentarians were predominantly Leftists, and Jews have been over-represented in "the leadership of radical and revolutionary Left-wing political parties" (Medding, 1977, p.116). [Further], Jewish political attitudes have also been found to be overwhelmingly liberal in such matters as social justice, economic welfare, civil liberties, anti-discrimination, and internationalism (Medding, 1977, p.116). What makes all of this interesting is that "their [the Jews] pattern of voting and political attitudes seems to run counter to their class situation and to the voting and attitude patterns of all other groups in similar socioeconomic situations" (Medding, 1977, p.117). As other groups have replaced the politics of ethnicity with the politics of class as their socioeconomic status rises, the Jews have gone the other way.

The objective of this chapter will be to evaluate the several theories which exist regarding Jewish political behavior. The first task will be to properly define all relevant terms. The second step will be to examine and critique the evidence which is advanced in order to arrive at a claim for a coherent Jewish liberalism. It will be shown that at least some of these measures may be questionable, at best. Finally, several of the explanations that have been devised to explain Jewish liberalism will be reviewed and evaluated.
2. CONCEPTS

Precise definitions are essential in any academic work. This requirement is particularly troublesome in studies dealing with abstract concepts. Liberalism, like conservatism is a historical movement which is constantly changing. Further, both these concepts are, at least in their colloquial sense, compared to the equally abstract notion of center. It follows then that there are major differences between important manifestations of the same movement in different societies and continents, and what was liberal yesterday may be conservative today. By the same token, what conservatives opposed yesterday they may tolerate today as part of the accepted status quo (Medding, 1977, p.115). In order to discuss and critique the notion of a "Jewish liberalism" we must first establish which meaning of liberalism the authors are using. Once we have established that, we can move on to the task of examining the these substantive claims

2.1 CONSERVATIVE

There are several different conceptions of the term liberal. It is therefore perhaps best defined by first examining its antithesis. When the Jews are referred to as being overwhelmingly liberal, it is usually understood as being the opposite to
conservative. Conservatism stresses the importance of tradition: what the industrial and democratic revolutions sought to overthrow, conservatism sought to defend.

What they sought to establish, conservatism attacked.

From conservatism's defense of social tradition sprang its emphasis on the values of community, kinship, hierarchy, authority, and religion, and also its premonitions of social chaos surmounted by absolute power once individuals had become wrenched from the contexts of these values by the forces of liberalism and radicalism. (Nisbet, 1966, p.11)

There is no natural order for conservatives, no individual first. Instead, what is of primary importance is society and its traditional institutions. Fundamental to conservatism, therefore, is an antagonism towards the enlightenment, particularly in the ideas of Rousseau. It rejects the cultural, political, and economic elements of modernism.

According to the conservatives, the revolutions and subsequent move towards modernism was the culmination of several negative stages in history. The first was the birth of Protestantism which brought man further away from faith and from the discipline of the church. Next came the belief in secular individualism, advanced by the moderns, which stressed man's intellectual powers, and detracted from God's omnipotence. Lastly came "the dangerous romantic image of man as the creature of
inherently good, ineffaceably stable, instincts on which institutions and governments sat repressively and needlessly” (Nisbet, 1966, p.13).

Along with the revolution came several transformations. Feeling and passion replaced the disciplined restraint of tradition and piety. Impersonal norms of contract and utility replaced non-rational sacred values. There was a steady decline of authority, both social, political, and religious. There was also a loss of liberty, which the conservatives chose to define in “the medieval sense of the word, as connoting not so much freedom, which signified disengagement and license, as principled right within divine law and tradition” (Nisbet, 1966, p.14).

The most important element of conservatism is its vision of liberty and equality. “There is perhaps no principle more basic in the conservative philosophy then that of the inherent and absolute incompatibility between liberty and equality” (Nisbet, 1986, p.47). For the conservative, the guiding principle behind liberty is the protection of individuals. Equality, in contrast, is bent on the redistribution of resources or the leveling of inequalities. For the conservatives, not all humans are created equal in physical ability, mental faculty, or spiritual fitness. In seeking an artificial equality, legal or governmental initiatives are required which will by
definition curtail the liberties of some. Conservatism is therefore preoccupied with the liberties of all, and less with notions of equality.

2.2 Liberalism

Two very different liberalisms can be identified within political discourse. The liberalism that we often think of is the liberalism of the Anglo-Scottish tradition, stemming from the writings of Locke, Hume, and Adam Smith. Individual liberty is the focus, and government is regarded with distrust. It was this Anglo-liberal tradition that was the model for the American Revolution. The second strain of liberalism is the continental liberalism which lead to the French revolution. It charged the old regimes with corruption and oppression. It believed in revolution and enlightenment, and had a general distrust for the market economy and individualism.

While there are differences between the liberals of Manchester who were concerned with economic freedoms vis a vis the law and custom, and the liberals of Paris for whom the concern was for freedom of thought vis a vis the clerical tradition... What liberals had in common was, first, acceptance of the basic structure of state and economy, and second, a belief that progress lay in the emancipation of man's mind and spirit from the religious and traditional bonds of the old order. (Nisbet, 1966, p.10)
Those pointing to a Jewish liberalism tend to have the “continental” liberalism in mind. the “conviction that the community and the government has a responsibility to provide remedies to the less affluent” (Lipset and Raab. 1984. p.402).

2.3 Radicalism

Radicalism has a different conception of the state. While liberals place their belief wholly in the modern conception of the state, and conservatives are extremely distrustful of the state, radicalism sees both flaw and hope.

[Their belief is in] the redemptive possibilities which lie in political power: its capture, its purification, and its unlimited, even territorialistic, use in the rehabilitation of man and institutions. Coupled with power is almost limitless faith in reason in the fashioning of a new social order. (Nisbet, 1966, p.10)

Nineteenth century radicalism was secular; it sought overthrow traditional conceptions of the state in the name of a new political conception, not a religious one. Jewish radicalism, or the Jewish counterculture, was, at times, religious in nature. What unites radical action is the desire for revolt or uprising based on “faith in absolute power; not power for its own sake but for the sake of rationalist and humanitarian liberation of man from the tyrannies and inequalities that had plagued him for millennia” (Nisbet, 1966, p.11). Where conservatism is afraid of power, and liberalism places it in the hands of the state, radicals occupy the middle ground.
2.4 Pragmatism

Pragmatists certainly have opinions regarding the moral and political issues of the day such as truth and justice, but they do not translate these opinions into theory. Pragmatism is simply “anti-essentialism applied to notions such as ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, ‘language’, ‘morality’, and similar objects of philosophical theorizing” (Rorty, 1982, p.162). In regarding the above concepts as being contingent upon a subjective reality, their meaning becomes intrinsically linked to their practice, their action, and their experience:

Certain acts [are seen] as good ones to perform, under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful to say about what makes them all good... the conscious acquisition of a belief is a justifiable, praiseworthy act in certain circumstances. But, a fortiori, it is not likely that there is anything general and useful to be said about what makes [them] good.” (Rorty, 1982, p.xiii)

It will be argued that Jewish political behavior is best understood as pragmatic rather than philosophically motivated. By this it is meant that while a majority of Jews may have inclinations as individuals towards a certain political or philosophical view, they behave as an organized whole in a rational manner. Their political behavior can be seen as the result of careful evaluation and cost-benefit analysis and not knee-jerk reaction. Pragmatism rejects the “impossible attempt to step outside our skins— the traditions, linguistic, and other, within which we do our thinking and
self-criticism” (Rorty, 1982, p.xix). We act according to our interests and not merely on philosophical conviction.

2.5 JEWISH

Lastly, if any claims are to be made about “Jews”, we must arrive at a meaningful definition of “the Jews”. This is not as simple a task as it may seem. Some ethnic groups are rather easy to define. For most, a simple determination of one’s origin will suffice. Therefore “the Chinese” will comprise all those who have their origins in China. There are certainly ambiguities; details such as how far back one wishes to go in history in order to determine ethnicity, and how one is to deal with mixed marriages and the like. There is, however, a certain straightforwardness.

In order to gain some insight regarding the North American Jewish population, it is useful to understand its origins. The behaviors and attitudes of an ethnic group will undoubtedly reflect both their present realities and historical experiences. In the case of the Jews, three specific waves of immigration to the new world can be identified, each representing the entrance of a different Jewish community and a specific world view.
2.5.1 **United States:**

The major influx of Jews to the United States occurred between 1840 and 1925. Roughly 2000 Jews lived in the territories prior to the American revolution, and that number did not grow dramatically for the next 65 years; only 15,000 Jews were to be found in 1840. Just 21 years later, in 1861, there were over 150,000 Jews in America. Sixteen years after that, in 1877, there were 280,000. Eastern European Jewish immigrants poured into the US and the population rose to 1,000,000 by 1900. By 1915, the number has risen to 3,000,000, and 4,500,000 in 1925. The Jews increased in numbers more than three hundred times between the years 1840 and 1925.

The first Jews in America were Sefardim, the Spanish and Portuguese Jews. Their Judaism was fused with Iberian culture, and was "modern, polite and urbane" (Gartner, 1983, p.9). The Central European Jewish Majority were Jews of traditional culture. They came from rural areas, spoke mainly Yiddish, observed the rudiments of Judaism, and were mainly tradesmen or peddlers. The wave of Jewish immigration from 1820 and 1870 brought 150,000 proud Germans to the United States. They were ambassadors from Germany, "diffusing a higher, philosophic culture among the

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1 All references, unless otherwise noted, are from Gartner, 1968.
Yankees” (Gartner, 1983, p.12). Theirs was a Judaism which blended with contemporary liberalism, rationalism, and scholarship; theirs was Reform Judaism.

Massive immigration of East European Jews occurred between the years 1880 and 1925, when free immigration to the United States ended. In 1900, Jews made up 1.4% of the American population, and by 1927 that number had risen to 3.6% (Goldstein, 1983, p.65). These immigrants were Jews, but they were ‘Ashkenazim’, and differed greatly from both the Sephardim and Central European Jews. The new arrivals were “intellectually mobile and innovative, in keeping with their regional traditions of intense piety and arduous, sharp-witted Talmudic study” (Gartner, 1983, p.15). In addition, while the Germanic and Central European Jews settled evenly throughout the United States, the East Europeans settled in the large cities, and in large numbers.

To the Russian Jew, the German Jew was a sham, and his reform Judaism was “little more than a superficial aping of Christianity meant to curry Christian flavor” (Gartner, 1983, p.17). He had lost his community spirit, his sense of common history, and his religious fervor. The German Jews saw the East Europeans as “primitive and clannish”, and unwilling to modernize, aggressive, assertive, unrefined,
and threatening to the good name of the American Jew. They were political radicals and Zionists.

2.5.2 Canada

The Canadian Jewish community differs from its American counterpart. In part, this is due to a different immigration pattern. In 1881, the Canadian Jewish population numbered slightly less than 3000. Of those, only 667 declared their origin as “Hebrew”; Most identified primarily as “British”. In fact, the first Jews in Canada were not political or economic refugees, but merchants from Britain, looking for new markets. In the 1870’s, roughly 500 more East European Jews came to Canada, either directly or via the United States. By the late 18th century, the first Canadian synagogue had been established, a Spanish and Portuguese congregation located in Montreal. By 1901, there were 16 000 Canadian Jews, the majority of which settled in Montreal, Toronto, and Winnipeg. In the first decade of the 1900s, a total of 68 000 Jews arrived to Canada, and roughly 12 000 emigrated to the United States; bringing the population to 75 000. Between 1914 and 1920, as many Jews came to Canada as left to the United States. With changes to Canadian immigration laws, 1923 to 1931 saw an average of only 4000 Jews per year coming to Canada. By 1931, the Canadian Jewish
population was fully in transition; 44% of Canadian Jews were native born, and many others had at least grown up in Canada.

Following a period of decolonization in North Africa, Canada received many Jewish immigrants. "Thanks to the sympathy of the Montreal Jewish community, Canada was second only to Israel in receiving Moroccan Jews" (Vigod, 1984, p.6). In fact, by 1970, Montreal had more than 11,000, and between 3000 - 4000 more lived in Toronto and other centers.

The Canadian Jewish community is largely the product of Eastern European immigration. Canadian Jews shared a common language (Yiddish), origin, and the Ashkenazi Orthodox form of religious expression. They settled together in the major centers of Montreal, Toronto, and Winnipeg, in the typical European Jewish fashion. They formed 'shtetys' such as the St. Lawrence/Main district in Montreal, the Ward in Toronto, and Winnipeg's North End. In fact, the Canadian Jewish community has become even more homogeneous over time - [more so than] its American counterpart. (Vigod, 1984, p.22)
2.6 *Political Participation*

Before discussing the political behavioral patterns of the Jewish population, a discussion of the range of activities comprising political participation is needed. Political participation can be defined as "those voluntary activities by citizens that are intended to influence the selection of government leaders or the decisions they make" (Mishler, 1979, p.158). These activities can be grouped along three main lines: direct - indirect, individual - group, and conventional - unconventional.

Voting in elections is the most obvious and recognized form of individual, indirect political participation. In addition to voting, citizens can also work on electoral campaigns by ringing doorbells, distributing literature, manning committee rooms, and canvassing. Individuals can also make financial contributions to campaigns, and during periods between elections, citizens can continue to work within political parties.

Citizens can also attempt to individually influence government decisions directly. This is particularly effective when "interests cannot be expressed adequately through simple choices that voting provides]... or issues cannot be postponed until a

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2 All references are, unless otherwise noted, from Mishler, 1979.
future election” (Mishler, 1979, p.159). This can be done by contacting elected officials by mail, in person, or by telephone. In addition, citizens can also run for elected office. Direct methods of participation can also be undertaken collectively. Citizens can form lobby or pressure groups, or act directly in corrective measures such as block security programs.

Lastly, more unconventional means are also available to individuals who wish to voice their opinion or effect change. Individuals can engage in graffiti, civil disobedience, or other deviant behaviors. Groups can demonstrate, strike, and engage in passive resistance, like the organization Greenpeace, or they may engage in criminal activity, like the FLQ.

3. Political Variance

North Americans do not all engage in equal levels of political participation. Further, they are likely to differ in their participation rates along several variables. According to Mishler, “The extent of citizen participation in political life is determined by the interplay of motivation and opportunity” (Mishler, 1979, p.172).
3.1 Opportunity Theory

"The higher a person's social standing, the more likely she will be to engage in virtually all political activities" (Mishler, 1979, p.173). People holding higher status occupations participate more, particularly in more time consuming and costly forms of behavior. This is due mainly to the subsequent increases in both social and economic resources available for political investment. At the most basic level, money can buy leisure time which allows for the gathering of political information and the fostering of formal political contacts. Moreover, those with high socioeconomic status have more opportunity to foster informal communication networks and connections. They can also engage in a wider variety of political activities.

Money can also buy education, a significant factor in political participation. Education has been shown to lead to an increase in political interest, awareness of resources, and political skills (Mishler, 1979, p.173). Increased socioeconomic status and education has also been shown to be accompanied by an increased belief in the political system, as well as in the perception of personal stakes and ability to change the system. However, "If most Canadians do not have sufficient resources to become full-time politicians, they do have the wherewithal and opportunities to perform a
wide variety of political activities (Mishler, 1979, p.172). This brings us to the second determinant of political activity levels: motivation.

3.2 Motivation Theory

“The motivation to participate is determined by a complex set of attitudes and beliefs about politics, society, and self” (Mishler, 1979, p.173). Mishler demonstrates that general interest levels in Canadian politics tend to be quite marginal, with only one in five Canadians following politics daily. During the 1984 political election campaign, that figure only rose to one in three. It would seem that for many, government and politics is irrelevant and remote. Many citizens are also poorly informed and are unaware of the workings of government. In fact, Mishler (1979) points to the fact that of those who do vote, a true understanding of the issues and different political ideologies is rare. The last important factor discussed is the belief that the actions of one citizen can make a difference. In a 1990 public opinion poll, 2/3 of respondents felt that government was too complicated. Over one half felt that the government did not care about their opinions. The majority felt as if they had no real say in the governing of the country. Motivation to participate, stemming from interest, understanding, and belief in the system is posited as a major determinant of political participation.
Hooper (1983, p.498) elaborates on the “motivational basis of political behavior” which he defines as “the psychological forces which impel the individual to perform various political behaviors”. The motivational basis of political behavior has four main components: penalty avoidance, instrumental orientation, duty orientation, and internalization. Penalty avoidance is the motivating factor when there is a perception that sanctions are available, and will be invoked if the given behavior is not performed. Instrumental orientation is at work when a behavior is performed because it is seen as instrumental to the attainment of a goal. Duty orientation is the performance of a behavior because it is seen as a part of a role with which the actor identifies. Lastly, internalization is the process by which an individual is self-motivated to perform the behavior because it is intrinsically satisfying, or is “the right thing to do.

According to this type of analysis, it is not external factors such as socioeconomic status that will dictate political participation, but structural conduciveness. For example, for behaviors such as donating money to political parties, voting in elections, and following politics in the news media, internalization seems to be the mechanism at play. “These behaviors will tend to be performed under conditions of relevance to an individual’s values ... regardless of external agents” (Hooper, 1983, p.508).
In short, these behaviors are self-motivated. Acts such as signing petitions, writing letters to elected officials, and attending political party fund-raising functions, internalization also plays the most significant role, followed by instrumental factors. It appears that variances in political participation are determined by factors that are internal rather than external.

3.3 Theories of Ethnicity

Two major theories exist regarding ethnicity and political participation. The first stresses the importance of ethnicity as "an important predictor of political behavior in American society and ought not to be excluded from any serious analysis of such behavior" (Greeley, 1974, p.173). The second represents a model in which:

Rising levels of socioeconomic status- in particular increased education, but also higher income and higher-status occupations- are accompanied by increased civic orientations such as interest and involvement in politics, sense of efficacy, and norms that one ought to participate. (Greeley, 1974, p.174)

This process inevitably leads to increased participation. This model is applied to ethnicity in terms of the rising socioeconomic status and institutional completeness of different ethnic groups over time. Ethnicity is seen as merely an intervening variable in the major relationship between socioeconomic status and political participation.
As we become a society which prides itself on being increasingly pluralistic, a proper understanding of ethnic voting patterns is needed; one which goes beyond common sense assumptions. According to Jerome Black, political scientists have tended to erroneously emphasize ethnicity as a major determinant of political participation; they often believe that “minorities... are passive and marginal to the practices of Canadian politics” (Black, 1991, p.130). Black examines ethnic participation rates in Canada and concludes that minorities do not systematically participate less than Canadians of British origin.

In terms of voter turnout, ethnicity did not play an important role in participation rates. Participation in campaign activity seemed to be a function of “ethnicity”, but the correlation turned out to exist only for the foreign born (Black, 1991, p.137). Contacting elected officials was not linked to ethnicity, but differences were recorded between socioeconomic categories. Communal activity, “working with others to solve community problems” (Black, 1991, p.138) was linked to ethnicity, but again, only insofar as it related to the amount of time elapsed since immigration; the longer immigrants had been here, the more likely they were to participate in communal activity. The only solid correlation between ethnicity and political behavior was observed in terms of protest involvement. Canadians of British origin were much more likely to engage in political protest. Interestingly, minorities were
more likely to contemplate protest activity, but did not seem able to mobilize. Black concludes by stating that participation variances are strongly linked to the foreign born. It is thus “the immigrant condition, rather than ethnicity per se, which accounts for lower levels of political participation” (Black, 1991, p.148).

4. JEWISH POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

4.1 Political Participation

It has long been known that the Jews are hyperactive in politics. For the Jews, “their minority status, in both the numerical and the sociological senses has ceased to be an obstacle to the political advancement of their adherents” (Duke and Johnson, 1992, p.328). Jews vote more than the general American population. “Nationally, Jews make up just under 3% of the population, yet cast 4% or more of the votes in presidential elections. The extra 1 per cent may not seem like much… but it translates into 750 000 votes” (Isaacs, 1974, p.7).

Jews do not end their political participation with voting. Isaacs estimates that Jews comprised between 10% and 20% of all those actively involved in the Democratic Party machine in 1975, including the chairman of the Democratic
National Committee, Robert Strauss. Jews excel in political reporting, film making and public opinion polling. Jews are also excellent political fund-raisers. The Republicans have used the skills of Max Fisher, and the Democrats relied heavily on Arthur Krim. Jews also write speeches. The republicans have William Saffire, and the democrats have Richard Goodwin and Adam Walinsky. Jews also organize campaigns; “Of the five principle candidates for the 1972 democratic nomination for the presidency, only one had no Jew in his managerial entourage” (Isaacs, 1974, p.8).

In the general election, two out of three of McGovern’s managers were Jews. Republicans have long know of the importance of the Jews to the Democratic party. “Of the twenty people on the top priority list of ‘enemies’ drawn up in the White House in 1971... seven of the first eight were Jewish, with a total of 10 out of 20” (Isaacs, 1974, p.9).

In terms of holding elected positions, the Jews had not yet begun to excel in the United States. In 1974, only 108 Jews had been elected to high office. This translates into a historical representation of 6/10 of 1% in congress, and 9/10 of 1% in the senate. The reason for this has been studied, and “as surveys have shown ... Jews still rank relatively low in social standing, and they still are not considered to be appropriate governmental representatives in the United States” (Isaacs, 1974, p.12).
Guerra (1987) studied the historical representation of three minority groups, Latinos, Blacks, and Jews, in important elected positions in Los Angeles. In 1960, ethnic minorities held 4% of important elected positions. By 1986, the number had risen to 54%. He identifies “the Jewish takeoff period” as the late 1970’s. During that period, Jews tripled their level of representation from 5 to 22, representing over 2/3 of all minority growth. Further, the gains of the Jews were not only in ethnic areas. In 1990, while representing 2.3% of the US. population, Jews occupied 7.1% of US. seats in Congress, and 8% of senate seats (Duke and Johnson, 1992, p.325). It would appear as if Isaacs just missed the mark, the situation seems to be improving.

In Canada, the situation of Jewish participation is much more difficult to determine. Few studies exist regarding the specific levels of participation of ethnic groups. We do know that between the years 1867 and 1964, only 97 individuals of non-British and non-Francophone origin were members of the House Of Commons. Minority groups were also glaringly absent from positions in the cabinet, as judges, senators and civil service employees (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban, 1991, p.14). In the 1988 election, out of 295 ridings (at least 900 candidates) there were 17 Jewish candidates. Historically, “even when ethnic minorities attained office in the House Of Commons, they had limited impact ... While two Jewish Liberal MPs worked to allow entry of Jewish refugees who had been uprooted as a result of Nazi atrocities,
the King Liberal government resolutely ignored their requests” (Stasiulis and Abu-Laban, 1991, p.13).

“Fear undoubtedly is the greatest single factor accounting for Jews’ high level of political activity” (Isaacs, 1974, p.14). Jews are, according to Isaacs, the product of anti-Semitism. Aside from the obvious ravages of the Holocaust, Jews have suffered from exclusion and expulsion from many lands. Jews become extremely active in North American politics because they have found a good home here. They see their political activity as a prerequisite for the maintenance of a just society. If their participation as Jews is important, the recognition as such is not. For many, being identified as Jews is a frightful thought. For many, the notion of a yellow arm band springs to mind. There is evidence here to demonstrate that more than mere socioeconomic status is at work.

The motivational bases of behavior can be used as an intervening variable in the study of the different political behavior patterns of various group members. “In this expanded model, the independent variable would serve to activate the motivational bases which, in turn, would serve to trigger performance of the dependent behavior” (Hooper, 1983, p.510). The study shows a “rather strong relationship between Jewish group membership and the motivational bases... group
goals are embedded in the value system of group members, and the behavior necessary to implement these goals is part of the role repertories of the respondents" (Hooper, 1983, p.511-512). The group effect is alive and well in the Jewish community.

Certainly then, none of the theories of political participation are sufficient on their own. While it is true that Jews enjoy a high economic status, it cannot be the sole reason for their heightened participation. It has been established that elite Jews participate more than non-Jews of the same socioeconomic status. Motivational explanations seem useful in that they allow for the discussion of individual beliefs and understanding. In the Jewish case, all factors seem to play contributing roles.

4.2 Jewish Liberal Behavior

American communism is often associated with foreigners; radicalism is seen as imported. The Jewish people have had a long history of radical liberal thought and activity and whenever Jews have displaced, they have brought their radical liberalism with them. Anywhere Jews have settled, be it "in Canada, Australia, South Africa,
Latin America, or Israel”, they tend to be left of center (Kristol. 1990, p.116). The East European Jews who came to the United States in the 1880s proved to be no exception. “During the first decade of the new immigration, more unions were organized and survived than throughout the whole previous history of the United States” (Schappes, 1977, p.13).

4.2.1 ROOTS

In August of 1887, the Jewish members of the Socialist Labor Party requested permission to organize a Jewish branch in order to mobilize Jewish workers. Permission was granted, and the branch immediately began work on federating the already existing fourteen Jewish unions. On October 9, 1888, the United Hebrew Trades was formed (Schappes, 1977, p.13). By 1907, the UHT had 74 affiliated unions representing 50,000 workers. By 1914, the number of unions had risen to 104, representing 250,000 workers (Dreier and Porter, 1975, p.36).

In his study of early ethnic press in North America, Charles Jaret concludes that “the ethnic press has played a vital role in the processes of assimilation and socialization of immigrants and their children” (Jaret, 1979, p.60). Further, he points out that of the early Italian, Greek, and Jewish papers, it was the Jewish ones which
were “most pro-labor... a large number of Yiddish journals championed the cause of the union movement and socialism” (Jaret, 1979, p.61). The Radical Yiddish press was “widely read and influential” (Dreier and Porter, 1975, p.35).

The role of the Jews in the early days of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) was also considerable. Harvey Klehr (1979) examined the ethnic composition of the CPUSA, and found the role played by the Jews to be unsurprisingly high. Specifically, 34% of the party’s central committee members have been Jewish (Klehr, 1979, p.37). This is not at all surprising, since “the most prominent activists of the radical left in the USA when it was at its peak were Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman, two Jews” (Isaacs, 1974, p.8).

The Jewish immigration to Canada after 1900 also brought with it “the latest ideological and cultural developments” (Vigod, 1991, p.10). The Arbeiter Ring, a North American working class Jewish fraternal organization in Canada was home to Marxists Zionists, and Anarchists. The task of bettering the situation of the Jewish worker was taken up with fervor in Canada as well.
4.2.2 SOCIAL ATTITUDES

Self definition is often posited as a good indicator of political orientation. In his study of California Jews, Fisher (1990) finds that non-Jews were twice as likely to define themselves as 'conservative' than were California Jews. In fact, 70% of Jews surveyed placed themselves on the center of the political spectrum, versus 33% of the non-Jewish population (Fisher, 1990, p.134). Kristol (1990) cites a Los Angeles Times poll showing that when Jews are asked about those qualities they feel are most important to their Jewish identity, a majority place 'a commitment to social equality' above both religious observance and support for Israel (Kristol, 1990, p.112). In a study of elite Jews, it was found that 37% of non-Jewish elites refer to themselves as “liberal”, as compared to 75% of Jewish elites (Lerner, Nagai, and Rothman, 1989, p.333). It has also been shown that Hollywood opinion leaders, of which Jews make up 40%, exhibit extreme liberal tendencies in self report surveys. According to Prindle, Endersby, and Gans (1993), Hollywood Jews are considerably more “liberal” than their non-Jewish counterparts.

Jews have been shown to be more apt to accept initiatives that allow governments greater control over individual enterprise and increased taxation. Jews are also more likely to support the limitation of nuclear power projects, increased rent control, and oppose reductions in income taxes (Fisher, 1990). Jews are more likely to support increased spending for the poor and oppose social spending cuts, (Lipset
and Raab, 1984) and support state supported financial aid for disadvantaged students (Drew, 1971). While the rates of support for guaranteed income security in the general population mirror the rates of urban manual workers in that population, the proportion of Jews who support income security is more than double the rate of Jewish Manual workers (Lipset and Raab, 1984). Finally, elite Jews are less favorable to laissez faire capitalism than both non-Jewish elites and the general, non-elite Jewish population and are also more likely to support public ownership and want to move towards a more socialist system (Lerner, Nagai, and Rothman, 1989).

Jews demonstrate comparatively high levels of opposition to increased military spending, and are less likely to own a handgun. They have higher levels of support for gun control legislation, and global nuclear freeze (Fisher, 1990). Jews also rate higher in issues regarding civil rights and civil liberties. More Jews feel that the government pays too little attention to minorities, and they support victims rights more than others. Irwin and Thompson (1978) found that of those who support the rights of homosexuals, most tended to be of the Jewish faith, among other characteristics. Jews are also more likely to oppose the quarantine of HIV infected people (Fisher, 1990) and support school desegregation (Drew, 1971). Lower levels of support for capital punishment exist in the general Jewish population, (Fisher, 1990) and student population (Drew, 1971). Jews support publicly financed
abortions more, while almost none demonstrate a desire to prohibit abortion (Fisher, 1990). Hertel and Hughes (1987) found that among Americans, Jews demonstrate the highest levels of support for abortion, in both extreme and non-extreme cases.

Jews and Episcopalians “register themselves as not opposed to making sex education available” (Hertel and Hughes, 1987, p.84). are least apt to view non-marital sex as immoral, show the least interest in making divorces more difficult to obtain, and are less sexist and actively oppose sexism the most. The Jews are the most liberal group in terms of acceptance and consumption of pornography as well. Lastly, the results of Jewish responses remain constant even when controlled for socioeconomic status.

4.2.3 VOTING BEHAVIOR AND PARTY AFFILIATION

American Jews vote Democratic. It is often said of the Jews that they “have the economic status of Episcopalian WASPS [but] vote more like low-income Hispanics” (Kristol. 1990, p.109). It is a well known fact that “American Jews have voted democratic in all presidential elections since 1924 by an average of about 25% more than the electorate generally” (Lipset and Raab, 1984, p.401). In the 1986 presidential election, 57% of Jews voted Democrat, as compared to 37% of the
American population (Fisher, 1990). In 1980, Jews were the only identifiable group
to give Reagan less support in 1984 than in 1980; between 66 and 70% (Fisher,
1990; Lipset and Raab, 1984). Elite Jews also support the Democrats by margins of
4 to 1. This means that elite Jews are more likely to support the Democratic Party
than both the Jewish community as a whole, and the general elite population (Lerner
et al., 1989). It has also been shown that Jews vote liberal in both the house of
representatives and the senate (Duke and Johnson, 1992). In the 1982 senate race,
Jews were 24% more likely to vote Democratic, and in the 1986 senate race, 80% of
Jews voted Democratic as opposed to 43% of non-Jews (Duke and Johnson, 1992,
In the Southern United States, where Jews are said to have acculturated the most,
Jews generally maintained their liberal patterns. Both in the south and in the US in
general, Jews were twice as likely to support Humphrey in the 1968 presidential
election than white middle and upper class Americans. In addition, only 3% of
southern Jews voted for Wallace, as compared to 18% of southerners as a whole
(Reed, 1979).

Jewish support for the Democrats does not end with electoral support. 68% of
American Jews are registered democrats (Fisher, 1990). Jews also financially support
their party of choice. Michael Webber (1991) reviews a study conducted by
Ferdinand Lundberg in which the relationship between big business and political parties is examined. Lundberg concludes that in the 1936 presidential election, the Democratic party received most of its funding from big business, because of their desire to see the purchasing power of Americans improved. In re-examining the study however, Webber concludes that Lundberg may have missed the major determinant in funding, ethnicity. “If we look more closely at these Democratic donors... it is apparent that they come primarily from one ethnic-religious group, namely Jewish Americans” (Webber, 1991, p.259).

4.2.4 POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Two separate studies regarding the attitudes of American Jews towards the Vietnam war have been conducted (Granberg, 1973, and Campbell and Granberg, 1979). Similar findings were uncovered in both studies. Campbell and Granberg (1979) conclude that Jews are significantly more antiwar in their attitudes than Non-Jews, and that Jews are also more likely to sign and circulate antiwar petitions. Granberg (1973, p.102) further concludes that “Jewish tradition may also include a heightened propensity to convert attitudes into actions”.

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Being Jewish also seems to play a role in radical group membership. A study of student political protest at the University of Illinois in 1932 and 1941 demonstrates that in both years, Jewish students were over-represented in radical student politics (DeMartini, 1975, p.396). In 1941, Jewish students made up over 50% of all protesters, and in 1932, they made up 88%. The role of religion on “the decision to align oneself publicly with an ideologically articulate group at or near either end of the political spectrum” was examined by Grupp and Newman (1973). They examined the religious composition of members of the John Birch Society (right wing) and the Americans for Democratic Action (left wing), and found that whereas 35% of the ADAers were Jewish, virtually none of the Birchers were. There results show that Jews are both more likely to join such groups, and that they join radically left ones rather than right.

4.2.5 PROBLEMS

Each of these measures of Jewish liberalism makes certain assumptions, many of which are hard to justify at best. First, the effectiveness of using self definitions as evidence of a political or philosophical orientation is highly suspect. What we perceive ourselves to be may not always correspond to what we are. A good example of this is provided by Simon (1989), who summarizes the results taken from a survey
of Arab and Jewish Israelis. The survey measured attitudes toward and support for various civil liberties, the Israeli system of law and justice, and the way in which Israeli has responded to uprisings in the occupied territories of the West Bank. While the results of the survey show that “Israelis have high regard for fundamental civil liberties and the rule of law...[they continue to engage in human rights violations such as] placing severe limitations on movement and in invoking censorship and curfews” (Simon, 1989, p.126).

There are also serious problems with the use of voting patterns as indicators of a philosophical or political world-view:

Political behavior is hard to correlate with ideology since political reality often does not correspond with the demand for theoretical consistency. [for example] the same party takes on different images in different parts of the country; liberal parties may offer illiberal candidates for election and vice versa; general programs and orientations may be liberal, but specific policies and responses of particular candidates, politicians, party bodies, and governments may be illiberal, and so on. (Medding, 1977, p.115-116)

In short, people and groups have many reasons to support or not to support different political parties, candidates, and political options.
Problematic within the literature describing what has come to be referred to as the “Jewish student counterculture”, those radical campus groups which formed in American campuses in the sixties and seventies, is the lack of generalizability. While these groups are widely referred to, “it is obvious that the Jewish counterculture does not attract all Jewish young people. [Rather] we would suggest that it is useful to see the core of the movement as a minority generational [movement]” (Glanz, 1977, p.123). The existence of these groups is probably more a reflection of the thoughts of American university students at the time than a reflection of Jewish preoccupation. In fact, “it was perhaps predictable that the existence of a general counterculture would provoke a parallel Jewish student counterculture” (Glanz, 1977, p.117).

Not only was the Jewish student counterculture a minority, it was at times, vehemently opposed. One key plank in the platform of these groups was the encouragement of open dissent regarding Israel. “There was strong opposition to... open dissent on and criticism of Israel’s position from Jewish community leaders/organizations, from the Orthodox community, as well as from the majority of America’s Jews” (Friedman, 1988, p.132). In fact, the movement as a whole found that “its political ideas and activities proved problematic and difficult to achieve and to be accepted by the mainstream and organized Jewish community” (Friedman, 1988, p.133). While Jews may have been highly active in these movements, it is
important to recognize that this activity was "mostly the activity of individuals, not of specifically Jewish left-wing organizations" (Mendelsohn. 1993. p.142).

It is difficult to establish measures which are able to capture political beliefs. More often than not, we are merely measuring tangible manifestations, political actions. People act politically for many different purposes, and these motivations may change from minute to minute. An actor may support the left in issues of economic concern, but the right in areas of ethics and morality. One can belong to several different subgroups whose political aspirations and interests lie in direct conflict. This is not to claim that the above-mentioned studies are of no use, merely that inferences based on this type of data must be treated with caution.

5. THEORIES OF JEWISH LIBERALISM

With the conviction that the Jews consistently behave in a liberal manner, many theorists have sought to explain the phenomenon. These theorists claim that there is nothing surprising about the fact that the Jews initially embraced the liberalism of the French revolution. It is the persistence of their liberalism over time that is troublesome. Conventional wisdom dictates that as ethnic groups climb the economic ladder, the liberalism that characterizes the immigrant experience is shed.
and a more conservative position is adopted (Kristol, 1990, p.109). This has been shown to be the case with both the Irish and the Italians. The same cannot be said for the Jews. While liberalism was in the class interests of the Jews during the first half of this century, in the last forty years, the Jews have emerged as “the most personally affluent ethnic/religious group in America” (Lipset and Raab, 1984, p.403). Their political beliefs have remained liberal, as has their voting behavior, despite high socioeconomic status. “The Jews do not vote their pocketbooks” (Lipset and Raab, 1984, p.402). The question remains therefore: Why is it that “Jewish political attitudes in the 1980s have a more direct connection with Jewish political thinking of the 1880s than with current social, economic, or even political realities in the United States”? (Kristol, 1990, p.112)

Assimilation theories such as that of Dahl (1961) deny the importance of ethnic politics altogether. Persistence theories advance the notion that ethnic identity can remain a factor in political decision making and behavior, but neither offer us much in terms of an explanation of the behavior of the Jews. For this, we need to turn to specific theories which have been developed specifically to explain the phenomenon of Jewish liberalism despite high socioeconomic status. The following are the “major explanations, all of which... accept the anomaly of Jewish liberalism and Left voting as the universal norm to be explained” (Medding, 1977, p.117).
5.1 Political Socialization

It is a fairly common assumption that political partisanship and opinions regarding social issues are, at least to some extent, passed on from generation to generation. That assumption lies at the heart of political socialization theory. Applied to the case of Jewish liberalism, the theory claims that at some level beyond mere religion, liberalism is passed on through the generations. This helps to explain why Jewish elites, who by definition have attained high socioeconomic status, have nonetheless been found to have very high liberal tendencies. Indeed, Lipset and Raab claim that Jewish elites “have inherited a tradition of responding in particular ways to felt marginality... [and] that this response has remained strong, even though the conditions ... have changed” (Lipset and Raab, 1984, p.347).

Theories of political socialization are interested in the gap between the actual economic status of the Jews and their social status. It is believed that because Jews do not achieve the same social status and acceptance as others in their socioeconomic status, they turn to protest, “such as Left voting and political liberalism, and in other cases to radical and revolutionary political activity” (Medding, 1977, p.117). A sense of marginality is created which keeps Jews from acting either like the dominant group.
or the other members of society with similar economic status. This marginality has become a Jewish condition, and therefore the response mechanism, political liberalism, becomes permanent. Liberalism gets passed on from generation to generation, regardless of what is perceived as the ‘temporary’ economic and social situation of the day.

5.2 Psychological factors

While Jews may have developed a reaction to perceived marginalism, proponents of the psychological factors of liberalism maintain that liberalism is the result of a psycho-dynamic process. The best known advocate of this explanation for Jewish liberalism is Rothman (Gutmann, Rothman and Lichter, 1979, Isenberg, Schnitzer and Rothman, 1977, Lerner, Nagai and Rothman, 1989, Rothman, 1978, Rothman, 1980). While acknowledging sociological factors, Rothman maintains that Jews suffer from a ‘group fantasy’ and that this fantasy is developed both overtly and subconsciously. Jews are liberal for reasons other than concern for mankind or mere sympathy. Many Jewish males seem to have a character structure which Rothman terms “paranoid masochistic” (Rothman, 1980, p.210). Several excerpts from his work will prove self explanatory.

Surrounded by an enemy too strong to fight, Jewish males could only survive by controlling the urge to strike back at their tormentors...
The European Diaspora and the Ghetto experience encouraged among Jews the emergence of a particular family pattern; a pattern characterized by mothers who were ‘protective’ and controlling, especially with their male children. The Jewish family became... a kind of matriarchy in which the husband was perceived by the children as [frightened], less capable, and weaker than the wife, who... dominated him in crucial ways. Since the father is considered inadequate, castration fears may be lower among Jewish males. However, with the mother continually perceived as a seductive, devouring pre-oedipal figure, males may doubt their male potency. They may alternate between pseudo-homosexual panics... and deny the reality of sexual differences. Thus the identification of some Jewish males with the Russian Proletariat during the Soviet revolution, with Irish and Italian Workers in the 1930s, and with the black underclass today. (Rothman, 1980, p.211-239)

Rothman examines, in other studies, the effects of the Jewish family type on anal, genital, oral, and phallic tendencies, and links these with Jewish liberalism. Lastly, he associates being Jewish with tendencies such as “overt aggressiveness, narcissistic deficits and surpluses, and imagery”, and correlates them with liberalism and radicalism.

5.3 Holocaust Theory

Yet another factor that has been posited as a possible cause for continued Jewish liberalism is the experience of the Holocaust. The question posed by Weinfeld, Sigal, and Davis (1986) was whether the Holocaust has had “observable inter-generational micro-level consequences...[in terms of] socio-political attitudes”
(Weinfeld, Sigal, and Davis. 1986, p.365). They found that the Holocaust did have an effect on the political attitudes of young adult Jews. They were found to be more likely to “tolerate divergent and distasteful views, accept Blacks as neighbors, accept more refugees to Canada, and oppose militantly the infringement of both non-whites and Jews” (Weinfeld, Sigal, and Davis. 1986, p.379). While children of survivors scored higher on these scales, so too did those who were interested in, or had researched the Holocaust. Implicit in this theory is the idea that Jews are in a situation of status strain. While they score relatively high on socioeconomic status in American society, they are also the targets for racial discrimination. Their liberalism is seen as a manifestation of their desire to eliminate discrimination in order that they may be able to exist as high status members of society (Lipset, 1981).

5.4 Biblical, religio-ethnic traditions

According to Kristol, the main reason for Jewish loyalty to liberal ideology has been the change in religious outlook which began in the early eighteen hundreds, and has continued ever since. It was “the sharp shift in emphasis from the rabbinical elements in the Jewish tradition to the prophetic elements” (Kristol, 1990, p.113). These two very different traditions have always existed side by side in Judaism. The prophetic tradition is moralistic, with emphasis placed on peace, justice, and love for
mankind. The Rabbinical tradition emphasizes the legal and rational interpretation of biblical scriptures. Both elements are crucial to a complete Judaism, but the levels of importance accorded to each has been a historical variable. It was in the aftermath of the French revolution that the prophetic tradition “acquired an ever-greater vitality and autonomy” (Kristol, 1990, p.113). The traditional interpretation of the Jewish purpose in life was “ignored and left to wither away”, replaced by a belief in secular messianism, and a subsequent search for universal truth and social justice through political and social action (Kristol, 1990, p.114). Along with this shift came a distrust for the main tenets of capitalism. Jews had always been comfortable with the practice of commerce, but capitalism saw the market as the major institution of society, as the guarantor of individual rights. While the practice of business was acceptable for Jews, the spirit of capitalism was not.

According to this theory therefore, the source of Jewish liberalism lies in three main aspects of Jewish life: education, charity and social justice, and non-asceticism (Medding, 1977, p.117). As a result of the interplay of these three values, Jews learn and replicate egalitarian ideologies. Jews are raised in a religious tradition of cosmopolitanism, universalism, and a concern for social justice. The Reform
movement, and to a lesser extent the Conservative movement, embraced this shift from the Rabbinical to the Prophetic while for entirely secular Jews, the process reached its maximum in the articulation of humanism.
Chapter II: Problematic

1. INTRODUCTION

We have thus far situated the literature regarding Jewish political behavior within a spectrum of political discourse. It has been shown that Jews are, for whatever reason, disproportionately active in the political arena. In addition, we have also seen that Jews have had a long history of left-wing political activity in North America. Many analysts claim that the Jewish bent towards the left continues, and is evidenced in the social attitudes, voting preferences, party membership patterns, political activities and political donations of the Jews. From this starting point, several theories have been developed in order to explain the persistence of Jewish left wing tendencies despite rising socioeconomic status. While some point to political socialization, others to psychological factors, and still others to common cultural experiences and knowledge of the Holocaust, all of these theories begin with the assumption of continued Jewish liberalism. It is precisely this starting point which must be put into question.

In this chapter, we will examine another conception of Jewish political behavior, one which sees the Jews as a dynamic people with varying political ideals
and aspirations. It will be shown that the depiction of the Jews as a uniformly liberal group is not nothing more than an over generalization. Several Jewish political traditions will be discussed in detail. From there, we will turn to specific historical and contemporary instances in which the Jews have engaged in what we will refer to as “illiberal behavior”. Finally, we will introduce an alternative theory of Jewish political behavior, one which sees variance as inevitable, and a function of pragmatism.

2. JEWISH POLITICAL VARIETY

David, a true believer in the holy principle of Jewish unity, a principle that for all-to-many Jews was honored more in the breach than in the observance, encounters in this wretched backwater the following competing Jewish ideologies: integrationism or assimilationism, Orthodoxy (also divided into two types, Hasidic and anti-Hasidic), several varieties of socialist Zionism, Zionist Zionism, cultural Zionism, Mizrahi (Orthodox Zionism), Sejmism, territorialism, socialist territorialism, and Bundism. (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.3)

The theme of Mendelsohn’s work is to demonstrate that Jewish politics is anything but homogeneous. He identifies several different political strands within the Jewish community, each varying according to the way in which its adherents answer the following questions: How are the Jews, taken collectively, to be defined? What should be the predominant cultural (linguistic) orientation of the Jews? Where does the solution to the Jewish Question lie? In the Diaspora or in Israel? Which
Jewish histories and pasts should be celebrated? Which political forces in the non-Jewish community can/should be trusted and allied with? What political tactics should be used? High or low profile activity. Loud and open protest or quiet diplomacy? (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.6) The range of responses to these questions has been great in the history of Jewish political thought, but we can identify three coherent political camps: the Integrationists, the nationalists, and the Orthodox.

2.1 The Integrationists

The first political camp originated with the work of Simon Wolf in 1888, and was articulated by the B’nai B’rith movement. These Jews proudly proclaimed that they were not a people or a race, but a religion. They were Jews rather than “Hebrews” or “Israelites”.

In the words of Isaac Meyer Wise: Judaism is no tribal, nor racial religion, no conglomeration of antiquated customs or obsolete laws, it is the universal religion, progressive like reason, motherly humane, and like God’s sun radiating light and life to all pilgrims of this sublunar sphere. (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.7)

These Jews were militantly acculturationist. It was their conviction that Judaism needed to adapt, to “fit in” with the larger society. One of the ways in which the Jews could effectively “fit in” was to abandon their use of their Jewish languages. “The most serious impediment to gentile understanding and respect would have to be
removed (Hebrew and Yiddish), and the sooner the better” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.8). They believed that American Jews should look and sound American. “The language of the land, however defined, must be learned, and learned quickly” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.9). Cyrus Adler noted that in 1922, “over 960 000 persons in New York City had Yiddish as their mother tongue” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.9), and it was therefore not surprising that many Americans were getting fed up with recent immigrants who refused to “melt”, and were increasingly opposing free immigration.

The solution to the Jewish problem, if there was one, was to be found “Here”, and not “There”. This principle, known as doiket, a Yiddish word meaning “hereness”, as opposed to the “thereness” of Zionism and other forms of Jewish territorial nationalism, saw Jews as citizens of their lands, and there was vehement opposition to the idea of a sovereign Jewish homeland. “Hereness” meant fierce patriotism. Accordingly, Integrationists formed organizations with names like The Central Union of German Citizens of Jewish Faith. These Jews continually stressed the important roles that Jews played in the histories of their homelands. (wars, exploring, etc.)

Integrationists "naturally preferred people who had succeeded in combining loyalty to Judaism with close cultural links to the great outside world (Mendelsohn,
1993, p.13). Modernity, characterized by the Enlightenment and emancipation, was seen as the best of all historical periods for Judaism. The heroes of the biblical era were the prophets who “combined deep religiosity, a rejection of narrow parochialism, and a universal outlook” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.15).

Integrationists sought political alliances with “individuals and organizations that saw in religious pluralism and toleration a highly desirable feature of modern society” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.15). This ruled out alliances with the right and highly favored the left and liberals. Low profile tactics were also preferred by these Jews.

The Jewish People, my dear Mr. Schiff, are somewhat to blame, in my opinion, for the attacks [against them]. We have made a noise in the world of recent years in America and England and probably elsewhere, far out of proportion to our numbers. We have demonstrated and shouted and paraded and congressed and waved flags to an extent which was bound to focus upon the Jew the attention of the world and having got this attention, we could hardly expect that it could be all favorable. Now it may be that many persons think this was a wise policy. I do not. (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.15)

2.2 The Nationalists

The national school of modern Jewish politics is best understood with the words of Ozjassz Thon who said: “The Jews are a nation, not a religious sect, and we wish the world to know it” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.17). For the nationalists, the nationhood of the Jews came first, and only then, religion. Further, “if the Jews were
a modern nation, they obviously deserved to possess national rights, which could mean anything from full-fledged statehood to some sort of national autonomy in the lands of their dispersion” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.17). Since a modern nation requires a national language, they insisted on the teaching and fostering of a Jewish language. They split into two factions, the Hebraists and the Yiddishists. Extreme Yiddishists claimed that Hebrew was a dead language, and a tool of the religious elites. On the other hand, the Hebraists were embarrassed by the informal roots of the Yiddish language and insisted on Hebrew as the language of the Jews.

Nationalists were also split among Zionists, (mainly Hebraists) Territorialists, (mainly Yiddishists) and Diaspora nationalists regarding the question of where the new national culture should be created. Zionists sought to locate the new nation in Palestine, the historical Jewish homeland. Territorialists sought the appropriation of land anywhere they could have it, including the Middle East, Alaska or Madagascar. Autonomists or Diaspora Nationalists sought to locate the new nations in their homelands. A fourth group, the national advocates of hereness, believed that their governments should:

of their own free will or under irresistible political pressure, would grant to the Jews not only equal rights as individuals but also recognize as a national minority with legally defined national minority rights, above all in the realm of culture- for example the right to establish Yiddish-language state-financed schools and other cultural institutions, wherever large numbers of Yiddish-speaking, national minded Jews resided. (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.18)
Jews were to be loyal citizens of their countries, but regarded themselves as unique. They agreed with the nationalists of their home countries that they would and could never truly become members of the dominant society.

For all Jewish nationalists, the prized historical period was the era in which the Jews were sovereign in Palestine. For secular Zionists, the heroes were those who defended Israel from the Romans, Syrians and other historical foes. For the religious Zionists, heroes were found among those who maintained fierce levels of religiosity despite adversity, like Rabbi Akiva. For Diaspora Nationalists, the periods to be hailed were those in which the Jews maintained sovereign structures in foreign lands.

Political allies were found among other national minorities and with Anti-Semitic regimes themselves. For Diaspora nationalists, the forging of links with other minorities was seen as only logical, with the goal of mustering a united force insisting on minority rights. For Zionists who believed that the only safe place was Israel, links were made with the anti-Semitic regimes themselves. It was reasoned that if they were not wanted in a given country, why not use those who so desperately wanted them gone as a political force to create a Jewish homeland. The Nationalists were all united in their belief in the use of open, loud political behavior. The politics of noise was preferred to back room organizing and diplomacy.
Of course, Zionists were pessimistic about the future of the Jewish Diaspora. They believed that it would always exist, but only with the support of Israel as a model for cultural and religious life. The diaspora Nationalists were more optimistic about the possibility for peaceful coexistence with the majority gentiles.

2.3 The Orthodox

This group of Jews remained faithful to Orthodox Judaism and rejected the “improvements” made by the reformers. They clung to the 613 commandments of Jewish law. While Orthodox Jews could be found in both the nationalist and integrationist camps, they formed their own third force, the Agudat Israel. These Jews saw themselves as a people, “a people loyal to the Torah” (Mendelsohn. 1993, p.23). Segregation was seen as the best strategy for survival. “The famous Chinese wall separating Jew from gentile, which the integrationist beavers were so busy chewing at, was regarded as a blessing” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.23).

While many of these Jews resided in Israel, mainly in the holy city of Jerusalem, they were not allies of the Zionists and the Territorialists. While they rejected the idea that Jewish peace could be found in the diaspora, they also felt that:

A Jewish national home or state in Palestine/Eretz Yisrael- the work not of God and not of pious Jews but of heretical secularists, of Jewish
nationalists who were enemies of Judaism- was regarded as a certain recipe for catastrophe, a revolt against God himself, and a provocation in the eyes of the gentiles. (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.25)

The Orthodox camp was essentially pragmatic in its alliance systems.

Potential gentile allies included all those political forces that subscribed to religious pluralism and were willing to allow traditional Jews to practice their religion in peace and earn a living (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.26). Deals with right wing governments were entirely possible if it was a pluralist regime.

It is clear then that the Jewish polity does not espouse one single political ideology. Extensive differences exist between different Jewish organizations. Some are secular, others religious. Some believe in Zionism while others prefer to work for assimilation. Some advocate cooperation with local governments while others refuse to recognize government at all. As we will see, these differences in ideology helped define both the Jewish left and right.
3. **Jewish Illiberal Behavior**

In what can be seen as the beginning of a new era in Jewish history, the period since World War II has seen dramatic changes in the Jewish polity. The Holocaust claimed a great number of Jewish political leaders, many of whom were socialist. Hitler also destroyed several Jewish left-wing organizations such as the Bund and the Zionist socialist movements of Eastern Europe. In addition, “beyond Hitler’s domains upward Jewish mobility and the end of mass immigration were burying Jewish socialism... By 1939 the Jewish left.. was but a shadow of its former self; after the war its decline continued apace” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.142).

While there has been a strong, and at times influential Jewish left, there has also always been an element of right-wing thought in the Jewish community as well; an element which has historically varied in popularity. "If we define the Jewish right as constituting a political camp fiercely opposed to socialism and conservative in its view of how Jewish society should be organized, a Jewish right.. is definitely discernible” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.34). Not only does a Jewish right exist, it has gained significant
ground in recent years. Many Jews who were on the left have since moved to the right, both in Israel and in the diaspora.

The Jewish right has historically believed, above all, in Jewish unity. For right-wing Jews, the advocacy of class consciousness simply encourages division and is fundamentally dangerous for the Jews. Modern concerns regarding social issues external to the Jewish world are seen as irrelevant. The Jewish right attacked the Jewish left “for ...importing into the Jewish world ...dangerous “foreign” ideas that falsely set Jew against Jew and therefore play into the hands of the common enemy, the anti-Semite” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.34).

The Jewish right, like the Jewish left, has traditionally been divided along secular and religious lines. As we will see later, with the establishment of Israel, these distinctions have grown increasingly vague. The major representative of the Jewish religious right is the Agudah. It was (and still is) extremely conservative, both in terms of religious belief and social issues. They firmly believe that the Jewish community should be lead by the elites within it, and stands “firmly for the domination of the learned and the rich” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.34). The Zionist revisionist movement
is the major secular force in the Jewish right. While these Zionists flatly reject and oppose socialism, they insisted on the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, within large, maximalist, historical frontiers. They further believed that this could only be done with the use of military force, and thus created what can only be described as militia, which trained young Jews for battle (Mendelsohn. 1993, p.34). “The revisionists, under the leadership of Jabotinsky, not only wished to make alliances with the East European moderate right but were open admirers of the variety of East European integral nationalism” (Mendelsohn. 1993. p.35). As we will soon see, the link between these two groups in the Jewish right has been replicated in Israel, between the Likud Party (Zionist Revisionists) and various Orthodox, non-Zionist factions, including the Agudah.

3.1 Diaspora Hasidic/Orthodox right

If there is one source of rebuttal against the theory that Jews are overwhelmingly liberal, it is the case of the Orthodox and ultra-orthodox Hasidic Jew. In terms of the general political camps outlined by Mendelsohn, the most religious of Jews tended to be quite comfortable working with those on the political right. Mendelsohn cites two instances
in which the Agudah, the political voice of the Orthodox movement, made political alliances with right-wing regimes. The first involved an alliance with the regime of Jozef Pilsudski in Poland, “an authoritarian, but no great anti-Semite, and certainly tolerant of religious diversity in his country- a leader who preferred Orthodox Jews to the socialists” (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.26). The second example was in Latvia, where the Agudah linked up with the right-wing 1934 regime.

Agudah certainly much preferred the politically and culturally conservative environment of inter-war Eastern Europe to the militantly atheistic and horribly intolerant Communist regime... where it could find no gentile allies at all and where its adherents were fiercely persecuted. (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.26)

If the Orthodox movement can be characterized as conservative, then the various Hasidic communities in Canada, and indeed worldwide, must be seen as ultra-conservative:

Hasidism are ultra religious Jews who live within the framework of their own centuries own beliefs and traditions and who observe Orthodox law so meticulously that they are set apart from most other Orthodox Jews. Even their appearance is distinctive: the men bearded in black suits or long black coats with black hats over side curls and women in high-necked, loose fitting dresses, with kerchiefs or traditional wigs covering their hair. They are dedicated to living uncontaminated by contact with modern society except in accord with the demands of the work place and the state. They do not, for the most part, own radios or television sets nor do they frequent cinemas or theaters. They dress and pray as their forefathers did in the eighteenth century, and they reject Western secular society, which they regard as degenerate... All attach great importance to preventing assimilation by insulating their members from the secular influences of the host culture. (Shaffir, 1987, p.19)
While many Hasidic groups exist in major urban centers such as New York and Montreal, some communities have chosen to distance themselves geographically, as well as intellectually and emotionally, from the dominant society. In 1963, the Tasher Hasidim of Montreal moved to Boisbriand, a rural suburb 40 KMs away from Montreal. They quickly formed an institutionally complete society.

The move was motivated by the belief that the moral climate of Montreal was rapidly deteriorating (Shaffir, 1987, p.21). It was felt that in geographically isolating the younger members of the Tasher movement, they would be shielded from “undesirable influences” (Shaffir, 1987, p.25). For the Tasher, the task of becoming and remaining a devout Hasidic Jew is difficult enough without the added temptations of the city. Shaffir quotes a Tasher father as saying:

If he took his son to Montreal he would constantly ask him to avert his eyes from what was exhibited in the shop windows and in the street... In the Boisbriand enclave, on the other hand, he would not see the obscene covers of magazines on newsstands in Montreal, he would see nothing that was evil in the streets. (Shaffir, 1987, p.26)

The Tasher movement also has very strong traditional views of the family and of women. Shaffir quotes another Tasher as saying that he was extremely concerned about “the harmful influences which some modern
magazines might exert on gullible Hasidic women in Montreal” (Shaffir, 1987, p.27). In the enclave, the children can play free in the streets, and the women “can attend to her household duties without having to check constantly that her children have not strayed too far” (Shaffir, 1987, p.27).

In Tash, the chief Rabbi, or Rebbe is the spiritual and political leader of the community, and this fact is reflected in the entire organization of the group. The land on which the community is built is owned by the chief Rabbi, and he is therefore free to individually select who he desires in the community. While decision making in the group is “theoretically vested in an advisory committee consisting of seven members (all males), of which two or three are appointed by the Rebbe, and the remainder elected by [the] adult members of the community, ... In practice, the decision-making is the domain of the charismatic leader- the Rebbe” (Shaffir, 1987, p.28). A set of permanent bylaws which “cannot be amended by a democratic vote of the residents” (Shaffir, 1987, p.29) governs the behavior of all of the residents of the Tasher community in Boisbriand, and agreement to abide by these bylaws is a prerequisite to settlement in the community.
1. No book, newspaper, or magazine is permitted in the buildings of the community, unless their content is in conformity to Orthodox Judaism.

2. All members of the community must attend religious services, three times per day, at the synagogue.

3. No radio, television, record, or cassette is allowed in the buildings of the community.

4. No members of the community may attend the cinema or be present at any theatrical performance under the penalty of immediate expulsion.

5. All women residing in the community must dress in accordance with the Orthodox laws of modesty, as follows:

6. All dresses must be at least four inches below the knees, no trousers of panty-hose may be worn by young girls 3 years of age or older.

7. [Married women's] Hair must be completely covered 24 hours a day, by a kerchief or by a wig which is no longer than the nape of the neck.

8. It is forbidden for men and women to walk together in the street.

9. Men and women must be separated by a wall, at least 7 feet high, when attending any gathering of a social or religious nature.

10. All food consumed in the buildings of the community must conform to the dietary laws of the Code of Laws and be approved by the chief Rabbi or his second in command.

11. No car may be driven by a woman or by an unmarried man.

12. The members must submit any interpersonal conflict to the arbitration of the court established by the chief Rabbi.

13. The Sabbath day must be observed in strict conformity to Jewish law.

14. Members must study the bible and other religious texts for at least two hours a day.

Tasher education is also extremely conservative in nature. "The Tasher maintain that secular education threatens their traditional values;...

they [therefore] run their own schools where secular classes are closely
supervised to ensure that the pupils will not see any conflict with the contents of their religious studies” (Shaffir, 1987, p.31). Traditional gender roles are further reinforced in the classroom. Two separate programs exist for the boys and the girls. While the boys learn secular subjects, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic two hours a day, the girls are given three and a half hours per day to learn these subjects. It is believed that:

The boys must have the minimum amount of diversion from their religious studies; they might become attracted to secular subject to the detriment of their religious learning; and second, the girls will require practical skills later in life. “They have to be able to understand much more of the outside world and what goes on because they’re the people who’ll be building the home, doing the shopping and everything else”. (Shaffir, 1987, p.31)

The Tasher carefully screen what material can and can not be used in the classroom. Further, the teachers of secular subjects (who come from the outside) are given strict guidelines:

1. All textbooks and literature to be used by the students in class or at home.. must first be approved by the principal.
2. No stencil or photo copy of any other book may be used without approval.
3. Students are not permitted to go to the library nor is the teacher permitted to bring into the school, for the students, any such books.
4. No newspaper or magazine may be read in school or hung up. Students are not permitted to read the above at home either.
5. No records or tape may be used in the classroom without approval.
6. No extra subjects, books, magazine supplement or other information which is not on the required curriculum of the school may be taught.

7. For extra credit work or for class projects, students should not be told to write away for such material. The teacher should supply them with the material with approval.

8. No discussion on boyfriends.

9. No discussions on reproduction.

10. No discussion about radio, television or movies.

11. No discussion about personal life.

12. No discussion on religion.

13. No discussion about Women's Liberation.

14. No homework on Thursdays.³

It should be evident that there is certainly a Jewish right, and that this right is not merely an obscure minority. In fact, it is a vision of the Hasidic Jew that comes to mind to many non-Jews when they imagine world Jewry. The Hassids are, in all senses of the word, conservative. From their adherence to tradition to their belief in exclusion from worldly politics, the Hassids are certainly not a liberal community.

³ Rule #14 prohibiting homework only applies to girls. Boys are never given homework relating to secular studies. The girls are expected to help their mothers in preparation for the Sabbath. (Shaffir 1987:33)
3.2 **ISRAEL**

If we begin with the idea that Jews are somehow inherently left-wing, radical minded, progressive people, then the politics of Israel becomes difficult to understand. If, as has been argued, the politics of the left and radicalism is characterized among other things by a great concern for the rights of minorities, then the treatment of the Palestinian residents of the politico-geographic area today called Israel does not mesh with this type of politics. That there is a right wing in Israel would be an understatement. The belief that this right wing is merely a fringe or minor political force would be an error. The political right in Israel can be, albeit with difficulty, divided along secular and religious lines. It is often the case that these lines are blurred and the two strands of right wing politics work in unison. Nonetheless, we can discuss the two separately.

3.2.1 **THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT**

Historically, the Orthodox Jews have believed in passivity in terms of the establishment of a Jewish homeland. In fact, a large segment of Orthodox Jews do not believe in modern Zionism. Agudat Yisrael is a
grouping of ultra-religious, non-Zionist Jews, who largely reject worldly political activity. It has organized a global organization called Agudat Yisrael World Union whose mandate is to promote obedience to Jewish law. Agudah is strongly of the belief that the Jewish state is a heresy, and Zionism an aberration of the word of God. It even refused to participate in any political decision making in pre-Israel Palestine or any Zionist Jewish organization because these movements extended the right to vote to women. Currently, the Agudah participates in Israeli elections, but does not recognize Israel as the Jewish state (Tessler, 1986, p.16-19).

With the dawn of modernity (or at least modernization) a segment of the Orthodox Jewish population began to rethink this traditional view. With the legal emancipation of Jews in various nations, anti-Semitism rose. Many Jews (except the socialists who saw a complete restructuring of the social order the only solution) saw the establishment of a Jewish homeland as the only key to sustainable peace for the Jews. It was reasoned that since what caused anti-Semitism was the fact that the Jew was always an anomaly, and that since Jews had retained their religion over the centuries, they could (and should) effectively form a “nation among the nations” (Hertzberg, 1986, p.86).
Organized Orthodox involvement in the Zionist cause began in 1902, when the political party Mizrahi was formed (Tessler, 1986, p.13). Mizrahi’s platform was the advancement of the Zionist cause while working to ensure that the new Jewish homeland would be not merely Jewish in the demographic sense, but in a religious sense. Mizrahi had members in many countries and after Israel’s independence, merged with another group to form the National Religious Party (NRP). These religious Zionists did not gain much momentum until the Six Day War in 1967, in which Israel expanded its borders to the river Nile and the river Jordan. While at first the Israeli government considered returning the annexed land in return for peace, it soon became clear that there was little support for that option. Instead, the government decided to keep the land as a military buffer, and as possible negotiating points in the event of future peace talks.

Along with the miraculous victory in 1967, and the subsequent expanse of the landscape of Israel came the rise of another revolutionary group. These ultra-religious Jews believed that the Six Day War victory was, in reality, a modern miracle:

God himself had intervened, not merely to deliver the many in to the hand of the few or the unrighteous into the hands of the unrighteous; the events of June 1967 were interpreted, with bold religious certainty, as the beginning of the messianic era. (Hertzberg, 1986, p.88)
The movement, founded by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and continued after his death by his son, Zvi Yehudah Kook, believed that Israel was theirs. Under the name Gush Emunim, the group made several attempts to establish settlements in the newly occupied territories. They saw this land not as a tool for peace, nor as a military buffer, but as Jewish land. Despite the fact that the area contained, at the time, half a million Arabs, they insisted that it be used for vast Jewish settlement. “Even the gentlest of these believers does not imagine equal rights for Arabs in the undivided land” (Hertzberg, 1986, p.89).

3.2.2 *The Secular Right*

The political right in Israel has by no means been composed solely of Orthodox Jews. The Revisionist Party, founded in 1925 by Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, was, by all accounts both secular and right wing. It espoused territorial maximalism as well as military preparedness. Its members insisted not only that Israel maintain sovereignty over the occupied territories, but that it also settle and maintain a Jewish demographic majority at all times. In the 1930s, The Revisionist party withdrew from the mainstream political arena, and formed “an autonomous paramilitary
organization. The Irgun” (Tessler, 1986, p.20). Another right-wing group.

The Herut was born of the old Revisionist Party.

After the state of Israel was created, secular right-wing nationalists were banded together by the Herut Party, which was established in 1948. Its leader was Menachem Begin. While the Labor coalition had, until 1977, been the holders of power in Israel, since 1977, the Israeli parliament, or Knesset has been dominated by the Likud coalition. The major player in this coalition is the Herut Party with its “Revisionist traditions of militant nationalism and territorial maximalism” (Tessler, 1986, p.22). The Likud has remained a powerful party because of its “hawkish posture towards the Arabs in general, and its insistence that Israel retain control of the West Bank and Gaza in particular” (Tessler, 1986, p.25). The party has gained increasing support from Israel’s young and Jews of Afro-Asian origin (Tessler, 1986, p.26).

More moderate voices have existed in the Knesset, and even within the Likud coalition. Despite their consistent efforts, “the moderates were unable to provide a political counterweight to the more hard-line policies of the government mainstream, and by 1980 this faction had virtually
disappeared” (Tessler, 1986, p.28). If the Likud coalition was seen as too right-wing for some, it was seen as too liberal for others. This was the opinion of Tehiya, a party which was formed in 1979 and opposed the return of Sinai to Egypt, and any notion of Palestinian autonomy. Tehiya won three seats in the 1981 election, and five in 1984. “Its relative strength reflected a significant increase in public support for the extreme right of the Israeli political spectrum” (Tessler, 1986, p.30).

Another extremist party also elected a member to The Knesset* in 1984. Kach, “a movement even more militant than Tehiya” is headed by Rabbi Meir Kahane, founder of the Jewish Defense League (Tessler, 1986, p.31). Among other things, Kach advocates the rescinding of citizenship rights for all non-Jews living in Israel.

No non-Jews can be citizens of Israel... [If Arabs choose] to live there in tribute and servitude, then they must be treated charitably, never as equals... [If they object] we’ll put them on trucks and send them over the Allenby Bridge...we’ll use force. And if they fire at our soldiers, we’ll kill them. (Tessler, 1986, p.31)

We cannot underestimate the impact that the right has had in Israel. During their brief time in power in Israel, and through their ongoing pressure campaigns, they have successfully moved the center of the political

*The Knesset is the Israeli Parliament.
spectrum way over to the right. "No place in which Jews live can ever be surrendered by the Israeli government, even for diplomatic advantage" (Hertzberg, 1986, p.91). Further, the demographic trends forecast an even more drastic shift to the right as the younger generations continue to break from the left-wing Jewish tradition. Lastly, we also must not assume that Israeli right-wing politics somehow reflects a regional or local phenomenon. In reality, the right-wing tendencies of the Israeli Jewish community from 1977 to 1992 were not isolated; "the right-wing Israeli regime [was] supported by the world Jewish community" (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.143).

Public opinion polls conducted in 1985 demonstrated that support for Kach was close to 10%, and combined with the support for Tehiya, “this signifies a significant expansion of political forces to the right of Likud” (Tessler, 1986, p.31).

4. **Pragmatic political behavior**

It has been shown that the Jewish people have never acted in a politically homogeneous manner, at least not in so uniform a manner as to justify the assertion of a united Jewish political front. Nonetheless, there is no denying that the Jews have been major players in many the left-wing
and radical political movements. While many have attempted to explain these manifestations in terms of characteristics inherent to the Jews as a whole, we have also seen that this type of theorizing can be extremely problematic. For a theory of Jewish liberalism to be accurate, it would have to either limit itself to a segment of the Jewish community, explain a universal, constant behavior, or at least be able to explain variances. The theories so far discussed are unable to do so. What is needed is a theory which explains Jewish political behavior in all its various forms. Such a theory would view liberal behavior as merely one possible articulation, one which arises under a set of specific circumstances.

This is the goal of Medding, who claims that we should not be asking whether there is a Jewish liberalism, or why there is one. Rather, we need to ask:

What are Jewish political interests? How have Jews in different societies behaved politically in pursuit of their political interests? What would a comparative examination suggest with regard to supposed universal norms or traditions of political behavior? Or put another way, given these political interests, under what conditions are Jews liberal? And is such liberalism particularly altruistic or public-spirited? (Medding, 1977, p.118)

Medding seeks to demonstrate that “the political liberalism of Jews is a particular variant of Jewish political behavior, occurring only under specific
historical and social conditions, rather than a universal phenomenon” (Medding, 1977, p.115). Variances in political behavior can be explained in terms of Jewish political interests. The outstanding political characteristic of the Jews in the western world has been their vulnerability as an identifiable, conspicuous, and permanent political minority group. As such, their political interests can be separated into a set of immediate, micro-political interests, and longer-term macro-political interests (Medding, 1977, p.118).

4.1 Immediate Micro-political Interests

The first, and most immediate political interest of the Jewish community is the survival of the Jewish group. This translates into an instinct for survival manifested in the quest for physical security. “Jewish concern with sheer physical survival and security as a basic and primordial political interest has, in recent years, been strikingly manifested in actions in support of Israel, particularly those seeking to ensure its continued physical existence” (Medding, 1977, p.119).
The second political interest is the capacity to participate fully and freely in the societies in which they live. "Put negatively, it consists of opposing anti-Semitism specifically in all its forms, and of attempting to combat prejudice and discrimination in general" (Medding, 1977, p.119).

It is important to remember that due to the history of the Jewish people, they value and understand the necessity of maintaining opposition to discrimination. While many use the Jewish alignment with minority causes as a sign of liberalism, it is not always the result of an implicit acceptance of others, but the knowledge that it is a prerequisite for physical security.

Jewish support for the black cause may have derived in part from a disinterested idealism, but it was also based on the perception that American Jews had a real interest in the successful integration of all minority groups into America society... If the Blacks, low men on the America totem pole, could make it, so, surely, could the Jews. (Mendelsohn, 1993, p.15)

Further, Jews do not merely trust that the societies in which they live are intrinsically different than the others who have committed atrocities such as those of the Holocaust or the pogroms. Instead, many live in a constant state of political agitation. It is believed that:

Every Christian society has untapped potential for anti-Semitism which could, under certain social and economic conditions, produce catastrophic results for the Jews. There must therefore be constant vigilance and both public and private opposition to anti-Semitism. (Medding, 1977, p.119)
The third political interest is the quest for social and political conditions which will permit the free exercise of Jewish religious and national values and allow a distinctive pattern of Jewish social organization and affiliation, without in any way infringing upon Jewish participation in the larger society and without requiring Jews to conform to any particular manner of participation. Jews feel that they must be able, at all times, exercise as much or as little Jewishness as they desire without sanction.

The fourth political concern revolves around economics. While in the past Jews were distributed along the entire socioeconomic spectrum, modern Jewry is predominantly concentrated in the middle and upper middle strata, “especially in the professions, in managerial and administrative positions, and in independent business” (Medding, 1977, p.120). The goal becomes the securing of this state of affairs because it is believed that “concentration unifies”. Jews are able to act politically without the problems of class divisions. Middle class concentration provides both the motivation to maintain the status quo (i.e. those situations which have allowed the Jews to flourish) and the leisure, skills, and financial opportunities to influence political outcomes.
All of these micro-political interests shape Jewish political behavior and opinion concerned with "order, stability, and predictability, and with conditions which maximize these factors - in particular, the maintenance of constituted political authority" (Medding, 1977, p.121). This becomes even more true when the Jews are in a situation in which they feel threatened. The higher the threat, the more the focus on these short term goals. Where there is a perceived danger, political activity proceeds with the utmost caution, "maximizing whatever possibilities of predictability exist, and refraining from political actions which seem to threaten and endanger whatever security, predictability, and constituted political authority exist" (Medding, 1977, p.121). The tendency therefore is to make immediate and short-term compromises and concessions in the hope that these will head off further threats to security and survival.

4.2 LONG-TERM MACRO-POLITICAL INTERESTS

Simply stated, the long term interest is in the types of legislation, social organization, and government which would allow for both the achievement of Jewish micro-level goals and a guarantee of their
permanence and inalienability. For Medding, it is a type of liberalism which is in the long-term interest of world Jewry:

[They have] an interest in a liberal or open society where Jewry is not at the mercy of dominant groups for its rights, freedoms, and liberties. These are constitutionally guaranteed and cannot be easily be removed. In this society, the rights of citizenship in the broadest sense are more or less automatically maintained by various checks and balances, by self correcting mechanisms, by the existence of plural centers of power, and the intense form of political competition, and seeking of public and group support that characterize its decision making process. (Medding, 1977, p.121-122)

It is therefore in the political interest of the Jews to ally themselves with those who support the above-mentioned type of liberal society. While these may be the Macro-level goals of the Jews, as we have already stated, the Micro-level goals may differ. In reality, the short term goals of a group will often take precedence over the long term ones. Issues of immediate survival will win precedence over the quest for a utopic world, or ideals like justice and cultural relativity and acceptance. Therefore the Jews will only pursue their long term goals once they have secured their short term ones. Within this conceptual framework, we can see that Jews may be forced, under different circumstances, to resist opposing regimes which may not be ideal, but provide a minimum level of stability and order.

At times, to actively promote and seek the establishment of liberal constitutional regimes may endanger further an already precarious political, economic, and physical security, because it directly challenges constituted political authority. (Medding, 1977, p.122)
Therefore, Medding claims that in general, Jews will first seek to secure their micro-political interests (stability and security) irrespective of the nature of the regime under which they live. Secondly, the specific Jewish political response will be inversely related to the direction from which the greatest perceived threat to Jewish micro-political interests is seen to come.
Chapter III: Case Study

1. INTRODUCTION

We have examined the major theories regarding ethnicity and political behavior. We have also outlined major trends in Jewish political behavior as well as several theories which seek to explain them. It has been shown that while most theories attempt to assert and defend the notion that Jews are persistently liberal, these theories are often selective of the behaviors they treat, and are largely unable to explain cases of Jewish illiberal behavior, of which we demonstrated several. Medding’s theory of a Jewish pragmatic political tradition has been presented as an alternative theory, one which can be used to understand all aspects of Jewish political action, and not merely liberal behavior.

We move, therefore, to the case study of this thesis. For a theory to be truly useful, it must be able to function in any situation. Our concern will be the political behavior of a segment of the Montreal Jewish community during the 1989 Quebec provincial election. It will be argued that these Jews supported, both directly and indirectly, a new provincial
party. Moreover, this new provincial party had, as its sole mission, the articulation of a defense of individual rights against encroachment by the state, a mission often associated with right wing political movements. It will be argued that this support translates into a departure from liberalism, if not a context-sensitive adoption of the conservative agenda.

2. Political Backdrop

Before we turn to a discussion of the Equality Party, the role of the Montreal Jewish community in its formation and success, and the implications of our findings, a brief discussion of the political antecedents is in order.

The Quebec political scene has long been dominated by issues of language. Particularly, the fear held by many Francophone Quebecers that their language is seriously threatened. Accordingly, the political evolution of the Quebec electorate has essentially been a story of the evolution of the national identity of Francophone Quebecers. In fact, as Thériault (1995) notes, we can trace this identity along a spectrum which runs from “Canadiens” to “Canadiens-Français”, to “Québécois”. The road to the
period referred to by Thériault (1995) as the Québécois era, 1950 and beyond, has been long and arduous. Nonetheless, it is the politics of this era with which we are primarily concerned. A new form of Quebec nationalism was born which was markedly different from the nationalism of the French Canadians, or of the quiet revolution.

Au niveau identitaire il s'agira donc de rompre avec la vision ethnique, folklorique, culturelle, de la nation pour lui donner un contenu politique. La nationalisme “Québécois” refusera de voir l'espace francophone comme une mise en réserve à l'intérieur d'un univers socio-politique qui lui demeure étranger. (Thériault, 1995, p.22)

It was, of course, the “quiet revolution” which thrust Quebecers into this new era. “Elle fut en effet accompagnée et aussi suscitée par une transformation du nationalisme canadien-français en un nationalisme Québecois” (Rocher, 1992, p.427).

If the political culture of Quebec Francophones can be divided into several time periods, the same can be done with the evolution of linguistic strife in Quebec. Rocher identifies four specific periods: the incubation of the fifties, the escalation of the crisis between 1960 and 1968, the era of linguistic legislation between 1969 and 1977, and ‘the debate’ following the adoption of Bill 101, the Charter of the French Language.
Linguistic debates and legislation have tended to center around issues of immigration and signage; with the latter reflecting a greater concern: It was in the 1950s that various nationalist movements began to demand that the French language be brought into prominence in Quebec, not only in terms of usage, but visibility. “On peut dire que le changement de ton que l'on observe va se centrer sur un point particulier: le visage anglais du Quebec. et tout particulièrement de Montreal” (Rocher, 1992, p.424).

The period between 1960 and 1968 saw a new problem, the anglicization of immigrants. There rose a new urgency; “Ce n’est plus le seul statut de la francophonie qui est en jeu, c’est son existence même” (Rocher, 1992, p.427). The issue changed from maintaining visibility in a sea of English to integrating immigrants into the dominant culture. For the Quebec government, the primary vehicle which drove immigrants towards English was the primary and secondary school systems. The Saint-Leonard crisis capped the conflict5. “In the name of la survivance, the Quebec government was called upon to force the integration of the immigrant population with the Francophone community by requiring that the children

5For a discussion on the Saint-Léonard affair, see Rocher, 1992, pp. 429-431.
of immigrants attend only French language schools" (McRoberts and Postgate, 1980, p.131).

From 1969 to 1977, a plethora of legislative attempts were made, none of which proved satisfactory to anyone. With the election of the Parti Québécois on the 15th of November, 1976, the political landscape was changed forever. In 1978, Bill 101 was passed in the Quebec legislature.

À la différence de toutes celles qui ont précédé, cette loi se voulait dégagée de toute incohérence et de toute contradiction; cette fois-ci, ses auteurs voulaient assurer la concordance entre la rhétorique et les mesures législatives. (Rocher, 1992, p.437)

Bill 101 included several elements. It made French the only official language of Quebec; it would become the language of government and of justice. It made the program of francisation outlined in the official languages act mandatory and enacted sanctions for enterprises which refused to comply. It also restricted English education to children of parents who were educated in English in Quebec, in effect, making French schooling mandatory for all new immigrants. It also prohibited the use of any language other than French on all industrial, commercial, and business signs. Lastly, it made French the language of public administration. Bill 101 had a profound effect on Quebec politics. It set the stage for a new
framework within which to envision both the right of the state to protect its linguistic minority. and the need, if any, for linguistic minorities within Quebec for protection.

3. THE EQUALITY PARTY

The Quebec Equality Party was born on March 21, 1988, when Robert M. Libman "sat down with some friends... and grasped that half of their McGill graduating class had moved to Toronto and that many of the others were thinking seriously about it" (Richler, 1992, p.69). The general consensus was that their friends had left as a result of the political climate in Quebec, particularly what they felt to be repressive language laws.

The party initially aimed at mobilizing support from Quebec's Anglophones, many of whom were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the Bourassa Liberals. It was believed that Anglophones in Quebec were "disgruntled by the fact [that] Bourassa reneged on a 1985 election promise to allow bilingual outdoor signs" (Le Pierres, 1989, 1-WJ). Further, Anglophones were particularly alarmed that the Supreme Court of Canada had struck down Bill 101 because its language provisions were judged to be
an infringement of freedom of expression, but Bourassa chose to use a clause in the Canadian Constitution allowing him to override the protections of freedom of expression in the constitution, allowing for the passage of Bill 178.

The Equality Party held its first rally on March 12, 1989, and attracted over 300 people. It officially launched its campaign on March 28th of 1989, and by that time had a membership of 1200 (Maser, 1989, A9). Its platform called for the immediate repeal of Bill 178, complete freedom of expression for all Quebecers, the right for all parents to choose the language of instruction for their children, and unequivocal opposition to the Meech Lake constitutional accord.

On Tuesday, April 11, Quebec’s chief electoral officer granted official party status to the Equality Party (Thompson, 1989b, A5). The following day, the party announced that it had revised its original platform which had called for complete freedom of choice in matters of signage. The new platform accepted the notion of mandatory French provided that no restrictions were imposed to other languages (Thompson, 1989b, A5). By August 15th, party membership was estimated at 8000 (Scott, 1989a, A4).
It was only on August 31st that the Equality Party was considered an official party in the September 25th election, giving them the right to have their party’s name appear on the electoral ballot (Simard, 1989, A3).

On September 25, 1989, Quebeckers re-elected another liberal government under Robert Bourassa. The most dramatic development of the election however was in the west island, where four Equality Party members were elected in the ridings of Notre Dame de Grâce, D'Arcy McGee, Jacques Cartier, and Westmount. Further, Equality candidates came in a close second in five other ridings. Libman and his party has succeeded in registering their discontent. According to Charles Taylor, “Anglophones really decided to clobber the Liberal Party... They really wanted to show Bourassa they were angry” (Peritz, 1989, B5).

4. THE EQUALITY PARTY AS A CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT

If we envision Quebec linguistic legislation such as Bills 22, 101, the use of the notwithstanding clause, and Bill 178 as legislation designed to assist the quest for self determination of the French Canadian minority in Canada, then we can equally see opposition to such legislation as
manifestations of conservative sentiment. As we have seen, conservative philosophy sees liberal, collectivist conceptions of rights as the transfer of freedoms from the individual to the nation. This type of liberal freedom is, for the conservative, merely "the freedom of the people as a national community to act against all groups... The highest kind of freedom [becomes no longer] the "freedom from" but rather the "freedom to" (Nisbet 1986: 48).

Conservatives see this conception of liberty as dangerous and oppressive; groups of individuals become the victims of arbitrary sanction, discrimination and rights violation. It is believed that "If the rights of such groups... are invaded by the central state- and almost predictably in the name of individuals assertedly robbed of their natural rights- the true walls of individual freedom will in time crumble" (Nisbet 1986: 49).

We need only examine the political argumentation of Equality members and organizers in order to demonstrate that they held such conservative beliefs. That Bill 101 and Bill 178 were unconstitutional and a direct violation of individual rights and freedoms is a theme which
pervades the public discourse of the party organizers. Libman explained his motivation for forming the Equality Party in the following way:

I just thought something had to be done before people lose sight of the potential danger. Most civil rights violations that go unchecked usually just continue.... What begins as signs today and restrictions to education become radio stations and newspapers tomorrow (Le Pierres, 1989, I-WJ).

Gerald Klein, the party's co-founder announced the existence of the new party at a rally by announcing that:

A new provincial party now exists that will defend the guaranteed rights and liberties of all individuals in the province of Quebec... We have a message for the Liberal government, that no longer will the people of Quebec accept the persecution of their cultures, the defamation of their educational systems, and the obliteration of their institutions, their language and their way of life by a government hostile to the very notion of cultural diversity (Mennie, 1989, A4).

Tony Kondaks, another party organizer, was quoted as saying:

The education provisions of the French Language Charter determine a civil right on the basis of bloodlines, which is a doctrine of law that lies at the very cornerstone of the South African apartheid system. (Macpherson, 1989, B3)

Klein also claimed that the Quebec political situation was, in some ways, similar to that of South Africa. “South Africa has racism; Quebec has linguicism!... How long do you think it’s going to be before the government forces the closure of English media institutions?”

(Macpherson, 1989, B3). During the course of his election campaign,
Gordon Atkinson, the Equality Party candidate in the riding of Notre-Dame-de-Grâce, accused the Bourassa government of “cultural and linguistic genocide” (Scott, 1989b, A4). At a rally in the St. Laurent riding at the end of March, speaker Lionel Albert suggested that “Ottawa would be justified in sending troops into Quebec and cutting off transfer payments in response to Bill 178” (Thompson, 1989a, A3).

Another major characteristic of the Equality Party was that it was staunchly federalist. Reflecting more than merely a great love for Canada, this federalism reflected the belief that

liberal democratic values (such as)... effective obstructions to the arbitrary exercise of governmental power, (protection of) civil liberties, and... the (ensurance of) responsive grass roots democracy, are better protected in certain circumstances by federalism than by some alternative kind of governmental arrangement. (Smiley, 1987, p. 12)

Federalism was invented by the Americans in 1787 by those who, using our operationalized definitions, were conservative. “The anti-Federalists... were by the standards of the day Democrats... Those supporting (Federalism) were fearful of popular majorities, particularly those which would challenge property rights” (Smiley, 1987, p.13). They sought in the proposed constitution several checks and balances which
would, if properly implemented, "prevent any group of power-holders from abusing their authority in challenging individual rights or the general welfare" (Smiley, 1987, p.13).

According to Smiley (1987), there are three mechanisms by which federalism works to address the concerns of conservatives. First, the distribution of resources and powers between two level of government often keeps both levels of government from abusing its powers. Second, ongoing competition between the two levels of government "helps sustain civil freedoms" (Smiley, 1987, p.16). Finally, where the desires of citizens diverge between regions and territories, the federal system allows for the wishes of a greater number of people to be satisfied.

5. THE EQUALITY PARTY AND THE JEWISH CONNECTION

The question which remains to be asked is whether it can be demonstrated that a segment of the Jewish community in Montreal supported the Equality Party. It will be argued that perhaps the most organized manifestation of Jewish discontent with the Quebec governments
handling of language and cultural issues. short of mass exodus, was the organization of the Equality Party of Quebec.

Jews have always been suspicious of Quebec nationalism, which many felt excluded them. The Question "when does one cease to belong to a "cultural community" and actually become "Québécois" has not been lost on the Jews (Delisle, 1993, p.20). Montreal’s Jewish community was once the largest and most vibrant in Canada. From 120 000 in 1969, that number decreased to 95 000 by 1989 (Richler, 1992, p.70).

(Many of these Jews were) wary of the tribalism that has taken hold here. René Lévesque was not an anti-Semite. Neither is Jacques Parizeau. All the same, Jews who have been Quebecers for generations understand only too well that when thousands of flag-waving nationalists march through the streets roaring "Le Québec aux Québécois!" they do not have in mind anybody named Ginsburg. Or MacGregor, come to think of it.

For many Jews, the only solution was to leave.

En refusant de reconnaître ces dimensions (pluralité) dans la culture commune de la citoyenneté québécoise, on pousse aujourd’hui ces citoyennetés particulières à rechercher ailleurs qu’au Québec leur appartenance commune de citoyen. (Thériault, 1994b, 52)

For those Jews who could not leave or who chose to stay in Quebec, bill 178 was a final slap in the face which could not go unchallenged.
Despite their frustration, the Montreal Jewish community did not officially and publicly embrace the Equality Party, a fact which is explained by Richler:

Members of the Jewish community ... remembering recent incidents in the Montreal suburb of Outremont, were apprehensive... One after another, alarmed Jewish establishment heavies threw their support behind a compliant Liberal candidate, who hinted darkly that if the electors of D'Arcy McGee misbehaved, rocking the collectivity's boat, they would be putting government-pledged funds for Jewish public health and cultural institutions at risk. (Richler, 1992, p. 70)

If the Jewish community did not, through its official institutions and spokespersons, support the Equality Party during the electoral campaign, it was, to a large extent, responsible for both its creation and success. The party was, at least in its origins, a largely Jewish phenomenon. "After all, Libman was a graduate of Herzaliah High School, and almost all of his associates in the Equality Party were also ostensibly nice Jewish Boys" (Richler, 1992, p.70). The co-founder and president of the Party, Gerald Klein, the president of the D'Arcy McGee riding, Sam Goldbloom, and a major spokesperson for the party, Gloria Freedman, were also Jewish. Many of the remaining organizers, myself included, were also Jewish. Keeping in mind the demographic realities of Montreal, there was certainly a disproportionate number of Jews in the Equality Party organization.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, a significant number of Montreal Jews electorally supported the party. Libman ran, and was easily elected in the riding of D’Arcy McGee, a riding “just about 80 percent Jewish” (Richler, 1992, p.70). The Jews of D’Arcy McGee seemed comfortable giving their electoral support to the party.

While the Equality Party was seen by most as a one-issue party, courting only the votes of those sympathetic to the cause of Anglo rights in Quebec, most of the mainstream Anglophone media was hesitant to openly support the Equality Party. In fact, the only real support that the Equality Party received in the print media came from The Suburban. We have seen that while reluctant to openly support the Equality Party through its institutions and representatives, the Montreal Jewish community was extremely active in both the creation of the party and in the organization of the political campaign. By conducting a content analysis of both The Montreal Gazette and The Suburban, we will demonstrate that the West-End Montreal Jewish Community supported the Quebec Equality Party not only in terms of votes and organizational support, but through more informal mechanisms such as the use of a type of “ethnic press”.

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The Montreal Gazette is Montreal’s only English language daily. The Suburban is Montreal’s largest English language weekly. Both papers are circulated over the entire island of Montreal. A content analysis of both newspapers during the three month period preceding the 1989 Quebec election campaign will show that while The Suburban is not formally a Jewish newspaper, it has extremely high levels of Jewish content. In addition, it will be shown that The Suburban gave a much higher level of coverage to the Equality Party and that such coverage represents a form of support. While both papers claim simply to be “Montreal English” papers, The Suburban will be demonstrated to be, for all intents and purposes, a Jewish paper. If The Suburban can be shown to have supported the Equality Party by way of coverage and editorial comment\(^6\), an explanation of this support cannot merely be found in the fact that it is an Anglophone weekly. It will be argued therefore, that The Suburban is a paper which speaks to and reflects the opinions of the Montreal English Jewish community. It was the Jewish connection that made The Suburban pro-Equality.

\[^6\]In fact, The Suburban did throw it’s support behind the Equality Party in no uncertain terms in an editorial, presented in Appendix VII.
Chapter IV: Methodology

1. Goals of Content Analysis

With a general hypothesis developed and a case study in mind, a suitable methodology must be found. In order to demonstrate that The Suburban was both heavily laden with both Jewish content and support for the Equality Party, it was decided that a content analysis would be appropriate. In 1893, in what is proclaimed to be the first attempt at a content analysis of newspapers, the question was asked: “Do Newspapers Now Give the News?” (Krippendorff, 1980, p.14). Since then, there has been a considerable increase in both the use of, and theories pertaining to, content analysis. Krippendorff (1980) attributes the increased use and status of content analysis to three major factors: a growth in electronic media, a development of social and political problems which were attributed by many to the mass media itself, and the emergence of empirical methodologies in the social sciences (Krippendorff, 1980, p.15). While external changes may have lead to a greater acceptance of content analysis, its continued use as a methodology can be attributed to its inherent benefits. “Content analysis is an unobtrusive technique, accepts
unstructured material, is context sensitive and thereby able to process
symbolic forms, and can cope with large volumes of data” (Krippendorff,
1980, p.16).

Perhaps more than any other research method available to social
scientists and humanists, content analysis has been marked by a
diversity of purpose, subject matter, and technique.
(Holsti, 1969, p.42)

Content analysis has many functions. Holsti identifies what, for
him, are the three major purposes of content analysis: to describe
characteristics of communication, to make inferences as to the antecedents
of communication (the encoding process), and to make inferences as to the
content analysis in a different way:

Our distinctions are motivated by differences in the mechanisms
content analysts use to relate data to their context. They imply
differences in the kind of contextual knowledge sought, in the
analytical constructs needed, and in the way findings may be
validated. (Krippendorff, 1980, p.35)

The different types of inferences content analysis can make include
references to systems, standards, indices and symptoms, linguistic
representations, interpersonal communications, or institutional processes.
A system is “a conceptual device to describe a portion of reality”
(Krippendorff, 1980, p.35). Just as examinations of kinship systems allow
us to predict the way in which new members will fit in, or an understanding of a linguistic system can allow us to predict possible syntactic evolutions. “the inferences of interest to content analysis stem from transformations that are invariant to a symbol system and extendible beyond the time and space of available data” (Krippendorff 1980: 35). The purpose of systems theories as applied within content analysis is to develop theories regarding trends. Once trends have been identified, patterns can be predicted. Lastly, differences between communicators can be identified.

Some studies have, as their goal, the assessment of a medium or a specific communicator in terms of some form of standard. Others use indices and symptoms to relate data; “an index is a variable whose significance in an investigation depends on the extent to which it can be regarded as a correlate of other phenomenon” (Krippendorff 1980: 40). For example, “the frequency with which a symbol, idea, or subject matter occurs in a stream of messages tends to be interpreted as a measure of importance, attention, or emphasis” (Krippendorff 1980: 40). Linguistic representations can also be the focus, emphasizing how different communicators use language to represent reality. Other studies analyze communications between interlocutors, and still others examine the rules
that govern institutions and what effects those communications have in
terms of the development of institutional policy, politics, and the like.

Perhaps it is Weber who captures both a goal of content analysis and
of our study in the most appropriate fashion. For Weber, content analysis
can be used in order to better understand various cultures:

One important use of content analysis is the generation of culture
indicators that point to the state of beliefs, values, ideologies, or other
culture systems. Based on political documents and other texts, culture
indicator research determines how the concerns of a single society,
institution, group, or other social organization differ. Many studies
are comparative and examine the similarities in the concerns of more
than one society or group. (Weber, 1985, p.10)

2. Research Designs

Whatever the specific purpose of a content analysis is, there are
certain steps that must be followed. The first such step is the formulation
of a research design.

The researcher is held accountable for the processes leading to [his]
findings: He must describe the conditions under which data are
obtained, justify the analytical steps taken, and see to it that the
process is not biased in the sense that it favors one kind of finding
rather than another. (Krippendorff, 1980, p.49)
It is within the research design that this information must be made explicit. Research designs must be context sensitive. There must be some explicit or implicit link between the analytic procedures used and relevant properties of the context (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 49).

Krippendorff outlines three types of designs. The first design is for studies which attempt to estimate some phenomena within data. The attention is on the data itself, examining frequencies, themes, and patterns. The second design is used in order to test the suitability of a research technique by way of content analysis. The last design is formulated in order to test hypotheses. This type of design is most common for studies which use content analysis as only one of several research techniques.

Holsti identifies several research designs for studies which have the description of communication as their goal. All of these techniques reflect the fact that “in order to state meaningful conclusions, all content data must be compared to some other data” (Holsti, 1969, p.28). The first design is the inter-message analysis which involves the examination of one source as it differs over time (trend studies), between different situations (effects of circumstances), or according to different audiences. The second
design consists of a comparison of messages produced by two or more sources. "Usually the purpose is to relate theoretically significant attributes of communicators to differences in the messages they produce" (Holsti. 1969. p.30). The third and final method involves comparing data to some pre-established standard.

3. C.A. AND THE DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNICATION

Several questions may be answered within the set of content analysis purposes referred to by Holsti as "the description of communication". The first set of questions are the 'What' questions. The answers to these questions describe trends in communication content, relate known characteristics of sources to the messages they produce, or audit communication content against certain predetermined standards. The second set of questions are the 'How' questions, which analyze both techniques of persuasion and style. The last set of questions are the 'to whom' questions. They relate known attributes of audiences to the messages produced for them, and describe patterns of communication.
This type of study has, as a presupposition, that communicators often cast their messages "in the idiom of the intended audience" (Holsti. 1969, p.64).

Interpretations of findings relating audience attributes to communication content are generally of three basic types: that authors write differently for dissimilar audiences, that the literature reflects basic value differences of the audiences, or that such materials shape the values and predisposition of the audience7. (Holsti, 1969, p.65)

4. CONTENT ANALYSIS IN ACTION

In his book entitled Les Méthodes de la Recherche Qualitative, Jean-Pierre Deslauriers (1991) provides a six-step procedure in which to properly undertake content analysis: preliminary reading and establishment of units of analysis, choice and definition of units of analysis, categorization and classification, quantification, scientific description, and interpretation of results. The following section will be organized around these steps and will include both a discussion of each process, and how they were specifically integrated into the present study.

7 Both the first and second interpretations apply in this study.
4.1 Preliminary readings and establishment of units of analysis

The first step in a content analysis involves several preliminary readings of all possible sources. Familiarity with the material to be analyzed is essential in order to anticipate problems and to appreciate the differences between and unique qualities of various sources. This is particularly important in a comparative study where subtle differences between sources must be properly understood in order to ensure for both proper sampling and coding. It is also through these readings that a preliminary set of categories in which to later classify units of analysis may be devised.

C’est une première familiarisation avec le matériel, une sorte de ‘préanalyse’ pour en dégager une idée du ‘sens général’, certaines ‘idées forces’ permettant d’orienter l’ensemble de l’analyse subséquente pour atteindre les objectifs visés. (Deslauriers, 1987, p.55)
4.2 Choice and definition of units of analysis

While Deslauriers presents this section in one step, it can be further divided into two sections: sampling and definition of units.

4.2.1 Sampling

It is almost impossible to imagine an experiment which does not necessitate some type of sampling technique. The first task is the definition of the universe, all members of the class of documents about which generalizations are to be made. Once the universe has been chosen, the sources which will be representative of the universe can be chosen.

Once the universe of relevant communication has been defined, a single-stage sampling design may suffice. More often, a multistage sample is required. This may involve as many as three steps: electing sources of communication, sampling documents, and sampling within documents. (Holsti, 1969, p.130)

According to Holsti, three targets of sampling may exist (Holsti, 1969, p.132). The first involves a possible sampling among communication sources. If an analyst is interested in the content of American sports magazines, he will probably want to sample from all possible titles. It may be the case that because of the specific research question, sampling from
communication sources may not be necessary. Once the sources have been specified, an analyst may also have to sample among the editions, texts or volumes of the communication texts themselves. In the study of American sports magazines, the analyst may have decided to study titles a, b, c, and d, but may have to further sample which editions or weeks he will study. Lastly, the researcher may also be forced to sample within documents. Here, the analyst may code every $K^{th}$ article, ad, or picture within each magazine copy.

At all levels, the normal rules of sampling apply. Six major techniques of sampling exist. A random sample involves the listing of all relevant units followed by a completely random selection of the units to be treated. Stratified sampling involves the definition of strata, followed by random sampling within each strata. Systematic sampling is the selecting of every $K^{th}$ unit of a list into the sample, after determining the starting point of the sequence at random. Cluster sampling, varying probability, and multistage techniques are the last three (Krippendorff, 1980, p.66-69).
Once familiar with the sources at hand, and having properly sampled the sources, the next task is to choose and define the units of analysis. The question to be asked is, what are we to count? A study may have pictures, words, sentences, or entire concepts or themes as its unit of analysis. As well, there is usually some notion of meaning attached to these units of analysis. As Deslauriers points out, content analysis is rarely concerned with the mere frequency of certain linguistic constructs or grammatical formulations, but with the meaning and consequences of these frequencies. Several levels of units can be identified. While the distinctions between these types of units is not always clear, Krippendorff provides a good framework. The first type of unit is the recording unit. "the specific segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given category" (Krippendorff, 1980, p.58). The second unit is the context unit, "the largest body of content that may be searched to characterize a recording unit" (Krippendorff, 1980, p.59).

Krippendorff also provides a set of ways of defining units, regardless of their level. Units may be physical: books, newspapers, or movies
(Krippendorff, 1980, p.60-63). They may also be syntactical, consisting of words, sentences, or inferences. Referential units are the objects, persons, events or ideas to which an expression refers. For example, He, Howard, and Mr. President may all refer to the same referential unit. Prepositional units are units which must conform to some grammatical structure. Lastly, units may be thematic.

4.3 Categorization and Classification

A central problem in any research design is selection and definition of categories, the 'pigeonholes' into which content units are to be classified. Content analysis either stands or falls by its categories. (Holsti, 1969, p.95)

Once the units of analysis have been determined, the next step involves the development of a process of categorization and classification. Deslauriers identifies three models for this step; the open model, the closed model, and the mixed model. In the open model, there are no pre-existing categories. The researcher develops categories in the process of analysis, according to similarities which become evident. The closed model begins with a strict set of categories which does not change during the course of analysis. The researcher merely measures the degree to which the material fits into the given categories. In the mixed model, the researcher begins with a set of categories, but is open to their modification, deletion, or the

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addition of new ones. The open model is best suited for studies in which the material itself is of primary importance. By contrast, the closed model is useful if the researcher is looking for a particular phenomenon in a source, but it is the phenomenon which is of utmost importance.

In developing code categories, there are several important criteria which must be adhered to. Categories must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. (Babbie, 1989, p.299) In other words, a unit must fall into at least one category, but not more than one. “All relevant items in the sample of documents must be capable of being placed into a category...[and]...no content datum can be placed in more than a single cell” (Holsti, 1969, p.100) Further,

A non-exhaustive set of categories can be rendered exhaustive by the addition of another category that represents all units not representable in the original set. Such categories are often labeled ‘not applicable’, ‘other’, or ‘none of the above’... This solution does not apply to categories that lack mutual exclusivity. To add a category ‘ambiguous’ to the set that would catch all units for which the assignment to categories is unclear or multi valued, such as when two or more categories apply, prevents the assessment of reliability and, more important, biases research results. (Holsti, 1969, p.75)

To this requirement, Deslauriers adds four more. Categories must be pertinent to the material analyzed, the goals of the study, and the theoretical framework used for the study. They must be objective and
clearly defined. "a ne laisser que le minimum de champ au jugement du
codeur et faire en sorte que divers codeurs parviendraient à une codification
identique du même matériel" (Deslauriers. 1987, p.60). "The analyst must
clearly state the variables she/he is dealing with. (conceptual definitions)
and must specify the indicators which determine whether the given content
datum falls within the category (operational definition)" (Holsti. 1969,
p.95). Categories must be homogeneous, uniting only units with
similarities. Lastly, each category must bring something new to the study
and should not be redundant. Holsti adds still two more criteria:
independence of categories, "the rule that assignment of any datum into a
category not affect the categorization of any other datum" (Holsti, 1969,
p.100) and the single classification principle in which conceptually different
levels of analysis must be kept separate.

While Holsti, Babbie and Krippendorff provide the criteria to which
categories must conform, Weber provides an eight step process for creating
and testing a coding scheme. The first step is to define the recording units,
which can be words, sentences, themes, paragraphs, or whole texts if "the
whole text is relatively short, like newspaper headlines, editorials, or stories"
(Weber, 1985, p.23) The second task is to define the categories; are they
to be mutually exclusive? How narrow or broad are the categories to be?
The third step is to test the coding scheme on a sample of text. Then the
analyst can assess the accuracy or reliability of the scheme. Any revisions
that need to be made to the coding rules are made next, followed by a
return to step 3. When the researcher is satisfied with his results, he may
now proceed to code all of the relevant text. The last step involves an
assessment of the achieved level of reliability or accuracy.

5. Quantification

"One cannot analyze what is not suitably recorded and one cannot
expect that source material comes cast in the formal terms of a data
language" (Holsti, 1969, p.71). This step comes as the culmination of all of
the previous preparatory steps. The researcher now applies his coding
schemes to the data he has selected according to his research designs and
sampling techniques. Krippendorff identifies seven ways of delineating the
semantics of a data language. Verbal designation involves single word
designations of characteristics or properties, which are counted or scored.
Extentional lists may be used, a type of scale with a list of terms that will
receive a given value. Decision schemes involve a list of decisions which
when systematically completed will result in a proper classification. Magnitudes and scales may be used in order to place datum on a continuum. Simulation of hypothesis testing is when the coder applies a given datum to a set of mutually exclusive hypotheses and ascertains to which hypothesis it pertains. Lastly, in a simulation of interviews, the coder makes predictions of how a communicator will respond to questions based on his knowledge of previous communications (Krippendorff, 1980, p.75-80).

Data Sheets can make the job of the coder far more simple, and can aid in organizing data. The benefits of the data sheet can only be realized if the sheet has three important types of information on it (Krippendorff, 1980, p.81-84). Administrative information must be on each sheet which explicitly states what the sheet contains and how it relates to other sheets. Information on data organization must also be explicitly written. While there may be no ambiguities for the coder as to the methods of data organization, other individuals may need to decipher the sheets at a distant point in time or space. Lastly, the data proper must be clearly written or entered. The last two steps involve the scientific description of the data and a subsequent interpretation of the results. It is important to identify
these steps, but a discussion on the different ways in which data can be
treated is well beyond the scope of this paper.

6. Other Requirements of Content Analysis

Content analysis, like any other scientific method, must be
replicable; "other researchers, at different points in time and perhaps under
different circumstances, apply the same techniques to the same data, the
results must be the same" (Krippendorff, 1980, p.21). The replicability
criteria also entails that the methodology be objective, systematic, and
generalizable. Objectivity refers to the requirement that "each step in the
research process must be carried out on the basis of explicitly formulated
rules and procedures" (Holsti, 1969, p.3) thereby minimizing the
possibility that findings will reflect merely the researchers predisposition,
and not the actual content.

Thus, one test of objectivity is: can other analysts, following identical
procedures with the same data, arrive at similar conclusions? ... The
investigator who cannot communicate to others his procedures and
criteria for selecting data, for determining what in the data is relevant
and what is not, and for interpreting the findings will have failed to
fulfill the requirements of objectivity. (Holsti, 1969, p.4)
Content analysis must also be systematic; “the inclusion or exclusion of content or categories [must be] done according to consistently applied rules” (Holsti, 1969, p.4). Categories must be devised which allow for consistent application and all material must be considered, not just data which support the hypothesis. Lastly findings must have theoretical relevance, or generality. There is no value in a study which merely cites frequencies or content without theoretical relevance. “A datum about communication content is meaningless until it is related to at least one other datum. The link between these is represented by some form of theory” (Holsti, 1969, p.5).
Chapter V: Content Analysis: application & discussion

At this point, it will be helpful to briefly restate the purpose of the present content analysis. While the conventional wisdom claims that Jewish political behavior is almost invariably liberal, such presuppositions are seriously flawed. It has been shown that there exists a rich and varied Jewish political tradition which has evolved over time. (Mendelsohn, 1993) Moreover, Jews interact with both their objective and subjective surroundings or realities. (Medding, 1977) Like others, Jews articulate a political stand only after evaluating the conditions both within and outside of their group. In short, any political stance taken is the culmination of rational political thought and not knee-jerk liberalism as is often claimed.

If Jewish political behavior is viewed as the result of a pragmatic decision making process based on internal and external factors, then Jewish illiberal political behavior becomes entirely understandable. In other words, it is logical for certain Jews, in certain circumstances, to engage in behavior departing from liberalism. It is only when we abandon the notion of an ever present Jewish liberalism that we are able to analyze the political behavior of groups such as Israel’s ultra right or segments of the Hassidic
movement. Within Medding's framework, these Jews are no longer anomalous; they are merely continuing the long standing tradition of Jewish pragmatism.

We have also examined several political realities in Quebec and have made some important discoveries. The Equality Party, formed as a result of Anglophone frustration over Bill 178, was in several ways a conservative political movement. Further, a high proportion of those involved in the creation, organization, and ultimate success of the Equality Party were members of the Montreal Anglophone Jewish community. Jewish support for the Equality Party was also found beyond the electoral and organizational levels. The Montreal Anglophone Jewish community also supported the Equality Party by way of The Suburban, a Montreal-based English weekly. It was in order to demonstrate this support that a content analysis was conducted.

Through the content analysis, it became apparent that while the Equality Party was formed in order to defend the concerns of Anglophone Quebecers, The Montreal Gazette, Montreal's English daily newspaper, was largely hostile towards this mission. By contrast, it was found that The
Suburban Newspaper was extremely supportive of the Equality Party. This difference cannot be explained merely by the language of The Suburban's content or the demographic profile of its target audience. Any difference between the papers in terms of support for the Equality Party was due largely to a fact uncovered in our content analysis: The Suburban is not merely an English language paper; it is a Jewish paper.

1. Application

The first issue that must be addressed in a content analysis concerns the parameters of the data. In this study, the universe was defined as The Suburban and all other Anglophone newspapers in the Montreal region. In order to have a meaningful comparison, The Suburban had to be compared to a similar paper. While other English language papers do exist in Montreal, they are all either specific to a municipality or to another ethnic group. Virtually no sampling of communication sources was therefore needed. The Montreal Gazette is the only paper targeting all English Montrealers.
Because of the relatively short time period involved in the study, no sampling was needed to determine which editions to code. All editions of *The Suburban* and *The Montreal Gazette* published during the pre-election period of May 30, 1989 to September 25, 1989 were analyzed. In fact, the only sampling undertaken was in the treatment of commercial advertisements. Due to the sheer number of ads, it was determined that only those contained on every 2\textsuperscript{nd} page would be treated, beginning either on page one or two as selected at random.

The recording units were comprised of headlines, advertisements, editorials and photographs. The analysis of articles was limited to headlines for several reasons. First, while reporters may be objective in writing news articles, it is the editorial staff which determine article headlines. In so doing, they have the ability to shape the overall tone of the newspaper. Furthermore, the importance of headlines is heightened by the fact that readers may not always venture far beyond them.

Within headlines, the context units were words. References to both political parties and specific candidates were coded. With respect to editorials, the context units were themes. Entire editorials were read and
coded, according to their major theme, be it support for, or overt
disagreement with, a political party, or a specific position regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Advertisements were also coded with words as
their context units. References with clearly Jewish content were coded, such
as “Kosher”, “Closed Shabbat”, and the like.

A mixed model was used to develop categories. While certain *a priori*
categories existed, such as references to political candidates from specific
parties or the parties themselves, others were developed during the
preliminary reading stage, and still others during the early coding process.
The actual categories used are exhaustive. They are not mutually exclusive
in that multiple references in one headline were each coded. Each context
unit was only coded once. Certainly the categories can be seen as being
pertinent to the study as they were devised solely for that purpose. The
categories were clearly defined and required no judgment calls on the part
of the coder; either a referent was or was not present. Similarly, an editorial
is either neutral or expresses an opinion. A sample data sheet can be found
in Appendix VI.
2. Rationale

Two main arguments have emerged within our case study thus far, each comprising a goal of the following content analysis. First, we have argued that The Suburban was more supportive of the Equality Party than The Gazette. Second, we have argued that The Suburban Newspaper is, in reality, a Jewish Newspaper. In order to substantiate such claims by way of content analysis, we must determine what observable phenomena will be observed. Within Holsti’s framework (1969), this involves the description of the characteristics of communication. For Krippendorff (1980), it involves making references to indices, measuring two linked phenomena within a text. We will then link these manifest phenomena to more latent ones; we are not merely interested in the frequencies themselves, but in their underlying significance. The logic behind this process deserves some elaboration.

A) Equality Party Support

It has been argued by many that all choices as to what makes it into a newspaper, be it in the editorial, news, or entertainment sections “[has]
an ideological basis and a political dimension rooted in the structural characteristics of the medium”. (Holsti, 1969, p.49) A 1959 study demonstrated that endorsed political candidates received better news coverage, and it was concluded that “there could be no doubt in the reader’s mind as to which side the different newspapers supported. News and comment were inextricably mixed in the ‘News’ reports and special articles” (Holsti, 1969, p.49) It has been further shown that “differences in news coverage of political campaigns have been correlated with editorial endorsements”. (Krippendorff, 1980, p.37)

Based on the belief that the amount of coverage political contenders receive in a publication is both based on and reflects an editorial position, our analysis observed and quantified three variables addressing political coverage in both The Suburban Newspaper and The Montreal Gazette. The first analysis was of headlines which contained references to provincial political parties (Appendix I). The second involved headlines with references to specific candidates (Appendix II). The third analysis focussed on articles with photographs of political candidates or figures (Appendix III).
B) JEWISH CONTENT

Within Holsti’s framework (1969), the present study also aims to relate known characteristics of sources to messages they produce, and to relate known attributes of the audience to messages produced for them.

Hypotheses of the form: sources with characteristic A are likely to produce messages with attributes w and x, whereas those with characteristics B are likely to produce messages of types y and z have been tested in many disciplines and from various theoretical orientations. Sources may be two novelists, political candidates, or newspapers... (Holsti, 1969, p.48)

In order to demonstrate that The Suburban Newspaper was more “Jewish” in content than The Montreal Gazette, it was necessary to devise a measure of “Jewish orientation”. It was reasoned that references to Middle Eastern affairs, the Jewish religion and culture, and the Montreal Jewish Community, all reflected a Jewish orientation.

3. FINDINGS

The results of the content analysis are presented in appendices I - V.

With regards to party reference (Appendix I, p.137), The Suburban made 50% more references to the Equality Party in its headlines. By contrast,
The Montreal Gazette made 3.2 times (226%) more references to the Liberal Party, and 8 times (700%) more references to the Parti Québécois. Interestingly, The Suburban also had three headlines with references to “other” parties, whereas The Montreal Gazette had none. The results of this tabulation are fairly self-explanatory; The Suburban Newspaper was far more likely to mention the Equality Party in its headlines than The Montreal Gazette, and less likely to give headline space to the two other conventional parties. Further, The Suburban Newspaper was also more willing to give headline space to independent candidates or those running for more marginal parties.

Appendix II (page 138) presents the results for headlines with references to specific candidates. Once again, similar results are found. The Suburban made 1.4 times (40%) more references to Equality Party candidates, and had only 28% and 5.8% as many references to the Liberals and Parti Québécois respectively as did The Montreal Gazette. Appendix III (page 139) presents tabulations of articles with pictures of political figures. In this case, The Suburban had 2.2 times (120%) more photographs of Equality candidates, and The Montreal Gazette had 2.5 times (150%) more photographs of Liberal candidates. In addition, The Montreal Gazette had
four photographs of Parti Québécois candidates while *The Suburban* had none. Finally, *The Suburban* had one photograph of an independent candidate. These findings are particularly interesting. Not only did *The Suburban* give more headline space to the Equality Party as a whole, it also focussed more directly on individual candidates. The impact that media “endorsement”, or even coverage of individual candidates can have should not be underestimated.

Appendix IV (page 140) deals with political editorials. Of the editorials appearing in both papers regarding the Equality Party, those found within *The Montreal Gazette* were, without exception, “anti” Equality (11), while those in *The Suburban* (6) were “pro” Equality. The only “pro” Liberal editorial was found in *The Montreal Gazette*, and both papers had the same number of “anti” Liberal editorials (3). *The Montreal Gazette* had two “anti” Parti Québécois editorials, and was the only paper to deal with that party in its editorials. Finally, neither paper dealt with “other” parties.

*The Suburban* did in fact take an official editorial position supporting the Quebec Equality Party (see appendix VII). This editorial position was a determinant of the subsequent news bias towards the Party. Conversely, it
will be argued that *The Montreal Gazette*’s lack of support for the party shaped its coverage as well.

Appendix V (page 141) codes Jewish content. Interestingly, *The Montreal Gazette* had 4.1 times (308%) more references to Middle Eastern affairs in its headlines. When we examine references with Jewish content however, the results are more dramatic. *The Suburban* had 10.7 times (970%) more headlines with Jewish content. In addition, 39 advertisements were found in *The Suburban*, while none were found in *The Gazette*.

Clearly, the hypothesis that *The Suburban* contained both higher levels of Jewish content and coverage of the Equality Party has been confirmed. It is apparent that while *The Gazette* did give moderate exposure to the Equality Party, it gave significantly more to the Liberals. Conversely, *The Suburban* gave much less coverage to the Liberals and the Parti Québécois. The most impressive results were found when coding for Jewish content. *The Suburban* is, without a doubt, heavily laden with Jewish content, while not an officially “Jewish” paper.
Chapter VI: Conclusions

We began this thesis with an examination of two major theories regarding the impact of ethnicity on political behavior. The first set of theories claims that ethnicity is only an important factor in the political decision making process of recently arrived immigrants. It posits that once the group has “integrated” and attained a reasonable level of institutional completeness, the politics of class replaces the politics of ethnicity.

In contrast, the second set of theories insist that ethnicity remains an important factor in the formulation of political opinion and strategies. Many of these theoreticians focus on the Jews in order to advance their claims. Their arguments almost invariably center around the claim that the Jews have maintained a liberal orientation despite having reached a relatively high level of socioeconomic status and institutional completeness. In other words, the theoreticians claim that if the politics of ethnicity were indeed replaced with the politics of class, Jews would be an overwhelmingly conservative ethnic group.
Such an argument rests on two major assumptions: first, that modern Jewry has maintained a certain level of liberalism, and second, that there is a link between this liberalism and “being Jewish”. Several questionable assumptions of a continued pattern of Jewish liberalism were addressed, including the inherent problems in the process of identifying and characterizing political behavior. Such definitional problems further complicate any attempt to identify “liberal” behavior. One may also question whether observable behavior should be attributed to internal, philosophical convictions such as liberalism or conservatism. Finally, it is doubtful that the political behavior within a group will be consistent enough over time and between issues to allow for accurate generalization.

It is with the assumption that there is something about Jews which makes them liberal that we find the most problems, and with which this thesis is primarily concerned. Identifying liberal behavior may be problematic, but making a causal link between that behavior and membership in a particular ethnic group is much more difficult. As we have seen, several theories have been developed in order to explain “why the Jews are so liberal”. While theoreticians have pointed to a wide spectrum of factors to explain this “liberalism” including political socialization,
psychological make-up, and elements within the religion itself, all begin with the assumption that the Jews behave politically as a whole. The starting point for all of these theories is the belief that there is indeed a phenomenon which needs to be explained, a mechanism by which the Jews make political decisions, a mechanism specific to the Jews.

The primary task of this thesis was to demonstrate that the assumption of Jewish liberalism, that Jews behave in a uniform fashion, is at least an oversimplification if not a falsehood. We began with a discussion of the many political orientations which have existed simultaneously within the Jewish community over time. It was shown that there has always been a tension within the Jewish community between several competing political currents. Such currents as the Integrationists, the Nationalists, the Zionists, and the Orthodox have existed, and continue to exist, each with a well articulated and unique political perspective.

We then undertook the task of identifying specific instances of Jewish illiberal behavior. Several examples of Jewish conservative movements were discussed: historical and contemporary, secular and religious, Israeli and Diaspora. What emerged was the understanding that
Jews are anything but a uniform group with respect to political thought and behavior.

Medding's theory of Jewish political behavior was then presented (1977), a theory which focuses on pragmatism as the source of Jewish political behavior. Specifically, the theory states that Jews create their political agendas as a result of a careful analysis of their short and long terms goals in light of the political reality in which they live. In other words, Jews make rational political choices according to their objective and subjective realities. Within the framework provided by Medding, instances of Jewish illiberal behavior become comprehensible. Medding's theory of Jewish political behavior provides the tools with which to address any type of political enunciation that is founded on rationality and pragmatism.

The thesis case study was then presented, the election of four Equality Party candidates in the October 23rd, 1989 Quebec election. The party's main objective was conservative in nature: to defend the individual rights of Anglophone Quebecers against encroachment by the state or other collectivities. It was shown that the Equality Party was supported directly by the Montreal Anglophone Jewish community. Furthermore, the content
analysis demonstrated that *The Suburban Newspaper* is a Jewish paper, and thus served as a tool for the Jewish community to indirectly support the Equality Party. This indirect support was also apparent through the content analysis comparing election coverage in *The Montreal Gazette* and *The Suburban*.

The behavior of the Jews of D'Arcy McGee, and other areas of Montreal, can be described as conservative in light of their support of the Equality Party. How then should this behavior be explained? Is it to be understood as a rupture from the longstanding Jewish political tradition of liberalism? Perhaps. But perhaps it is more plausible that such behavior merely represents a continuation of a different political tradition, a tradition of pragmatic political action.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Jews consistently engage in liberal behavior, we have argued that Jewish political behavior is pragmatic. The classic examples of liberal behavior cited by theoreticians can also be seen as examples of pragmatic behavior. It was, after all, the liberalism of the French Revolution and the ideology of Napoleon that "liberated European Jewry from confinement in the Ghetto". (Kristol 1990,
It was this ideology which gave Jews the right to own land, to vote, and to pursue economic interests of their choice. The historical affinity Jews have had for the left is, therefore extremely logical.

Once upon a time, when Nazism and fascism endangered the world, especially the Jews, many Jews believed in the slogan "no enemies on the left" - and with good reason. (Mendelsohn 1993:143)

The Jewish liberalism of that period can therefore be explained within Medding's theoretical framework as rational, pragmatic behavior. It was in the best interests of the Jewish people, in order to achieve their short term goals, to support the left.

After the Holocaust and the revelations about the true nature of Stalin, there arose within the Jewish world, a belief that "Jews [could] rely only on themselves, that the gentiles, including even the socialist gentiles, [were] not to be trusted". (Mendelsohn 1993:142) Given the current realities of the Jewish people, perhaps the right is an equally rational, pragmatic ideology to support.
## Appendix I

### HEADLINES WITH PARTY REFERENCE

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Appendix VII: Suburban Editorial

Suburban supports Equality as the only dignified choice

The Equality Party is our choice for this election. It is a choice we recommend to readers because the prospect of a large-scale Equality win in West End ridings represents a new beginning for the English-speaking people of Quebec.

A vote for the Liberals means a vote to accept that English-speaking Quebeckers are little more than unwanted guests in a home they helped to build. It is a new departure, a time to take stock of our own resources, a time to expect elected representatives to represent the best interests of the voters and not the views of those hostile to their interests.

Liberal logic is defunct. It offers only promises of better care on the death row of Quebec's condemned cultural community. Connexions, Anglo-Liberals, the voters have had little chance to see the Liberals, to choose a choice but to support the party to which they have given loyalty, or resign.

Today, Liberal candidates gave no guarantee that there won't be a repeat of the D'Herelle Farrier performance, when the official languages commission judged 'language laws humiliating,' and was condemned for doing so by anglo MNAs in a unanimous motion of censure. Liberal candidates do not say that this will not happen again, only that the same circumstances are unlikely to repeat themselves, or that the question itself is hypothetical. This is not good enough. This is precisely the sort of question in which he was never allowed to participate in the CIAD's Free For All show on Saturday when the whole of Quebec civil rights, Bill 178, or Messrs Lefa．

For instance, if he is a man of English-speaking Quebecers, he would have stood out and made fools of them. The anglo cultural establishment prefers debating topics on such topics to be one side.

Mr. Atkinson, in part of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, mostly made up of Montrealers, was killed in the Battle of the Scheldt, outside Antwerp in 1944. It was not only the best battle in World War II, but perhaps even the best in history. Mr. Atkinson is a brave man, an able commentator, and the best defender N.D.C. could hope for.

D'Arcy McGee candidate and Equality Party leader Robert Liberman, 28, is the young architect who decided that if anything were to be done about injustices, someone had to do something. So he got up and did something. From a tiny mustard seed, through months of wrangling debate, he nurtured his movement into a genuine political party. His feat thus far has been nothing less than amazing, he has galvanized anglo-Quebec going against the flow of the anglo cultural establishment to build his tiny movement into a mass political party.

A new departure is what this election is all about. The Equality Party may stumble and grow as it moves towards the light at the end of the tunnel, but it will move in that direction. The Liberals offer to assist the English-speaking community in making itself comfortable in the dark if it keeps quiet and makes no trouble.

We take this unusual action in recommending a vote for the Equality Party because we believe that the English-speaking community, while wishing no harm to the French community, must demand a place in the sun.

To vote Liberal is to vote for more of the same, and to spoil one's ballot is a way to vote for more of the same without voting Liberal. The Equality Party will make every attempt to stand up and protect rights that are threatened and secure those that have been lost. It is time to be brave, it is time for a new beginning. It is time for Equality.

Gordon Atkinson, Equality's N.D.C. candidate, is an old soldier, who in his broadcasting career, has fought against what is clearly wrong in this country and province. Even having one's voice heard from his position in this country, is not only easy. He could speak in isolation, but was frozen out of wider discussions when the topic turned to Quebec civil rights, Bill 178, or Messrs Lefa．

Co-ed on page A-10
Bibliography


WEBER, Robert Philip (1985), Basic Content Analysis, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.

