THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE, 1598-1740

by
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Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

Université d'Ottawa/University of Ottawa

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ABSTRACT

THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE, 1598-1740
Margarita Gascón
University of Ottawa, 1994

This thesis analyses the impact of the Araucanian revolt of 1598-99 on the southernmost Spanish colonies. In North America, military posts (presidios) were the cutting edge of settlement, and the border between whites and natives separated different economies. In the Southern Cone, however, feral horses and cattle were as important to Spaniards as to Indians, and presidios were conduits draining the wealth of the Andes towards the frontier. The focus of the work is the west-to-east articulation of this border in the seventeenth century. The Great Revolt forced the Crown to establish an army on the Bio Bio. The resources needed, however, provoked recurring political struggle between its agents and Santiago's elite, since both needed access to local products and aspired to use Peru's aid as they wished. The socio-political situation thereby created defined the salient characteristics of this frontier. The conflict was ultimately resolved by creating a corridor which extended frontier activities and characteristics eastward, to Cuyo, Tucumán and the Río de La Plata. Through this movement, the experience of Santiago was recreated until, eventually, even distant Buenos Aires was transformed into a "frontier society". That change, of course, was peculiarly appropriate for even as the Spanish frontier spread eastward, the Araucanians were driving towards the Atlantic.
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Abbreviations

AGNA  Archivo General de la Nación, Argentina
ANCH  Archivo Nacional, Santiago de Chile
APCB  Dirección General de Archivos, Córdoba
APMZ  Archivo Histórico, Mendoza
ACBA  Actas del Cabildo de Buenos Aires
ACCB  Actas del Cabildo de Córdoba
ACCH  Actas del Cabildo de Santiago de Chile
ACMZ  Actas del Cabildo de Mendoza
HAHR  Hispanic American Historical Review
HNA   Historia de la Nación Argentina
CHCH  Colección de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional
RHAA  Revista de Historia Americana y Argentina
Jarhbuch  Jarhbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft, und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas
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1 - INTRODUCTION

Generally, the word "frontier" denotes a line separating two societies, often isolating one from another. In the Americas, it evokes the image of a border characterized by seemingly endless struggle between whites and natives\(^1\). "Frontier" also calls to mind a fringe of empty lands predestined to be settled by "civilized" men. Indeed, for General Julio Roca and the so-called Generation of 1880, the military campaign that extended their dominion into northern Patagonia was the "Conquest of the Desert," a label that deliberately ignored the fact that natives lived there, owned the land, and controlled its resources\(^2\).

None of these concepts, however, is directly relevant to this thesis. On the southern border of the Spanish Empire ties of war and commerce crossed over the border and bound two hostile societies together. They were not isolated one from another. Nor can that frontier simply be defined by white-Indian strife, north to south. The very existence of the inter-racial struggle had a profound impact on relations west to east, between the Spanish colonies strung along the border and among the Indian tribes which they faced. Most importantly, the concept of "frontier" cannot be limited to the militarized fringe, for the impact of the struggle was acutely felt in those communities that provided support, these settlements transformed into "frontier societies" by the need to find and deliver the resources required to defend the border of the realm.
In the present work, "frontier" is defined by the effects of a Chilean experience that began at the end of the sixteenth century with a massive Indian rebellion. The definition involves three basic elements which altered and transformed the internal dynamic of the colony, from a fringe settlement to a frontier society. First, Chile, and Santiago in particular, were deeply affected by the steady input of external resources required to control the Indian border. Secondly, the need to contain Arauco reinforced military values and the ideals of a nobility of services since officers and soldiers, as opposed to conquering warriors, began to play a central role in public life. Finally, the frontier experience emphasized the fact that commercial exchanges based on politically-created opportunities were essential to the prosperity of the elite, and that family and corporate networks were vital for successful economic enterprises.

Obviously, as conceived of in this work, the southern frontier of the Spanish Empire was less a fixed boundary than an experience in dynamics, the outcome of opposing but balanced pressure, fierce effort against unyielding resistance which shaped the body politic of the contending societies and which accumulated energies which could only be released into the eastern void. Political geographers have distinguished between "boundaries" and "frontiers". To them, the first evokes a precise, linear division, within a restrictive, political
framework. The second implies more zonal qualities and a broader social context. In this thesis, however, "borders" are simply areas where Spaniards settled as part of the ongoing process of conquest. When the four colonies under study were founded, they were border communities -- at the very edge of "civilized" settlement, yet meant as stepping stones for further expansion. None was meant to guard the boundaries of the empire. But the anticipated expansion never materialized. Instead, Araucanian resistance unleashed the complex process which created a "frontier society" behind a militarized fringe, and forced the successive evolution of Santiago, Mendoza, Córdoba, and ultimately Buenos Aires, from border settlements to "frontier societies".

Of course, the colonies located on the southern border can also be analyzed in terms of their peripheral location. The pattern of their development was clearly different from that of the Andean and Mexican core. Nevertheless, to define a society on the basis of its peripheral location alone can be profoundly misleading. In Spanish American studies, "fringe" colonies have been defined by a straightforward inversion of the purported characteristics of the "core". Thus, "no sedentary Indians, no silver, no full stream of immigration [and thus no quick replication of Iberian urban society], late and gradual development, and so on". Not only is such a definition unacceptable for Chile because it only considers the lack of
certain "core" characteristics, it also misleads by denying
elements which were very much present. In Chile, sedentary
Indians were brought in from afar, the situado was a silver mine
of sort, the ever-renewed soldiery provided a full stream of
immigration, and war (as always) quickened the pace of social
evolution and urban elaboration.

Although it is obvious that the development of the colonies
on the southern border of the Spanish Empire differed greatly
from the evolution of core societies, the reasons are very
different from those provided by the notion of fringe colonies.
Early in the seventeenth century, the ongoing Indian war forced
drastic changes in Chile. The Great Araucanian Revolt of 1598-99
forced the Crown to establish a permanent army of 2,000 paid
soldiers and institutionalized fiscal transfers from Peru (a
situado) to support the troops. The meteoric militarization and
the influx of capital from Peru transformed Santiago and the
entire region.

As for the long-term consequences of the rebellion, the
Spanish defeat in 1598 was more than a military fiasco. It
brought in its wake the loss of essential labour, productive
mines, and fertile lands for the colony's expanding agriculture
and ranching. In the early conquest years, gold mining from La
Serena in the north to Osorno and Valdivia in the south took
first place in the local economy. At the beginning of the
seventeenth century, however, as the increasing poverty of easily
worked deposits became ever more evident, settlers started exploiting the abundant livestock in the countryside, making tallow and hides Santiago's most important exports to Peru, even as the military market in the south began to open up. In a few decades, however, resources became scarce in the Central Valley and settlers needed them for their own subsistence and to support themselves by trading surpluses on the Peruvian market. The needs of the border became difficult to bear. Inevitably, the struggle for access to available resources generated political tensions between royal authorities and the elite of Santiago. Governors feared the war-making capacity of Araucanians, but were also worried about the mutiny of their own troops should their basic needs not be properly satisfied. Santiago, for its part, recognized the vital importance of keeping troops on the border, but it was unwilling to sacrifice its own economic growth by reducing exports to Peru. To keep the balance, the civilian and military sectors imported goods and services from eastern territories, expanding the influence of Arauco's rebellion to trans-Andean colonies.

That influence, however, also spread directly. As Araucanians migrated eastward, they entered into contact with the Spanish colonies across the Andes, recreating the patterns of interaction that had long characterized the Chilean homeland. Successively, Mendoza, Córdoba, and even Buenos Aires in time also became frontier societies.
Studies dealing with the frontiers of the Hispanic American Empire are by no means a novelty. Such works, however, have tended to focus on missions and garrisons (presidios); the so-called "frontier institutions". Both garrisons and missions were established with the purpose of contributing to the expansion and the defence of the empire in peripheral regions. In the case of the southern frontier, however, none of the colonies involved was established as garrisons or missions, a fact that did not prevent them from becoming frontier societies in the course of the seventeenth century.

Although the southern frontier does not fit the standard model, it has long been studied by historians who have largely respected its unique characteristics. These studies have focused on the north-south axis, the vertical link between each regional centre and its immediate Indian neighbours. Scholars have concentrated on the relationship between Spaniards and natives, the royal attempts to regulate them, and the Indian reactions to Hispanic rule, all within the context of individual colonies. Accordingly, the west-to-east articulation of the frontier, the chronology of that articulation, and the forces acting upon the colonial populations because of that lateral dimension, as colonies evolved from fringe to frontier societies, are still largely unknown. Indeed, the border seems historiographically spent, as a vast majority of "frontier" studies remains
thematically and geographically defined, cementing the grip of a
tradition long dominant among both Chilean and Argentine
historians7.

In Chilean studies, the frontier has been examined in great
detail since historians have always recognized the deep impact of
Arauco on national history. That attitude has sustained the
production of high-quality monographs on southern Chile during
the colonial period. One of the most influential of these studies
was Alvaro Jara's *Guerre et société au Chili*. First published in
1961, this detailed account concentrates on the evolution of
Arauco during the sixteenth century8. Arauco has continued to
attract historical attention. The works by Sergio Villalobos,
Ricardo Ferrando Keúñ, and Andrea Ruiz-Esquide provide new and
interesting insights on the history of the border9.

For their part, Argentine historians have examined the
linkages between the southern areas of Mendoza, Córdoba, and
Buenos Aires and the neighbouring Araucanians. These historical
studies have concentrated on the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. References to the seventeenth are quite vague in these
works, and entire decades are often portrayed with
impressionistic abandon. This is in sharp contrast to the
precision usually found in studies dealing with the southern
frontier in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Recent works
nonetheless challenge that traditional approach. For example,
there is a refreshing revisionism of both paradigms and concepts

8
in the works by Raúl Mandrini and Miguel Angel Palermo who argue against prevailing definitions and interpretations of the dynamic of the Buenos Aires frontier¹⁰.

As part of this revisionism, Leonardo León Solís describes the evolution of the frontier on the eastern side of the Andes by establishing the links between Araucanians and the tribes living in the Argentine pampas¹¹. Although this is a significant contribution to our understanding of the eighteenth-century frontier, its seventeenth-century articulation remains largely ignored. Also, some of the interpretations are debatable and barely sustained by historical evidence; in particular, Solís refers to a switch from what he calls the "Great War in Arauco" in the seventeenth century to the "Small War of malones" in the eighteenth century, completely ignoring the input of the parlamentos of the second half of the seventeenth century¹².

Historians in Chile and Argentina have been strongly influenced by these historiographical traditions, which focus on narrow geographical areas, but they are not alone. A recent book by Jean Pierre Blancpain, published in Germany, described the evolution of Arauco from early conquest to post-Independence years. Despite his attempt to provide a more comprehensive narrative of the history of southern Chile, Blancpain fails to go beyond cliches concerning native resistance. At times, the book is highly misleading. When the author deals with the second half of the seventeenth century, for example, his statements are based
on idiosyncratic beliefs rather than on any specific
documentation. For instance, although rebel Araucanians were on
the verge of a systematic expansion across the Andes, Blancpain
states that

"Quand, durant la seconde moitié du XVIIème siècle la
situation militaire se stabilise et qu'un certain
équilibre se crée par la lassitude et épuisement, la
guerre d'Araucanie ne rapelle que de loin l'entreprise
de conquête et les chevauchées du siècle précédent.
Côte espagnol, le concours des Indiens "amis", décisif,
n'a jamais fait défaut, mais deux grandes réformes sont
intervenues qui ont modifié le style et les conditions
de la guerre: la création d'une armée d'État permanente
et l'officialisation de l'esclavage. Chez les Araucans,
en revanche, le principe de la résistance reste intact,
même si l'hécatombe par meurtres directs ou par
esclavage a émoussé la pugnacité primitive des tribus.
Quand survient l'Indépendance du Chili, l'hydre,
affaiblie, reste insaisissable et le verrou araucan n'a
toujours pas sauté"[13].

This thesis will demonstrate, among other things, that the
evolution of the frontier during the second half of the
seventeenth century was due to separate but reinforcing factors
rather than to "lassitude." Moreover, a central goal of this
research has been to establish an accurate chronology since most
misinterpretations are based on the tendency to present a foggy
image of the seventeenth century.

Lastly, these traditions have also influenced American
historians. With regards to the Arauco, Spanish Policy in
Colonial Chile by Eugene Korth exemplifies the tendency to
analyze the evolution of one segment of the frontier. Published
in 1968, this book on seventeenth-century Arauco confirms that
"the principal cause of the resistance was the harsh
treatment that the Indians experienced at the hands of the
whites, many of whom looked upon the war as a convenient way
of solving the labour problem and of acquiring slaves for
their farms and haciendas."\textsuperscript{14}

Although Korth recognizes the benefits of the parlamentos
and other attempts to pacify Arauco during the second half of the
seventeenth century, he concludes that "basic attitudes changed
little between 1540 and 1700, and the abuses that fostered
antipathy between Indians and whites continued to prevent a
rapprochement."\textsuperscript{15}

As to the eastern segment of the frontier, Susan Socolow
concentrates on the southern pampas of Buenos Aires during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. She starts out with the
definition of European and Indian frontiers as "the intermediate
zones between areas of secure European settlement and those where
Amerindians maintained their autonomy." She briefly characterizes
the evolution of the frontier starting the chronology in the
sixteenth century when natives adopted horses and an "Indians's
warrior ethos." Then, Indians "became gradually dependent on
cattle as both a source of food and an object of trade with other
Indians and Spaniards alike," a statement that possibly refers to
seventeenth-century developments. For the Spanish colonies,
Socolow confirms that there was a permanent threat of Indian
attack from the conquest days of the sixteenth century.
Immediately thereafter, however, she simply enumerates tribes
whose raids and activities along the southern frontier occurred
at very different moments, starting in the early seventeenth and
dragging on until the late nineteenth century. This thesis seeks to specify how the four border settlements
of the southern fringe of the Spanish Empire became frontier
societies during the course of the seventeenth century. The
common factor was that Santiago, Mendoza, Córdoba, and Buenos Aires were ultimately shaped by Chile's struggle with rebel Araucanians. The first moment of this long-term process was the
Spanish expansion into southern territories in Chile by mid-
sixteenth century. Santiago, a small colony founded in 1541, served as a base for the thrust into Arauco, as reflected in the
foundation dates of the leading southern settlements. From 1541 to 1553, Spaniards founded Concepción, Imperial, Valdivia, and Villa Rica. Although colonization was punctuated by periodic Araucanian revolts, it was an orderly advance characterized by the use of the usual conquest institutions; entradas, encomiendas, gold mining, mercedes (and the concomitant development of Spanish agriculture and ranching), and the establishment of Spanish municipalities. The history of the border in the sixteenth century merely repeated the early colonial experience of practically every fringe area of the empire.

By the end of the sixteenth century, however, the evolution of that colonization was brutally truncated by the Great
Araucanian Revolt". Chile's Spaniards, deprived of essential human and material resources, strove to obtain goods and services from beyond the Andes. Araucanians, for their part, adapting to the presence of Europeans, altered their relations with other tribes living eastward of the Andes. These two movements, together, produced a militarized belt, which looked very much like the "medial moraines" of glaciologists. That is, the border was an accumulation of posts and settlements thrown up by, and between, the uncoordinated eastward flows of native and Spanish societies. Nevertheless, genuine dynamism was not to be found in the military fortifications, religious missions, or trading factories, although this is where Indians and Spaniards were in direct contact. Rather, the evolution of the society and its governance was determined in the immediate hinterland of these installations, where struggle over resources dictated the course of Spanish development and Indian expansion". These near-border zones determined future development. They, and not the fortified fringe, were the genuine frontier societies.

Across the Andes, Mendoza was the first settlement to be affected by the circumstances in Arauco, in part because the Crown determined that Mendoza had to help the troops, which coming from Spain via Buenos Aires, were on route to Chile. Further, Indian raids forced Mendoza to protect its southern areas, especially after the 1630s when ranching boomed in the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa. Equally decisive was the fact that
Arauco greatly influenced local commerce, which was largely based on re-exporting goods brought in from the eastern provinces.

Córdoba did not become fully integrated into the southern frontier until the 1640s. Nonetheless, commercial ties linked the settlement with Chile from the late sixteenth century onward. With regards to hostile Indians, because of the commercial importance of the route to Potosí, Córdoba devoted military resources to controlling the northern border with Calchaqui tribes. In 1643 the Dutch attack on Valdivia brought to the surface the connections and alliances among natives living along the southern border. Córdoba was warned that the Dutch had allied with rebel Araucanians, who in turn, in confederation with other Indians, were preparing to carry out a massive raid against Spanish colonies, including Córdoba. After this episode, Cordobans became aware that the threat of Indian attacks could come from the Pampas tribes living in the southern regions instead of the Calchaquis, and they redistributed their military assets accordingly.

In Buenos Aires, the Portuguese advance towards the Río de la Plata area was the crucial factor in military evolution since it forced the Crown to establish a garrison at the beginning of the 1640s. This outport of the Viceroyalty of Peru profited from Atlantic commerce and contraband from the late sixteenth century onward. In addition, the abundance of livestock in the countryside allowed colonists to partially pay for slaves and for
European merchandise brought in by Dutch, Portuguese, and British vessels with tallow and hides from their hinterland. From the perspective of this thesis, it was that abundance of horses and cattle which linked Buenos Aires with Arauco. Indeed, on the one hand, Indians rounded up animals in the area to trade with the Araucanians, a commercial exchange that can be documented for the seventeenth century. On the other, the Spaniards of the eastern segment of the border found an alternate source of income in Chilean markets when they started exporting cattle to the western provinces. The intensive exploitation of the cattle on both sides of the border had a decisive impact on the evolution of the frontier. By the end of the seventeenth century, Buenos Aires badly needed to expand its jurisdiction into new areas where feral cattle might be found. This growth, however, could not be trouble free. Not only did expansion promote conflict with Spaniards living in Santa Fe and Córdoba, and with the Jesuits in Paraguay. It was also the driving force which completed the west-to-east articulation of the southern frontier. Indeed, the Pampas, Serranos, and even more distant Araucanians were quite prepared to defend their right to exploit the decreasing livestock of the area and military priorities accordingly became ever more dominant. In the first three decades of the eighteenth century, the long-term process that articulated the four colonies along the southern border into a coherent whole was at last fully completed.
The dissertation begins with the Great Revolt of 1598-99 in Arauco and ends by the 1740s, when Buenos Aires underwent a series of new experiences that redefined it as a frontier colony; a society whose political agenda was determined by the military needs of the frontier. Like Santiago, Mendoza, and Córdoba, Buenos Aires' frontier experience cannot be fully related to geographical location or the character of the neighboring Indian society. Such characteristics would have defined the port as merely another "fringe" colony. Early in the eighteenth century, the need for access to resources available in southern areas transformed Buenos Aires. The outport, which had focused its political struggles on contraband, began to discuss control over its southern areas. This articulation into the southern frontier of the Viceroyalty of Peru was a consequence of the eastward expansion of Arauco during the seventeenth century. It was not, however, the end of its influence on the societies on the eastern segment of the frontier. Indeed, the political consequences of being transformed into a frontier society transcended the colonial times. The two most important political leaders of nineteenth-century Argentina --Juan Manuel de Rosas and Julio Argentino Roca-- were frontier men.

The historical evidence has been organized into three chapters. The first deals with the royal army in Arauco and it demonstrates how the endless need for supplies altered the economic and political life of Santiago where the elite, through
the Cabildo, sought to monopolize resources despite the opposition of governors who required horses and cattle for their soldiers. The second chapter analyzes the seventeenth-century evolution of the settlements located on the eastern side of the border. It specifies when and how they became articulated into the southern frontier. In the last chapter, the attention focuses on the driving force of this west-to-east articulation of the southern frontier; the struggle over resources. It strives to describe how the societies located on the eastern segment of the border belatedly came to mirror the earliest southern frontier.
ENDNOTES

1. In North America, frontier studies are frequently associated with the name of Herbert Eugene Bolton. See "The Epic of Greater America," The American Historical Review 38 (1933), 448-74; and "The Missions as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish American Colonies," The American Historical Review 22 (1917), 42-61.


3. One could argue that encomenderos in Chile tried to sustain older feudal ideals, whereas the new militarized nobility justified its position in terms of ongoing service. This variant of nobility of service was also extended eastward along with the frontier.


6. In fringe areas one expects a relatively important and prolonged role of regular orders and some sort of long-lasting military mobilization on the part of local Europeans. Bolton stated that "the missions then, like the presidios or garrisons, were characteristically and designedly frontier institutions, and it is as pioneer agencies that they must be studied;" for his concepts, see "The Missions as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish American Colonies," *The American Historical Review* 22 (1917), 42-61, 53-4; for Latin America, see John Saeger, "Another View of the Mission as a Frontier Institution. The Guaycuruan Reductions of Santa Fe, 1743-1810," *HHR* 65:3 (August 1985), 493-519. A presidio was first and foremost a fort presiding over a military district, the classic examples are the garrisons in Northern Mexico, in particular those in the Chichimeca region where they protected the silver highways from the Zacatecas mines to Mexico city; for further information, see Max Moorhead, *The Presidio, Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975); Philip Powell, *Soldiers, Indians and Silver, North America's First Frontier War* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1975); Edward Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest. The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970); and Alistair Hennessy, *The Frontier in Latin American History*
(Bristol: Arnold, 1978).
9. Sergio Villalobos et al., Relaciones Fronterizas en la Araucania (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1982), and Araucania. Temas de Historia Fronteriza (Temuco: Universidad de la Frontera, 1985); Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1989); Ricardo Ferrando Keún, Y así nació la frontera (Santiago: Antártica, 1986); and Andrea Ruiz-Esquide, Los indios amigos en la frontera araucana (Santiago: Universitaria, 1993).


12. He sees a continuity between the traditional warfare and the eighteenth-century raids ["El saqueo, el robo, el asalto en los caminos y el esclavizamiento de los Cristianos prisioneros desplazaban las formas tradicionales de la confrontación militar. Por su regularidad y magnitud, la guerra chica del malón era quizá menos heroica que la anterior guerra de toquis, pero no se puede negar que por sus efectos era menos feroz y brutal"]; "Maloqueros, tráfico ganadero," *Jahrbuch*. 37.


16. Susan Socolow, "Spanish Captives in Indian Societies: Cultural Contact Along the Argentine Frontier, 1600-1835," *HAHR*

17. North American scholars have been attracted by the resistance to Spanish rule posed by rebel Araucanians. One of the classic articles in the list is R.C. Padden, "Cultural Change and Military Resistance in Araucanian Chile, 1550-1730," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 13 (Spring 1957), 103-21.

18. A medial moraine is a border of detritus formed between two ice flows as they move in a parallel direction, but at different rates. The southern frontier was much like a medial moraine. Formed by two separate movements, each of which must be understood as the result of an original and enduring proximity to a zone of cross-border conflict -- whose consequences gradually flowed eastward from the Pacific to the Atlantic. On the Spanish side of the border, this situation created a "frontier society", so-called because of its proximity to the border. The frontier itself, in its physical embodiment as fortifications and in its institutional incarnation in military units and supporting elements (as in Valdivia or Concepción) was an inert product. A "frontier society" (as in Santiago or Mendoza), on the other hand, was very much a dynamic process; one which gradually extended the consequences of Araucanian rebellion, province by province, from one ocean to another.
When Spaniards travelled south from Santiago de Chile, they were moving to and beyond the very edge of the former Inca dominions. Four decades after these first attempts to control Arauco, however, and after numerous attempted revolts, the Indian uprising of 1598-99 obliged Spaniards to abandon the territories south of the Bío Bío River. The defeat of Curalaba in 1598, which was followed by the massacre of vanquished soldiers and decapitation of the governor by rebel natives, was more than a military catastrophe. The major settlements of Valdivia, Imperial, Angol, Villarica, Santa Cruz, and Osorno were abandoned or destroyed in the years following. Nor were these losses limited to settlements and territory, for the Indian labour which sustained Spanish colonization was also forfeited. Spaniards were then confined to the resources of the Central Valley since the north was an utter desert and the south had become a hostile zone.

In order to protect the remaining settlements, the Crown implemented unusual military measures, establishing a royal army to hold a fortified line, as it did nowhere else in the Indies, and assigning a situado to support the troops. A genuine military frontier was established. The royal decision was crucial because it freed Santiago from most of the financial and military costs involved in protecting the newly established frontier. It did
not, however, liberate it from the obligation of finding necessary supplies.

The needs of the soldiers had also an enormous impact on the local and regional economy. Year after year, they required horses, cattle, produce, and other supplies. Yet, although it opened a potential market, the presence of troops also generated conflicts between the elite of the capital, which had its own economic plans; and the governors who had to prevent shortages of military supplies. This chapter will analyze how this market of some 2,000 paid soldiers, plus allied Indians (Indios amigos), affected Santiago during the course of the seventeenth century.

2.1 - *Four Colonies on the Southern Border of the Spanish Empire*

In 1541, after establishing their capital in the Central Valley of Chile, Spaniards pushed both southward and eastward to expand their dominion. As elsewhere in the Indies, the search for an Indian labor force was a principal motive for further exploration. *Entradas* were the normal device for expanding the boundaries of Spanish control and extending the grasps of the conquest society which preserved it and lived from it. The east was neither as rich nor as well-populated as the south, which attracted the greatest degree of attention, nevertheless Chileans were drawn beyond the Andes because Pedro de Valdivia and Francisco de Villagra (the conquerors and first governors of
Chile) needed ever increasing supplies of material and human resources to grant to their followers. Thus, as early as 1552, Captain Juan de las Cuevas received an encomienda in the Uspallata Valley in Mendoza. This pattern continued into the seventeenth century. In 1618, for example, the Chilean Captain Juan Ortiz de Urbina was granted an encomienda, which included Indians of San Luis in Cuyo.

Santiago could claim rights over Cuyo because Captain Juan de Villagra had discovered it on behalf of Chilean authorities. Effective Spanish occupation, however, did not come until a decade later, when Captain Pedro del Castillo, starting out from the capital, established Mendoza at approximately the same latitude as Santiago (lat. 33°) in 1561. Although insignificant in size, the new settlement had important consequences. It allowed access to native labour in the Valle de Huentota, Lagunas de Huanacache, and the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa, and served as a base from which eastward expansion could be sustained. Spaniards established another settlement, San Luis, following this eastern direction in 1593. All remaining eastward movement, however, led to disputes with the government of the province of Tucumán, and especially with the encomenderos of Córdoba.

In the late sixteenth century, authorities in Tucumán and Santiago bitterly argued about their rights to exploit the eastern flanks of the Andes. In the struggle, Córdoba often acted as a proxy for the Viceregal court in Lima. Competition between
Santiago and Lima for control over these territories began in mid-sixteenth century. In 1549 Juan Núñez del Prado founded Ciudad del Barco, but four years later, Francisco de Aguirre left Santiago charged with the task of changing the settlement into a new municipality under Chilean jurisdiction, Santiago del Estero. Aguirre's mission was part of a broader thrust designed to support Santiago's claims on trans-Andean territories. Ultimately, the Crown decided to create the Government of Tucumán under Lima's control and the Corregimiento of Cuyo as part of the Capitanía General of Chile. The zone was therefore split between the two contenders, but not to Chile's advantage. Peru consolidated its jurisdiction by establishing Córdoba (1573), Salta (1582), and San Salvador de Jujuy (1593)⁶.

Mendoza and Córdoba were "conquest societies" at the end of the sixteenth century. Both colonies were founded in response to jurisdictional disputes, which also characterized the first moment of the Spanish expansion in the Indies⁷. At the end of the sixteenth century none could see these settlements as border colonies, located on the fringes of the Spanish dominion. The conquerors hardly believed that they had reached the limits of the expansion. Nor could anyone see any indication that Córdoba, and Mendoza would become frontier societies in the course of the next century.

Having founded no more than a score of settlements in this section of the empire by the end of the sixteenth century,
Spaniards were living in isolated pockets. They were constantly searching, however, for the staple production and commercial ties that might bind them into an economically prosperous whole. Growth depended not only on access to labour and material resources, but also on the opportunity to connect regional and international markets. The Crown also wanted to open routes to consolidate and expand its dominion. As a result, private and royal interest coincided and contributed equally to the development of inter-regional links.

One of the most important lines of communication bound together the four colonies of the southern border. In 1583 Alonso de Sotomayor, who had been appointed governor of Chile, arrived in Buenos Aires with 500 men. When he reached Mendoza in June, he opened a corridor connecting Spain to Chile, and avoiding the hazardous Strait of Magellan. Sotomayor believed that the route would suit royal interests since troops in Arauco could be assisted more easily and cheaply than before. In 1583, for example, he wrote to the king that his forces would be able to import horses from Tucumán and Paraguay, reducing the costs for the royal treasury. Although there were many horse-breeding farms in the Central Valley and Arauco, the price of these animals was extremely high in Chile. The reason was that colonists preferred to export mules and horses to Potosí since this yielded a higher profit than that which could be obtained in the local market. Consequently, troops frequently suffered from
shortages. Sotomayor expected that the new route, connecting eastern areas with Arauco, would solve the problem.

From the earliest times, civilians had also organized expeditions to explore neighbouring areas and to open trade routes. In the same year that Córdoba was founded, Spaniards joined Santa Fe to Buenos Aires; and three years later, the route was complemented by the segment that connected Córdoba with Mendoza. The expedition of Alonso de Sotomayor was the first which travelled the entire route linking the distant port of Buenos Aires with Santiago via Córdoba and Mendoza.

While Sotomayor saw the military benefits, merchants perceived the commercial possibilities of a route that connected the southernmost colonies. At least four Cordoban companies designed to trade with Santiago started operating in the last two decades of the sixteenth century. Slaves and merchandise began to travel the route. A contract signed in 1584, only a year after the Sotomayor expedition, sheds light on the type of early trading relations which existed between Córdoba and Santiago. According to the document, merchants could encounter danger in the route, but profits outweighed the fears of "fire and perils of war." The volume of such a trade was considerable. One of the first requests to import slaves in 1589 was for a total amount of 6,000 Blacks. Córdoba argued that the lack of manpower in the region imposed a recourse to African slave labour. Two decades later, however, the number of slaves cited in the dowries and
testaments was still very small, which probably indicated that slaves were imported to be sold and reshipped to Peru and Chile, although the commercial use of this route had been prohibited. Spanish expansion south of 35° ceased at the end of the sixteenth century. Nowhere could conditions be found which were propitious for further colonization. Patagonia remained as a region for entradas where Spaniards made a few attempts at colonization. Only the legend of the "City of Caesars" attracted Spaniards towards the Patagonian Andes, where the fabulous kingdom was supposedly located. The legend describes three wealthy cities in which almost everything was made of gold and silver, with abundant cattle and docile, hard-working Indians. It was said that the white-skinned kings had escaped from the Araucanian Revolt of 1598-99 when Imperial, Angol, Osorno, and other settlements were burned to ashes. Others, however, assured that the Caesars were survivors of the shipwreck of Camargo's expedition.

In 1604 the Governor of Buenos Aires, Hernando Arias de Saavedra (known as Hernandarias), organized an expedition to determine the location of the kingdom. His expedition included 130 soldiers, 700 allied Indians, 76 carts, 600 horses, and abundant number of cattle. They left Buenos Aires in the first day of December, reached the Negro River, and came back three months later without having found the City of the Caesars. For
Hernandarias, the only usefulness of the adventure was that it appeared in his relation of merits and services to the king.

Nevertheless, the Crown wanted further information and in 1620 ordered another expedition to discover the mythical kingdom. It was organized in Córdoba by Gerónimo Luis de Cabrera, the grandson of the conqueror of the colony. In 1622 he wrote a report to the Crown informing it that he had recruited people in Córdoba, Paraguay, and Chile. Cabrera left the colony at the head of a 400-man expedition, which followed a southwestern direction until they reached the Andes in the Neuquén area. Once again, the golden cities failed to appear, reinforcing the rumour that they could be invisible to some Spaniards.

A long-term consequence of these campaigns to find the golden cities in Patagonia was that they dispersed a certain number of tired or lazy horses, cows, and bulls. These losses spread wild cattle and horses far south of the Spanish dominions; distant tribes were thereby freed from the need to advance towards Spanish areas to obtain animals. This circumstance may explain why Indians did not start attacking Spanish farms on the eastern segment of the border until the second half of the seventeenth century. By then, their own herds and wild cattle might have become a scarce resource, although as we shall see, other factors were also involved.

The western and eastern segments of the southern border therefore were significantly different at the beginning of the
seventeenth century. In the western segment Spaniards maintained a foothold southward of latitude 35°. Santiago, however, became and remained a frontier society for it had to cope most immediately with consequences of successful Araucanian resistance. As the most stable and populated colony proximate to the frontier, it could hardly avoid its impact.

Concepción, which was founded in 1550, was burned to the ground by natives four years later. Once rebuilt, the Crown attempted to give it a leading role by opening a Real Audiencia in 1567, but the institution only worked until 1575. Finally, Concepción was impoverished by the Great Araucanian Rebellion and devastated by earthquakes of 1657 and 1687\textsuperscript{14}. In the case of Valdivia, the revolt depopulated it completely at the end of the sixteenth century. In 1645 it was fortified anew after the Dutch attack on Chile, but remained a mere fortress down to the end of the colonial times. Further south, Imperial and Villarica were depopulated and abandoned in 1600 and 1602 respectively, and the episcopal seat located in the former was moved to Concepción\textsuperscript{15}. Santiago therefore was the most important settlement on the western segment of the border, and the only one with a viable and self-sustained society of any size.

On the eastern segment, Mendoza was a satellite of Santiago and was handicapped by its political and economic dependency on the capital across the Andes. As Santiago strove to find resources in neighbouring areas, in particular after the
Araucanian revolt, which deprived it from half of the country, vecinos of Mendoza adapted to the needs of the Chilean market by re-exporting cattle imported from Tucumán, Paraguay, and Río de la Plata. The volume of Mendozan trade was very modest, however, and proportional to its limited number of inhabitants.

The demographic growth of the settlements of the Corregimiento of Cuyo was very slow since Spaniards preferred to settle down in Santiago. Governor Pedro Osorez de Ulloa encouraged this situation by authorizing vecinos of Santiago to disobey the decree of June 29, 1619, which obliged encomenderos to settle down where they had their encomienda. The governor’s authorization to those encomenderos in Cuyo who were living in Santiago was granted in exchange for an agreement to provide the troops in Arauco with horses, cattle, and foodstuff. The input of the revolt in Chile on development in the eastward colonies could not have been more clearly demonstrated.

Although Mendoza derived commercial benefits from its proximity to Santiago, there was also a negative side since the capital considered Cuyo mainly as a place from which to extract resources. The first taken away were Huarpes who were driven to work across the Andes. Encomenderos were even allowed to rent the Huarpe’s labour to non-encomenderos. The rent of a Huarpe gave an annual profit of $15, 7 tomines, and 3 grams of gold, which represented double the returns that encomenderos could get from regular Indian tribute. Moreover, encomenderos usually
received the payment for renting the Indian in advance. This set of possibilities contributed to the sharp decline of the Indian population in Cuyo. In 1570 there were 2,500 natives in encomiendas while by 1692 only 165 were left, and many of them were permanent residents in Chile. As early as 1614, for example, 37 percent of the Indians living in the outskirts of Santiago were Huarpes\textsuperscript{18}.

Lastly, another consequence of the proximity to and dependency on Santiago was that Mendoza was the first colony on the eastern segment of the border to have a genuine frontier experience. Pehuenches, from the eastern slope of the Andes, traded with Araucanians from the earliest days. Not surprisingly, they became their military allies during the malones directed against this segment of the border. Nor was this exportation of war the only symptom of this frontier situation. The struggle over control of available resources on the Spanish side of the border reproduced across the Andes a similar type of behaviour. Mendoza was directly affected by the changing circumstances in Arauco.

The situation in Córdoba at beginning of the seventeenth century was quite different. The main reason is that the colony was mostly concerned with its trade with Potosí. The route to the north was crucial, it could not be cut off without slashing local agriculture, cattle trade, and textile production. Since 1600 the local obrajes were exporting textiles, and during the 1620s,
there were at least 15 companies that traded mules to Potosí, a
market that bought an average of 20,000 animals per year from
Córdoba. At the same time, the African slave trade produced
profits of $143,821 in 1596-1610. Nonetheless, conflict on the
northern border with Calchaquí tribes also had an economic
impact. These natives periodically reacted against Spanish rule
and the uprisings of 1630, 1657, and 1665 forced Córdoba to
maintain a certain level of military preparedness. From the
Empire's perspective, however, although the northern frontier
with the Calchaquis threatened civilians, Córdoba was safe enough
to hold the Cañias Reales (royal treasury)\textsuperscript{19}. Until mid-
seventeenth century, the colony was able to devote military
resources to protect the route to Peru since, for all practical
purposes, the southern border did not exist.

On the eastern segment of the frontier the port of Santa
Maria de los Buenos Aires was the last colony to undergo a
frontier experience. Like Córdoba, at the beginning of the
seventeenth century, Buenos Aires did not pay much attention to
its southern areas. It concentrated on the Río de la Plata and
the Atlantic world. Buenos Aires was still a small settlement of
500 inhabitants, whose slow growth was due to a royal restriction
that closed it to external commerce, except for specially
licensed vessels (navios de registro)\textsuperscript{20}. In 1598 the Crown
authorized the export of a limited amount of wheat, tallow, and
dried beef (the so-called productos de la tierra) to Portuguese
colonies. The decree was renewed on August 20, 1602, thereby changing the local economy because it encouraged agriculture and ranching to produce surpluses, rather than just satisfying the limited internal market\textsuperscript{21}.

Smuggling through this outport of the Viceroyalty of Peru neither interfered with nor weakened the authorized commerce with Portuguese colonies in Brazil and West Africa. When officials first arrived in Buenos Aires, they were always struck by the astonishing regularity of contraband. A few administrators refused bribes, but some tolerated the contraband, and many were personally involved. Commercial exchanges with the Portuguese continued until 1640, reaching its zenith around 1625. The connections with Guinea provided Buenos Aires with the perfect chance of making high profits. Approximately 10,000 slaves entered the port between 1602 and 1627\textsuperscript{22}.

The slave trade linked the southern colonies and the Cabildo of Buenos Aires used the military importance of the corridor to defend the trade. According to these municipal authorities, the port played a prominent role in the defence of the southern colonies. Any royal attempt to reduce abuses by cancelling the authorization was answered with the threat of depopulation. The Cabildo usually reminded the Crown that the port protected both Chile's and Peru's backyards. During a meeting held in April of 1606, for example, cabildantes dealt with the possibility that a new royal decree could cut off commerce with the Portuguese
colonies, and they forecast catastrophe. The consequent depopulation of the port would create a state of jeopardy for the entire empire in the Southern Cone. Without Buenos Aires, the Cabildo argued, military assistance to Peru or Chile would be practically impossible. The bishop himself added his voice to the chorus of morbid forecasts. He overtly recommended disobedience to the royal mandate because it promoted the destruction of the colony, the province, and even of Tucumán23.

The Crown took appropriate action. It keep the status quo while gathering information. On June 7, 1618, it consulted both the Real Audiencia of La Plata and the governor of Buenos Aires on the consequences of forbidding Brazilian imports through registered vessels. In the same year, another decree ordered the opening of a customs office in Córdoba to control the leakage of Potosi silver through to Buenos Aires24.

Regardless of these measures, attempted restrictions on commerce and contraband had a minimal impact on Buenos Aires, which now left behind the previous days of famine and scarcity. The first governor sent by Philip III, for example, Don Diego de Góngora, tried to leave for his post with 300,000 ducats in contraband merchandise. A denunciation to the Council of the Indies stopped him, but it seems that he found ways to recover lost ground. He arrived in 1619 and died after only four years in office. During this short term, however, his activities earned him a 23,050 ducat fine. Most of seventeenth-century Río de la
Plata governors only differed from Góngora in the degree of involvements in contraband. In summary, at the beginning of the seventeenth century the southern border was still extremely diffuse. This was more evident in the cases of Córdoba and Buenos Aires since neither of them devoted any military attention to the south. Along the course of the seventeenth century, however, the frontier experience, which started in Arauco at the end of the sixteenth century, gradually expanded across the Andes, embracing the colonies of the eastern segment of the border. A growing awareness of the need for better protection of the southern territories and resources gradually spread to influential officers and soldiers.

2.2 - The Frontier with Arauco during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century

The Great Araucanian Revolt of 1598-99, which pushed Spaniards north from Arauco, was answered by a drastic military reform, which included a military budget of 212,000 ducats in order to support a strong presence of troops on the Bio Bio River. The king had much to ponder with regards to the defence of southern Chile. Francisco de Quiñones, who was appointed governor of Chile soon after the revolt, confirmed the suspicion that Araucanians demolished Spanish resistance without great
effort. In his letter of February 18, 1600, Quiñones clearly described the misery of this "ensemble of men," reluctant as he was to call them "troops." Soldiers were half-clothed, wore no shoes at all, and did not even have swords to protect themselves. Quiñones was convinced that peninsular regulars, better trained and properly paid would bring the war to an end in three years\textsuperscript{28}.

The revolt had changed the fate of Santiago and the entire region to such a degree that the Cabildo urged the Crown to establish a regular army to protect the remaining settlements. In turn, this modified the distribution of goods and services at the local and regional level since the army opened a market of around 2,000 men in addition to allied Indian forces. Year after year, they required livestock, wheat, wine, cloth, arms, ammunition, tobacco, and \textit{verba mate}; the latter imported from the faraway Paraguay.

Such a number of soldiers was the result of the arrival of Antonio Mosquera and his "1,000 men." Travelling Sotomayor's route, Mosquera arrived in Santiago in 1605. His arrival was celebrated by the encomenderos and vecinos of Santiago who were anxious to avoid their military commitments. The Cabildo, dominated by encomenderos, showed its gratitude by giving Mosquera a golden chain as a gift\textsuperscript{29}.

Although this influx of soldiers relieved the elite in the capital of dealing with the defence of Chile, it worsened the need for supplies. The Cabildo of Santiago sought to protect its
clienteles in two different ways. First, it defended its right granted by a decree of 1597 that ordered Santiago to provide for the army, but only with food. Secondly, it prohibited hunting wild cattle in Concepción the year after the arrival of Mosquera and his soldiers. The relevant Acta only pointed out that there was a serious shortage of livestock in the Concepción area, but it is quite clear that it was due to the sharp increase of troops in Arauco. Cabildantes knew that any shortage in food had to be covered up by the capital. In such a case, Santiago would have less cattle to sell on the Peruvian market³⁰.

From earlier experiences, members of the elite could remember the frictions with governors for access to resources in the Central Valley. In 1572, for example, the governor had threatened that the encomenderos would lose their encomiendas if they did not satisfy military requirements. At that time encomenderos finally agreed to send $2,000, 50 horses, and 500 fanegas of wheat to Arauco³¹.

During his term of office, Governor Alonso de Rivera (1601-05) also received 500 more soldiers via Buenos Aires. Yet the situation was desperate since Villarica was in ruins, Osorno had to be evacuated, and the Dutch had crossed through the Strait of Magellan and attacked Chiloé. He was alarmed by the ridiculously high ratio of 50 captains to 70 soldiers. This suited the interest of the principal families of the capital, but did not substantially contribute to defensive efficiency. He believed,
however, that paid troops would reverse the desperate situation of Arauco, as he had found that only 500 soldiers of 1,151 were useful. In addition, he had to call them out in advance because lodging was provided by friends and neighbours. Rivera's report concluded that it was a "divine miracle" that the Araucanians had not yet exterminated the Spaniards. A direct solution would have been to oblige encomenderos to fulfil the military obligations attached to their status, but Rivera soon realized that he could not trust Santiago's elite. He then conceived a general reform, which even included the establishment of royal farms, a textile workshop, and a tannery. Labour would be provided by enslaved natives. The three farms were "Loyola" between Chillán and Concepción, "Catentota" between Chillán and Maule, and "Quillota". The tannery in Santiago made shoes and horse-riding supplies, and the textile workshop of Melipilla made good profits, according to its accounts from 1607 to 1611.

The impediment to the continuity of this program was that it reduced the profits made by many officers on the frontier. The report of 1606 by the Oidor Luis Merlo de la Fuente revealed that the shortage of food was deliberately caused by those officers who distributed produce among the soldiers. Officers had systematically abandoned the royal farms, reducing their productivity. Captains who owned store-saloons (pulperías) marked up all the products by 30 percent. If these officers also owned
land, they sold their production to their own soldiers at any price, and even landless ones were able to profit because they sold at 14 reales the cattle that they previously bought at 4 reales in the Maule River area.

In 1605 Alonso de Rivera was forced to resign, not because of military failure, but due to his loss of power in Santiago. The elite had won the political struggle against a governor who had seized goods and ordered forced contributions. Rivera even sent inspectors to the encomiendas to check out whether they followed royal decrees and commissioned Captian Ginés de Lillo to carry out a land survey. Two considerations motivated the survey. First, Rivera wanted to protect Indian villages from land-hungry encomenderos. Secondly, he needed land to grant to his own followers. By so doing, the governor exasperated encomenderos who anxiously awaited for any mistake on his part. When in 1603 he married Inés de Córdoba without royal authorization, he gave his enemies the weapon they needed. Viceroy Marquis de las Salinas finally removed him from office. The Crown, however, appointed Rivera governor of Tucumán. When he crossed the Andes to take up his new post, he encountered along the way the soldiers which he had requested to bring the war in Arauco to a successful end.

The next governor, Alonso García Ramón had, as one of his first tasks, to convince the Crown to abolish the Royal Decree of 1604, which modified the salary budget and banned forced
contributions (*derramas*). García Ramón proposed another scheme for pacifying the frontier. He wanted horses to be imported from Paraguay, no less than 2,000 soldiers, and the establishment of permanent settlements to replace garrisons upon completion of a campaign*. He believed that an increase in civilians instead of in the number of officers and soldiers would better impose the Spanish presence in the region.

This program, however, was not viable. If the military presence was difficult and expensive, colonization was next to impossible. Demographic conditions posed unsurmountable obstacles to his plan. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Oidor Gabriel de la Celada had briefly described the Capitanía General of Chile as "eight cities that were poor and underpopulated at the same time". The capital itself had only 200 houses, Concepción 76, Mendoza 32, and San Luis 10. Where would settlers come from if Castro in Arauco had only a dozen of houses at the time?*

After two decades since the revolt of 1598-99, the Crown, like Sisyphus, seemed predestinated to roll a rock to the top of a hill only to have it plunge back down just as it reached the crest. Within this atmosphere, the Jesuit Luis de Valdivia advanced a series of visionary proposals, which nonetheless seemed worth trying. Valdivia explained to the Junta de Guerra in Spain that the enslavement and imposition of hard labour on natives had been the main reason for Araucanian retaliation. He
then proposed to keep a professional army at the Bio Bio River and to send only preachers to Arauco. This defensive-war strategy was the third program designed to pacify Arauco during the first half of the seventeenth century.

In 1611 Father Valdivia came back to Chile with the newly-appointed Governor Alonso de Rivera to implement the new system. Both agreed on the terms of cease-fire with Araucanian chiefs in 1612, but Rivera was not fundamentally convinced by the defensive-war strategy. His former experience may have warned him of possible resistance from officers and settlers since Indian enslavement represented a source of quick profits. The Cabildo of Santiago, for its part, considered Valdivia's program completely unacceptable because it implied the loss of the most fertile portion of the country. Such a loss of material and human resources could not be welcome in the capital.

Rivera's suspicions turned out to be well founded. The Cabildo immediately petitioned the Real Audiencia to avoid changes in native labour legislation. The Crown, however, firmly kept to the principles of Valdivia's program of defensive war. To maintain harmony between Father Valdivia and Governor Rivera ultimately proved impossible. In 1613 disagreements between them led Rivera to write his letter of resignation, but the Crown did not accept it. Equally disappointed, Father Valdivia considered Rivera more a traitor to the cause than a deserter from the struggle. The priest reported that the governor had violated the
pact with the Araucanians since he had allowed a *mita* (forced labour for the state), even though it was also prohibited\(^4\).

Governor Rivera died in 1617 and Valdivia's program only survived for another two years. Complaints to Lima and Madrid convinced the General Father Vitelleschi to recall Luis de Valdivia to Spain. Before leaving Peru, he was able to influence Viceroy Esquilache's New Ordinances to regulate native labour. Known as *Tasa de Esquilache*, these laws were immediately rejected by the *encomenderos* of Santiago who referred to the example of Yumbel, recently burned to ashes by rebel Araucanians. For the elite in the capital, this example was proof enough of the failure not only of the Valdivia's program, but also of the entire defensive-war program\(^6\).

King Philip IV authorized war "by fire and sword" (*a sangre y fuego*) in a Royal Decree of April 13, 1625. His decision was the fourth attempt to control the frontier and was influenced by a letter of the Viceroy of Peru of April 30, 1624, and by the opinion of the *Gidor* and interim Governor Luis Merlo de la Fuente. There were, of course, undisputable provocations which contributed to the royal resolution: Araucanians had organized 187 *malones* (raids) enslaving peaceful Indians and Europeans, and stealing around 2,500 horses\(^5\).

Philip IV decided that the change in policy could not be based on an increase in the military budget. If the *situado* had been enough to support "lazy troops," it would be more than
enough considering that the economic benefits of enslaving rebel Indians would pay for a more active posture. The royal authorization to enslave rebellious natives pushed Spaniards south. They promptly reconquered lands to the point of reaching Imperial within a one-year campaign. If this would have been the tendency, Arauco would have been pacified in a very short period. The frontier then would have also vanished along with its military, economic, and social benefits. Santiago had an ambivalent attitude with regards to the total pacification of Arauco. Peace was desirable, but the army benefited the elite, despite the fact that it also generated political tensions when governors requested more support from the capital. It happened to Rivera at the beginning of the century and also to Governor Francisco Lazo de la Vega three decades later.

In 1629 Governor Lazo de la Vega arrived in Chile with 500 soldiers and arms. Three decades after Rivera, the new governor tried a similar program of self-sufficiency and professionalism to bring the war to an end in a two-year campaign. Considering that Spaniards reconquered most of Arauco in a one-year campaign, his plan was entirely possible, even if the results proved temporary. He soon realized that most of the obstacles to this program was set up by Spaniards themselves rather than by Indians.

The attempt to pacify the frontier by forcing the elite in Santiago to play a more active role automatically fuelled its
resistance. To divide the available resources between military and civilian needs had been part of the political agenda since the beginning of the century. It was still a problem. Early in his government he had to import 12,000 head of cattle from Buenos Aires in order to supply the troops. Since the military budget had not been increased, if Lazo de la Vega required more goods and services for the army, he had to force the elite in Santiago to contribute. Strong tensions between the cabildantes and the governor characterized the political sphere during the decade that Lazo de la Vega ruled Chile.

2.3 - Political Conflicts

Two opposing sets of needs provoked frictions between the Cabildo of Santiago and the governors of Chile from earlier days. On the one hand, governors needed supplies for the troops in Arauco. And on the other, the residents of the capital wanted to protect their exclusive access to the few tradable resources available to them in the Central Valley.

As early as the third decade of the seventeenth century, the scarcity of wild cattle grazing south to the capital was recognized by the Cabildo. Suspending the licenses for vaquerías to civilians would be the solution to the problem of providing the army with enough cattle. Such a proposal caused further
conflicts because control over wild cattle and the licenses to hunt it was a right of all Cabildos”.

From the very beginning of his government, Lazo de la Vega tried to impose his program, which imposed an active role in controlling the frontier on all of the city’s vecinos. In 1640 the governor went personally to the meeting of the Cabildo to remind its members of their military obligations. Cabildantes were far from intimidated and defended themselves from the accusation of shirking their obligations by arguing that the colony could hardly protect itself from external attack. Consequently, Santiago needed to control all available human and material resources, if it was to defend the seat of government. Lazo de la Vega replied that despite the fact that there were five militia units in the capital nobody showed up to protect it when corsairs attacked Valparaiso. The Cabildo argued that the lack of military response was due to the fact that 600 well-trained soldiers had been previously authorized to leave by the former governor.

Unable to make any headway with the Cabildo, Lazo de la Vega then turned to the Real Audiencia, forcing that institution to play an active role in the struggle. To his despair, the oidores simply asked the Cabildo whether the colony would have enough people to send as soldiers to the frontier and to protect itself at the same time. It was the perfect opportunity for the Cabildo to stress that vecinos could not even protect themselves from “an
uprising of Negroes or Indians." The oidores then closed this circle by sending the report to the governor\textsuperscript{50}.

Such a state of affairs did not deter Lazo de la Vega who withdrew the Cabildo's rights to appoint administrators of the Rapel salt mines and the nearby Indian village\textsuperscript{51}. Moreover, in 1632 he enforced royal decrees about residential requirements for encomenderos as a device to remove three members of the local Cabildo from office. Two of these, Maestre de Campo Miguel Gómez de Silva and Captain Manuel de Caravajal were sent to Cuyo where they had their encomiendas. Francisco de Pastene, however, preferred to escape rather than live in a miserable village in Cuyo. The three were powerful members of the elite. Miguel Gómez de Silva, for example, was not only encomendero, but also a landowner in Malloa and Colchagua. His daughters' dowries amounted to $30,000, and he was able to buy the post of alguacil mayor for $12,000 in 1644\textsuperscript{52}.

Lazo de la Vega's decision to send members of the elite to Cuyo might have caused him difficulties. Unfortunately, the Actas of the Cabildo for the following years have vanished, making it impossible to follow the development of the struggle. Nevertheless, the Actas from 1638 onward reveal interesting aspects of the closing years of the government of Lazo de la Vega. In a memorial of 1638, for example, the governor deplored the fact that the situado had been used to pay military salaries, since this obligation only derived from the fact that
encomenderos refused to serve the king on the frontier. The tone of his complaint did not resemble his earlier aggressive attitude. The Cabildo seems to have worn him down. This may account for the Cabildo's condescending style when it responded to the memorial. The institution explained that Santiago had made great efforts to support the Spanish presence in the south and that the absence of vecinos in the army was due to "the poverty of a reign that forced them to work very hard to support their families".

Although they changed the style for correspondence, tensions were kept alive by the never-ending struggle over access to resources. The meeting held on November 6, 1638, urged the procurador to request the governor to revoke the licenses he had granted for vaquerías in areas under the Cabildo's jurisdiction. If the governor rejected the petition, the Cabildo decreed, then the procurator could prosecute the governor by informing the Real Audiencia about the abuse.

The Real Audiencia of Santiago was the other institution that could moderate political tensions. It became ineffective to protect royal interests, however, because it was under the elite's control. In essence, very little distinguished the members and officers of the Audiencia from the members of the Cabildo. Both had kinship ties with locals and shared concern over tradable goods. Alonso del Pozo y Silva illustrates the statement.
Alonso del Pozo y Silva, a lifetime canciller (from 1609 to 1645) was one of the wealthiest local merchants, a landowner in Puangue, and an encomendero in Cuyo. He may have used the capital available to him as treasurer of the Santa Cruzada to invest in slave trading since at the same time that he was treasurer, he bought slaves in Córdoba. More astonishingly, Canciller Alonso del Pozo even received legal permission to sell Indians from the Cordoban Captain Tristán de Tejeda. This was despite the fact that as a subordinate officer of the Real Audiencia he was supposed to enforce the decrees protecting natives from this type of commerce.

The link between Alonso del Pozo y Silva and Tristán de Tejeda exemplified the operation of extensive trading networks and overlapping activities. Tristán de Tejeda was a militia officer who owned farms both in Córdoba and in Buenos Aires. He became one of the richest Cordobans by trading a wide variety of goods, including slaves, textiles, wines, mules, and cattle.

Tristán's marriage to Luis del Peso's daughter furnished a further relationships with the elite in Santiago. Chilean-born Luis del Peso was the lieutenant of governor in Córdoba during Alonso de Rivera's government in the Province of Tucumán. The network also included Captain Juan del Pozo y Silva in Buenos Aires who was also born in Chile. As many others, Juan del Pozo y Silva was both an important landlord and smuggler. This type of extensive web linking powerful members of the elites in different
colonies contributed to commercial exchanges. Moreover, it explains how merchandise was introduced by contraband in Buenos Aires and distributed within Tucumán and Chile.

The case of Pozo y Silva might be extreme, but it was far from unique. Authorities in Lima believed that the Real Audiencia of Santiago cost too much and that its members "did not work and married in the province, contradicting royal ordinances." The viceroy even consulted the Cabildo of Santiago about shutting it down, which would have been a mistake because in such a case, the Cabildo would have concentrated almost all local political power59.

At a different level, the Cabildo's policy of protecting access to resources safeguarded Santiago. Since the demand for supplies of the army clearly surpassed the limited agrarian production of the Central Valley, the institution perceived the risks involved in allowing governors to extract them through forced contributions or at lower prices. In 1639 vecinos of Santiago reported that they had already given $1 million to the army in loans and forced contributions59.

This struggle for control of the resources of the Central Valley was finally won by the Cabildo. By the end of his government, Lazo de la Vega received a decree advising him "not to bother vecinos too much with warfare topics"60. Since such a decree left the governor to depend on a strict budget to pay for goods and services at the local and regional markets, it may have
been partially responsible for the future policy of parlamentos, which characterized the second half of the seventeenth century. Francisco López de Zúñiga, Marquis of Baides, who ruled Chile from 1639 to 1646, certainly generated the conditions which allowed him to potentially obey the royal order when he signed the Treaty of Quillín with rebel Araucanians in 1641. The ceasefire both cooled down the frontier and created an impasse in the struggle between the governors and the elite of Santiago. It was just in time to face other types of defensive problems in southern Chile. This time, they derived from the Dutch attack on Valdivia.

2.4 - International Tensions: The Dutch Threat

The Dutch and Portuguese conflicts with Spain in the 1640s both affected the Hispanic American Empire. On the western segment of the southern border, the Dutch set foot in Arauco, producing a local and regional impact, which even reached Córdoba⁴¹. On the eastern extreme, the Portuguese rebellion against Spain altered the life of Buenos Aires where a garrison had to be organized to protect the Río de la Plata region. The menace to Spanish colonies in the Indies contributed to the west-to-east articulation of the southern frontier of the empire in two complementary ways. First, the colonies had to cooperate in the defense by sharing their military resources. Secondly, the
Crown was unable to reduce its assistance to the centres. Quite the opposite, it had to allow the establishment of another royal army on the southern border.

The 1640s were crucial with regards to the military defence of the Empire. Spanish strategy centred on the idea that depopulated coastal regions would deprive invaders of the required support and foodstuff to successfully seize control of an area\(^2\). The strategy, however, did not take into account the possible assistance that rebel natives could offer to intruders in the case of an external attack. When the Dutch led by Enrique Brouwer arrived in southern Chile in 1643, the Crown came to appreciate the potential risks of native assisted invasion.

Corsairs had been navigating southern waters in the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans since 1599 and their presence caused a great deal of alarm in many ports including Buenos Aires. In 1620, for example, Governor Diego de Góngora reported that he was ready for an external attack\(^3\). Even Córdoba was prepared for an attack as early as 1629 when Governor Felipe de Albornoz ordered the organization of a local militia. According to Albornoz, corsairs were able to sail up the Paraná River and transport troops from Santa Fe by land to Córdoba; a desirable target since the royal coffers were located in the latter colony\(^4\).

Nevertheless, the Dutch posed a more serious problem when they attacked the western segment of the border. In April of 1643 Enrique Brouwer reached Chiloé, expecting to find Creole and
Araucanian support, but neither group were willing to help him to overthrow Spanish rule$^{65}$. Settlers had bad memories since prior Dutch expeditions destroyed rather than traded. Araucanians, for their part, suffered from the effects of the smallpox epidemic of 1639, which had reduced their war-making capacity$^{66}$. Equally important, they had recently agreed with Spaniards to a ceasefire in Quillín and could hardly see any benefit in changing Spanish for Dutch colonization. Adding to feelings of distrust, Spaniards successfully spread rumours that the invaders wanted the gold of Valdivia, which would be extracted by enslaved Araucanians$^{67}$.

Natives decided to provide Brouwer's navigators with barely enough food in exchange for firearms and whatever was made of iron. The Dutch asserted that Indians said that they would need half a year to ensure the required level of livestock. Faced with their failure to provoke a general uprising, and at risk of starving, the intruders left Chile in October$^{68}$. The native claim that they needed half a year to obtain the required foodstuff might have been a dilatory strategy$^{69}$. It may also indicate, however, the time necessary to drive cattle from eastern areas to Arauco. In any event, after trading with corsairs, rebel Araucanians not only had firearms, but also iron to exchange with other tribes for cattle.

There were two other important consequences of the Dutch presence in southern Chile. On the one hand, the attack magnified the behaviours of the elite in Santiago as regards collaborating
in the military defence of the region. And on the other, the seizure of Valdivia contributed to the west-to-east articulation of the four colonies.

In regards to the first aspect, self-serving tendencies won out over patriotism. A Cabildo held on April 1, 1644, recognized that a voluntary contribution, which it had launched, had failed to meet the minimum sum of $2,500 needed to help troops in Arauco. As donations amounted to only $500, the Cabildo forced 295 of the wealthiest and more prominent citizens to contribute.

At the top of the list, Maestre de Campo Juan Rodulfo had to send tallow worth 65 patacones. Following Juan Rodulfo were Captain Valeriano de Ahumada, Maestres de Campo Gerónimo Bravo de Saravia, Antonio de Caravajal, and Miguel de Silva, and Captain Francisco de Ovalle. Each of them had to send 50 patacones.

Supposedly, contributions were proportional to wealth. Valeriano de Ahumada, for example, had an encomienda of 54 natives as well as many houses and retail shops in Santiago. He also provided the army with foodstuff, and so did his son Gaspar. Maestre de Campo Gerónimo Bravo de Saravia belonged to a family whose social prestige was confirmed by the fact that Francisco Bravo de Saravia would acquired a title of nobility in 1684. Maestre de Campo Miguel de Silva had an encomienda in Cuyo while Antonio de Caravajal was engaged in the profitable slave trade. Finally, Captain Francisco de Ovalle arrived in Chile in 1600 and two
years later he was the procurator of Santiago. He climbed up the social ladder by marrying into the wealthy Pastene family.  

Nevertheless, the list of the forced contribution of 1644 involved a few cases in which the donations did not reflect the contributor's capital. Contributors who gave less money were at times those who had more capital and enough influence to evade the mandate. For example, wealthy individuals such as Antonio de Barambio and Ginés de Toro gave 10 patacones. The same is true for Captain Francisco de Fuenzalida, for Juan de Pastene, and for Pedro de Prado.

Some contributions were extremely meagre. Luis Jufré, offspring of conquerors and encomendero in Peteroa, Mataquito, and Pecoa contributed only 8 patacones like the urban baker Miranda. Maestre de Campo Felipe de Arce contributed 6 patacones, although he was an important officeholder and had inherited an estate worth $12,471 from his mother Margarita de Verdugo. Moreover, Felipe de Arce profited from the trade route that connected the eastern provinces with Chile. He ranched in Colchagua as well as in Valle de Uco, importing cattle from Buenos Aires where he used to sell his wines transported by his own ox-drawn carts. To sum this up, the forced contribution documents how some of the wealthiest members of the elite in Santiago managed to diminish the impact of this type of forced extraction of their resources for military purposes.
Another consequence of the Dutch invasion was its influence on the west-to-east articulation of the southern frontier. One episode in particular sheds some light on the situation. While in San Luis, Captain Luis del Toro received letters with news about Brouwer's arrival in Arauco. Luis del Toro was en route to Córdoba where he sold wines and bought slaves for the Chilean market. Although there were risks involved in such transactions, Toro operated under the protection of family links both in Cuyo and in Santiago.

On December 8, 1643, the Cabildo of Córdoba requested Luis de Toro to read his private letters during the meeting because the colony could be in danger. There were growing fears that Indians were confederated to attack Spanish settlements along the southern border. As the letters to Toro asserted that the Dutch instigated the alliance, the Cabildo sent an urgent message to the governor of Tucumán. He was compelled to return to the colony to protect the southern areas of Córdoba with the troops originally sent to protect Buenos Aires from a possible Dutch invasion. For the first time, Córdoba turned its attention to the south and became aware of its frontier position.

A few months later, the Cabildo sent Captain Gerónimo Márquez de Bustamante to the Real Audiencia of La Plata. His mission was to convince the oidores of the necessity of abolishing the decree that obliged Córdoba to assist Buenos Aires. In October of 1645, a Cabildo Abierto took into
consideration its deep concerns about leaving Córdoba's backyard unprotected, while Buenos Aires was able to ask for help from Paraguay whose Jesuit missions had the potential of sending 3,000 soldiers. This assistance could arrive in the port very quickly by sailing down the Paraná River.\(^3\)

The Cordoban attempts must have failed because the order to assist Buenos Aires was enforced a year later. At that moment, a frightening rumour affirmed that the Dutch had arrived in Chile once again, but this time with many Negros to help them during the attacks. The Cabildo of Córdoba decided to prepare troops to be sent either to Mendoza or to Buenos Aires, depending on where the intruders would show up first. Moreover, the cabildantes took an unusual (perhaps illegal) action. They agreed on retaining in the colony the troops coming from Santiago del Estero even though they were protecting the situado on route to Buenos Aires.\(^4\)

Altogether these episodes related to the Dutch threat, and especially Brouwer's expedition to southern Chile, contributed to the west-to-east articulation of the southern border. While both Santiago and Mendoza had devoted military attention to the south in earlier years, Córdoba became aware for the first time of its frontier situation. In essence, this was the most unexpected and long-lasting consequence of the Dutch attack to Arauco.

2.5 - The Benefits and the Beneficiaries

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Until 1640 the Chilean experience exposed the paradox originated by the foundation of the royal army of the frontier, which protected Santiago and competed for local resources at the same time. Although the army created an alternate market, it led to a shortage in products that the elite needed to trade with Peru. To minimize the competition for resources, both the governors and members of the elite imported goods and services from eastern territories. By so doing, they contributed to the west-to-east articulation of the southern border.

For many Chileans, military needs were a source of stable jobs, and for a few others, the steady demand was a source of personal enrichment. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the sharp increase in the number of soldiers increased the demands of the troops in the Bio Bio frontier. Horses, for example, became one of the most expensive goods in the southern region. Its scarcity was caused by two combining reasons. First, the high local demand, and second, the fact that breeders preferred to raise mules. Different factors justified their preference. There was a domestic demand, because mules were required to cross the Andes, and also an international market, because Peruvians paid a good price for the beasts. Lastly, risks were much lower since mule-breeders neither faced the frequent military requisitions nor suffered from frequent theft, as horse-breeders did.
To cope with the lack of horses for the army, Governor Alonso de Rivera imported them from faraway areas of Tucumán and Paraguay. There was a considerable gap between Rivera's request and the actual arrival of animals in Arauco. It was not until García Ramón's government that horses from Tucumán and Paraguay arrived in Chile⁸⁵. The delay was caused by Captain Pedro Martínez de Zavala who was responsible for driving the animals from Tucumán to the frontier. Apparently, he got sick in Córdoba in March of 1610. Although he promised at that time to gather enough horses for the next summer, it took him two years to arrive in Mendoza with only 158 horses along with the firearms that had been imported by Mosquera many years earlier⁸⁶.

Such a failure, however, did not prevent governors from considering Tucumán and Paraguay as the appropriate markets to buy animals. For instance, Governor Juan de la Jaraquemada (1611-12) insisted on importing horses from eastern territories because a horse could cost up to $200 in Chile. Juan de Jaraquemada was truly convinced that the lack of useful horses came from the tendency of raising mules. He then firmly forbade this activity (as García Ramón had done during his term of office) and ordered the gelding of jackasses on May 1, 1611⁸⁷.

Although there were many attempts to supply the troops with enough horses, the documentation attests to a permanent shortage. In addition, the drastic measures described should not be taken literally. Nor do they disclose the strategy implemented by most
governors -- anxious as they were to provide sufficient supplies to their soldiers -- that is, they usually asked for a lot to get just enough.

From the military perspective, the main difficulty was that natives raised excellent horses for both warfare and trade\textsuperscript{88}. The allies of the rebel Araucanians across the Andes, the Pehuenches, traded with both Araucanians and Spaniards. They sold poisons to Araucanians for their arrows and horses to Spaniards. Pehuenches were also intermediaries, passing horses and cattle that came by way of southern Mendoza from southern Córdoba and Buenos Aires to the other side of the Andes\textsuperscript{89}.

These animals were occasionally stolen from Spanish farms, but they mainly came from the livestock proliferating southward latitude 35\degree where Europeans had no dominion at all. In other words, these were mostly feral animals, and may have been the offspring of those scattered around during the expeditions to the City of the Caesars. After rounding them up, natives domesticated them, and sold them to other tribes or to Spaniards. By and large, natives did not yet need to steal cattle from Spanish farms. Araucanian and Pehuenche alliances and their movements both sketched the frontier in a west-to-east direction, functioning as a corridor whose southern side was of exclusive use of natives while the northern one was under Spanish control.

Horses were not the only animals demanded by the troops. There was also a high demand for cattle during the entire
seventeenth century. In the early years, mining areas competed with the army for the beasts left over after exports to Peru. Santiago preferred to export tallow, hides, and some other products to the north rather than to the south because the colony had been exempted from paying overseas duties (almojarifazgo) since 1594. At the end of the sixteenth century, wild cows were still abundant in the area. Indeed, in 1595 the Cabildo of Santiago ordered hunters to burn carcasses because of sanitary considerations and in 1602 Governor García Ramón deplored the waste of meat because only tallow and hides were tradable goods. The exports to Peru and the establishment of the army in Arauco automatically determined the intensive exploitation of the feral cattle in the Central Valley.

Until 1640 Santiago was able to export around 18,000 quintales of tallow per year. As a cow provided one quintal of tallow, 18,000 cows were annually required to fill the amount of exported tallow. Resources in the Central Valley, however, were limited, and the Araucanian Revolt of 1598-99 closed off the south to agrarian expansion. Since the far north was an utter desert, vecinos of Santiago had no choice, but to cross the Andes to find places for either hunting or raising cattle.

An unexpected factor contributed to accelerate the use of the land in the trans-Andean territories. The region underwent a short glacial period, which produced cooler weather with abundant rainy days. More water extended the natural grasslands in the
valleys, creating appropriate conditions for expanding the ranching activities. In Mendoza, the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa acquired new economic value not only thanks to this climatic change, but also because they were strategically located on the route to Santiago through the pass of Tupungato.

Captain Juan de Amaro, who had received one of the first mercedes in Valle de Uco, sold the lands to Jacinto Videla Guevara in 1625. There is no evidence that Juan de Amaro exploited the lands in any way. Two decades later, however, the new owner, Jacinto Videla Guevara, had his cattle grazing in Valle de Uco⁶⁴. In the third decade of the seventeenth century, the powerful Maestre de Campo Domingo Sánchez Chaparro --Lazo de la Vega’s agent in Cuyo-- was granted a merced in the area. In Mendoza, he married Eufrasia de Videla and was appointed lieutenant of corregidor in 1646⁶⁵. Some documents of the 1630s confirmed the scarcity of available useful lands in these valleys due to Lazo de la Vega’s extensive mercedes⁶⁶. Ironically, while ranching was in expansion in Mendoza, many poor settlers suffered from the lack of meat to the point that the local Cabildo had to oblige the so-called "four lords of the cattle" to sell cows in the local market⁶⁷.

Landowners and encomenderos were able to profit the most from the situation of Chile. As in some other places in the Indies, they frequently combined economic power with appropriate links to the political sphere. Most of them (if not all) enjoyed
military ranks. Captain Alonso de Campofrío could put the natives of his Cuyo encomienda to work on his farm in Chile, while his son-in-law, Antonio de Barambio, was one of the main importers of cattle from San Luis and Buenos Aires\(^9\). Likewise, Nicolás de Lisperguer used his 34 Indians as labourers on his Chilean farms. \textit{Maestre de Campo} Lisperguer exported tallow to Lima and dried beef to Arauco. While in the army, he went from captain to \textit{maestre de campo} in only two years. Politically, he was \textit{regidor} between 1631 and 1635, and \textit{alcalde} in 1642\(^9\). One of his sons, Pedro, was granted the desirable encomienda of Talagante while his brother Juan carried on family business, and acted as a political agent of Santiago in Lima\(^10\).

Martín García represented one of the most successful cases. In 1580 he was a mere tailor, but 20 years later he had accumulated enough capital to participate in the slave trade. He owned lands in Puangue via \textit{merced} and on the road to Valparaiso. In the port, García acted as lieutenant of \textit{corregidor}\(^10\).

The way in which family networks operated is even more illustrative than isolated cases. The Sánchez Chaparro and Toro Mazote families are cases in point. Domingo Sánchez Chaparro, a landowner in Mellarauco, who was one of the officers selling foodstuff to his own soldiers, was promoted from captain to \textit{maestre de campo} and granted a \textit{merced} in Xaurúa under the government of Lazo de la Vega. In Mendoza, he combined his political action as \textit{corregidor} and his economic interests since
he was a wine maker. His son Sebastián was also an active officer and administrator. The clan included Captain Andrés Sánchez Chaparro, landlord and cattle breeder in Valle de Uco; and Manuel, the first captain of the militia of merchants. The ways in which Manuel amassed his fortune show interesting strategies. He used to drive cattle to Valparaíso and received some of the animals as payment. These cattle then grazed on his farms in Mellarauco and Puangue, which he received in a merced. Manuel also sold wines to the troops in Arauco. At first, he rented vineyards in Chile, but in 1609 he bought some in Mendoza. The lack of an encomienda barely affected him because he usually rented Huarpes in exchange for merchandise.

The Toro Mazote family's period of influence started with Ginés, a merchant in Santiago and encomendero in Cuyo. Ginés accumulated a considerable estate that included land, vineyards, a tannery, and a labour force of 13 Aucas and 30 Negroes. In 1630 he bought a lifetime regimiento for himself and the depositaria general for one of his sons. Another son, Andrés, was not only a lawyer of the Real Audiencia, but also the lieutenant of corregidor in Santiago. Family links in Cuyo and Córdoba created an efficient network, which greatly benefited the clan's commercial operations.

Finally, it is useful to refer to some examples of the social and economic achievements obtained while on duty or after having served in the army. Captain Francisco de Eraso, for
instance, occupied several military and political posts. He was alférez, regidor, and 31 times alcalde of Santiago, Quillota, and Melipilla. In 1648 he asked for the encomienda of Lagunas de Guanacache and San Luis in Cuyo, which was granted to him in the following year along with authorization to move these Indians to his farm in Chile\textsuperscript{104}. Also illustrative is the case of Captain Francisco Fuentes de Villalobos who arrived in Chile as one of the soldiers of Mosquera’s expedition. Only a few years later, a group of soldiers promoted him to captain in an irregular acclamation. The investigation that followed asserted that Fuentes was "elected" leader of the unit because all of the other officers had died in an Indian attack. Eventually, the clever captain was able to gain the confidence of the governor, the Marquis of Baides, who granted him the post of veedor general of the army, which he held from 1638 to 1655\textsuperscript{105}.

In general, these cases corroborate the information given by governors' reports, by the Actas of the Cabildo, and by other available sources. The army in Arauco created a market for several products. Although it absorbed a great deal of the goods that otherwise might have gone to the Peruvian market, the army benefited settlers if they were positioned to profit from both Peruvian and the military needs. It is evident that the high demand for supplies, added to the availability of cash and goods from the situado, buttressed the local economy. Furthermore, military needs propelled the economic integration of the
communities located along the border, even eastward beyond the Andes, since the local economy was unable to meet the needs of the frontier. In other words, one element in the west-to-east articulation of the southern border was the endless quest for resources in the trans-Andean areas of Mendoza, Córdoba, and Buenos Aires.

2.6 - Military Stability and Reorientations during the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century

The Pact of Quillín in 1641 inaugurated the policy of parlamentos. It accepted Araucanian self-government in the territories south the Bio-Bio River, even though Spaniards would still rule their own settlements located in that zone. The core of the agreement was that natives could not be enslaved or forced to work. In turn, Araucanians had to return captives, ally with Spaniards against corsairs, and allow the presence of preachers106. The pact repeated many aspects of Valdivia's proposal and its philosophy of defensive war. Yet, it also testified to new times and showed Spanish and Araucanian need for a suspension of hostilities.

On the Spanish side, the parlamento mirrored both the international and local circumstances of the 1640s. Spaniards underwent a series of reverses exemplified by the rebellion of Portugal, the revolt of Catalans, and the endless struggle in
Flanders, which, once ended with the Dutch, continued with the French. The situation in Europe was difficult enough as to suggest that Hispanic American colonies find their own way of solving regional conflicts without depending on military support from the metropole. At a local level, the peace helped to restore harmony between the elite of Santiago and the governors after half a century of conflicts over local resources.

On the Araucanian side, the prior smallpox epidemic had reduced Indian war-making capacity and the eruption of the Volcano of Villa Rica was considered an extremely negative omen, restraining Araucanians from belligerent actions\textsuperscript{107}. The consequences of the parlamento transcended the local sphere because Araucanian then renegotiated their alliances with tribes living on the eastern segment. The pact of Quillín gave natives some hopes that Spaniards would moderate their aggressive attempts to dominate Arauco. Natives therefore were able to devote more attention to other activities rather than guarding the frontier. Released from intense preoccupation over the frontier, Araucanians could cross the Andes whenever they needed resources from the eastern territories. In other words, they needed fewer intermediaries. As a result, for Indians and Spaniards in the eastern segment the parlamentos in Chile had a rather negative input. While the pact benefited the western segment of the border, it contributed to the frontier experience of the colonies of the eastern segment.
Disappointingly, from the Crown's perspective, it was unable to reduce its military expenses. Despite royal expectations that the pact of Quillín would begin a new era of border relationships, peace did not change basic conditions. First of all, it proved to be almost impossible to enforce the interdiction on slave raids. Governor Antonio Acuña y Cabrera (1650-56), for example, tolerated malocas to the point of being considered accountable for the Araucanian uprising of 1655. In addition, the Crown was surprised by the cruel paradox that, while warfare decreased, the number of soldiers increased. According to fragmentary data, in 1670 the army had 2,270 Spaniards and 429 indios amigos. Another estimate for the same year was that there were 2,500 soldiers and officers, including both allied natives and Spaniards. This was despite specific directives, which absolutely prohibited any increase in the number of soldiers. To put the figures into perspective, at the beginning of the seventeenth century Rivera reported an army of 1,151 soldiers and in 1640 Zúñiga specified that there were 1,738, although reliable data does not exist and historians do not agree on any of these figures. According to Ruiz, for example, in 1640 there were 2,121 soldiers receiving payment from the situado; 215 being Indians. External witnesses such as the Dutch, however, considered that in 1640 there were 1,480 Spanish soldiers for the entire Chile. Since the military budget remained the same throughout the seventeenth century, one might...
ask how some soldiers managed to survive\textsuperscript{15}. The development of activities that had no relation at all with military duties might be a tentative explanation.

The establishment of a permanent garrison of 500 soldiers in Valdivia after the Dutch attack aggravated the problem of both availability and distribution of supplies. From 1648 onward, the army offered to buy 6,000 cows per year at 11 reales each, but such a price could never compete with the 14 reales offered on the free market. Similarly, the price of horses was marked up on the market\textsuperscript{16}. While this sort of dispute over cattle and horses prices echoed those heard during the first half century, complaints about a shortage in crops was the novelty of the second half. On June 8, 1656, the Cabildo decided that the governor had to resolve the issue since cereal transportation to the frontier was both difficult and expensive. Wheat had to be transported from the farms and mills in the Central Valley to Valparaiso where it was shipped to Concepción. According to the Cabildo, the governor himself had to organize the whole enterprise and pay $10 per cart transporting cereal from Santiago to Valparaiso. The Cabildo even suggested to bring back Rivera’s project and established farms in Melipilla, Llileo, Lampa, Cuminón, and Aconcagua in order to harvest enough cereals for the troops\textsuperscript{17}. Surely, the motion was a new version of the old policy of protecting resources. This time, the Cabildo’s suggestion sought to prevent future disputes with the governor.
In many ways, prices in Chile during the second half of the century resulted from the seventeenth-century inflation that affected the entire economy of the Spanish Empire. In the Central Valley, the scarcity of some products accelerated the rhythm of local inflation and fiscal pressure became more noticeable. The unión de las armas, for instance, doubled tax rates from 2% to 4% in 1645. The duty was part of a program developed by Count-Duke of Olivares for the military defence of the empire and sustained after his fall. A Royal Decree of 1636 applied it to the Indies, but Santiago alleged that it had already been contributing to imperial defence since the first days of the Spanish presence in the region. Even though this was true, the Crown ordered Chile to pay the unión de las armas from 1640 onward.\textsuperscript{118}

On November 26, 1643, the Cabildo consulted 73 vecinos, 34 of them officers, about ways of paying the duty. They decided to postpone payment, but the governor counteracted the decision by seizing anything useful to the military protection of Santiago and ordered the shipment of arms to Concepción. Santiago then tried to convince the governor that the capital was unable to pay the unión de las armas. Only the earthquake of 1647, however, enabled Santiago to obtain temporary relief from paying the duty.\textsuperscript{119} In 1653 the Cabildo dealt once again with the amount owed to the royal treasury, but not even a favourable letter from the Jesuits could get the desired exemption.\textsuperscript{120}
Considering that the number of troops was still very high, the need for supplies remained a potential source of conflicts between royal authorities and the Cabildo. Opposing interests began to be evident once again when Governor Pedro Porter Casanate arrived in Chile after the Araucanian uprising of 1655. He found the frontier quite unstable\textsuperscript{121}. Accordingly, he requested further support from the capital, but Santiago dealt with the governor's petition in a routine, and not very responsive, manner. During 1658, for example, every request from the governor was read during the session and summarized in the Acta. The Cabildo never implemented any measure to react to the demands. To better illustrate the Cabildo's behaviours, when Pedro Porter Casanate announced his expedition against Arauco, the cabildantes concurred by soliciting that every convent in the capital pray for the success of the endeavour, and left it at that.

The governor would undoubtedly have preferred material over moral support. Thus, he demanded 9,000 heads of cattle, even though he did not expect to receive such an amount. An estimate of 1661 shows that of the 24,388 beasts that he had requested in the three previous years, he had only received 14,000. In other words, the army usually received about half of the requested amounts\textsuperscript{122}.

In 1660 Porter Casanate in letters to the Cabildo insisted that the situation of the army was "deplorable." His appeal to the elite's sense of compassion, however, was used by the
cabildantes to their own advantage. They sent the letters describing the poverty of the soldiers in Arauco to the viceroy as proof of the deplorable situation of the whole region and the consequent need to excuse Santiago from paying the unión de las armas. A royal decree of 1661 finally released Santiago from the tax. Meanwhile, the governor realized that he had to quit waiting for help from Santiago. He ordered the two detachments that were protecting the Maule River area to go to the frontier, leaving Santiago's backyard and its nearest farming region unprotected.

It was Governor Angel de Paredo who partially restored relations with the elite of Santiago when he proposed to set aside $25,500 of the situado to pay for 9,000 head of cattle at 20 reales each and 1,000 horses at $3 each. It was reported, however, that the army only received 5,400 heads. According to Angel de Paredo, the army needed approximately 8,000 cows per year. It can be assumed that the gap was filled up by buying cattle from the natives.

Natives, in turn, had to cross the Andes towards the southern regions of Cuyo, Córdoba, and Buenos Aires to either hunt wild cows or buy the animals from other tribes. In other words, the military requirement influenced the native alliances since Indians had to agree either on rights to hunt cattle or on the rate of exchange. Conflicts among them in case they could not reach an agreement seem to have been frequent.
Although this political struggle between royal authorities and the elite still characterized the life of Santiago, other factors affected its dynamic. The demographic factor played a central role. An increasingly Mestizo population began to satisfy the demand for labour, which heretofore had been satisfied by natives and slaves. In 1613 a census by Oidor Hernando de Machado established that there were 1,717 inhabitants in Santiago. The population increased to 5,000 in 1657, the majority of them landless Mestizos who became rural workers. The earthquake of Lima in 1684 propelled Chilean agriculture since Peru increased its imports of cereals. It is possible that the Crown considered this demographic factor when it ordered the implementation of the Royal Decree of 1674, which totally abolished Araucanian enslavement.

In addition to demographic changes, there was also considerable commercial transformation. The port of Concepción became another centre of contraband in the Southern Cone. Such a role concentrated royal attention on corrupt administrators, rather than on rebel Araucanians. The appointment of the ex-governor of Buenos Aires José de Garro to the government of the Capitanía General of Chile was the royal response to smuggling in Arauco. Governor José de Garro's competence in such matters was indisputable since he had dealt with the Portuguese and their establishment of Colonia do Sacramento across the Río de la Plata River, in front of Buenos Aires.
The last governor of seventeenth century Chile, Marin de Poveda (1692-1700), summarized the spirit of the times. His report of 1695 was optimistic with regards to the frontier. From his perspective, Arauco seemed almost pacified, but corsairs gave rise to another type of concern both in terms of military protection and smuggling activities. Contrary to what happened during the first half of the century, when Governor Poveda asked for horses, he did not have any problem. Not surprisingly, he had severe difficulties to get enough wheat for the troops since cereal was now the main export to Peru.

What did not change during the second half of the seventeenth century was the political role of the Real Audiencia, in particular, its reluctance to cooperate with the governors. When Captain Francisco Briseño, for example, went to the farms located north of Santiago with an order to extract products to be sent to the army, his action was obstructed by a Real Audiencia document allowing the privileged few to evade their obligation. On another occasion, the institution meddled with the governors handling of a trial against suppliers who sold contaminated food to the army. The Crown had to remind oidores that the case was a military one, therefore under military fuero and governor's control.

Finally, although changes moderated the influence of the army on society as a whole, the military still took the lion's share. It not only invigorated networks of production and
exchange because the situado represented cash or goods worth around $293,000 (212,000 ducats), but also generated wealth by absorbing local goods. It is not unexpected that the number of officers and soldiers increased rather than decreased during the seventeenth century\textsuperscript{134}. Both individual cases and family networks exemplify the degree of power and influence of Chilean officers during the second half of the seventeenth century.

Encomenderos and farmers may have profited most from the presence of the army in Arauco during the first half of the seventeenth century. In the second half, however, officer merchants began to come to the fore. The case of Ignacio de la Carrera is characteristic. As governor of Chiloé he abused his power so as to monopolize the exports of woods from the island. He also received 21 natives belonging to the encomienda of Malloa and Peteroa in 1655, the year he was appointed to the Corregimiento of Santiago\textsuperscript{135}.

Similarly, Diego González Montero accumulated military and political posts, being governor of Valdivia in 1650 and governor of Chile twice. His encomienda included 27 Puelches whom he used as workers on his farms, located close to the mining area of Marga-Marga. Although he received more lands through the dowry of his second wife, he became an associate of Flórián Ramírez de Montenegro who had a considerable track of land in Colchagua with his own cattle, vineyards, a tannery, and a working force of 18 slaves\textsuperscript{136}. 77
Family networks were still an important factor in the dynamic of the colony, as in the first half of the century. An interesting case of family connections is the Toro Zambrano clan. Captain Alonso de Toro Zambrano, ancestor of the Conde de la Conquista, accumulated capital by negotiating the diezmos and receiving both an encomienda and mercedes. Alonso became one of the most important cattle and mule-breeders of the colony. His son-in-law, Captain Martin de Zavala, regidor in 1647, received $14,000 when he married Alonso's daughter. Captain Zavala himself is another example of officer-merchants since he imported cloth, honey, and sugar to trade in Chile. The clan included Juan de Ugalde, Alonso's father-in-law. Both Alonso de Toro Zambrano and Juan de Ugalde participated in the political life of the colony, holding different posts in the Cabildo of Santiago for many years.

When Maestre de Campo Andrés de Toro Mazote settled down in Cuyo, he expanded the network to the eastern flank of the Andes. Andrés had both an encomienda and land in San Luis. One of the borders of this 4,000-cuadra property was the route used by carts en route to Córdoba. Another member of the family, Manuel de Toro Mazote, was a member of the Cabildo of Santiago for almost half a century, from 1612 to 1661. Huarpes worked on his farms in Aconcagua and Quinteros and, from 1651 onward, he traded with Lima in association with Tomás Cascos. Manuel also exploited the mines of San Lorenzo in the Uspallata Valley. Finally, a legal
document signed by Marcos Toro Mazote in Córdoba testifies to the commercial links of the Toro Mazote family in the province of Tucumán.303

There is more than enough documentary evidence linking families in Chile with those in the eastern provinces. For example, two sons of the most powerful encomendero of La Serena in Chile, Gerónimo de Pastene, married in Córdoba.339 Most frequently, ties bonded members of the elite in Santiago with powerful families in Cuyo. For example, Melchor de Caravajal, who was a supplier of the army in Arauco, settled down in Cuyo once he was appointed to the corregimiento. His offspring also played a part in the military, and in the economic and the political spheres.340

One of the most interesting cases is that of the Portuguese-born Antonio de Barambio. This landowner in Lampa and Colina imported cloth from Peru to be reshipped to Buenos Aires from where, in turn, he imported cattle to sell in Santiago. Importing activities were conducted in association with Gerónimo de Ugas, a notary, through a company which operated with a capital of $62,000. Furthermore, Antonio de Barambio counted on the dowry of his wife who brought to the marriage $46,779. Captain in 1655 and alguacil in 1644, Barambio operated in Córdoba where Captain Domingo de Burgos had the legal authorization to represent him in commercial transactions.41
Other cases illustrate the changes of the second half of the seventeenth century. Captain Jorge Zapata de Mayorga --regidor in 1643, alcalde in 1647, and encomendero in Cuyo-- sold not only the traditional dried meat, tallow, and cheese, but also wheat to the garrison of Valdivia\textsuperscript{142}. The increasing need for cereals impacted on the use of land. Consequently, areas suitable for cereal production became scarce. The last tract of 1,000 cuadras in one of the most fertile areas, Colliguay, was granted to an army supplier, Captain Antonio Irrazával. The preference was to devote the land to crops. Captain Luis de las Cuevas, for instance, preferred agriculture over cattle-breeding activities. His farm "Colina" had not only grasslands, but also vineyards and large areas with cereals\textsuperscript{143}.

Altogether, the available information for the entire seventeenth century corroborates that Arauco generated a set of experiences, which affected the capital and even transcended the local sphere. Across the Andes, the impact of a distinctive frontier experience differed from one colony to another in intensity, mode, and chronology. The next chapter will reconstruct the seventeenth-century evolution and the frontier experience of the three colonies of the eastern segment of the southern border.
1. The Indian population between the Maule and the Bio Bio Rivers, which previously provided labour for the Spaniards, was largely relocated south of the Bio Bio by the rebel Araucanians.

2. For the sixteenth-century Spanish expansion and colonization, see Leonardo León Solís, La merma de la sociedad indígena en Chile central y la última guerra de los promoaucaes. 1541-1558 (St Andrews: University of St Andrews, 1991); Agustín Venturino, Sociología primitiva Chile-indiana (Barcelona: Cervantes, 1928); Francisco Encina, Resumen de Historia de Chile, I (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1956); Guillermo Feliú Cruz, Historiografía colonial de Chile (Santiago: Fondo historiográfico José Toribio Medina, 1957); Miguel Amunátegui, Compendio de la Historia política y eclesiástica de Chile (Santiago: Esquerra, 1896), and El Cabildo de Santiago desde 1573 hasta 1581. (Santiago: Nacional, 1890); and Horacio Lara, Crónica de la Araucanía (Santiago: El Progreso, 1889); some general studies also contain useful information for the seventeenth century, see Julio Alemparte, El Cabildo en Chile colonial (Santiago: Andrés Bello, 1966); Domingo Amunátegui Solar, Historia social de Chile (Santiago: Nascimento, 1932), and Chile bajo la dominación española (Santiago: Universo, 1925); Horacio Aranguiz, "Estudio institucional de los Cabildos Abiertos en Santiago de Chile (1541-1810)." Revista de Indias 32: 127-30 (1972), 217-26; Arnold

3. For the first *encomenderos* in the region, see Juan Draghi Lucero, Preface to the *ACMZ* I (Mendoza: Best, 1945), LIV.

4. The *encomienda* was granted on August, 11, 1618; see *La Provincia de Cuño del Reino de Chile*, 2 vols. ed. Juan Luis Espejo, I (Santiago: Universitaria, 1954), 130.

and for the seventeenth century, see María del Rosario Prieto, "Formación y consolidación de una sociedad en un área marginal del Reino de Chile. La Provincia de Cuyo en el siglo XVII," (Ph.D. dissertation, Universidad de Sevilla, 1983).

6. For the struggle over Tucumán, see Roberto Levillier, Chile y Tucumán en el siglo XVI (Paris-Praga, 1928); Guerras y Conquistas en Tucumán y Cuyo (Buenos Aires: Porter, 1945); and "Conquista y organización del Tucumán," HNA III (Buenos Aires: Ateneo, 1961), 215-67. Regardless of the royal decision, Santiago could barely resist the temptation posed by the available resources on the eastern side of the Andes and pursued the goal of expanding its jurisdiction to the point of suggesting that it should become the capital of new viceroyalty, including the provinces of Tucumán and Paraguay. Governor García Ramón himself supported the idea in a letter to the king that he sent in October of 1609, a decade after Governor Francisco de Quiñones had sent a similar proposal. On these proposals, see Crecente Errázuriz, Historia de Chile, 2 Vols. (Santiago: Cervantes, 1908), I, 87; and II, 317-8 and 395.

7. There are many examples as provided by cases such as that of the three contending parties that arrived near the modern-day Bogota in 1538, and the various currents converging in Central America.

8. Sotomayor had to finance his troops to the point of
solving his personal wardrobe in Buenos Aires; for details, see Pedro Mariño de Lovera, "Crónica del Reino de Chile," Biblioteca de autores españoles (Madrid: Atlas, 1960), 413.

9. Chilean horses were very expensive in Peru; see Carlos Sempat Assadourian, Guillermo Beato, and José Carlos Chiaramonte, Argentina. De la conquista a la independencia (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1972), 137; and Luis Tribaldos de Toledo, "Vista general de las continuadas guerras," CHCH IV, 1-145.

10. On colonial networks of communication, see Enrique Barba, Rastrilladas, huellas y caminos (Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1956); for the slave trade in Córdoba, see Assadourian, Argentina, 47-9; and El tráfico de esclavos en Córdoba, 1588-1610 (Córdoba: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 1965); for the slave trade in Mendoza, see Rosa Zuluaga, "Trata de negros en la región cuyana durante el siglo XVII," RJEH 6:1 (1970), 39-71.

11. In 1551 Villagrán organized and entrada from Chile and so did Governor of Lope de Ulloa in 1620. For further details, see José Toribio Medina, Ensayo acerca de una mapoteca chilena (Santiago: Ercilla, 1889), 51-2.

12. For related documents, see Colección de Obras y Documentos para la Historia Argentina, ed. Pedro de Angelis, I (Buenos Aires: Colmegna, 1900), 352-61.

13. On these entradas, see Manuel Figuerero and Enrique de Gandía, "Hernandarias de Saavedra," HNA III, 269-91; Ramiro Martínez Sierra, El mapa de las pampas, (Buenos Aires: Imprenta


15. For a brief account, see Juan Espejo, Nobilario de la Capitanía General de Chile (Santiago: Bello, 1967).


17. For information on the natives of the eastern flank of the Andes, see Alberto Rex González and José Pérez, Argentina indígena. Visperas de la conquista (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1976), and Salvador Canals Frau, Las poblaciones indígenas de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Hyspmérica, 1986).

18. For these estimates and additional information, see Alvaro Jara, "Importación de trabajadores indígenas en el siglo XVII," Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía 124 (1956), 185, 199, and 204; and Los asientos de trabajo y la provisión de mano de obra para los no-encomenderos en la ciudad de Santiago, 1586-
1600 (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1959), 66-9; and
Assadourian, Argentina, 70.
19. On colonial Córdoba, see Efraín Bischoff, Historia de
Córdoba. Cuatro Siglos (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1979); Manuel
Lizondo Borda, "El Tucumán de los Siglos XVII y XVIII," HNA III,
249-67; for the slave trade and other related activities, see
Assadourián, Potosí y el crecimiento económico de Córdoba en el
siglo XVI y XVII (Córdoba: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba,
1973), 160-205.
20. For descriptions of the earliest colonial years in the
River Plate area, see Ángel Caballero, Las corrientes
conquistadoras en el Río de la Plata (Santa Fe: Universidad de
Santa Fe, 1943); Ernesto Fitte, Hambres y desnudeces en la
conquista del Río de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1971);
Enrique de Gandia, "La primera fundación de Buenos Aires," and
"La segunda fundación de Buenos Aires," HNA III, 179-234 and
275-314; and Julián Rubio, Exploración y conquista del Río de la
Plata: Siglos XVI y XVII (Barcelona: Salvat, 1953).
21. For general information, see Ricardo Zorraquín Becú,
Orígenes del comercio rioplatense, 1580-1620 (Buenos Aires:
Sociedad Histórica Argentina, 1947); Emilio Coni, "La
agricultura, ganadería e industrias hasta el Virreinato," HNA IV,
211-9; Juan Vedoya, Historia social y económica de la colonia,
Siglos XVI, XVII, XVIII (Tandil: Universidad Nacional del Centro
de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 1985); for the seventeenth


23. Folio 68, Libro Original, Actas del Extinto Cabildo de Buenos Aires, AGN, Sala IX.

24. For the related decrees, see Libro de Registros-Cedulario del Río de la Plata, 1534-1717 (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Historia del Derecho, Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, 1984), 1212, 1213, and 1232.

25. For details, see José Torre Revello, "Los gobernadores de Buenos Aires, 1617-1777," HNA III, 293-332; and Moutoukias,


27. For an interesting analysis, see Alvaro Jara, Guerra y Sociedad en Chile (Santiago: Universitaria, 1981), 135-145.


29. Cabildantes also agreed on other celebrations and gifts, see the Acta of April 4, 1605, ACCH, IV.

30. The authorization was granted during the Government of García Oñez de Loyola; on his government, see Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 94-123; on arguments over local resources, see the Acta of July 14, 1606, ACCH, IV.

31. For similar episodes, see Meza, Régimen, 29, and 35-7.

32. In 1601, 400 European soldiers arrived in Chile and 511 from Peru between 1602 and 1604; for further details, see Venturino, Sociología, II, 410; Amunátegui, Sociedad, I, 70; Campos Harriet, Historia de Concepción, 42; and Ferrando, Y así nació la frontera, 159-62. For Rivera's report, see Document 17, Expedition 23, Volume 14, ANCH, Fondo Claudio Gay.

33. On the military reforms, see Jara, Guerra y Sociedad, 136 and 143; Campos Harriet, Historia de Concepción, 43; and Góngora,
Encomenderos, 39-40.

34. The report urged Viceroy Marquis de Montes Claros to prohibit trading among officers and soldiers; see Errázuriz, Historia, II, 165-8.

35. For the consequences, see Venturino, Sociologia, 410; Amunátegui, Sociedad, 28-9; Jean Borde and Mario Góngora, Evolución de la propiedad rural en el Valle del Puángue, I (Santiago: Universitaria, 1956), 33 and 47; Luis Roa y Ursúa, El Reino de Chile, 1535-1810 (Valladolid: Cuesta, 1945), 574-5. Ginés de Lillo was appointed lieutenant of Córdoba (1606-1612) when Rivera was the governor of the province of Tucumán; see Arturo Lazcano, Cabildantes de Córdoba (Córdoba: Archivo Histórico, 1954), 102.

36. Inés was Alonso de Córdoba’s daughter. Alonso arrived in Chile with Mosquera and was corregidor and presidente interino. He also enjoyed an encomienda and owned lands in Tomuco. On Alonso, see Espejo, Nobiliario, 384; Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 586; and Amunátegui, Sociedad, 59. On Inés, see the Actas of April 1, 1644 and April 30, 1655, ACCH. Another daughter, Leonor, received the encomienda of Lagunas in Mendoza; for the evolution of the encomienda, see Pieza 1, Volume 1092, ANCH, Real Audiencia; Espejo, Provincia, I, 131-5; and the Acta of October 30, 1653, ACCH, XV.

37. These soldiers increased the amount of troops in Arauco to 3,000 men according to Claudio Gay, see his Historia física y
38. *A maestre de campo* received 100 ducats monthly, sargents between 12 and 50 ducats, captains 50 ducats, and soldiers 70 reales; see Amunátegui, *Sociedad*, 99-100; for the letters to the king of April 12, 1607, and March 9, 1608, see Documents 19 and 20, Expedition 23, Volume 14, ANCH, Fondo Claudio Gay.


40. For additional information, see Jara, *Fuentes para la historia del trabajo en el Reino de Chile*, I, (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1965), 223; and "Fuentes para la Historia del trabajo en el Reino de Chile," *Boletín de la Academia Chilena de la Historia*, 58 (1958), 111-26; Andrea Ruiz, *Los indios amigos en la frontera araucana*, 26; on Rivera's ideas, see Documents 26 and 30 Volume 14, ANCH, Fondo Claudio Gay.

41. For examples, see Ferrando, *Y así nació la frontera*, 167.

42. The Crown reminded the Viceroy of Peru, the Príncipe de Esquilache, that Araucanian *encomiendas* were strictly prohibited. The *Cabildo*, however, was able to impede further changes in native labour legislation; for related documents, see Jara, *Fuentes*, 228-31.


45. Amunátegui, Sociedad, 44, and 98-9; Jara, Fuentes, 234; and Lara, Crónica, II, 24.
46. Venturino, Sociologia, II, 423.
47. On Lazo de la Vega, see Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 641; and Ferrando, Y así nació la frontera, 196-7.
49. For the arguments, see the Actas of March 20 and December 14, 1629; April 3, and May 10 and 15, 1630, ACCH, X.
50. Actas of August 3 and 9, September 14, 1630; and December 2, 1631, ACCH, X.
51. The Cabildo registered Lazo de la Vega's action in the Acta of March 24, 1631, ACCH, X. In 1637 the Cabildo launched an investigation because of the lack of salt in the capital and in 1638 it was granting the authorizations once again; see the Actas of April 17, 1637, and February 19, 1638, ACCH, XI.
52. For these members of the elite, see Góngora, Encomenderos, 167; Errázuriz, Sociedad, II, 86; Borde and Góngora, Evolución, 50; Jara, Importación, 184-5; and Espejo, Provincia, I, 63.
53. For the memorial and reply, see the Acta of August 28, 1638, ACCH, XI.
54. For his activities, see Errázuriz, Sociedad, II, 89; Borde y Góngora, Evolución, 49; Morales Guínazú, Primitivos, 35; Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 533; on his business in Córdoba, see the Documents 23, 33, 39, and 40, Volume 20, APCB, Protocols.
55. For his commercial exchanges, see the Documents 387, 388, and 490, Volume 21; Documents 609 and 636, Volume 22; Documents 956, 969, and 801, Volume 23; Document 1076, Volume 24; Document 1165, Volume 25, APCR, Protocols; for information on his family and political activities, see Lazcano, *Cabildantes*, 75 and 154-89.


58. For the report, see the *Acta* of November 11, 1639, ACCH, XI.

59. Santiago underwent a $3 million deficit at the beginning of the 1640s according to Rolando Mellafé; see *Introducción de la esclavitud negra en Chile* (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1969), 211.

60. *Actas* of November 4 and 11, 1639, ACCH, XI.

61. By 1641 the Dutch had already taken control over Luanda, the capital of Angola, and Elmina in Guinea. They developed the precariously held colony of Pernambuco and continued the expansion on Portuguese possessions in West Africa and Brazil. A


64. Acta of October 17, 1629, ACCB, VIII.

65. For a survey on pirates in Chile, see Guillermo Feliú Cruz, Notas para una bibliografía sobre viajeros relativos a Chile (Santiago: Universitaria, 1965), 62. For the Brouwer's expedition, see "Nota bibliográfica sobre el viaje de Enrique Brouwer a Chile," CHCH XXXXV (Santiago: Universitaria, 1923), 129-216.

66. The Araucanian reaction to the Dutch presence seems unclear; for viewpoints, see Isidoro Vázquez, Las incursiones corsarias holandesas en Chiloé (Santiago: Universidad de Santiago, 1992), 71.

67. Letter of the Viceroy of Peru to the king, December 3,
68. "Nota bibliográfica," CHCH XXXV, 202-7; for an overview of the expeditions of the second half of the seventeenth century, see Feliú Cruz, Notas para una bibliografía, 62-7.

69. According to Father Valdivia, rebel natives did not cultivate to avoid tribute in crops; for his report and other examples, see Enrich, Los Jesuitas, 14, 15, and 497.

70. In a meeting of 1643 Rodulfo had the honorific title of "Don" and a decade later he was almirante, see the Actas of November 26, 1643, and June 20, 1657, ACCH, XII, XVI.

71. Valeriano was also a horse-breeder and his son continued the activity; for their activities, see Góngora, Encomenderos, 96 and 141; and the Actas of February 20, 1634, and June 20, 1657, ACCH, XI, XVI.

72. On this family, see Amunátegui, Sociedad, 121; Espejo, Nobiliario, 179; Góngora, Encomenderos, 153; Borde and Góngora, Evolución, 52; and the Acta of November 12, 1687, ACCH, XII.

73. On Miguel de Silva, see Morales Guíñazú, Primitivos, 35, and Espejo, Provincia, I, 405; and on the Caravajal family, see Zuluaga, Trata, 53; and the Actas of March 3, 1664 and March 13, 1665, ACMZ, III.

74. Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 547; and Amunátegui, Sociedad, 58.

75. Góngora, Encomenderos, 91 and 159; and the Acta of November 26, 1643, ACCH, XII.

76. On the Pastenes, see Errázuriz, Historia, II, 86; Borde

77. He was a cattle breeder and a supplier of the army; see Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 93; and the *Actas* of April 30, 1655, June 20, 1657, and August 5, 1670, ACCH, XVI and XVII.

78. In 1648 he sold 2,000 heads of cattle to the army. He was nevertheless a small encomendero who was appointed corregidor in Cuyo in 1671; for details, see Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 144-9; Amunátegui, *Sociedad*, 31 and 59; and the *Acta* of August 26, 1648, and May 19, 1671, ACCH, XVII.


80. In 1650, while being a vecino of Santiago, he married Catalina de Bustamante. A few years later, an *Acta* of the Cabildo of Mendoza mentioned him as the local maestre de campo and owner of carts. His political activities enable him to obtain benefits such as Indian labour. He collected the unión de las armas, but never sent the money to Santiago; for further details, see Zuluaga, *Trata*, 49-50; the *Acta* of December 5, 1629, ACCH, X; and the *Actas* of February 15 and November 22, 1645, ACMZ, II.

81. *Acta* of December 8, 1643, ACCB, IX.

82. Córdoba was declared plaza de armas to assist the port in case of invasion; see *IV Centenario de las fundaciones de Córdoba*
y Santa Fe, 1573-1973 (Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1974), 101; and the Acta of April 15, 1644, ACCB, IX.
83. Acta of October, 17, 1645, ACCB, IX.
84. Actas of October 14 and December 15, 1645, ACCB, IX.
86. Pedro Martinez de Zavala had many relationships in Córdoba because he had been its lieutenant governor in 1602. Not even those 158 horses were apt for warfare, a reason to face prosecution once in Chile; see IV Centenario, 95; Errázuriz, Historia, II, 119 and 214; and folios 4 and 12, Contaduría Mayor, ANCH, Capitanía General.
87. The governor noted that natives had excellent horses, whereas Spanish cavalry was deficient. The reason was that local breeders preferred mule-raising activities to avoid forced contributions. Even the Cabildo received a petition requesting its help to increase the number of horse-raising farms in the Central Valley; for further details, see Errázuriz, Historia, II, 214; Amunátegui, Sociedad, 218 and Siglo XVII, 1 and 47; and Ferrando, Y así nació la frontera, 168-70; the Acta of January 24, 1611, ACCB, X; and the Document 24, Expedient 27, Volume 14, ANCH, Fondo Claudio Gay.
88. Many chronicles pointed out to this difference; see, for example, Alonso González de Nájera, Desengaño y reparo de la guerra de Chile (Santiago: Universitaria, 1970), 19.
89. On the Pehuenche-Araucanian relationships, see Canals
Frau, Poblaciones, 536-8; and Villalobos, Los Pehuenches, 34. For an account on southern Cuyo, see Isidro Maza, Malargue (Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1991), and Rodolfo Casamiquela, Un nuevo panorama etnológico del área pan-pampeana y patagónica adyacente (Santiago: Museo Nacional de Historia Natural, 1969).

90. For the decree, see Borde and Góngora, Evolución, 39; and Góngora, Encomenderos, 43.

91. For the Cabildo's policy, see the Acta of January 27, 1595, ACCH, V; for García Ramón's report, see Errázuriz, Historia, I, 393.

92. Mellafé, Introducción, 168-9; and Amunátegui, Sociedad, I, 47; II, 240-1.

93. For climatic changes in Cuyo, see Prieto, "Formación," 37 and 55.

94. Coria, Evolución, 94.

95. Located in Xaurúa, the farm "El Cepillo" was the motive for a trial between Rafael Triviño and the Videlas; for the merced to Domingo Chaparro, see Document 1, Carpeta 4, Gobierno, AHMZ, Colonial; and Espejo, Provincia, II, 512-3; for the trial, see Document 1616, Volume 123, ANCH, Real Audiencia; and Espejo, Provincia, II, 499-500; on other members of this powerful family, see Espejo, Provincia, II, 505; and Nobiliario, 723-4 and 850; Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 556; Document 1, Carpeta 40, Gobierno, AHMZ, Colonial; Document 737, Carpeta 696 and Document 1616, Carpeta 123, ANCH, Real Audiencia; and the Acta of March 3, 1605,
ACMZ, I.

96. For other examples, see the Document 81, Volume 123; the Document 82, Volume 1892; and the Document 847, Volume 696, ANCH, Real Audiencia.

97. Acta of November 19, 1630, ACMZ, II. Unfortunately, this source does not include the names.

98. On Barambio, see Góngora, Encomenderos, 94-6; Fernando Silva, Tierras y pueblos de indios en el Reino de Chile (Santiago: Estudios de Historia del Derecho Chileno, 1962), 75; Espejo, Nobiliario, 230-1; Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 302; and the Actas of September 23, 1587, and September 2, 1643, ACCH, V, XII.

99. On his activities, see Góngora, Encomenderos, 91, 149-50, and 160-2; Amunátegui, Sociedad, 58; and the Acta of December 31, 1587, ACCH, V.

100. The Lispesguer clan was one of the most powerful families in Santiago; for further information, see Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 361; Espejo, Provincia, I, 58 and 61; Borde and Go. ora, Evolución, 229; and the Actas of January 23 and March 30, 1625, ACCH, X, XI.

101. On Garcia, see Góngora, Encomenderos, 80-1; and Borde and Góngora, Evolución, 49-50 and 223. Another case is the slave trader, Juan de Hinestrosa, a member of the Lisperguer clan. He was encomendero in Cuyo and owned the farm "El Melón" in Chile, see Góngora, Encomenderos, 160; the Acta of January 12, 1629, ACMZ I; and the Acta of April 1, 1644, ACCH, XVI.
102. For this family, see Espejo, Provincia, I, 63; and II, 405, 502-4, 514-20, and 723; and Nobiliario, 850; Coria, Evolución, 94; Góngora, Encomenderos, 83, 100, 166-7; Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 539; Borde y Góngora, Evolución, 49, 55, 225, and 227; the Document 1, Carpeta 40, Gobierno; and Carpeta 278, Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial; the Actas of December 20, 1638, November 22, 1645, May 30, 1645, and April 9, 1670, AHMZ, II, III; and the Pieza 2, Volume 1299, ANCH, Real Audiencia.

103. For details on members of this network, see Amunátegui, Sociedad, 97; Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 551; Góngora, Encomenderos, 96 and 146; and the Actas November 3, 1637, October 30, 1653, August 19, 1661, and November 9, 1663, ACCH, XI, XV, XVII.

104. On Eraso, see Espejo, Provincia, I, 34-5; II, 539; Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 551; and Góngora, Encomenderos, 96 and 146; and the Actas of November 03, 1637, October 30, 1653, August 19, 1661, and November 9, 1663, ACCH; XI.

105. For his military and political activities, see Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 585; and Document 2, Volume 480, ANCH, Real Audiencia.

106. For the agreement, see Amunátegui, Sociedad, 45-6.

107. On the effects of this disease, which also affected Santiago in 1645, see Ferrando, Y así nació la frontera, 208; for the Araucanian interpretation of natural phenomena, see Lara, Crónica, II, 42.

109. A document of 1676 proves that troops surpassed the 2,000 places. According to the salary budget, there were 1,654 soldiers (138,936 ducats yearly), 20 captains (12,000), 20 alfereces (4,000), 15 sergeants (2,160), 1 colonel (1,800), and 1 maestre de campo (1,200); for the military situation, see Gay, Historia, III, 280; and Ferrando, Y así nació la frontera, 222; and the Document 55, Expediente 25, Volume 16. ANCH, Fondo Claudio Gay.

110. See, for example, the Decree of April 9, 1662, Document 8386, ANCH, Capitanía General.

111. Venturino, Sociología, 409.

112. Ferrando, Y así nació la frontera, 203.

113. Ruiz, Indios Amigos, 32.

114. There were 300 soldiers in Santiago and Valparaíso; for the settlements and garrisons in Arauco, see "Nota bibliográfica," CHCH XXXV, 201.

115. The Royal Decree of July 7, 1653, specified that the army could not have more than 2,000 positions; see Document 8344, Volume 715, ANCH, Real Audiencia. A statistical study on this royal army is impossible due to the lack of reliable sources; on this obstacle, see Góngora, "Vagabundaje," 348.

116. Valdivia was under Lima's control until 1662. Governor Pedro Porter Casana was worried about the support of these troops without any increase in the situado; on these financial considerations, see the Documents 8344 and 8389, Volume 715,
ANCH, Capitanía General; and for prices in the Central Valley, see Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 108.

117. *Actas* of December 5, 1652, June 8, August 22, 1656, March 15, June 20, 1657, and August 3, 1658, ACCH, XIV, XV.

118. For the attempts to stay free from taxation, see Mellafé, *Introducción*, 211; and the *Actas* of August 28 and November 3, 1645, ACCH, XIII.

119. There were 300 soldiers in Santiago and Valparaíso; for the settlements and garrisons in Arauco, see "Nota bibliográfica," *CHCH* XXXV, 201. Góngora, "Incumplimiento de una ley en 1639," *Estudios de Historia de las ideas e Historia social* (Valparaíso: Universidad de Valparaíso, 1980), 305-39; and *Actas* of November 26, 1643; and November 3 and 18, 1645, ACCH, XII, XIII.

120. Document 365, Pieza 6, Volume 480, ANCH, Capitanía General; and *Actas* of May 13 and June 14, 1647, and February 7 and May 29, 1648, April 1 and May 23, 1653, ACCH, XIII, XV.

121. For an account of the military situation of Arauco, see the Documents 14 and 17, Expedient 24, Volume 15, ANCH, Pondo Claudio Gay.

122. For other examples, see the *Acta* of April, 1, 1659, ACCH, XV; the *Actas* of 1659 are mostly incomplete, but one may consult the *Actas* of August 18, October 6, and December 2, 1659; ACCH, XVI; for the estimate, see the *Acta* of July, 27, 1661; ACCH, XVI.
123. Actas of January 5, February 13, June 25, and July 8, 1660, ACCH, XVI.
124. For the governor's action and the Cabildo's reactions, see the Actas of October 1665, ACCH, XXVII.
125. Actas of October 3, 1665, and June 14, 1669, ACCH, XVII.
126. The figure does not include Indians, Negros, and Mestizos, see Korth, Struggle, 224.
127. Amunátegui, Sociedad, 134; and Enrich, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús, I, 645.
128. For the impact of the earthquake in Peru on the Chilean economy, see Góngora, Origen de los inquilinos de Chile central (Santiago: CIRA, 1974), 106; and Demetrio Ramos, "Trigo Chileno, navieros del Callao y hacendados limeños entre la crisis agrícola del siglo XVII y la comercial de la primera mitad del siglo XVIII," Revista de Indias 26: 105-6 (1966), 23; on native enslavement and the increasing Mestizo population, see Ruiz, Indios Amigos, 101; for an analysis of the influence and action of Father Diego de Rosales, his work and ideas, see his Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes indiano. (Santiago: Universitaria, 1969), 100; Walter Harrish, "El manuscrito de la 'Historia General de Chile' del Padre Diego de Rosales y su larga peregrinación," Jahrbuch 22 (1985), 69-97; and Amunátegui, "La Capitanía General de Chile hasta la fundación del Virreinato del Río de la Plata," Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia 10 (1936-7), 233-4; for the population of Arauco, see Document


131. For an example of the difficulties involved in supplying the troops with wheat, see the trial "Causa contra Francisco García Sobarzo y otros sobre la provisión de trigos, conducción del situado y otras materias, 1697," (incomplete), Volumes 593 and 437, ANCH, Real Audiencia; on Governor Marín de Poveda, see Gay, *Historia*, 332; and Amunátegui, *Sociedad*, 151.

132. *Actas* of January 6 and 7, 1651, ACCH, XV.

133. For the Royal Decree of March, 18, 1653 and other related documents, see Volume 715, ANCH, Capitanía General.

134. In 1713 there were 650 captains, 350 lieutenants and alfereces, but only 150 soldiers. Also, the Crown was concerned because soldiers were promoted to captains without having served enough time. For details and examples, see Ferrando *Y así nació la frontera*, 237; Roa y Ursúa, *El Reino*, 163, 551, and 163; Borde and Góngora, *Evolución*, 219; and the Document 8367, Volume 717, ANCH, Capitanía General.

135. On Carrera, see Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 157; Espejo, *Nobiliario*, 214; Ferrando, *Y así nació la frontera*, 226; and the *Actas* of April 30, 1655, and June 20, 1657, ACCH, XV.

136. On Diego González Montero, see Amunátegui, *Sociedad*, 59;
Ferrando, y así nació la frontera, 223; Góngora, Encomenderos, 147-8 and 152; and the Actas of December 11, 1620, and June 20, 1657, ACCH, VIII, XVI.

137. For this network, see Amunátegui, Sociedad, 83; Borde and Góngora, Evolución, 228; Góngora, Encomenderos, 91, 169, and 172; Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 540; and the Actas of October 10, 1625; April 1, 1644; August 26, 1648; April 30, 1655, and June 20, 1657, ACCH, X, XII, XIII, XVI.

138. On the Toro Mazotes, see Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 402; Góngora, Encomenderos, 91 and 168-9; Espejo, Provincia, II, 405, 540, and 546-7; Morales Guiñazú, Primitivos, 3; the Actas of April 1, 1644, and June 20, 1657, ACCH, XII, XVI; the Folio 161, Volume 343, ANCH, Archivo de Escrribanos; the Document 22, Carpeta 96, Hacienda, and Carpeta 29, Gobierno, AHMZ, Colonial; and the Documents 72, 74, 110, and 481, Libro 1, APCB, Archivo de Escrribanos.

139. Espejo, Nobiliario, 636-41; and Góngora, Encomenderos, 97.

140. On the Caravajal, see Espejo, Provincia, II, 297 and 405; and Nobiliario, 233; Góngora, Encomenderos, 144-5; the Actas of April 1, 1644 and June 20, 1657, ACCH, XII, XVI; the Actas of March 24, 1664, and March 13, 1665; ACMZ, III; the Document 278, Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial; and the Document 1658, Fondo Documental Monseñor Molina Cabrera, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Another example is the wealthy Maestre de Campo Juan
Morales de Negrete. His son settled down in Cuyo, being a corregidor and a wine producer; see Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 73; Espejo, *Provincia*, I, 63; and the Document 17, Carpeta 278, Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial.

141. On Barambio, see Roa y Ursúa, *El Reino*, 665; Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 94-5 and 156; and the *Actas* of April 1, 1644, June 20 and August 1, 1657, ACCH: XII, XVI; for his activities in Córdoba, see the Document 129, Protocols, APCB, Archivo de Escribanos.

142. Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 172; and *Actas* of April 1, 1644, and June 20, 1657, ACCH: XII, XVI.

143. For Irrazábal, see Borde and Góngora, *Evolución*, 45; and Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 148; for the evolution of agriculture, see Ramos, "Trigo chileno," 232-4; and for Cuevas, see Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 148.
3 - THE SUBSIDY SYSTEMS

During the course of the seventeenth century, the three colonies of the eastern segment of the border became frontier societies. On the Spanish side of the border, most of the frontier experience derived from the fact that the requirements of the army in Arauco surpassed the productive capacity of the Central Valley. The market of southern Chile needed imports from across the Andes. Horses, cattle, tobacco, *yerba mate* and other goods were imported from Tucumán, Río de la Plata, and Paraguay, expanding the influence of Arauco into a vast trans-Andean region.

Equally important, the frontier experience was grounded on the increasing awareness of the impossibility of expanding Spanish dominion southward without military protection. Before attempting this direction, settlers had already tried to extract resources from safer territories north- and eastward. This move, however, provoked severe arguments with Spaniards from other jurisdictions. The south finally appeared as the only alternative for further expansion, although it implied rampant conflicts with natives.

On the Indian side of the border, a similar dynamic took place, although they advanced northward. After decades of exploiting wild horses and cattle southward of latitude 35°, natives advanced northward in their search for more resources.
They began to attack caravans and to steal domesticated animals from Spanish farms, forcing settlers to protect these areas militarily. Lastly, beyond the actual number of troops in the colonies, the role that these officers and soldiers played in the communities was one of the most evident and direct consequences of the frontier experience.

This chapter will focus on the evolution of the three colonies of the eastern segment of the border from the late sixteenth century until they became fully articulated into the southern frontier. Mendoza was the first colony of the eastern segment to be affected by Arauco because it was the capital of a Chilean province. Deprived of the resources of the south, Santiago reinforced its earlier tendency of expanding eastward, crossing the Andes and extracting human and material resources from Cuyo. Although Córdoba and Buenos Aires belonged to other provinces, they were also influenced by Arauco. By mid-seventeenth century, Córdoba switched its attention from the north to the south, in response to circumstances in southern Chile. The northern frontier with the Calchaquis had previously drawn most of the military resources because the route to Peru had to be protected. Nonetheless, awareness that Araucanians could ally with other nations living in the eastern flank of the Andes and attack Spanish settlements forced Córdobans to reconsider their entire strategy for local defence. In turn, Córdoba transmitted this frontier effect, which originated in
southern Chile, to Buenos Aires when it argued against its obligation to send military assistance to the port.

By mid-seventeenth century a garrison was established in Buenos Aires to protect the Río de la Plata from external attacks. The military need refers to the threat posed by European powers, in particular, by the Portuguese. Some decades later, the Cabildo of Buenos Aires debated asking the governor to use the royal army in the garrison to patrol the southern territories. Locals were concerned because foreigners, including both vecinos from other jurisdictions and natives, were extracting cattle.

3.1 - Mendoza: A Satellite Settlement

Since the Corregimiento of Cuyo was under Chilean jurisdiction, it depended on Santiago both on a political and economic level. Resources, in particular Indian labour, were exploited by the vecinos of Santiago. The extraction of Huarpes depopulated the area of Indians, which had a broader demographic impact since Spaniards refused to live in a place deprived of native labour. At the same time, however, depopulation allowed Spanish expansion over the irrigated lands that used to be under Indian dominion. In a sense, of course, this is misleading for many other places in the Indies were underpopulated. Nonetheless, in the case of Mendoza the Crown was determined to prevent further depopulation because it would affect the whole military
strategy for the protection of the southern portion of the Empire.

From this point of view, the colony was the last Spanish settlement where soldiers arriving from Buenos Aires could stay and prepare themselves before crossing the Andes on the way to Arauco. In 1583 Alonso de Sotomayor and his soldiers had to stay in Mendoza during the Winter months, and so did Mosquera's expedition some years later. Unfortunately, most of the Actas of the Cabildo of Mendoza have vanished, making it impossible to describe how the small population managed to feed and accommodate the soldiers. Before Mosquera's arrival, the Cabildo had ordered the vecinos to cultivate more cereals. Cabildantes were seriously preoccupied by the possibility that they would have to provide the immense expedition with food and shelter for many months if the force did not arrive on time to cross the Andes before late Fall².

According to the available Actas, a few vecinos were able to contribute. Those who sent cereals, cattle, and wine were registered in the Acta of the Cabildo held on March 3, 1605, because they expected to be rewarded. Captains Antonio Chacón, Juan Ortiz de Urbina, and Juan Ladrón de Guevara contributed wheat, wine, and cattle. Captain Lope de la Peña gave cattle and wine, while Antonio Moyano gave some wheat. On the whole, there were only 11 donors, an insignificant number since Mosquera arrived with hundreds of men. The Cabildo's worries turned out to
be well-founded. When the expedition finally arrived in Mendoza, it was too late to cross the Andes.

Another proof of the strategic importance of the colony is a Royal Decree of 1608 that demanded a detailed report of the reasons causing the depopulation of the zone. The decree shows that imperial authorities were aware that governors in the capital tolerated such a state of affairs. Indeed, although governors were required to oblige encomenderos to settle down where they had their encomienda, Chilean governors usually authorized encomenderos to stay in Santiago and to extract Huarpes from their encomiendas in Cuyo.

On the native side of the border, another eastward expansion equally contributed to the frontier experience. In 1620, for example, Mendoza paid off two natives with cloth because they had crossed the Andes to bring news of an Araucanian plan of attacking the colony. Generally, Mendoza, as did Santiago, under the wave of Araucanian uprisings, and was forced to prepare for Araucanian attacks in 1632, 1658, 1661, and 1668. Such an awareness of being a frontier society determined a high ratio of officers from earliest times. As elsewhere in the Indies, military titles operated as a signal of social prestige and economic power, and Mendoza was not different. The Corregidor Gualdes y Rocamora testified that most members of wealthy families held a military rank.
Dependency on and proximity to Santiago explained Mendoza's frontier experience. It was not, however, only vecinos of Santiago who considered Mendoza as the alternate place from which to extract resources. Governors also had the same attitude. In addition, during the seventeenth century, horses, cows, and bulls were often bought in Tucumán, Río de la Plata, and Paraguay, and grazed in Cuyo before crossing the Andes. The frontier experience, however, transcended this passive role as the link between the eastern provinces and Santiago. Locals realized how important it was for their own security to keep Spanish control over the frontier with Arauco. By the mid-seventeenth century, settlers clearly perceived that the colony was a segment of the southern frontier and that circumstances in Arauco also affected local life. The main proof came with the Araucanian uprising of 1655 when rebel natives, confederated with Pehuenches and Puelches, crossed the Andes, and carried out a devastating malón on the farms of Valle de Uco and Xaurúa. A small group of armed men from Mendoza pursued the hostile natives down to the Pehuenche's dominion where the stolen herds were grazing⁵.

This malón illustrates the dynamics of frontier life. Indians drove cattle and horses southward as a means of avoiding confrontations with the tribes living between the Valle de Uco and the Diamante River since they were allied to Spaniards⁶. Equally important, in the Pehuenche's territories, Indians could cross the Andes through at least 11 passes at relatively low
altitudes, ranging from 1,700 to 2,400 meters above sea level, whereas the passes of Uspallata and Tupungato used by Spaniards were twice as high. Levels of snow were also lower in these southern passes; therefore crossing the Andes could be done for longer periods. Araucanians even crossed the mountains in late Winter, perplexing authorities who could not believe that a malón including natives from Chile could be possible during such early Spring days. Moreover, the malón sketches a frontier that functioned as a corridor, whose northern side—with the passes of Uspallata and Tupungato—was used by Spaniards; while its southern side—that penetrated into Pehuenches' and Puelches' dominion—was for exclusive use of natives.

Another important feature of the conflict was that, when Araucanians and trans-Andean tribes allied, they first jointly conducted raids on the farms located on the Maule River region. After that, they attacked Valle de Uco and Xaurúa. The double movement indicates that they combined for the purpose of extracting resources from Spanish farms located on both sides of the mountains. The Maule River area had as much cattle as the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa. Farms in the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa, however, had very little, if any, military protection. In fact, after the malón in 1660, almost all breeders, including the Jesuits, left the Valle de Uco complaining about the lack of security.
Furthermore, the malón exposed the possibility of losing this fertile area. In such a case, the loss of the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa to ranching and agriculture would have been for Mendoza what the loss of southern Chile was for Santiago at the end of the sixteenth century. In other words, Mendoza needed this oasis to expand its cattle trade. With a desert climate, Spaniards first concentrated on the northern oasis where they developed small-scale agricultural and production consisting of vineyards and fruit trees. They also raised sheep and goats. Early in the seventeenth century, the opening of markets in Córdoba and Buenos Aires expanded agriculture, especially vineyards. Once Mendoza had access to Córdoba and Buenos Aires, two captains were the first locals to profit. One of these early merchants was Antonio de Videla, the lieutenant of corregidor\textsuperscript{13}. The other was Antonio Moyano Cornejo who had an encomienda in Cuyo, although he lived in Santiago. Antonio Moyano Cornejo also owned ox-drawn carts in Mendoza and had appropriate connections with Córdoba, since two of his brothers-in-law were living there\textsuperscript{14}. Exports to Córdoba included wheat, soap, and candles\textsuperscript{15}. It was a very modest trade, but it was more regular than that of wine, often affected by plagues and hail.

This economy, which centred on trading wines in eastern markets, had an impact on a military-related issue because Mendoza usually argued that it could not pay the unión de las armas because wine production had undergone difficulties\textsuperscript{16}. In
1645 the Cabildo followed the common practice of sending an agent to Spain, and even tried to argue that the earthquake of 1647 in Santiago should exempt them from taxation\(^7\). The Crown, however, was not prepared to run the risk of having every colony use such excuses to avoid taxes. From its perspective, the graduated payments provided for in the unión de las armas already took into account the different degrees of wealth in each colony\(^6\).

The exports of wines to eastern markets complemented the cattle trade, which in turn, promoted ranching activities in Valle of Uco and Xaurúa whose grasslands had became vacant after many decades of driving Huarpes to work in Chile. Ranching in these valleys developed from the third decade of the seventeenth century onward, although a few mercedes had been granted in the area in earlier years\(^9\). The Valle de Uco and Xaurúa not only had extensive grasslands, but were also perfectly located on the route to Santiago via the pass of Tupungato. Three complementary factors contributed to the extension of ranching in Mendoza; the market in Arauco, Santiago’s growing exports of tallow to Peru, and climatic changes that enlarged pastureland in the area\(^20\).

Ranching then appeared to be an attractive economic option for landowners like Jacinto de Videla. He systematically drove cattle to the 4,000 cuadras of land in Valle de Uco that he had bought from Captain Juan de Amaro, who was more concerned with wine production. According to a subsequent deed of donation to
the Agustinian Fathers, Amaro's considerable estate included
vineyards, wine presses, two carts, 27 oxes, and 22 slaves²¹.

Another landowner in the Valle de Uco was the Maestre de
Campos Domingo Sánchez Chaparro. In the 1630s, Sánchez Chaparro
settled down in Mendoza where he married Eufrasia de Videla and
received an important tract of land called "El Cepillo" on
Xaurúa. Another merced in 1673 of 10,000 cuadras in San Luis
suggests that he might have been involved in the cattle trade
since San Luis was on route between Xaurúa and Córdoba. Domingo
de Sánchez Chaparro also made and exported wines. He was
important enough in this activity to be sent to Buenos Aires to
negotiate the sales tax that the port applied to wine²².

Notwithstanding that ranching in the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa
allowed Mendozans to expand the local economy, it forged a
frontier experience for them. On the one hand, the abundance of
cattle made the area a very attractive target for Indian raids;
while on the other, governors continued in the attitude of
considering Cuyo as a place from which to extract resources to
meet the need of their troops. During the second half of the
century, the policy of parlamentos did not decrease the level of
preparedness on the frontier. The decree ordering governors not
to bother vecinos of Santiago with warfare related requirements
forced them to find alternate locations for goods and services.
In 1656, for example, Governor Pedro Porte Casanate asked the
vecinos of Mendoza to take care of the cattle and the horses that

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had been bought for the army in eastern areas. These animals would graze in Mendoza before crossing the mountains. Moreover, in 1662 Governor Angel de Peredo ordered Juan de Ulloa to drive the available livestock --- "up to 15,000 head of cattle" --- to be driven from the Valle of Uco and Xaurúa to Arauco in order to feed the troops. According to an Acta of the Cabildo of Mendoza, however, Juan de Ulloa only extracted 100 cows from Valle de Uco in July.

Such a disproportion between the requested amounts and the animals finally sent to the army raises other questions. Although governors usually exaggerated the amount in order to fill the minimum requirements, the question of how many animals the army in Arauco actually needed remains difficult to answer. The few available figures, for example, do not reveal how many allied natives were to be fed. It is also possible that the army needed animals not only for dietary purposes, but also for exchanges with Indian and Spanish suppliers. According to Governor Angel de Peredo, the army required around 9,000 heads yearly, and Santiago usually sent half of that amount. If this was the case, governors had to fill in the gap of around 5,000 animals by trading with Indians.

Natives might obtain cattle in trans-Andean areas either by direct appropriation or by exchange with other tribes. During the second half of the seventeenth century the wild cattle grazing south of latitude 40° may have become a scarce resource. Then, if
they needed more beasts, Indians had to move northward. As a result, the increasing Indian actions in southern Mendoza may well have been far from accidental, but rather the result of filling either military or native needs. The following episode will illustrate this statement.

In 1668, when the governor of Chile asserted that the army lacked at least half of the required amount of cattle it needed, the Cabildo of Mendoza noticed that there was increased Indian activity in the south and ordered for the preparation of the militia to protect the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa from the threat of a malón. On September 24, 1668, the Cabildo informed the Real Audiencia in Santiago about the damages that natives had caused to the farms in Valle de Uco. At this time, natives stole not only cows and bulls, but also mules and horses in order to hinder Spanish pursuit. In the meeting of August 16, cabildantes realized that after the malón, the colony did not have enough horses left to organize a campaign against the natives. Interestingly, the colony operated in the same fashion as Santiago did when it needed resources; it extracted them from eastern areas. In the case of Mendoza, the eastern territory under its control was San Luis. Indeed, on March 28, 1669, the Cabildo ordered 150 horses to be driven from San Luis to Mendoza in order to organize the defence of the area25.

It may seem provocative to insinuate that the governors in Chile were buying cattle previously stolen by natives from the
other Spanish provinces. Authorities might have ignored the fact that cattle had been stolen, especially if animals did not bear the mark of the owner. Cattle marks, however, had been registered in the local Cabildos since the first years of the conquest, and most animals bore the mark of their breeder. The governors' endless struggles with the local elite to receive an adequate supply of cattle and horses to sustain the army in Arauco justified their attitude. After using every possible means to break the resistance of the Cabildo of Santiago, they finally accepted what was made available regardless of where and how they had been obtained. Even if authorities were aware that the cattle had been stolen from Spanish farms, they had other reasons to pretend ignorance. Governors wanted to avoid involving the royal army in duties related to the control of cattle theft, and they may well have thought that the threat of devastating malones could force the elite to contribute to the protection of the frontier.

By expanding ranching activities, Mendoza deepened its dependency on trans-Andean circumstances. Fluctuations in Arauco and in the market in Santiago could have fatal consequences for the local economy. In fact, when Santiago reduced imports, the price of cattle in Mendoza collapsed. In 1604 the price for cattle could be as high as $6 a head, but 40 years later, it hardly surpassed $1.5.²⁶ It seems that the crisis affected the local market and the entire circuit because merchants tried to be
exempted from taxes imposed on other goods. It was not until 1690, however, that a Royal Decree ordered Buenos Aires not to restrain Mendozans from selling in the local market because, it was said, this was the only available outlet for Mendoza's products.

By that time, merchants competed with retailers from Santiago who were trading in Mendoza as a means of evading taxes in the capital. The Cabildo started to collect sales tax from these "foreign" merchants, considering it a fair policy since any merchant trading in the settlement had to pay the current taxes, regardless of his permanent address. It is also possible that merchants from Santiago were operating in other places because their home market was saturated. According to the diary of Father Alonso in 1641, Cuyo seemed to have been the land of opportunity, since increasing demographic density in Santiago propelled Spaniards to migrate. He pointed out that he had seen many vecinos of the capital marry and settle down in Cuyo because they could no longer aspire to prosper in Santiago.

The last remarkable feature of the situation was that, although close to and dependent on Santiago, the settlement was isolated. A round trip to Buenos Aires took 4 months, and one to Córdoba half that time, and Santiago was a week way. Commercial traffic lasted only the short period when caravans were able to cross the Andes and transit the pampas. Under such conditions, authorities abused their power without fears of any immediate
punishment. *Corregidor* Juan de la Banda, who faced trial in 1679, had forbidden Captain Francisco de Fraguas to trade in Mendoza some years before. Coming from Salta, Fraguas wanted to exchange cloth for wines, but he competed with the commercial activities of Juan de la Banda who was unwilling to tolerate such a situation in the small local market. Consequently, the *corregidor* used all his political power to expel Captain Fraguas from the colony. Impotent to counteract the situation at the local level, Fraguas had to give up business with an estimated loss of $9,000^30.

Only those whose influence matched the power of the local authorities dared to take legal actions. When Dorotea de Castañeda carried out a suit against Captain Juan de Puebla, she described the family network of powerful officers, which inevitably protected Puebla from punishment. She attested that this network of relationships had always impeded authorities in Santiago from knowledge of the state of affairs in Mendoza^31. Her remarks are relevant because the historiography portrays colonial Mendoza as a stereotypical peaceful colony. Nonetheless, the fact that there were no protests does not indicate that there was a lack of conflict, but rather that it was almost impossible to make formal complaints against the local authorities.
3.2 - Córdoba: The Intersection of Trading Routes

Approximately 800 kilometres east from Santiago, Córdoba began to be part of the southern frontier by mid-seventeenth century. During more than six decades from its foundation, Córdoba was a border settlement on the fringes of the Viceroyalty of Peru. Its marginal location, however, was compensated by the fact that it was the central point of the routes linking Buenos Aires, Peru, and Chile. In the late sixteenth century most of the benefits can be related to the slave trade because most of the Blacks introduced through Buenos Aires were bartered in Córdoba and shipped to Peru and Chile. It was a lavish business considering that between 1595 and 1610 the 539 slaves which were sold in Córdoba fetched $143,821. The trade also promoted other spheres of the local economy, in particular, agriculture and transportation, and linked together members of the elite, officers, and authorities in these colonies.12

Nonetheless, at the same time as some linkages were forged, the commercial relations between Córdoba and Buenos Aires threatened older trading associations. The province of Tucumán began to buy merchandise imported through Buenos Aires because they were cheaper, compared to goods imported from Lima via Santiago. Only the wines from Concepción and Araucanian wool textiles were still competitive enough in the markets of Tucumán to justify the expensive transportation costs of crossing the Andes.13 As an indication of the new times, at the end of the
sixteenth century, a Cordoban merchant wrote to his partner in Santiago that he would be unable to sell Chilean merchandise because of the cheaper European goods available in the market and introduced via Buenos Aires.

Córdoba was in the perfect geographical location to funnel products to other colonies in the west, north, and east. The transit tax exemplifies how it profited from its central location. Even sending soldiers from Paraguay to the army in Arauco nourished the economy of Córdoba. In 1608 the army in southern Chile received 200 Paraguayan troops who demanded yerba mate as part of their diet. Yerba mate and tobacco from Paraguay paid transit and sales tax in Córdoba, duties usually justified on the grounds that they financed public works.

Its location had a demographic impact since it was a very attractive place to settle down. This demographic factor explains why Córdoba developed some areas of its economy before Buenos Aires. In the last third of the sixteenth century, for example, vaquerías exploited livestock to the point of forcing the Cabildo to tighten control over licenses from 1610 onward. In 1614 a Bando pointed out that the number of cattle hunters increased at the same rate as exports of tallow and cattle to Peru and Buenos Aires. The Bando also prohibited the sales of cattle to vecinos of other jurisdictions for the following three years. It was a means of protecting the local economy in two
complementary ways. It protected the available livestock and it prevented the establishment of new farms in other provinces\(^8\).

Protective measures became a priority since as early as 1602 when some vecinos of Córdoba were already hunting cattle in the southern areas to export tallow to Peru\(^9\). For them, the royal authorization to trade with the Portuguese colonies was a lavish opportunity. Governor Hernandarias and the Cabildo of Buenos Aires, however, safeguarded the priority of the port in matters of trade with the Portuguese. They even went further when they considered a scheme to monopolize commerce within the region\(^40\). The Cabildo of Córdoba then requested that the governor of Tucumán write to Hernandarias to remind him that it was an abuse to impede Cordobans from trading wheat and tallow in that port\(^41\).

The awareness of being part of the southern frontier after the Dutch attack on Valdivia modified Córdoba's defensive strategy. The threat of alliances and connections among tribes forced Córdoba to pay attention to the southern border. Before organizing any military campaign to control the south, however, Córdoba needed to eliminate the threat posed by Calchaquís in its northern region. In 1663 the Cabildo of Córdoba agreed to send an agent to Spain to explain difficulties related to the simultaneous control of both frontiers. A year later authorities organized an expedition against the Calchaquís, which required military assistance from Buenos Aires. The governor of Buenos Aires, however, only authorized Córdoba to extract 1,000 head of
cattle from Santa Fe instead of the 2,000 requested. Buenos Aires also delayed the order to drive horses and was extremely reluctant to send other supplies. Nonetheless, the governor was quite ready to remind Córdoba of its obligation to dispatch a fifth of the enslaved natives to the port "to serve the king".

A few years later, Córdoba showed the same type of reluctance to collaborate with Buenos Aires, announcing that the colony was depleted of resources due to the Calchaquí campaign and the depressed state of the Peruvian market. With some irony, the colony offered Buenos Aires mules, which were the only abundant good at that moment.

The rivalry between Córdoba and Buenos Aires over military resources derived from the general defensive strategy, which had been designed to meet the international tensions of the 1640s. In 1641 Viceroy Mancera ordered Córdoba to assist Buenos Aires in case of external invasions. The Cabildo of Córdoba immediately rejected the order, arguing that Buenos Aires was located in another jurisdiction and that Córdoba itself had few resources to protect its own territories. The viceroy rejected the excuses and Captain Francisco Ruiz de la Cueva was forced to go to Buenos Aires with the requested military assistance.

Córdoba then tried to convince the viceroy that the colony had already contributed beyond its limits. According to the Cabildo, many vecinos migrated to other settlements because of the "misery" produced by the "hardships" of living in the colony.
The viceroy merely confirmed the obligation of sending 20 soldiers and supplies to Buenos Aires. Still, cabildantes not only deplored the unfair treatment that the governor in Río de la Plata imposed on soldiers from Córdoba, but they also reduced the assistance to only 10 unarmed soldiers. The governor of Tucumán decided to intervene and lured cabildantes with the promise of granting encomiendas to those who would cooperate in the defence of Buenos Aires. Authorities were aware that Córdoba exaggerated the "hardships." Despite the claims, the colony could recruit a potential 500 militiamen, compared to the 200 that Buenos Aires had to rely upon. Yet, Córdoba believed that it never received appropriate payment for the military help sent to Buenos Aires.

The obligation to use local resources to assist another settlement was a novelty for Córdoba whose previous military service had consisted of supporting the troops that passed by on the way to Arauco. That effort, however, was never of such a magnitude as to promote the awareness of belonging to the same border as Mendoza and Santiago. The periods these troops stayed in Córdoba were usually very short, although for some it proved long enough to desert. In most such cases, it is impossible to follow their activity thereafter, but Luciano de Figueroa who was a soldier of Mosquera's expedition, successfully integrated himself into the local society. In 1605, when the rest of the soldiers left Córdoba for Mendoza, he stayed, supposedly because
he was ill. The actual reason seems to be his marriage to Micaela de Soria, a relative of the powerful Luis de Abreu. The family connection proved to be to his advantage since he was accepted as a member of the local elite. Only three years later Luciano was appointed to one of the alcalde of the Cabildo49. 

Also related to the changes of the 1640s, the colony had to pay the unión de las armas. On March 10, 1646, the procurador stressed that the duty violated a previous decree that had exempted Córdoba from paying sales tax for a century. While awaiting the response from the viceroy, the Cabildo decided to keep the money previously collected50. In the following year, the institution agreed to offer the administration of the unión de las armas in public auction51.

As in Santiago, the lists of those who paid the unión de las armas in Córdoba demonstrate the commercial activities of most local officers and authorities. The first available list of 1647 declared that the amount of $462 would be collected proportional to income52, but it was not entirely correct. The obrajes paid the maximum of $25 ("Soto"), $50 ("Lagunilla"), and $60 ("Totoral"). The minimum was paid, among others, by Ruy de Sosa's widow, Captain Gabriel de Tejeda Guzmán, and Francisco de la Cámara. These cases clearly contradicted the policy of proportional payments. The widow, for example, inherited the estate of the wealthiest merchant of early-seventeenth century Córdoba53. Captain Gabriel de Tejada, who was alcalde in 1635,
inherited the obraje "Soto" that he exploited in conjunction with his brother Luis⁵⁴. For his part, the rich Alférez Francisco de la Cámara had received a large estate from his father, Alonso de la Cámara, who opened the route linking Córdoba to Mendoza in 1574. Alonso profited from the enterprise since he traded slaves and wines in the last years of the sixteenth century⁵⁵.

In 1648 the unión de las armas list included other powerful members of the elite, but they did not pay proportionally to their assets. For instance, Captain Alonso Molina Navarrete paid only $8 even when he was a mule-breeder who had commercial ties with Potosí⁵⁶. Captain Diego Céliz de Quiroga also gave only $8, despite being the offspring of a slave trader and owning the big farm of "Nabosacate" in the Rio Segundo region⁵⁷. In the following year, Sergeant Pedro de Castañeda owed $12, but two years later, he paid $20. Castañeda traded mules, and other undeclared goods with the Chilean Antonio de Barambio⁵⁸. Another wealthy merchant, Simón Duarte, was charged with only $2 in 1649⁵⁹.

Diego Negrete de la Cámara, one of the six richest people of Córdoba, was able to evade taxes until 1651. Son of Alonso de la Cámara, Diego inherited the encomienda of Macatiné. Between 1621 and 1640 he held high positions within the Cabildo. His payment of $3, however, was disproportionate to his estate. Finally, in 1649 Blas de Peralta paid for the very first time, although he had an encomienda, and was an active merchant⁶⁰. In 1653 there
was a considerable increase in the list of tax payers because the Cabildo estimated that business done in Córdoba during the first half of the year surpassed $100,000. Nonetheless, the obrajes gave only $10 more than their usual rate, and many individuals paid exactly the same amount as always. The list of that year expanded only because it included many small merchants\(^61\).

In summary, by mid-seventeenth century international and regional changes affected the colony. Like Santiago and Mendoza, Córdoba underwent economic adjustments derived from the fluctuation of demands on the Peruvian market\(^62\). Sources prove that Peru was the most important market, but Chile contributed to Córdoba's growth from the moment it began to buy cattle and horses from across the Andes\(^63\). The increasing demands contributed to the frontier experience because Cordobans expanded the territory they controlled in an eastward direction until the 1680s. At that time, local authorities began to dispute jurisdictional rights over various zones with the Cabildo of Buenos Aires. Until that decade, Cordobans were able to establish up to 800 farms along the route between Córdoba and Santa Fe and a report of the Society of Jesus asserts that the 1,000 vecinos of Córdoba owned 700 farms\(^64\). Such a ratio explains the necessity of expanding the Cabildo's jurisdiction eastward and southward to broaden ranching activities, despite the fact that both directions generated conflicts either with Spaniards from other jurisdictions or with Indians.
In addition, merchants from Cuyo and Buenos Aires affected the market and deepened the frontier experience by starting to avoid going to Córdoba so as to evade sales and transit taxes. Caravans preferred a southerly route that linked San Luis and Buenos Aires. Although that behaviour had commercial benefits, it was an option with undesirable consequences. Natives soon saw the advantages of stealing goods from caravans rather than obtaining them through exchanges with Spaniards or other tribes.

Obviously, the Pampa tribes of southern Córdoba could exploit the wild cattle southward of latitude 35°, if they needed it to trade with Araucanians. Sources documenting the Pampas' activities are rare because Spanish officials referred to native actions for entirely different reasons. They were more interested in documenting military problems in their reports to the Crown than in focusing on their economic relations with natives. For example, in the last decades of the seventeenth century the focus was on the fact that natives were armed. Captain José Bazán de Pedrosa reported that Pampas bore "large swords made by the natives of Chile," an indication of the relationships between both nations. Merchants en route to Buenos Aires, however, complained that Indians intercepted them not only to steal their horses, but also their wine. Cattle hunters, for their part, in southern Córdoba affirmed that natives systematically stole their horses.
Arauco influenced Córdoba in different ways. On the Spanish side, the demands for troops contributed to its commercial growth and may have propelled the expansion of *vaguerías* and ranching southward. A similar eastward move on the native side of the border alerted the settlement to the threat of alliances between Araucanians and local natives. By mid-seventeenth century, Córdoba was acting as a frontier colony. Its need for expansion and consequent awareness of the presence of natives in the area determined its future behaviour in pacifying the northern frontier, paying a closer attention to the moves and activities of the Pampa tribes, and neglecting its obligation to assist Buenos Aires militarily.

3.3 - Buenos Aires: The Southernmost Port of the Viceroyalty of Peru

Santiago, Mendoza, and Córdoba experienced their frontier situation between the end of the sixteenth century and mid-seventeenth century. The easternmost colony of the southern border, Buenos Aires, was not modified by a frontier experience until the eighteenth century. From its foundation and during the whole seventeenth century, its life was characterized by its coastal, although peripheral, location on the Atlantic routes.

Late-sixteenth century Lima merchants had good reasons to believe that this remote port could challenge their monopolistic
position. Consequently, they made a considerable effort to reinforce the Crown's policy of keeping Buenos Aires closed off to Atlantic commerce. Some trade had to be allowed through the so-called "registered vessels," but ships did not arrive regularly. Smuggling then not only complemented the legal trade, it represented a way of life for many inhabitants of Buenos Aires. King Felipe II also authorized yearly exports of 100 fanegas of wheat, 500 quintales of dried meat, and 500 arrobas of tallow to Brazil and Guinea. Most of the available wheat in port was imported from Córdoba, but since the opportunity to develop agriculture arose, Buenos Aires closed off imports from Tucumán. Authorities justified their actions against Cordobans by informing the Crown that 2,000 carts from the Tucumán province arrived in the port each year, not only with tradable goods, but also with silver from Potosí.

Buenos Aires' actions related to its own monopolistic interest in enjoying the benefits of being part of the Atlantic commercial network. Governor Hernandarias was aware that the flow of bullion, which so clearly irritated the Crown, also nourished the economy of the port. In effect, the export of silver supported the slave trade, which was the most expansive commercial activity of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Buenos Aires not only funnelled slaves towards the interior territories, but also needed this labour because of the shortage of local manpower, which was intensified by the smallpox.
epidemic after Mosquera's arrival. It estimated that this epidemic wiped out around 500 of the 700 slaves living in the colony. Local and regional demands for labour impelled the importation of 10,000 slaves between 1600 and 1625 via Buenos Aires.

Although the Crown was aware of illegalities associated with the slave trade, it was not prepared to risk the collapse that would follow from closing the port. Imperial authorities therefore increased control by establishing a customs office in Córdoba to reduce the drainage of silver from Potosí. The institution opened its doors in 1625, but it did not modify the conditions generated by the slave trade. According to a letter from the Jesuit Francisco Vázquez Trujillo, between 1628 and 1631 many slaves from Brazil and Luanda were yearly introduced in these regions via Buenos Aires.

Locals paid for imports mainly with hides, exploiting the abundant herds of wild cattle grazing in the surrounding areas. In the case of such expensive goods as a slave, however, hides could only pay part of the value since one slave was equivalent to 100 hides and a vessel's capacity to transport exports was limited. In other words, ships could never hold the volume of hides equivalent to a cargo of slaves and therefore silver was needed to complete the payment. Silver came from Potosí not only via Córdoba, but also via Santiago because both colonies were integrated in this slave trade network. Besides the common
understanding that the slave trade was silver driven, there was a long-term consequence for the life of Buenos Aires because it demanded an intense hunting of wild cattle, if only as a cover for contraband.

Political changes in the 1640s, and in particular the rebellion of Portugal, affected the trade, although Buenos Aires was still able to export approximately 20,000 hides between 1650 and 1700. Buenos Aires was an Atlantic-oriented colony whose military role was related to its coastal location rather than to being on the fringe of settlement. Until mid-seventeenth century the port served as a base for troops sent to Chile. In 1604 Governor Hernandarias received a letter from the Viceroy Luis de Velazco informing him of the future arrival of Mosquera's expedition. The high number of soldiers to be fed forced Hernandarias to consider that contributors might include not only porteños, but also vecinos of Santa Fe and probably of Córdoba; even though this last colony was in another province.

Buenos Aires did not demand special military attention since the Río de la Plata River posed enough difficulties to navigators. Only the Riachuelo River (a water course running a mile south of the port) allowed smaller vessels to reach safe shores with less difficulty. For this reason, the Riachuelo area began to be the centre for contraband and those who received mercedes in the area devoted the land to raising cattle and smuggling merchandise. Hernandarias, who was willing to control
those smugglers who were his political enemies, established a small garrison in the Riachuelo\textsuperscript{78}, which was practically useless\textsuperscript{79}.

Nonetheless, after 1640 Buenos Aires began to require greater military protection because of the Portuguese advances into Uruguay. The establishment of Colonia do Sacramento (1680) marked the arrival of Portuguese to the Río de la Plata. Although Governor Pedro de Dávila had previously arrived in Buenos Aires with 200 paid soldiers to increase the defensive force of 100 militiamen, the need for military protection was urgent. Imperial authorities further reacted to the situation by establishing a garrison in Buenos Aires in 1640 and declaring Córdoba a plaza de armas in 1641, with the obligation to send assistance to the port\textsuperscript{80}.

Having its own frontiers, Córdoba tried to obtain an exemption from the obligation to the extent of suggesting the use of Paraguayan resources. Such an idea was welcome because the Royal Decree of July 5, 1661, authorized Governor Alonso Mercado y Villacorta to recruit natives from the Jesuit missions of Paraguay\textsuperscript{81}. A few years before, the traveller Acarette du Biscay had noticed that the garrison was quite small at first glance, but the 1,200 horses grazing around it could provide the governor with enough animals to organize a calvary with the militiamen in the case of an invasion. Moreover, Biscay asserted that Paraguayan natives could be easily recruited to reinforce the
local defence. The garrison of Buenos Aires started with 300 paid soldiers. After 1669 the number of soldiers increased up to 1,000 men. It was a high ratio considering that the entire population of Buenos Aires only amounted to 8,000 Whites and 500 Negroes by the end of the seventeenth century*.

The garrison kept growing. During the last third of the seventeenth century, it even received greater military attention than the army in Arauco. Spain sent 455 soldiers to Buenos Aires while only 200 went to the army in the southern Chile. The same was true financially. The situado for Buenos Aires reached its zenith of $187,051 in 1683-87. This amount was almost equal to the budget supporting the troops in Arauco. The average of the situado for Buenos Aires was $70,000 between 1673 and 1702**. Lastly, in 1678 both extremes of the southern frontier were considered equal priorities for military matters, and service in the garrison of Buenos Aires was regulated following the rules previously established for the army in Arauco***.

The Crown's policy was perhaps grounded on two complementary factors related to the dynamic of the southern frontier. First, during the second half of the seventeenth century, the policy of parlamentos (although imperfect) had reduced the risk of a total collapse of Spanish dominion in southern Chile. Second, the firm Portuguese presence in Rio de la Plata called for a reworking of the military strategy for the defence of the Southern Cone.
What happened to the garrison in the port from the late seventeenth century onward was the result of the transformation of Buenos Aires into a frontier colony. By the 1730s, the struggle for tradable resources in the Río de la Plata region reached a turning point. Porteños switched military attention from the north to the south since they were less worried about the river and the Portuguese in the north and more concerned about the southern areas where Spaniards from other jurisdictions and Indians were hunting wild cattle. The local Cabildo even considered the option of asking the governor to allow the use of officers and soldiers from the garrison to patrol the southern border.

3.4 - Strategies

Before considering how Buenos Aires became a frontier society and articulated itself into the southern border, it is important to analyze the strategies implemented by other colonies to protect their tradable resources. Mendoza, for example, had few possibilities of expanding its geographical control because of its dependence on Santiago, its small Spanish population, and its limited labour force. Commerce was the only outlet. When Mendozans opened a market for wines in Córdoba and Buenos Aires, they began to integrate the trade network connecting Chile with Tucumán, Paraguay, and Río de la Plata. Santiago tolerated the
expansion of Mendoza into the markets in the eastern provinces, in part because it had its own customers in Arauco and Peru. In this regards, the tolerance was due to the fact that Mendoza complemented Santiago's interests.

The opposite image is provided by the tense relationship between Córdoba and Buenos Aires. The two economies never quite complemented each other and the two cities competed for the few available markets of the region. Since the Portuguese colonial market was the most attractive, both colonies tried to satisfy its demand for agricultural products and to monopolize the imports of slaves and merchandise. As early as 1603, the Cabildo of Córdoba sent Portuguese-born Ruy de Sosa to Lima to negotiate a license to import slaves via Buenos Aires. Cordobans chose the right person because Ruy de Sosa had powerful connections with the political sphere after years of trading with Potosí. The wealthy Ruy de Sosa paid $6,050 for the post of alguacil of the Cabildo, but the Crown ultimately decided not to grant him the title in 1609 because of his foreign origin. Nonetheless, it was as alguacil of Córdoba that Ruy de Sosa travelled to Buenos Aires with the legal authorization granted by the Real Audiencia of La Plata, which allowed Córdoba to trade with Portuguese colonies through the port.

Ruy de Sosa personally profited from the opportunity of trading with the Portuguese through Buenos Aires. In 1618 he organized a company in Santiago with another Cordoban merchant.
Simón Duarte. The "official" version states that they wanted to raise sheep and mules⁸⁷. Most likely, the company served as a mask for the traffic in slaves. In such a case, Simón Duarte was the perfect partner because of his links with the Tejada family in Córdoba that had powerful relatives in Santiago⁸⁸.

After receiving the license that Ruy de Sosa obtained in Peru, the Cabildo of Córdoba tried to expand the opportunities to trade with the Portuguese colonies. To avoid local pressure groups, Córdoba sent its agents directly to Madrid. They were charged with obtaining authorization to import 400 slaves and a license to trade directly with Brazil using ships owned by Cordobans⁸⁹. Yet, the slave traffic brings to light many of the strategies implemented to evade royal control, in particular, the use of networks binding merchants to officers who were also members of powerful families.

One of the first to arrive in Mendoza from Buenos Aires to sell slaves in Santiago was the Alcalde of Buenos Aires Captain Gaspar de Quevedo. His partner in Mendoza was Captain Juan Ortiz de Urbina who, regardless of the fact that he had an encomienda in Cuyo, was living in Santiago until at least 1640⁹⁰. The network included Alonso del Campo Lantadilla in Santiago, a wealthy merchant who bought the post of alguacil in $3,000. Alonso gave his daughter a dowry of $46,779 when she married Captain Antonio de Barambio, an active merchant with connections in Córdoba and Buenos Aires⁹¹.
Captain Bartolomé Rojas de Puebla was part of this slave trading circuit linking the colonies along the border. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, he operated through a network of connections along the southern border. Although living in Santiago, he established alliances in Mendoza during earlier years when he was politically active in the colony. In addition, part of his family settled permanently in Mendoza. His cousin Captain Gregorio de Puebla, for example, acted as regidor of the local Cabildo at the same time that Bartolomé was trading slaves in the region. These cases explain why the customs office in Córdoba was unable to control the slave traffic between Buenos Aires and Santiago, which also drove silver contraband, since it was based on family connections. Moreover, when the customs office opened its doors in 1625, caravans linking Mendoza and Buenos Aires were already avoiding Córdoba by using a southern route that went from the Valle de Uco to San Luis, and from San Luis to Buenos Aires.

In Buenos Aires, officers and authorities developed other strategies to evade royal control of imports and exports. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, for instance, when three lawyers attempted to work in the port, the Cabildo considered the consequences before granting the lawyers the requested permits to open their offices. During the meeting, Treasurar Simón de Valdés explained that it would be a mistake to let lawyers in the colony. He mentioned the possibility of promoting trials by
giving advice about illegalities. Immediately thereafter, the Council of the Indies compelled Valdés to explain such an idea. In his letter of 1611, the treasurer justified himself by arguing that the concept was based on the fact that Buenos Aires already had enough lawyers and that more of them would only promote trials with the sole purpose of making money.

Members of the Council of the Indies were quite right to be suspicious of Valdés' notion. Cabildantes were extremely afraid of the presence of lawyers who could advise royal authorities about the illegalities behind certain actions. A few years later, another lawyer from Santa Fe asked for a license to work in Buenos Aires. This time, cabildantes refused the petition on moral grounds. They considered it unacceptable that he had left his wife in Santa Fe just to make money in Buenos Aires.

Such moral arguments sound cynical, of course, since those who used them included two of the best known smugglers in Buenos Aires: Captain Juan de Vergara and his partner Simón de Valdés. Captain Vergara arrived in the port in 1605 and sometimes assisted Hernandarias as a notary. Vergara and Valdés traded confiscated slaves and merchandise, earning an estimate of $7 million between 1612 and 1615. The network included Portuguese-born Diego de Vega, a banker with connections in Flanders, Portugal, Brazil, and Peru. Diego de Vega even went to Córdoba in 1612 to do business with Simón Duarte. According to the deed of sale, the transaction amounted to $3,450. Although

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the document does not specify what type of merchandise was exchanged, obviously they traded slaves”.

Vergara and Valdés were not prosecuted until 1615. The proceeding on several charges of smuggling was given extra spice by the suspicion that they had poisoned Governor Diego Marín Negrón. The long judicial examination that followed was so extensive that it used all of the available 19,000 pieces of papel sellado, the required paper for legal actions. Although it provided abundant details, the investigation was declared incomplete and the Council of the Indies could not reach a verdict. Being able to act in political life once again, Captain Vergara bought five lifetime regimientos in the Cabildo of Charcas and in the Cabildo of Buenos Aires as a means of safeguarding his activities both in Río de la Plata and Peru97.

The Crown was familiar with the case because it had received several complaints, including a letter from the procurador Manuel de Frías who declaimed against the abuses committed by both Vergara and Vega. Frías suggested that both Vergara and Valdés should be deported. Members of the Cabildo of Buenos Aires sent a similar petition in 163098. Documents, however, indicate that Juan de Vergara was still living in Buenos Aires during the 1630s and that he had enough political influence to receive several mercedes99. When finally deported to Mendoza, it seems that it was Vergara himself who selected the place and the moment for a change.
The Portuguese rebellion against Spain altered the entire trade circuit along the border. In 1647 the Real Audiencia of Santiago reported that the colony had shifted its imports from Buenos Aires to Lima. The report also stressed that many merchants in Santiago had started to send merchandise to the eastern provinces across the Andes, reversing the practices of earlier years when Santiago bought slaves and merchandise introduced via Buenos Aires. The tendency can be associated with the presence of Vergara in the western segment of the border. When he arrived in the colony, Manuel de Cardoso, a slave trader who operated in Lima, was living in Mendoza. Vergara may have been his advisor, informing him how to perform trading activities in the region.

Francisco Núñez operated in Córdoba on a smaller scale. Núñez had been granted two encomiendas; he was the royal treasurer from 1605 onward; and he twice held the position of regidor in the Cabildo. Regardless his political activity, he was principally a merchant and a slave trader. A deed of sale of 1607, for example, testifies that he sold a slave to Alonso and Juan del Pozo y Silva, two influential members of the Chilean elite.

Effective connections proved to be vital for contraband, but they were also important during legal exchanges. Sometimes, connections became the keystone for successful enterprises like driving cattle along the southern border. In 1657 an Acta of the
Cabildo of Santiago, which designated those who had to sell the imported one third of cattle to the army, brings to light the names of the three most important cattle importers: Bernardino de Urbina, Antonio de Barambio, and Roque de San Martín. What happened during their transactions illuminates the necessity of good connections to carry out business in these southern colonies.

This thesis has already referred to Antonio de Barambio and his family network in Santiago. In the case of Captain Bernardino de Urbina, he might have had linkages with people in Cuyo since he was the encomendero of the Huarpes living in Lagunas de Huanacache. His marriage to one of the Maestre de Campo Juan Ramírez de Arellano's daughters expanded this network. Originally from Chile, Juan Ramírez de Arellano settled down in Buenos Aires in 1645. Some years later, he went back to Chile as a royal officer. He became associated with Gerónimo de Ugas to import cattle from eastern provinces, probably from Córdoba. Both Urbina and Barambio enjoyed political connections that they could activate in order to protect their private interests.

On the contrary, the case of Roque de San Martín illustrates the risks of operating alone, or at least, as an individual who had to trust person-to-person commitments. Roque de San Martín arrived in Buenos Aires as a soldier of Governor Esteban de Avila. A few years later, being alférez, he was registered as one of the most powerful landowners in Areco and Luján. In 1655
Roque de San Martín ventured to export cattle from Buenos Aires to Chile. From his farm in Buenos Aires, he handed over 14,000 heads of cattle to Captain Pedro de la Fuente. The latter had agreed to drive them to Chile and to equip the expedition with enough horses and workers. His own farm in San Luis would be used to graze the animals before crossing the Andes. This clear and simple agreement concluded in a disaster for San Martín's commercial interest.

Between Buenos Aires and San Luis, Fuentes lost 5,000 animals, most of them dispersed in the grasslands of Córdoba. If San Martín wanted to recuperate the animals, he had to find them himself and pay the rights of pasture to the respective landowners. From the Río Quinto in the limit between Córdoba and San Luis, Fuentes left for the west with 5,400 heads, arriving in the Valle de Uco with only 3,400 exhausted animals. To aggravate the situation, it was Winter and therefore impossible to cross the mountains.

Roque de San Martín had no choice at all. He was forced to pay landowners of the grasslands in Valle de Uco for the grazing of his animals over the following months since driving the cattle back to Buenos Aires was senseless. The option of selling the heads in Mendoza was discarded not only because the price was too low to compensate for the losses, but also because local cattle breeders were not interested in expanding their herds. Roque de San Martín then had to wait until late Winter to drive the rest
of the cattle across the Andes to sell the beasts in Santiago. Indeed, in 1657 the Cabildo of Santiago registered him and Fuentes as importing 1,850 cows and bulls.\textsuperscript{108}

Once in Santiago, Roque de San Martin went to the Real Audiencia to sue his partner Captain Fuentes because his negligence and failure to fulfil the contract caused estimated loss of around $10,000. During the trial, Roque de San Martin argued that Captain Pedro Fuentes acted intentionally. According to San Martin, Fuentes could not be discharged because he had agreed to provide the drive with enough horses and peons to maintain control over the immense herd. Moreover, Fuentes had maliciously delayed the departure from Rio Quinto to Mendoza in order to be late to cross the Andes, but on time for the birth of 600 animals, which San Martin would be unable to recuperate because bore no marks of ownership. He also argued that Fuentes had chosen the farm of his friend Captain Pedro Moyano in the Valle de Uco to let animals graze during the preceding days of births; a choice that San Martin noted as intentional and extremely prejudicial to his interests. The Real Audiencia was ultimately convinced enough to order the seizure of 524 cows from Fuentes' farm in Lolacán.\textsuperscript{109}

The fact that Roque de San Martin agreed to deal with Pedro Fuentes, someone he barely knew, suggests the need for links with other jurisdictions and markets. It may also indicate the necessity of guaranteeing access to grassland on different
sections of the route. The joint presence of San Martín and Fuentes in Santiago to sell the beasts reveals the logic of the market. Since Mendoza was unable to absorb more animals at a convenient price for San Martín, he had to sell the animals elsewhere, and Santiago was still the ideal location. This market, however, was closed, therefore San Martín needed Fuentes' connections.

Overall, the risky enterprise did not ruin Roque de San Martín or end his career as a cattle breeder. His son, Captain Juan de San Martín, was one of the most important landowners and cattle breeders in Buenos Aires during the third decade of the eighteenth century. In 1739, that son, Juan de San Martín, organized an expedition against the natives living in southern Buenos Aires, blaming them for cattle theft.\textsuperscript{110}

The case serves as an example of an informal trade monopoly protecting the elite's privileges. By keeping the markets closed to foreigners, locals reinforced their control over the entire segment of the economy. They were able to limit access to goods and to regulate sales and prices. Two other cases in Mendoza give further evidence of behaviour. In 1653 Governor Antonio de Acuña made a deal with Mendozan Antonio and Pedro Moyano Cornejo, both cattle breeders. They agree to sell 4,000 heads of cattle to the army up to a total of $14,000 to be paid by the situado in silver or cloth. The contract specified that Antonio and Pedro Moyano
Cornejo were responsible for driving the animals across the Andes.

Two years later Antonio Moyano went to the Real Audiencia of Santiago to sue the corregidor of Mendoza, Captain Martín de Maguna. During the trial, Moyano asserted that Maguna, in alliance with the Cabildo of Mendoza, impeded him from extracting natives for driving the animals across the Andes. Although Moyano argued that he had received the governor's authorization to extract Huarpes, authorities in Mendoza immediately refused to accept the validity of the document. The refusal caused a substantial delay in the departure of the drive and an early snowstorm killed 3 peons and many animals when they crossed the Andes. Witnesses asserted that Maguna and the Cabildo were not zealously following the legislation concerning native work when they prevented Moyano's actions. They only wanted to protect their own interests, seeking to guarantee that they would have enough workers to drive their filled wine carts to Buenos Aires.

Similarly, the Corregidor Juan de la Banda used his political influence to control the market. He was the officer who prevented Captain Fraguas from trading in Mendoza. Once again in 1679 Juan de la Banda confiscated Juan de Moyano's merchandise under the suspicion that goods were illegally imported. Juan de Moyano was part of a well-established trading circuit that sold wines in the eastern colonies. He profited from being an
encomendero since he used his Indians to drive his carts with his wine to Buenos Aires. Once in the port, he would buy merchandise to sell in Mendoza\textsuperscript{113}. This, however, competed with Juan de la Banda who was involved in the same activity. Being the higher authority at a local level, Juan de la Banda had all the necessary devices on hand to interpret the law to his own convenience.

The abuse of political and military power was also frequent in the other colonies. In Buenos Aires, for example, it was associated with the fact that most officers partook in smuggling. Many of them used their farms located along the Riachuelo as bases for the operations; even the captain of the garrison of Buenos Aires, Amador Rojas y Acevedo, was one of the main landowners and smugglers of the area. Likewise, Captain Gaspar de Gaete carried out contraband through his farms along the Riachuelo. The so-called "Puerto Gaspar", the best natural dock in the area, was located on one of his properties. Moreover, he was investigated for his abusive use of the situado from Potosí to Buenos Aires, which he used as if it were his personal capital. He traded along the entire route using the situado to buy and sell different goods keeping the resulting profits\textsuperscript{114}.

Lastly, even behaviour intended to prevent contraband contributed to personal enrichment. Captain Domingo de Acassuso, for instance, arrived in the district of Las Conchas sufficiently early to impede the entrance of contraband, but far from being a
coincidence, he bought the illegal merchandise in the public auction immediately after its confiscation. The revenues that he gained from the now legal sales permitted him to do business in Buenos Aires from 1697 to 1729. He thus bought the huge farm of "Monte Grande" and became one of the richest porteños during the third decade of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{135}

3.5 - Networks

A remarkable feature of these frontier colonies during the seventeenth century is the role of family networks in the commercial sphere. Families, instead of individuals, took advantage of the multiple connections among their members who lived in different places and assumed political and military roles. The image of the entrepreneur, who can successfully trade thanks to his personal qualities as a businessman, vanishes once such cases as that of Fraguas or San Martín are examined. Both had the qualities of any entrepreneur, but perhaps seventeenth-century markets did not favour the ethics of individualism.

Specific networks illustrate how family connection contributed to link these southern societies. The first bound families whose members were living in the four colonies of the southern border. The second network linked Santiago, Mendoza, and
Córdoba. The third embraced two prominent families from Córdoba and Buenos Aires; and the last refers to Mendoza only.

The first network includes the cluster formed by the first families that settled down in Córdoba. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Luis Abreu de Albornoz enjoyed social prestige, economic power, and political influence. His political cursus honorum included appointment to the lieutenancy of Córdoba by Governor Alonso de Rivera in 1606. Luis Abreu de Albornoz consolidated his links with the elite of Mendoza through his second marriage. Ranging further, his daughter Catalina married the Chilean-born Captain Juan Céliz de Quiroga. Céliz de Quiroga had outstanding links with members of the elite in the colonies along the border, which derived from the fact that his father was a slave trader at the end of the sixteenth century. Juan Céliz, himself, was a merchant, paying the unión de las armas for the first time in 1668. Trade might be the activity that brought the Albornoz and the Quirogas together since both were active in the slave markets at the same time.

The Medina family has also integrated this network because Ana Céliz de Quiroga married Miguel de Medina, a regidor from 1622 onward. His son, Miguel de Medina Céliz, inherited the post of regidor along with other goods and properties in the estate. In turn, he married Ana Cortés who was born in Mendoza into one of the first families to settle down in Cuyo. Her father, Captain Adrián Cornejo, received an encomienda in Córdoba in 1617, a fact
that might have influenced his decision to move to Córdoba. Nonetheless, Cornejo maintained useful connections within Mendoza, which proved to be beneficial for his commercial transactions. He often requested authorization to use the natives from his encomienda to drive carts between Mendoza and Córdoba.

Another of Luis de Abreu's sons, Pedro Bustos de Albornoz received the post of comisario real in the army and linked his family with the two of the richest families in Córdoba when he married Gregoria de Sosa who inherited portions of the Ruy de Sosa and Blas de Peralta estate. The activities of the Portuguese-born merchant Ruy de Sosa have already been described. As to Blas de Peralta, he held the encomienda of Saldán and Guamacha and was active in local political life for over 30 years. He was also a merchant. A legal document of 1608, for example, authorized him to employ the natives of his encomienda to drive carts to Buenos Aires and the lists of those paying the unión de las armas include his name, although he was among those who paid the minimum duty.

In regards to the second network, multiple ties between Santiago and Mendoza also include Córdoba as a result of the commercial transactions linking the three colonies along the border. For example, the network that included the Chilean Gabriel del Toro Mazote who, while in Córdoba, bought slaves, traded yerba mate, and granted his relative Francisco de Chirinos a power of attorney enabling him to demand payment of certain
debts in Mendoza. Captain Francisco de Chirinos de Posadas was one of the most powerful cattle breeders in Valle de Uco and therefore, the perfect partner on that flank of the Andes to guarantee the successful completion of cattle drives. As previously explained, Gabriel del Toro Mazote endured the opposition of the Cabildo of Santiago against cattle importers. In fact, cabildantes not only attempted to reduce his imports, but bitterly disputed his rights over land in the Aconcagua Valley on route between the Andes and Santiago.

The third network is that of the Cabrera family. Gerónimo Luis de Cabrera, grandson of the conqueror of Córdoba, was also a relative of Hernandarias. Born in Córdoba in 1590, Gerónimo de Cabrera organized one of the early-seventeenth century expedition to the "Kingdom of the Caesars," but like his relative Hernandarias, he was unable to locate the golden cities. As in the case of Hernandarias, however, such a service to the king entitled him to receive various rewards. He occupied the highest political posts in the area, being not only the governor of the province of Tucumán, but also of the province of Río de la Plata. Political responsibilities did not interfere with the progress of his economic enterprises since he owned the obraje "Lagunilla," exported mules to Potosí, and had properties in Mendoza. Gerónimo's relatives were also influential in Cordoban society. One of his cousins, Juan, was the treasurer of the customs office, while another cousin, Miguel, married Hernandarias'
daughter. Her dowry displays the economic capacity of her father since it included 30 slaves, 40 carts, 100 oxen, and several artifacts made of gold and silver.

Individuals operating without the protection of kinship ties were an exception. A few exceptions, such as Pedro Ome de Pesoa Saá, appeared to have been successful, although he may have enjoyed the benefits of being a member of some sort of network. Born in Chile in 1593, Pedro’s father was Portuguese. He was one of the officer-merchants since he requested authorization to travel to Paraguay to buy cattle for the army. Perhaps he did not plan to travel so far because he was a relative of two important cattle-breeder families in Chile, the Toros and the Illanes. Moreover, Pedro had a farm with cattle in Valle de Uco, an indication of cattle breeding and trading activities. The services in Chile allowed him to ask for mercedes in Buenos Aires where he held the military degree of maestre de campo and was politically active in the Cabildo. In Buenos Aires, Pedro Ome Pesoa married Melchor de Maciel’s widow, Isabel de Figueroa, who contributed to the marriage with wealth, but also with important social connections and political power.

Although family-based networks are to be expected in Ancien Régime societies, in these seventeenth-century southern colonies, family networks were intrinsically necessary for economic development. They not only contributed to the establishment of Spaniards in poor borderline societies, but also activated
communication and exchanges among them. Networks provided protection, allowing their members to bypass expensive legal contracts, and they also veiled illegalities. The latter disturbed the Crown because merchants were simultaneously authorities and officers who would enforce royal decrees only if they happened to be in harmony with their interests. The Crown tried to reduce such occurrences, of course, by constantly reminding the governors that hiring relatives, friends, and clients was against the law\textsuperscript{121}, but to no avail.

There were other consequences to the existence of these networks. Families tended to function as tribes and their struggles for power became almost inter-tribal conflict. Political struggles mobilized entire families to protect one of the members, but the action tended to guarantee that the privileges enjoyed by a member of the family could be used by the others and even passed on to the next generation. Under such circumstances, the elite did not always act with total unity. On the contrary, within elite families disputes for primacy, honour, and status occasionally fragmented solidarity, regardless of the fact that strategic alliances to protect corporate privileges dominated the social horizon. During his term of office, for example, Governor Alonso de Rivera attempted to manipulate the internal struggles of the elite as a means of gaining political power. In essence, he tried to conquer the support of the powerful Ríos-Lisperguer clan by appointing Gonzalo de los Ríos
to the corregimiento of Santiago. Immediately thereafter, Juan and Luis de las Cuevas decided to reject Rivera's decision and sent a formal complaint to the Real Audiencia, arguing that the decision made by the governor was inappropriate. The action exasperated both parties to the point that on Sunday August 10, 1614, after mass, members of both families had a sword fight in front of the cathedral\textsuperscript{122}.

Another political consequence concerns the difficulties in avoiding nepotism since family ties were omnipresent in seventeenth-century colonies. Authorities then ended up depending on a very reduced group of people since, from their perspective, the fact that many of them were inter-related was less important than the need for reliable agents. From a royal perspective, however, the actual problem was related to corruption rather than demography. The Crown was convinced that local authorities usually accepted bribes and so allowed members of the same family to occupy almost all available posts\textsuperscript{123}.

Lastly, a description of the networks linking these colonies must include the Society of Jesus since it adapted to the needs and circumstances of the southern border of the empire. To begin with, the Fathers influenced the Crown in order to design the policy that abolished the personal services performed by natives throughout the zone. In 1611 the Provincial for the region, Father Diego de Torres, wrote a letter to his convents informing them about the forthcoming decree that would abolish native
servitude\textsuperscript{124}. The so-called \textit{Ordenanzas de Alfaro} that abolished forced native labour provoked such a violent reaction in Paraguay that Jesuits were afraid of their personal security. \textit{Encomenderos} blamed Father Torres for the ruling because he had agreed on these laws with Governor Alfaro while both were in Córdoba\textsuperscript{125}.

In Santiago, \textit{vecinos} even spread rumours that the Jesuits would be expelled from the Chile as they had been from Venice. The ordinances attacked the central nervous system of the economy at the same time that the defensive war philosophy prevented access to the native work force in Arauco. As Father Luis de Valdivia was a Jesuit, the elite felt a growing hostility for the Society. Interestingly, although Alonso de Rivera disagreed with Valdivia's program to pacify the Arauco, he granted the Society a \textit{merced} consisting of 5,000 \textit{cuadras} of land\textsuperscript{126}.

The decision of the Jesuits to discard the use of native labourers on their properties affected their economic activities, but it can never be compared to the effect that the abolition of Indian servitude had on the \textit{encomenderos}. The reason is that in 1608 the Society received authorization to import slaves from Africa without having to use the \textit{asientos}, therefore reducing the costs. The entrance of slaves allowed the abolition of native labour in the convents of Córdoba and Santiago del Estero in 1609. At the same time, the Fathers opened a convent in Mendoza. Diego de Torres considered that the establishment of a convent in the colony was essential to his plans to protect the Huarpes, but
he also saw that Mendoza was the terminus for carts coming from Córdoba with goods from Buenos Aires and Paraguay. 

Early in the third decade of the seventeenth century, the Society had sufficient financial support to maintain the convents of Santiago, Concepción, Arauco, and Chiloé. During the following years, the Jesuits were able to accumulate 59 farms in regions spanning from La Serena in the north to Arauco. In the eastern segment of the frontier, Jesuits occupied a massive portion of the route linking the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa and San Luis, allowing the drives of cattle from their farms in eastern territories to Chile. The economic potential of the Society was of such a magnitude that they could literally feed Mendoza during food crisis. The disadvantage was that the large amount of animals grazing in these farms was a lure to both Spaniards and Indians who wished to increase their herds through theft.

With natives, the malón of 1658 over the farms in the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa alerted the locals about the dynamic of the southern frontier. The confederated tribes stole cattle from the Maule River area and began to see the farms across the Andes as a prime source for domesticated animals. The Compañía de Jesús then decided to drive part of the herds from Valle de Uco and Xaurúa to their easternmost farms in San Luis. The Jesuits explained the action by blaming the lack of military protection. It is possible, however, that changes in the market of Santiago influenced the decision. Since Santiago reduced the amount of
imports, the Fathers did not need large herds grazing in the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa where natives could strike again.

By 1665, the farms of the Society in the area were being used once more. During these years, cattle theft by Spaniards gave rise to conflicts and were a main source of concern. In 1667 the priests resentfully complained of Captain Andrés de Sánchez Chaparro because his cattle was grazing in areas belonging to them. Likewise, Captains Alonso de Caravajal and Francisco de Chirinos took advantage of the undefined property lines and let their cattle roam throughout the Society's farm. The resulting indifference of the three cattle breeders to the complaints and petitions by the Jesuits to round up the cattle from their land irritated the priests. As a last resort, they used excommunication in 1668 despite the fact that the episode was of a temporal nature.

Acting as a corporation, no other network could compete with the Jesuits in terms of either in its geographical extension or its degree of influence in Spain. The exemption from taxes in Paraguay, for example, created a centre of wealth whose livestock at the end of the eighteenth century surpassed the estimated figure of one million heads. From Paraguay, Jesuits exported cattle and other agricultural goods like *verba mate* and tobacco to Perú, Tucumán, and Chile. Another benefit was the lack of intermediaries during transactions. In 1696 the rector of the convent of Mendoza received 240 arrobas of *verba mate* from
Paraguay, which he then sent on to the rector of the convent in Santiago requesting him to reship this cargo to Peru. Finally, the priests complemented economic activities. In Córdoba, for example, they operated two obrajes, the huge farm of "Alta Gracia" (valued at $30,000), "Caroya," and "Guanasacate." These properties had fruit trees, vineyards, mules, and cattle.

In Buenos Aires, the Jesuits received mercedes in Luján and Las Conchas where they started running one of the first wheat mills. The exploitation of most of their properties centred on cattle raising practices, enabling them to export heads, hides, tallow, and dried beef. In terms of production and exchange, the Society generated one of the most competent networks that operated in the area. In this regards, this network also illustrates the general dynamic of the Spanish colonies. Along the course of the seventeenth century, Jesuits were able to expand their holdings. Like civilians, at the beginning of the eighteenth century Fathers began a southward expansion in their search for resources. This search for human and material resources had been the driving force in the west-to-east articulation of the southern border. The final chapter focuses on the ways in which this force operated in the Río de la Plata when it finally reached its easternmost limit.
ENDNOTES

1. When Mendoza was founded in 1561, it had a small population of 45 vecinos, although 30 of them were living in Santiago. A century later, an estimated 480 Hispanic inhabitants occupied the entire Corregimiento of Cuyo; for additional information on early-seventeenth century Mendoza, see Fernando Morales Guíñazú, "Los conquistadores," RUEH 12 (1938), 263-85; José Aníbal Verdaguer, "La región de Cuyo hasta la creación del Virreinato del Río de la Plata," HNA III, 333-40; Juan Isidro Maza, Muñeres en la Historia de Mendoza (Buenos Aires: Fundación Banco de Boston, 1989); and Rosa Zuluaga, El Cabildo de la ciudad de Mendoza. Su primer medio siglo de existencia (Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1964), 27; for a general survey, see Jorge Scalvini, Historia de Mendoza (Mendoza: Spadoni, 1965); and for demographic data, see Jorge Comadrán Ruiz, Evolución demográfica Argentina durante el periodo hispano, 1535-1810 (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1969).


3. Unfortunately, the Actas of the meetings held during that Winter are not available. Authorities were aware of the limited resources available in Mendoza. Antonio de Mosquera himself drove 900 heads of cattle from Córdoba, and Santiago also sent cattle and other goods to support troops; for contributions, see the
Acta of March 3, 1605, ACMZ, I.


8. For details on the area and this raid, see Juan Maza, Malargue (Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1991), 31.

9. On the different reactions of the local tribes to the Spanish rule, see Fernando Morales Guíñazú, Primitivos habitantes de Mendoza (Mendoza: Spadoni, 1965), 20.

10. Claudio Gay, Historia física y política de Chile II (París-Santiago, 1845), 70; Sergio Villalobos, Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1989), 40 and 201; and the Acta of August 21, 1657, ACCH, XV; for 161
other requests for protection, see Document 990, Pieza 1, Volume 487, ANCH, Real Audiencia.


13. On his activities, see Fernando Morales Guíñazú, *El Comercio colonial en Cuyo* (Mendoza: Best, 1938), 7; and "Genealogías" n.d. (mimographed); Luis Roa y Ursúa, *El Reino de Chile, 1535-1810* (Valladolid: Cuesta, 1945), 556; and the *Acta* of March 3, 1605, ACMZ, I.

14. According to a document, Antonio Moyano was a *encomendero* in Córdoba who sold land in Mendoza to Juan Ladrón de Guevara; see Espejo, *Provincia*, I, 39; for additional information, see the *Acta* of March 12, 1629, ACCH, X; Espejo, *Provincia*, I, 63, and II, 405; Morales Guíñazú, *Comercio*, 7 and 13; Coria, *Evolución*,

162
70; and the Acta of March 3, 1605, ACMZ, I.
16. Most of those included in the list of payers were
involved in wine trade. Captain Juan de Amaro paid $200, Captain
Juan de Villegas $144, Captain Juan Moyano $120, Captain Juan
Ortiz de Urbina $168, and Captain Juan Ladrón de Guevara $60; see
the Acta of February 15, 1645, ACMZ, II.
17. For this petition of the Cabildo, see Document 15, Volume
63, ANCH, Archivo de Escribanos.
18. The Cabildo usually requested discounts, arguing the
poverty of the region, bad harvests, and other commercial
difficulties; for these arguments, see, for example, the Acta of
March 5, 1674, ACMZ, II.
19. For the mercedes in Valle de Uco and Xaurua, see Volume
2720, ANCH, Real Audiencia.
20. On changes in the local climate, see María Prieto,
"Formación y consolidación de una sociedad en un área marginal
del Reino de Chile: La Provincia de Cuyo en el siglo XVII," Ph.D.
dissertation, Universidad de Sevilla, 1983, 36 passim; for local
landowners, see Documents 73, 78, and 79, Volume 73, ANCH, Real
Audiencia.
21. On Juan de Amaro and Jacinto de Videla, see Coria,
Evolución, 69, 70, and 94; Espejo, Provincia, II, 252-3, and 513;
Dionisio Chaca, Tupungato (Buenos Aires: Del Autor, 1941), 123,
and the Acta of February 15, 1645, ACMZ, II; for the donation,

22. Espejo, Provincia, II, 544; Coria, Evolución, 94; and the Acta of April 9, 1670, ACMZ, III.

23. Letter to the Cabildo of Mendoza, February 20, 1656, reproduced in the Acta of May 27, 1656, ACMZ, I.

24. This amount can be an indication of the fertility of the area. In 1701 a census specified that 40 thousand heads of cattle grazed in the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa; for further information, see Coria, Evolución, 78; for the cattle census, see Document 2, Carpeta 12, AHMZ, Colonial; for the amount of cattle sent to Chile, see the Acta of July 15, 1662, ACMZ, III.

25. Actas of August 16, 23 and 28, and September 24, 1668; and March 28, 1669; ACMZ, III.

26. For cattle trade and prices in Mendoza, see Coria, Evolución, 70.

27. Morales Guíañá, Comercio, 22.

28. Acta of April 24, 1656, ACMZ, III.

29. "[...] no hay duda sino que si comienzan a acudir gente de afuera aquella tierra será una de las más ricas de las Indias porque su fertilidad y grosedad no necesita de otra cosa sino de gente que la labre [...] la vecindad de Chile no la ha dejado crecer por haberse pasado allá muchos de sus vecinos [...] pero multiplicándose los españoles al paso que hasta aquí, habrá gente
para todo y de hecho he visto ya que algunos de Santiago se van a
casar a San Juan y a Mendoza y a asentar allí sus casas, ni puede
ser menos porque lo de Chile se va estrechando de manera que no
pueden tener todos en él la comodidad que desean;" for this
diary, see Verdaguer, "La región de Cuyo,". 337.
30. For the trial, see Espejo, Provincia, II, 281-2.
31. For the trial, see Document 37, Volume 1633, ANCH, Real
Audiencia; for another example of family networks, see the letter
to the Audiencia from Belisario Quiroga, October 11, 1725,
reproduced in Espejo, Provincia, II, 508.
32. On the slave trade, see Carlos Assadourian, El tráfico de
esclavos en Córdoba, De Angola a Potosí, Siglos XVI-XVIII
(Córdoba: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 1966). 3; El tráfico
de esclavos en Córdoba, 1586-1610 (Córdoba: Universidad Nacional
de Córdoba, 1965), and "Potosí el crecimiento económico de
Córdoba en los siglos XVI y XVII," Homenaje al Dr. Ceferino
Garzón Maceda (Córdoba: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 1973),
169-205; for examples of vecinos of Chile buying slaves in
Córdoba, see Assadourian, Tráfico, De Angola a Potosí, 37; and
the Documents 421, 424, 479, 554, and 555, APCB, Escribanos 1.
33. Miguel Amunátegui, "La Capitanía General de Chile hasta
la fundación del Virreinato del Río de la Plata," Boletín de la
Academia Argentina de la Historia, 227-39; and Horacio Lara,
Crónica de la Araucanía, I (Santiago: El Progreso, 1889), 344.
34. The sale of Chilean textiles in Córdoba and Buenos Aires

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was considered one of the most risky business during those years; for further information, see Mario Góngora, *Encomenderos y Estancieros* (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1970), 211; and Carlos Assadourian et al. *Argentina. De la conquista a la independencia* (Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1972), 100.

35. **Alcalde** Juan de Tejeda firmly argued against this policy when it affected wine production. Personal interests explained his behaviour because he made and traded wines. He received the *encomienda* of Nono, Pichana and Anizacate and owned the farm "Soto." He was **alcalde** in 1609, 1614-17, and 1620; **procurador** in 1613 and 1622, and **regidor** in 1610; for his activities, see Arturo Lazcano, *Los Cabildantes de Córdoba* (Córdoba: Archivo Histórico, 1954), 192; and Luis Altamira, *El Cabildo de Córdoba* (Buenos Aires: Universitaria, 1942), 12.


37. **Acta** of May 9, 1610, ACCB, V.

38. **Actas** of November 20, 1612 and on December 13, 1614, ACCB, V.

39. Exports also included cattle. In 1641 Córdoba sent 42,626
heads to Peru, and between 1681 and 1685, the amount was 69,027 animals; on this commerce, see Assadourian, "Potosi y el crecimiento," 175-6.


41. Cordobans insisted that Buenos Aires acted illegally ("tiene mandado [Hernandarias] con graves penas que de esta ciudad no vayan carretas ni harinas a Buenos Aires, so pena de quemarlas [esto es] contra la costumbre que se ha tenido desde que esta tierra se pobló [y es] cosa no usada en estos reinos ni en los de Europa porque jamás se ha visto que a los vasallos de un mismo rey se les prohíba el entrar y contratar unos con otros"), see the Acta of May, 7, 1603, ACCB, IV.

42. Actas of December 29, 1663; August 22, 1664; and May 3, 1665, ACCB, XI.

43. Acta of December 1667, 17, ACCB, XI.

44. Acta of December 18, 1643, ACCB, IX; IV Centenario, 100; and Carlos Luque Colombres, "Córdoba, plaza de armas de la gobernación de Tucumán para los socorros al puerto de Buenos Aires," HNA IV, 63-78.

45. Actas of October 10, 15, 17, 20, 1645; ACCB, IX.

46. José Torre Revello, "La sociedad colonial. Las clases sociales. La ciudad y la campaña," HNA IV, 317.

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47. Document 10, Volume I; and Document 30, Volume II; APCB, Gobierno.

48. For the support to Mosquera's expedition, see the Actas of November 10 and 23, 1603, ACCB, III; and for the assistance provided in 1668, see the Acta of November 5, 1668, ACCB, XI.

49. On Luciano de Figueroa, see Lazcano, Cabildantes, 73; also the Acta of October 2, 1645, ACCB, IX; for similar cases (Pedro Martínez de Zavala, Pedro González, and Diego Paez [Pérez?]), see Crecente Errázuriz, Historia de Chile (Santiago: Cervantes, 1908), II, 119 and 120; Adolfo Garretón, La municipalidad colonial, Buenos Aires desde su fundación hasta la gobernación de Lariz (Buenos Aires: Menendez, 1933), 314; and Lafuente, Los portugueses, 215; for other links between Santiago and Córdoba, see Luis Lira Montt, "Estudiantes chilenos en la Real Universidad de Córdoba del Tucumán, 1670-1815," Revista de la Junta de Estudios Históricos 8:2 (1975), 649-71; for a description of the local social structure, see Ignacio Tejerina, Formación social de Córdoba en el periodo hispano (Córdoba: Junta Provincial de la Historia, 1992).

50. Actas of March, 2 and 10, 1645, ACCB, IX.

51. The governor, however, disagreed and forbade the auctions in 1655. Nonetheless, the cabildantes ignored the order and decided to wait for the new governor's opinion. A decade later, the administration of the unión de las armas was still offered in public auctions. By then, agricultural production was duty free;
for details, see the Actas of August 13, and November 17, 1655; ACCB, IX; and of October 29, 1668, and December 16, 1669, ACCB, XI;

52. Acta of January 4, 1647, ACCB, IX.

53. On Ruy de Sosa, see Lazcano, Cabildantes, 150-78; the Acta of June 13, 1603, ACCB, VI; and Document 568, Volume 22; Documents 858, 859, 861, 1114, 1115, Volume 25, APCB, Protocols.

54. For the Tejedas, see Lazcano, Cabildantes, 154, 162, and 189; Assadourian, Tráfico, 37; the Acta of November 10, 1603, ACCB, VI; and the Documents 387, 388, and 490, Volume 21; Documents 609 and 636, Volume XXII; Documents 956, 969, and 801, Volume XXIII; Document 1076, Volume XXIV; and Documents 1165 and 1143, Volume XXV, APCB, Protocols.

55. On Francisco de la Cámara, see Lazcano, Cabildantes, 42; and the Actas of October 2, 1645; January 4, 1647; April 24, 1651; and June 18, 1653; ACCB, IX, X; on Alonso de la Cámara, see Lazcano, Cabildantes, 46; and the Documents 67, 71, and 165, Volume XX; Documents 261, 272, and 302, Volume XXI, APCB, Protocols.


57. Lazcano, Cabildantes, 53; Assadourian, Tráfico, 37; Tejerina, Formación social, 17; and the Acta of April 24, 1651, ACCB, X.

58. Documents 126 and 129, APCB, Escribanía 1.

59. On Simón Duarte, see Luis Martínez Villada, Simón Duarte.
un mercader del siglo XVII (Córdoba: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 1937); Lazcano, *Cabildantes*, 22; and the Document 876, Volume XXII; Documents 838 and 840, Volume XXV; Documents 1139, 1143, and 1250, Volume XXV; (sales in 1612-13 amounted up to $11,658); APCB, Protocols.

60. Lazcano, *Cabildantes*, 81, 137, 140, and 170; and Document 148, Volume XX, APCB, Escribanos I.

61. For example, the wealthy Blas de Sosa paid $1, likewise a tender, and Simón Duarte $2; see the *Acta* of June 18, 1653, ACCB, X.

62. Mules exports decreased from the average of 40,000 to 4,000 heads per year; see the *Acta* of December 17, 1667, ACCB, XI; for further information on the activity, see Luis Altamira, *El Cabildo de Córdoba* (Córdoba: Junta provincial de la Historia, 1992), 19-20; and *Paso de Ferreira* (Córdoba: Universitaria, 1949); *IV Centenario de las fundaciones de Córdoba y Santa Fe* (Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1974), 24 and 34; and Estela Toledo, "El comercio de mulas en Salta, 1657-1659," *Anuario de Investigaciones Históricas* 6 (1962-3), 173-81.

63. Chile's importers of cattle preferred to buy the heads once they were in Cuyo. For example, in September of 1660 Juan de Ulloa, vecino of Santiago, and Cristóbal de Arévalo agreed in Córdoba that Arévalo drive cattle from Santa Fe to the Valle de Uco; for this contract, see Document 476, APCB, Escribanos 1.

65. **Cabildantes** were also concerned because there was a shortage of wine in the colony ("la causa es que los viñateros huyen de entrar a esta ciudad por ser la medida muy grande y el precio de a 3 reales y medio el cuarto"), see the *Acta* of June 20, 1664, ACCB, XI.

66. Early in the seventeenth century, Pampas attacked caravans on route to Buenos Aires ("constar a su señoría [Governor Alonso de Rivera] el ser notorio los daños, muertes y robos que de poco tiempo a esta parte los indios de las pampas han hecho en la gente y carretas que caminan por el camino real del puerto de Buenos Aires."), see the *Acta* of March 17, 1610, ACCB, V; for the reports, see Pedro Grenón, *Los Pampas y la frontera sur* (Córdoba: Liendo, 1924), 19; and *Los Pampas* (Córdoba: Penitenciaría, 1927), 24-5.


68. For Hernandarias and his goverment, see Raúl Molina, *Hernandarias, el hijo de la tierra* (Buenos Aires: Lancestremere, 1948).

70. For the customs office in Córdoba, see Document 1232, Libro de Registros-Cedularios del Río de la Plata, 1534-1717 (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1984), 29.


72. In Buenos Aires a head of cattle was three times more expensive than in Paraguay. The difference generated strong tensions between the two areas when they exported cattle to the Portuguese colonies; for further information, see Horacio Giberti, Historia económica de la ganadería argentina (Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica, 1985), 25; and Carlos Aranguren, Hernandarias, primer estanciero criollo del Río de la Plata (Paraná: Nueva Impresora, 1963), 62-3.

73. This was the equivalence at the beginning of the eighteenth century, see Sergio Villalobos, Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata y Chile, 1700-1811 (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1986), 34.

74. Eighty-four vecinos received their licenses. Melchor Maciel was the first one; for additional information on this activity, see Giberti, Historia, 32 and 36-7; Juan Vedoya, Historia social y económica de la colonia (Tandil: Universidad del Centro de la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1985), 70 and 101; J. Cravioto, Quilmes a través de los años (Quilmes: Municipalidad, 1989), 43 and 69; and Lafuente, Los portugueses, 215.
75. Hernandarias was instructed to recruit 200 soldiers and 1,500 horses for Mosquera. The governor, however, sent 100 men and around 200 horses, which he extracted from Santa Fe and Paraguay. This policy continued in the first half of the seventeenth century. In 1640, for example, the Crown acknowledged the governors of Buenos Aires for sending horses to Arauco; on this behaviour, see Documents 1435, 1436, 1834 and 1892, Libro de Registros-Cedulario, II, 305; on Mosquera's expedition in Buenos Aires, see Aranguren, Hernandarias, 79; and Miguel Figuerero and Enrique Gandía, "Hernandarias de Saavedra" ANH III, 269-91, 285.

76. A report of 1612 informed that the Riachuelo provided small vessels with sheltered shores ("[el puerto de Buenos Aires] es muy desabrigado y corren muchos riesgos los navíos estando sueltos donde llaman Los Pozos por estar algo distante de la tierra, mas la Providencia proveyó de un riachuelo que tiene la ciudad por la parte de abajo como una milla, tan acomodado y seguro que metidos dentro de él los navíos no siendo muy grandes pueden estar sin amarrar"), see Adolfo Garretón, La municipalidad colonial. Buenos Aires desde su fundación hasta el gobierno de Lariz (Buenos Aires: Menendes, 1933), 297.

77. The main landowners were Juan de Tapia Vargas, Francisco García Romero, Melchor Maciel, and Juan del Pozo y Silva; see A. de Paula, Ramón Gutierrez, and Graciela Viñuales, Del Pago del Riachuelo al partido de Lanús, 1536-1944 (La Plata: Archivo histórico de la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1974), 25.
78. For some historians, Hernandarias was a zealous authority who wanted to prevent contraband; see, for example, Aranguren, Hernandarias, 70.

79. A few years later, Governor Pedro Esteban Dávila arrived in the colony with the mission of impeding contraband carried out through the farms located on the Riachuelo area. Nonetheless, the new governor tolerated the situation, and even became personally involved in smuggling; for details, see José Torre Revello, "Los Gobernadores de Buenos Aires, 1617-1777," ANH III, 293-332, 303.

80. For a brief account of the evolution of the garrison; see Juan Monferini, "La Historia militar durante el siglo XVII y XVIII," HNA IV, 203-310, 250-2.

81. For the decree, see Monferini, "Historia militar," 250.

82. Biscay sharply pointed out that governors frequently changed the three captains of the army, allowing any rich man to enjoy the benefits of having served in the royal army; for seventeenth-century descriptions of Buenos Aires, see Lafuente, Los portugueses, 189-200; for demographic data, see José Torre Revello, La sociedad colonial. Buenos Aires entre los siglos XVI y XIX (Buenos Aires: Pannedille, 1970), 312; and for the officers, see Monferini, "La Historia militar," 251; and Moutoukias, "Power, corruption and commerce," 39.

83. For an examination of the military budget, see Moutoukias, "Burocracia, contrabando y autotransformación de las élitest en Buenos Aires en el siglo XVII," Anuario IEHS 3 (1988), 174.
213-46.

84. _Libro de Registros-Cedulares_, II, 2130 and 2144.

85. On Ruy de Sosa, see Lazcano, _Cabildantes_, 150; and for his commercial activities, see the Document 568, Volume XXII; Documents 858, 859, and 861, Volume XXIII; Documents 1114, 1115, 1165, Volume XXV, APCB, Protocols.

86. Lazcano, _Cabildantes_, 178; and the _Acta_ of February 1, 1605, ACCB, IV.


88. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Tristán de Tejeda was a slave trader; see Assadourian, _Tráfico_, 37; his son Sebastián married Chilean-born María Cajal, see Lazcano, _Cabildantes_, 192.

89. _Acta_ of February 25, 1606, ACCB, IV.

90. For Juan Ortiz de Urbina, see Zuluaga, "Trata," 42; Espejo, _Provincia_, I, 53 and 63; and the _Acta_ of February 15, 1645, ACMZ, II.

91. Góngora, _Encomenderos_, 94-5 and 156.

92. For this network, see Zuluaga, "Trata," 46; Espejo, _Provincia_, I, 63; Roa y Ursúa, _El Reino_, 568-9 and 571; Coria, _Evolución_, 70; and Carpeta 278, AHMZ, Colonial.

93. For details, see Vicente Cútolo, "Abogados y pleitos en el Buenos Aires del 1600," _Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia_ 22 (1949), 243-53; for a comprehensive approach to the

94. For this network and activities, see Raúl Molina, "Juan de Vergara, señor de vidas y haciendas en el Buenos Aires del siglo XVII," Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia 24-5 (1950), 51-143; José Torre Revello, "Un contrabandista del siglo XVII en el Río de la Plata," Revista de Historia de América 45 (1958), 121-30; Zuluaga, "Trata," 44; and Cravioto, Quilmes, 78.

95. On Diego de Vega, see Aranguren, Hernandarias, 81; Assadourian, Argentina, 81; Lafuente, Los portugueses, 173; and Raúl Molina, "El primer banquero de Buenos Aires," RHAA 3-4 (1958-9), 55-124. 74


97. Valdés bribed authorities to obtain such a result; see Molina, "El primer banquero," 63; for Vergara's political involvements, see Gelman, "Cabildo y élite," passim; and Molina, "Juan de Vergara," 51-140.

98. For the complaint, see the letter to the king of October 8, 1630, in Repertorio de los documentos históricos procedentes del Archivo de Indias, ed. Roberto Levillier (Madrid, Rivadeneyra, 1921), 133.

99. On the properties he owned, see Mercedes de tierras hechas por los gobernadores a nombre del Rey (La Plata:
Ministerio de Educación de la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1979), 34, 76, 101, 107, 140, 259, 264 and 266. According to his testament, he owned 38 farms in the districts of Arrecifes, Las Conchas, Luján, Espinillo, Magdalena, La Plata, and Paraná, 6,000 ship, 5,000 heads of cattle, 75 slaves; for this document, see Molina, "Juan de Vergara," 68-9. Vergara also harvested wheat, see Enrique Udaondo, Reseña histórica del partido de La Conchas (La Plata: Archivo histórico de la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1942), 2.

100. Cardoso was in the list of captains of the local militia, see Acta of November 22, 1645, , ACMZ, II; for his involvements in the slave trade, see Zuluaga, "Trata," 53.

101. Vergara was a perfect partner due to his personal connections in Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Santiago. He had the protection of members of the family Caravajal and Saravia. Corregidor Antonio de Caravajal y Saravia and Lieutenant Melchor de Caravajal y Saravia were his allies. Another member of the network was Maestre de Campo Alonso de Caravajal y Saravia who lived in Santiago; for the network, see Espejo, Provincia, II, 297; and the report of December 13, 1658, in Fondo Documental Monseñor Cabrera, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; the Acta of February 20, 1634, ACCH; XI; and the alcabala list of 1657, ACMZ, III.

102. On his political activities, see Lazcano, Cabildantes, 141; for his commercial exchanges, see the Document 23, Volume
103. Espejo, *Provincia*, II, 130; the *Acta* of March 3, 1605, ACMZ, I; and Volume 1092, pieza 1, ANCH, Real Audiencia.


105. Urbina bought mules and slaves from Córdoba; on his economic activities, see the Documents 126, and 129, APCB, Escritanos I; and the *Actas* of January, 4, 1647; June 19, 1648; June 18, 1653; June 20, 1657; and October 29, 1668; ACCB; IX, X, XVI.

106. For his properties, see Lafuente, *Los portugueses*, 216; Eduardo Saguier, *Mercado inmobiliario y estructura social. El Río de la Plata en el siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1993), 94; and *Mercedes*, 34.

107. He may have been able to include his own friends and relatives; for example, there was a Luis Fuentes who was *encomendero* in Cuyo and farmer in Chile; see Góngora, *Encomenderos*, 159.

108. *Acta* of August 3, 1657, ACCH, X.

109. For the trial, see Document 1469, Volume 406, ANCH, Real Audiencia.

110. On Juan de San Martín, see Emilio Coni, *Historia de las vaquerías en el Río de la Plata, 1555-1750* (Buenos Aires: Platero, 1979), 17-8; Saguier, *Mercado*, 73, 100, and 117; and Torre Revello, *Sociedad*, 322; for his expedition against the Serranos and Pampas, see Monferini, "La historia militar," 207;
and Document 58, ANH, Colección Enrique Fitte.

111. For this family, see Morales Guíñazú, "Genealogías," n.d.; and the Acta of March 3, 1605, ACMZ, I.

112. For the trial, see Volume 1299, pieza 2, ANCH, Real Audiencia; on Maguna's activities, see Espejo, Provincia, II, 172-4; and Document 159, APCB, Escribanos 1.

113. Volume 1361, pieza 1; and Volume 1136, ANCH, Real Audiencia; Morales Guíñazú, Comercio, 13; and the Actas of November 22, and February 25, 1645; ACMZ, II.

114. On contraband carried out by officers and authorities, see Craviotto, Quilmes, 77-8; Lafuente, Los portugueses, 241; Moutoukias, "Burocracia," 232 and 243; Saguier, Mercado, 156; and Mercedes, 244-5; for Gaspar de Gaete in particular, see Mercedes, 57, 63, 91, 144, 149, and 176; Craviotto, Quilmes, 76-7; Moutoukias, "Burocracia," 233; and for Francisco de Gaete (Gaspar's son), see Lafuente, Los portugueses, 226.

115. Enrique Udaondo, Reseña histórica del partido de las Conchas (La Plata: Archivo histórico, 1942), 7-8; and Saguier, Mercado, 73.

116. On this network, see Lazcano, Cabildantes, 57-8 and 122; Assadourian, Tráfico, 37; Saguier, Mercado, 94; Document 64, Volume XX; Documents 12, 13 and 142, Volume IX, APCB, Escribanos 1; and the Actas of July 23, 1649; April 24, 1651; June 18, 1653; and October 29, 1668; ACCB, IX, X, XI.

117. On the Abreus, see Assadourian, Tráfico, 37; Lazcano,
Cabildantes, 33-4, 122, and 149-70; and the Actas of October 2, 1645; July 23, 1649; December 4, 1652; March, 16, 1655; and October 29, 1668, ACCB, VIII, IX, XI; and Document 148, Volume XX, APCB, Protocols.

118. This valley was located immediately after the pass of Uspallata. After crossing the mountains, animals needed to rest and graze here. For Gabriel de Toro and his relatives, see Espejo, Provincia, II, 259-68; Document 278, Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial; Documents 9, 12, 13, and 142 (authorization to Chirinos), APCB, Escribanos 1; for his struggle with the Cabildo of Santiago, see the Actas of April 2, 1664; April 7, 1679; January 9, 1680; and October, 13, 1680; ACCH, XIX; for Manuel del Toro Mazote, see Góngora, Encomenderos, 91 and 168; and Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 402; for Andrés, see Espejo, Provincia, II, 405, 546-7; Morales Guíñazú, Primitivos, 35; and Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 401; for Marcos del Toro Mazote, see Documents 72, 74, 110, and 480, APCB, Escribanos 1; and for Luis del Toro, see Zuluaga, "Trata," 49-50; Coria, Evolución, 70, and the Actas of February 15, 1645, ACMZ, II and December 8, 1643, ACCB, VIII.

119. For this network, see Lazcano, Cabildantes, 41-5; Espejo, Nobiliario de la Capitanía General de Chile (Santiago: Bello, 1967), 832; Molina, "Don Gerónimo Luis de Cabrera y Garay," Boletín de la Academia Nacional de la Historia 32 (1961), 295-305; Ramiro Martínez Sierra, El mapa de las pampas I (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Oficial, 1975), 56-7; and Documents 33 and 47,
Escribanos 1; and Document 554, Volume XXII; Document 1008, Volume XXIV; Documents 1139 and 1150, Volume XXV, ACPB.

120. Roa y Ursua, El Reino, 182; Acta December 14, 1629; Guillermo Furlong, Los Jesuitas en Mendoza (Mendoza, n.p., 1949), gaveta 4, documentos en apéndice; Lafuente, Los portugueses, 138 and 146. After his marriage in Buenos Aires, Pedro was entitled to request leftovers (demasias) of the farms that had belonged to Melchor Maciel, see Mercedes, 127, 145, 178, and 198.

121. For the Royal Decrees to viceroys, presidents of Reales Audiencias and governors of the Indies, see the Document 8381, Volume 715, ANCH, Reales Cédulas y Ordenes.

122. Captain Luis de las Cuevas, encomendero and landowner, was also regidor, alcalde, and corregidor; for details, see Góngora, Encomenderos, 145; Miguel Amunategui, Historia Social de Chile (Santiago: Nascimento, 1932), 59, 215-8; and the Actas of March 20, 1629; and November 1657; ACCH, X, XV.

123. For arguments on nepotism and the government of the colony, see, for example, the Actas of January 24, 1580; January 15, 1626; and of April 19 and 24, 1648; ACCB, IV, IX.

124. He believed that the Compañía de Jesús had to set the example for civilians by renouncing native labour; for the Carta Annua of 1611, see Documentos para la Historia Argentina XIX, 40.

125. Francisco Enrich, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile, I (Barcelona: Rosal, 1891), 221.

126. For examples of hostilities, see the IV Carta Annua of
1613, Documentos para la Historia Argentina XX, 83; and for the
mercedes in Chile, see Document 36, Volume 122, ANCH, Real
Audiencia, and Enrich, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús, 359.
127. For mercedes and donations in Mendoza, see Documents 2,
3, and 4, Carpeta 278, Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial; for other
assets, see Documents 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, Carpeta 278,
Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial; for a survey on missional and
educational activities in Cuyo, see Guillermo Furlong, Los
Jesuitas en Mendoza (Buenos Aires: n.d., 1949), 52-4. The first
civilians to donate to the Jesuits were Lope de la Peña and his
wife Inés de Caravajal. They lived in Santiago and Roque de la
Rocha administered their estate in Mendoza. In 1605 Peña
contributed wine and cattle to support Mosquera's expedition in
Mendoza; see Jean Borde and Mario Góngora, Evolución de la
propiedad rural en el Valle del Puñague I (Santiago:
Universitaria, 1956), 229; and Góngora, Encomenderos, 229; and
the Acta of March 3, 1605, ACMZ, I.
128. The Jesuits owned 12 farms in Santiago, 2 in Melipilla,
6 in Quillota, 5 in Valparaíso, 1 in Aconcagua, 3 in Colchagua, 2
in Talca, 2 in La Serena, 2 in Maule, 2 in Chillán, 16 in
Concepción, and 3 in Arauco, see Lara, Crónica, 358. According to
another source, they operated 8 farms in Santiago, 2 in Rancagua,
2 in Colchagua, 2 in Maule, and 10 in Concepción at the end of
the eighteenth century, see Document 400, Volume 408, ANCH, Real
Audiencia. A report informed that in Concepción alone the Fathers
owned 15 farms and 4 missions; see Volume 12, ANCH, Real Audiencia; for properties and mercedes in Chile, see Documents 15, 16, 33, and 35, Volume 119; Documents 5, 7, 11, 12, 34, and 40, Volume 122; Document 25, Volume 123; and Documents 18, and 25, Volume 124; ANCH, Real Audiencia.


130. In 1644 the Cabildo confirmed that during the food crisis inhabitants were fed by the Society, which accepted to sell cattle for coupons; see the Acta of May, 14, 1650, ACMZ, II.

131. The Jesuits efficiently protected their rights over land and cattle; for petitions and arguments, see the Documents 29 and 32, Carpeta 278, Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial.

132. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, 3,000 beasts grazed on "San José" and 13,000 on "La Arboleda," both farms in the Valle de Uco and Xaurúa; for details, see Chaca, Tupungato, 166-7.

133. For this episode, see Enrich, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús, 682; and the Documents 41 and 43, Carpeta 278, Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial.

134. For other beneficial circumstances, see Carlos Leonhardt, Papeles de los antiguos Jesuitas de Buenos Aires y Chile (Buenos Aires: Universitaria, 1926); Volume 191, 18, ANCH, Jesuitas en Argentina (catalog); Aranguren, Hernandarias, 26 and 156; and Assadourian, Argentina, 244.

135. These operations raised resentments among local
merchants who had to pay transit and sales taxes. The same year that the rector of Mendoza received the cargo from Paraguay, local authorities were advised that a slave in the convent was selling *yerba mate* and tobacco without paying the sales tax; for the case, see Documents 58 and 60, Carpeta 278, Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial.

136. For an account of the economic operation in Córdoba, see the XII Carta Anual, Documentos para la Historia Argentina XX, 150; and Ignacio Tejerina, *Formación social de Córdoba en el periodo hispánico* (Córdoba: Junta Provincial de Historia, 1992), 18-9.
4 - THE STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCES

The struggle for control of available human and material resources is a remarkable feature of the evolution of the colonies on the southern frontier. Cabildos zealously upheld the privileges of locals to get access to Indian labour and feral cattle. The defence of the exclusive right to exploit tradable resources ranged from formal petitions to more aggressive behaviour. On the Spanish side of the border, the struggle over human and material resources was a driving force in the frontier experience. This section will explain how geographical expansion and the confrontation between neighbouring communities defined the southern frontier.

4.1 - Availability and Control of Local Resources

The colonial economic system based its production on both slavery and servitude. It required native workers. From the very first Actas of the Cabildo of Santiago there are noticeable attempts to regulate access to land, water, and labour. The expansion towards Arauco, which started in the mid-sixteenth century, was supposed to provide Santiago with more human and material resources since those in the Central Valley were quite limited. On October 13, 1549, the Cabildo formally requested Governor Pedro de Valdivia not to enroll the Indians of Santiago as soldiers "because the land he is going to conquer has many
Indians while this land [the Central Valley] has an enormous lack of natives".

The east was, of course, the other possible direction in the search for resources. During the meeting of November 14, 1552, the cabildantes wanted to extend Santiago's jurisdiction from the Central Valley to the Maule River in the western flank of the Andes, and from Tucumán territories to the Diamante River in Mendoza. The Crown, however, confirmed the rights of Lima over the Tucumán province, allowing Chile to control only Cuyo. Even after the Crown issued its findings, Tucumán and Chile continued to compete for actual control of the disputed territories. Clear-cut limits did not avoid conflicts because administrators and civilians dismissed the ruling. There even was an Indian-enslavement expedition in 1578 organized by Chilean Captain Antonio Chacón. He planned to reach the Conlara Valley in Córdoba, but the raid was prohibited. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the establishment of a Real Audiencia in Santiago alerted Tucumán once again. Córdoba proceeded to send Father Pedro Farfán to Spain with the mission of avoiding being under the jurisdiction of an Audiencia in Santiago. Farfán's duties also included obtaining a license to trade with Brazil and Angola through Buenos Aires, and the permit for the so-called encomiendas de tercer vida.

In turn, Chile was invaded by vecinos from Tucumán who were searching for natives to enslave in Cuyo. As elsewhere in the Indies, Tucumán's native population experienced a sharp
demographic decline, which can be attributed to disease and the Potosí mita. While there were roughly 24,000 Indians in encomiendas in 1607, by 1670 only 2,200 were left⁵. Thus, vecinos of Tucumán began to organize their own expeditions towards the west to capture Indians, forcing the Real Audiencia of Santiago to remind authorities in Tucumán that Cuyo was under Chilean jurisdiction⁶.

Disputes between the encomenderos of Santiago and those of Córdoba on the rights to extract natives from certain areas compelled authorities to set up a committee whose duty it was to agree on the limits between Cuyo and Tucumán. The conflict of interests, however, impeded the resolution on the conflict, which dragged on into the following years⁷. The spokespersons for Mendoza, Gregorio Morales de Albornoz, Bartolomé Rojas y Puebla, and Gregorio de Puebla, were personally interested in reaching a solution. Gregorio Morales de Albornoz was a encomendero and a landowner in Llancorón, via merced granted by Governor Alonso de Rivera⁸. Bartolomé de Rojas y Puebla, a slave trader, was also an encomendero and landowner in Cuyo. So was his cousin Captain Gregorio de Puebla, who had a farm in the Valle de Uco, when he wrote a report in 1607 blaming the extraction of Huarpes for the depopulation of the region⁹.

As always, vecinos of both jurisdictions often found excuses to justify their invasions. They argued that runaway Indians fled following that direction; therefore they were in a "punitive" expedition. In 1627 one raid from Chile penetrated into
southwestern Mendoza claiming to be a punitive action against Pehuenches, the allies of rebel Araucanians. Two decades later, Captain Luis Ponce de León crossed the Andes from Villarica towards Patagonia, enslaving around 300 natives. Chilean raids in southern Cuyo and northern Patagonia were the result of mutually reinforcing factors. The loss of Arauco, the decreasing Huarpe population, and the jurisdictional arguments with Tucumán all forced Santiago to attempt other directions. Southern Cuyo and northern Patagonia were the most valid options.

Chile's frenzied search for native workers was not only a consequence of these regional circumstances, it was also a consequence of the demographic collapse that affected the whole Spanish American Empire. In Chile, encomiendas of 200 Indians in 1580 had only 20 or 30 natives left by the beginning of the seventeenth century. The situation increased the impact of losing the resources in Arauco after the revolt of 1598-99. From the revolt onward, Santiago could only access resources located across the Andes. Natives living in northern Cuyo had been driven to work across the Andes since a decade after the actual settlement of Spaniards in the region, ignoring legal proscriptions. The practice of moving Indians from one region to another persisted during the seventeenth century and, in a way, what happened to the Huarpes also happened to the natives of Chiloé.

The transportation of Indians had two decisive consequences. First, according to an early-seventeenth-century report, most of
the natives were permanently living on the farms belonging to their encomenderos. By so doing, Indian pueblos were almost depopulated. A bishop's letter of 1626 corroborates that vanishing Indian pueblos resulted from the combining action of diseases and relocations. As such, in 1647 the pueblos of Malloa, Huasco, Acúleo, and Chada each held only their chief and a couple of natives. Secondly, the relocation of Indians contributed to concentrate land in the hands of a few families of powerful encomenderos who were moving the natives as a means of appropriating their land. Since those Indians would permanently reside on their encomenderos' farms, the natives' land could be declared "vacant" and obtained a merced. Gonzalo de los Ríos, for example, sent his Indians living in Codegua to work on his farm in La Ligua, allowing Catalina de los Ríos to ask for the "vacant" land of Codegua.

An additional advantage to moving natives around was that it provided an opportunity to rent them out to inner circle members for hard cash. The permanent introduction of Huarpes to Santiago was a means of obtaining either a labour force or cash since the rent of a Huarpe gave the encomendero twice the profit, as he could receive in tribute. The Real Audiencia tried to find a solution to the Huarpe C'aspora in 1611 by analyzing the possibility of allowing a reducción to concentrate native population under Jesuit control. The Cabildo immediately called out vecinos because of the detrimental effects that such an action would have on the colony. As the project of a mission
aborted when the Jesuits rejected the proposal, Santiago succeeded to keep the mita of Huarpes until 1680 when a decree finally prohibited the relocation and rental of these natives.

Renting natives gave enormous benefits, but nothing compares to their actual sale. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Alonso de Rivera calculated that an enslaved native was worth up to $100, and as an advantage over a Black slave, the Indians were just been taken into captivity at the frontier. In other words, no capital investment was required to put an Indian into slavery. Furthermore, since nobody ever asked whether natives were captured during war, more non-hostile Indians ended up being sold in Lima, compared to rebellious ones. An episode illustrates the economic benefit of the military service in Arauco. In 1630 Sargente Rebolledo's troops rioted because he had sent only a few soldiers in a punitive raid. Accused of favouritism, Rebolledo calmed down the troops by promising that captives would be equally allotted among every officer and soldier in the unit. The immediate and long-term consequence of the enslavement of natives was that it contributed to the frontier experience by reinforcing the natives' bellicose response to Spanish rule.
4.2 - Native Reactions Against the Spanish Expansion

Native reactions to Spanish expansion in their search for human and material resources contributed to the establishment of a frontier along the West-East axis. Circumstances in Arauco affected Santiago and then expanded their influence across the Andes. In 1606 Mendoza shook from the Araucanian Revolt of 1598-99 which, in turn, reached Córdoba in 1609. Governor Alonso de Rivera, now governor of the province of Tucumán, reacted as if he understood the west-to-east articulation of the southern frontier on the native side because he immediately sent Luis del Peso to observe the Pampa Indians. Rivera might have known that the Araucanians had agreements with the natives of southern Cuyo, Córdoba, and perhaps Buenos Aires. Apparently, however, Luis del Peso was able to make a deal with the Pampas of Córdoba because this segment of the frontier was quiet until the 1640s. In consequence, the colony was able to devote its military reserves to controlling its northern frontier with Calchaquí tribes, keeping open the route to Peru.

The First Calchaquí War, which blew up in 1630, expanded very quickly towards the western areas and it terrified the vecinos of Cuyo, who had to plead with Santiago for armed protection. According to the Governor of Tucumán, the uprising echoed fears of being forced to work in the recently-discovered mines of the province in the same way that other natives had been forced to mine in Potosí. The Second Calchaquí War began in 1657,
and may have been connected to the Araucanean uprising of 1655. In fact, the leader, Pedro Bohorquez, came from Chile and had several links with natives across the Andes. Although Córdoba lacked properly armed, well-trained and paid troops, it managed to control these uprisings and its access to labour from the area. In 1665, at the end of the Second Calchaqui War, approximately 5,000 Indians were carried into captivity—.

The Cabildo of Buenos Aires also sought to expand its jurisdiction into territories with more human and material resources. From the mid-seventeenth century onwards, vecinos began to penetrate into Serrano and Pampa territories in southern Buenos Aires to extract salt from the Salinas Grandes, and to search for new zones with wild cattle. The device used to justify this southward expansion was the same as that already used by other settlements along the border. Governor Andrés Robles organized an expedition to "pacify" the south of Buenos Aires, the common means of acquiring services and goods for the settlers—. As a matter of fact, the port had lacked labour since its earliest days. Time only aggravated the needs for manpower. A census of 1677, for instance, reveals how underpopulated the encomiendas were in Buenos Aires. Encomenderos like Juan Jufré de Arce had only 32 natives. Other prominent citizens had even fewer: Captain Sebastian Cabral, 25; Captain Alonso Guerrero, 24; and Sargeant Juan del Pozo y Silva, 14. Gaspar de Gaete's widow reported 3 Indians and Roque de San Martin's enjoyed the tribute
of only two natives\(^4\). The *malocas* against Pampas and Serranos then increased the number of Indians put to work\(^5\).

Although forced labour and enslavement shaped most of the relationships between natives and Spaniards, there were other types. Jesuits themselves realized that Araucanians could not tolerate abusive *encomenderos*; therefore they proposed to ameliorate harsh working conditions to reduce the Araucanian resistance. Some civilians held the same ideas, but opponents even justified Araucanian extermination by famine\(^6\). In many ways, Chile provides the historian with a complete scope of Spanish-Indian relationships beyond war and subjugation. Natives, for example, could profit from selling produce to soldiers in the garrisons. Claudio Gay pointed out that Spaniards did not starve thanks to the assistance of natives, who were not properly allies, but were interested in selling cows, poultry, and vegetables for "some cash"\(^7\). This explains how the troops were fed when Santiago failed to send the necessary supplies. In the capital, the presence of natives explains how the demand for artisanal workers was satisfied. Since contracts included a small salary along with food and accomodations, many Indians had an option if their communities disappeared and their former lands had new owners\(^8\).

Quite often along the border, natives served as allied troops and watchmen, and thus represented a considerable portion of the army in Arauco. In Cuyo, allied Indians were the buffers between Spaniards whose farms were located in the Valle de Uco.
and Xaurúa and the rebel Pehuenches in the southernmost region of Mendoza. The Pampa's role in southern Buenos Aires at the beginning of the eighteenth century was by far one the most interesting cases of allied troops. Pampa tribes monitored the areas in the south of Buenos Aires against cattle theft, a role assigned then by the porteños themselves who worried about the vaquerías of the vecinos of Córdoba. It was a quite unusual role because natives were usually supposed to control other tribes, rather than Spaniards from other jurisdictions. The alcalde of Buenos Aires stated during the meeting of February 17, 1717, that the only way of protecting the wild cattle grazing south of the port would be "to designate Pampas as police guards". The Cabildos' attitude expressed in another fashion the struggle for resources between the vecinos of Buenos Aires and those of Córdoba. Moreover, porteños soon began to prefer to trade with Pampas rather than with inhabitants of Córdoba. In the third decade of the eighteenth century, for instance, natives were the salt suppliers of Buenos Aires, instead of the vecinos of Córdoba. The paradox is that, at the same time that natives could be allies of the port, protecting the resources against the illegal extractions done by vecinos from other jurisdictions, they were drawn northward and ultimately turned Buenos Aires into a genuine frontier.
4.3 - The Quest for Material Resources

This thesis has already described a series of episodes demonstrating the importance of controlling both the human and material resources available at the local level. With regards to the material resources, the four communities profited from the herds of wild cattle and horses in the countryside. Horses and cattle were the most important and tradable commodities on the local, regional, and international markets. To start with, the price of a horse at the beginning of the conquest of Chile, for example, was $2,000 in gold, decreasing to $150 at the end of the seventeenth century32. At the end of the sixteenth century, horse prices hardly surpassed $30 a head in Córdoba, which confirms official reports on the advantages of buying the animals from Tucumán and Paraguay33. It was not only availability which influenced the prices in these closed markets; local policies often proved to be a decisive factor. In Córdoba, for instance, breeders refused to sell horses to foreigners in an attempt to monopolize their horse- and mule-breeding activities34.

For their part, Indians raised excellent horses because they used them for dietary and transportation purposes, but even if shortages arose, they could be easily resolved by crossing the Andes towards the south of Córdoba and Buenos Aires where herds were more abundant35. It is clear, however, that during the first years of the seventeenth century Araucanians did not need such expeditions to round up wild animals. A report affirmed that it
took Araucanians only a couple of years to steal from Spanish farms around 500,000 animals among horses, cows, donkeys, goats, and sheep".

On the Spanish side of the border, vecinos of Santiago also flowed eastward in their search for either wild cattle to hunt or domesticated ones to buy. The ebbs and flows of exports to Peru, however, altered its relationship with the eastern territories. By mid-seventeenth century, Santiago was partially forced to change the policy of importing cattle from the east in response to a recession in the Peruvian market. Santiago tried to keep up the price of tallow by reducing the amount of available cattle on the local market. It proved to be the right strategy because the drastic reduction in the imports of cattle from Cuyo caused prices to boom in the Central Valley. The quintal of tallow jumped from $2 to $10.77.

Santiago certainly assured high prices by closing off imports from Cuyo, but it produced other effects. Governors, who felt the impact of higher prices on the military, tried to put an end to it. They reduced the number of licenses for vaquerías granted to the vecinos in Santiago as a means of saving wild cattle for their own soldiers. At the same time, governors ordered the reduction the tallow exports to Peru. Santiago reacted. It proposed that governors take a third of the imported cattle for the soldiers. Then, the army would be able to have enough animals and civilians would be able to keep up the level of exports to Peru. The Cabildo convincingly argued that the
cattle from Cuyo was cheaper, and it could also be paid "half in cash and half in cloth." The strategy of Cabildo would even help to control the number of imported cattle available on the local market.

Ironically, the idea backfired. The number of imported cows always went far beyond licences and military requirements, implying that animals were sold on the local market. According to the Cabildo, imports caused "inconvenience to all vecinos and inhabitants," but the generalization did not correlate with reality. One of the importers, Captain Gabriel del Toro, was a vecino of Santiago, and he profited from the imports, rather than suffering "inconvenience." It seems that the cabildantes channeled their frustration against Gabriel de Toro because he was collecting a toll from anyone passing cattle through his farm in Aconcagua. In 1680, the Cabildo agreed to explain the situation to the recently-appointed Governor José de Garro before his arrival in Santiago. A committee would wait for him in Mendoza and let him know about those who were "ruining the Central Valley economy by importing cheap cattle" from eastern territories. At the same time, Gabriel de Toro applied for the asiento, but cabildantes considered Captain Juan de Ahumada's proposal that the Cabildo itself assume it. Toro finally got it in 1680 and imported 10,000 head, provoking great suspicions, for the Cabildo knew that the army could only buy half of that amount. Toro simply replied that larger amounts covered up for losses while crossing the Andes. The Cabildo, however, kept an eye on Toro's
moves. Toro suffered countless acts of harassment and intimidation before the Cabildo finally recognized its failure to "convince" him to give up the asiento.

Meanwhile, Governor Garro had been occupied in Córdoba solving the conflicts derived from the military assistance that the colony had to send to Buenos Aires. Since the establishment of Colonia of Sacramento, the Portuguese presence on the region could not be minimized. To negotiate Córdoba's level of military assistance to the port was a top priority in the political agenda of the ex-governor of Buenos Aires, because he himself had faced many problems while organizing the troops to be sent against the Portuguese colony. In March, Garro finally arrived in Santiago. The following months the Andes were closed, until September, just when he left to check out the troops in the frontier with the Arauco. He avoided the burning issue, but the political atmosphere in Santiago was far from calm. As one might have expected, in 1683 the Cabildo reacted once again.

When 2,000 animals were imported under the Compañía de Jesús' licence, the Cabildo feared that an important number of animals would be sold on the local market. In a way, cabildantes were aware that the Jesuits helped civilians to avoid the obligation of selling a third of the imported animals to the army by crossing cattle under special authorization. According to the Cabildo, the priests were bringing in more beasts than the number required to feed themselves. Without consulting with the governor, the Cabildo seized part of the imported cattle, but
Garro ordered them to return 500 of the seized animals to their owners. The Cabildo then attempted to put José de Garro on its side by offering 2,000 horses for the army to be paid sometime in the future. The resolution of the struggle between Toro and the members of the Cabildo came through the appointment of Captain Pedro Galindo as corregidor of Aconcagua. Galindo would replace Maestre de Campo Andrés de Toro, a relative of Gabriel. If Galindo responded to the Cabildo's requirements, he would control not only Gabriel de Toro's moves, but also any import of cattle coming from Cuyo.

The trans-Andean commercial links benefitted the local economies, but they also generated tensions. In this regard, the rivalry between Santiago and Mendoza was not unique. In many ways, it reproduces the one between Buenos Aires and the other neighbouring colonies. Porteños had long struggled over resources and markets with the vecinos of Córdoba and with the nearby colony of Santa Fe. As early as 1594 the Cabildo of Santa Fe tried to set up jurisdictional limits with Buenos Aires. Its procurator was charged with obtaining an agreement with Buenos Aires, not only on the limits, but also on a license to extract horses since Santa Fe had helped during the second foundation of the port. When the mission failed, the uncertain limits allowed tensions to grow during the entire seventeenth century.

Vecinos of both colonies hunted cattle anywhere they could, and most of the time, they did not even know in which jurisdiction they were currently operating. It was not until 1719.
that Buenos Aires set aside some money to finance the cost of establishing the limits with Santa Fe. This action resulted from Buenos Aires' desire to stop the *vaguerias* that the inhabitants of Santa Fe were carrying out in Uruguay. The severe decrease of feral cattle grazing in Uruguay alarmed *porteños* who blamed hunters from Santa Fe for the catastrophe. The limits according to Buenos Aires were, of course, supposed to keep Uruguay under the *porteños'* control.

In the 1720s, Buenos Aires did not have many choices, but was forced to expand its jurisdictions because most available wild cattle grazed in faraway southern areas. Moreover, documents suggest that those animals were in Indian dominions. The distance of 50 leagues southward to find wild cattle went beyond the radius of 45 leagues that the *Cabildo* considered its jurisdiction for *vaguerias* in 1681. It was a critical decision. To hunt cattle southward would lead to confrontations with Pampas and Serranos, but if *porteños* expanded northward or westward, the confrontation would be with Spaniards from other settlements. As a matter of fact, Uruguay was the easternmost territory from which to extract feral cattle, and when the shortage of animals in this area became dramatically evident, the south appeared as the only possible direction for the expansion in the search for material resources.

Furthermore, by the second decade of the eighteenth century, the *Cabildo* of Buenos Aires blamed systematic *cuatrerismo* for the decreasing livestock in its own southern jurisdiction. Thieves,
however, were not Indians (as it might have been expected). According to a report, these thieves were vecinos from Córdoba, Santa Fe, Tucumán, Mendoza, San Juan, and Santiago del Estero\(^7\). The Cabildo insisted on a better control of the natural resources of southern zone Aires by patrolling it with gunmen. Contributing to the decision was the fact that those porteños who were already ranching not only wanted the protection of their livestock from theft, but also the enlargement of their herds of domesticated cattle by rounding up wild beasts. One of the first cattle censuses established that there were 18,000 cows on the northern farms and around 13,500 on the southern ones. Among the breeders, Alférez José de Arregui had 6,600 heads and Captain Juan de San Martín around 3,000. Captain Pedro de Giles reported 2,000 while Captain Luis del Águila 1,500. There were around 1,050 cows on Captain Juan Baez de Alpoín's farm and 3,500 on Antonio de Barragán's. It was not a mere coincidence that one of these breeders, Captain Juan de San Martín (whose father's experience when exporting cattle to Chile has already been explained) was an active officer during the first years of the struggle against Pampas and Serranos in the south of Buenos Aires\(^8\).

Cattle-breeders who were also officers became active members of the campaigns to expand southwards. These personal motives played a central role in their involvement in pushing the Spanish dominion south of latitude 35°.
4.4 - The Eastward Moves along the Southern Frontier

Although I have already dealt with the eastward flows of both Indians and Spaniards, it is important to consider the chronological development of eastward expansion. The east, of course, was not the only direction for the ever present search for resources, but it was the one that bound Santiago, Mendoza, Córdoba, and Buenos Aires along the west-east axis. The flow was quite slow as it took more than a century for Buenos Aires to undergo the frontier experiences that Santiago had at the end of the sixteenth century.

In Santiago, the frontier line with Arauco was the propelling factor in eastward expansion. The expansion resulted from the needs for native labour and supplies for the army. Since the army in Arauco had more than 2,000 men, it clearly surpassed the productive capacity of the Central Valley of Chile. At the same time, the elite in Santiago preferred to export its products to the Peruvian market where they found better prices. It was due to these considerations that Alonso de Rivera decided that military self-sufficiency would alleviate the royal treasury and avoid the manipulations of the Santiago elite. His long-term strategy went beyond the conjunctural requirements that devoured the situados year after year. The failure of Rivera's program, however, propelled the eastward search for supplying troops with horses and cattle.
As explained in the first section, the army in Arauco required a considerable number of animals. After Sotomayor's expedition, it was possible to buy them in Tucumán and Paraguay to be driven west towards Arauco. In these eastern provinces, prices were lower than in the Central Valley, but sometimes imported horses were unable to resist the heavy duties of frontier campaigns. Equally serious, imported cattle created further tensions between governors and the Cabildo since the attempts to regulate imports often confronted both parties.

Perhaps the acquisition of cattle from eastern territories was more regular than the available documents can testify. The lack of information is partly due to the fact that reports, claims, and legal actions took place only when something was perceived as irregular. Routine transactions were not usually documented. In 1631, for example, Captain Juan Jaramillo, who had the asiento, arrived in Santiago with 12,000 imported cows without provoking any particular action in the colony. The conflict, however, was documented in Mendoza due to another factor. Juan Jaramillo had an authorization to extract 30 Indians from Valle de Uco. The natives had to drive the cattle across the Andes, but the Cabildo of Mendoza tried to impede Jaramillo's action of extracting Huarpes from the jurisdiction.

Araucanians were as responsible as Spaniards for the eastward flows of the southern frontier. It is quite clear that each colony experienced becoming a frontier society at different moments. Santiago, for instance, had its frontier experience in
the last years of the sixteenth century. Mendoza’s border, however, was still in relative calm at that time. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, when Fray Reginaldo Lizárraga travelled from Córdoba to Mendoza, he wrote in his diary that there were few rebel Indians and that they almost never attacked Spanish caravans. The peace, however, was altered by the Araucanian uprisings, which shook the communities on a west-east axis, and by so doing, contributed to join the four isolated colonies into the same southern frontier.

By mid-seventeenth century, both Mendoza and Córdoba were acting as frontier societies. Mendoza’s frontier experiences started from the Araucanians’ raids in alliance with the natives of southern Cuyo. These confederated tribes carried out the malones in Maule, then in Valle de Uco and Xaurúa. Finally the circumstances in southern Chile reached Córdoba where the Second Calchaqui War coincided with the Araucanian rebellion. Four years after the rebellion of 1655, Araucanians, Puelches, and Pehuenches drove away cattle and other goods from Mendoza and San Luis. After the malón of 1659, Mendoza sent a report to Córdoba informing the latter that the confederation of tribes might have even included Pampas of southern Córdoba. This colony, they advised, should be prepared to receive a massive Indian attack, as Santiago and Mendoza had already done. The report also stressed that Indians’ preference was to steal horses. Other sources allow one to establish that southern Cuyo natives had earlier agreements with the Araucanians who usually crossed the
Andes to extract salt from the mines located by the Nevado Hill (Llancanello). It is impossible to determine, however, whether these alliances between natives were long- or short-term agreements, whether they followed specific needs for material resources, or whether malones were reactions to Spanish actions.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the Araucanian presence in southern Córdoba could not be denied by the authorities who had to face the need for more military attention. A report of 1708 notified Córdoba of an expedition including 2,000 Pampas and Araucanians. The figure, of course, had been exaggerated. Although the Araucanian presence in southern Córdoba was an undisputable fact, every year Spaniards expanded into southernmost areas in their search for cattle. Obviously, both natives and Spaniards soon realized that they were competing for the same resources. In other words, since vaquerías had reduced the livestock that grazed in safer areas, Spaniards were forced to penetrate into southern territories to hunt cattle, regardless of the threat of Pampas and Araucanians. It was said, for example, that the vaquería organized by Maestre de Campo Juan de Mayorga in Mendoza had arrived to within 100 leagues from the mythical kingdom of the Caesars. In essence, the report merely indicated that they had gone a long way south. Similarly, Córdoba expanded southward to the point of having to ask for military protection during the vaquerías. To justify the use of troops to protect these private hunting enterprises, vecinos argued that
cows and sheeps had fled 300 southward leagues because of a persistent drought. The same report mentioned the Araucanian presence in southern Córdoba and the possibility that they were also in Buenos Aires56.

The presence of Araucanians worried Spaniards as well as Pampas because Chilean natives were well-trained warriors. It seems that mid-seventeenth-century policy of the parlamentos with rebel Araucanians in Chile was a factor in their presence on the eastern side of the Andes. For practical purposes, the parlamentos allowed Araucanians partially to detach themselves from warlike preoccupations; therefore they could carry out commercial activities in trans-Andean regions without having to negotiate with Pampas or other Indian nations. At the same time, Pampas were too weak to resist the Araucanian’s direct appropriation of the wild cattle grazing in their dominion. The fact that most Araucanian tribes could extract cattle from transmountain regions without negotiating with other tribes was an unexpected consequence of the parlamentos. Surely, it had a negative impact on Pampa tribes because cattle had become the traditional unit of exchange between them and Chilean natives. The Araucanian-made arms that Pampas had in 1680 were probably obtained as payment for the animals that Pampas traded with them. Moreover, a few but clear testimonies reveal that Pampas had been involved in the cattle trade with the Araucanians for many decades. An encomendero of the Pampas, for example, assured that these Indians had contributed to keep the war in Chile alive by
providing Araucanians with many products, cattle, and horses. Pampas living in southern Buenos Aires were also part of this Indian cattle-trade network. The bishop noted in 1678 that horse theft in southern Buenos Aires had nourished the Araucanian war for many years.6

In the first decade of the eighteenth century documents testify that Araucanians were extracting animals from southern Buenos Aires. It seems that they operated in agreement with some tribes of Pampas, but only in a few cases.7 In other words, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the relationships between Araucanians and Pampas had changed. A document of 1726, for instance, describes a worsening atmosphere in native territories. The source reveals that there were 300 Araucaneans with lances and swords wandering around southern Córdoba. They announced that they would not attack any Spaniard before establishing whether "Pampas, their enemies, had been favoured in any way by Spaniards." The same document stresses that Pampas had been moving northward to avoid confrontations with Chilean natives. The document suggests that, unable to resist the Araucanean advances, Pampas shrank northwards, a displacement that caused frontier problems because Spaniards were travelling a southerly route between Cuyo and Buenos Aires and were also moving southward in their search for wild cattle. Not surprisingly, the report concludes that "isolated Pampas assaulted caravans to Mendoza, Chile, and San Juan."8 Buenos Aires was not yet involved. It seems that some of the
non-confederated Pampa tribes slowed down the Araucanian expansion towards southern Buenos Aires. Hypothetically, without these Pampas trying to protect their own dominions, the Araucanian expansion would have been felt simultaneously along the frontier line.

Almost every historian affirms that Buenos Aires did not function as a frontier society until the 1730s, or even the 1740s. Indeed, it was as late as 1738 Buenos Aires first received the alarm of a possible malón organized by confederated Araucanians, Puelches, and Pehuenches. As seen, both Mendoza and Córdoba had a similar malón in 1657, that is, almost a century before than Buenos Aires. Moreover, what happened to Buenos Aires in 1738 is quite revealing for two complementary reasons. On the one hand, the threat of a malón against Buenos Aires inverted what had been the common seventeenth-century move of military supplies because Santiago had to send military help to protect the port against rebel Araucanians who led the confederated tribes. On the other hand, the image of a corridor perfectly describes the Indian's routes during the malón. They travelled the southern side of the corridor, that is to say, the traditional route to connect their dominions avoiding Spaniards. In a tacit recognition of a frontier that functioned as a corridor, neither authorities in Córdoba nor in Mendoza intercepted the natives on route to the west. The Cabildos of both Córdoba and Mendoza agreed that they would only send the militias against Indians, if they attempted to move northward\textsuperscript{59}. 

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4.5 - From Anxiety to Aggression

On the Spanish side of the frontier, the general rule seems to have been that the less wild cattle were available, the more anxiety there was to find alternate areas to expand the colony's jurisdictions. Bitter arguments on the rights to exploit resources became jurisdictional conflicts between Cabildos. Any explanation could be used to hold on to available goods. In 1691, for example, the procurador of the Cabildo of Mendoza argued the rights of the vecinos to hunt cattle in southern Córdoba and Buenos Aires. He firmly explained that Indian hostility had caused farmers in Mendoza to abandon their properties; therefore herds flowed over eastern areas for herbage and water⁶⁰. The same type of argument served Captain Gregorio Ladrón de Guevara to request a license to hunt wild cattle. He pointed out that herds migrated from Mendoza to Córdoba, and vice versa, "following weather changes, the availability of water and grass, and many other circumstances"⁶¹. What nobody dared to suggest, however, was that animals could also flow southward. In fact, the Diamante River area in the south of Mendoza was closer than the territories of Córdoba and Buenos Aires, and also had extensive grasslands, but it lay in the Indian zone.

Although Spaniards could hunt south of latitude 35°, they usually preferred the safer eastward direction, and so did natives who avoided moving northward. The frontier did indeed function as a corridor in which Spaniards used the northern side
and natives the southern one. The process that configurated the southern frontier in the Spanish side was clearly the search for resources. To describe native movements, however, is almost impossible because their moves are underdocumented. It was only when Spaniards moved southward that they began to register native activities, and that these can be known. In other words, documents describe the movements of the Spaniards and their focus of attention than native activities themselves. For instance, in 1610, Córdoba was already paying attention to its southern border, but attention focused on the route to Buenos Aires, that is to say, on the last segment of the Potosi-Buenos Aires-trading route. It does not mean, however, that there was no Indian activity at all in the other segments of the southern border.

In the 1640s, after Viceroy Mancera ordered Córdoba to provide Buenos Aires with military assistance because of the threat of corsairs and the Portuguese, administrators began to divide available resources between the control of the frontier and the fulfilment of the royal decree. Yet it was the perception that the south was an active frontier in the years of the Dutch attack on Chile that changed Crown policy. At that time, the colony argued that it needed to protect itself and it was allowed to limit its military assistance to its traditional rival.

The relationship between Córdoba and Buenos Aires during the seventeenth century was far from being characterized by willing cooperation. In fact, the struggle for resources almost became a casus bellici. Buenos Aires considered using armed force and Pampas
as rural policemen to patrol the area under questionable jurisdiction. In fact, the Cabildo had already authorized the rural policeman (Alcalde de la Santa Hermandad) to patrol with 20 gunmen. In 1690 the Real Audiencia asked for a complete report about cattle theft within Buenos Aires' jurisdictions. Within an increasingly warlike atmosphere, in 1705, the Cabildo divided the ammunition between the soldiers controlling the Magdalena area (south of the port) and the guardmen patrolling Uruguay.

Porteños were certainly frustrated by their failure to intimidate vecinos of other jurisdictions. Such an incapacity to protect their monopoly to exploit the available material resources produced intolerant and aggressive behaviour. In a letter to the Cabildo of Córdoba sent by the Cabildo of Buenos Aires, the bellicose message was nicely conveyed in an "if"-formula. If Córdoba wanted to maintain harmony, authorities had to find a way to restrain Cordobans from "extracting cattle that is not their property." Córdoba sent the complaint directly to the Governor of Buenos Aires who, in turn, reacted with an Auto against the Cabildo for abusively sending three vecinos of Córdoba to jail.

Regardless of the areas under dispute with Córdoba, Buenos Aires assumed jurisdictional rights over many other regions with wild animals, including some lands northward. This expansion caused a long dispute with Santa Fe whose economy was based on control of very few material resources, mainly horses and cattle. At the very beginning of the seventeenth century, Santa Fe's
horse stock counted 8,420 animals”. The herd of excellent horses was the result of a long-term policy that had been implemented by the Cabildo to create a superior breed. Also, a roundup raid drove wild horses to an island to block off possible theft”. Cattle stock was also impressive. Although vecinos from Chile and Santiago del Estero were hunting in the region since 1600 or even earlier, the province could export to Potosí around 1,000,000 heads between 1611 and 1631”. As elsewhere, when livestock in Santa Fe decreased, vecinos expanded eastward into Entre Ríos and Uruguay, but the Cabildo of Buenos Aires immediately claimed that both areas were under its jurisdiction”. From Buenos Aires’ perspective, the defence of the rights for vaquerías in Uruguay was crucial.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century, Uruguay had enough wild cows and bulls to export to Buenos Aires farms. In the districts of Arrecifes and Areco (both northward of the port) each Uruguayan cow was worth from 4.5 to 7 reales”. The price was worth paying for two different, but complementary, reasons. First, the agent sent by the Cabildo of Buenos Aires to check out the available livestock reported that, having arrived in Tandil (70 leagues southward Buenos Aires), he could not find any bulls yet. Secondly, the English asiento paid 20 reales per hide, which still implied great profits”.

The difficulty was that porteños were not hunting alone in Uruguay; among others, both the Jesuits from Paraguay and some vecinos from Santa Fe profited from the feral cattle grazing on

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that side of Rio de la Plata River. Finally, the three parties had to come to an agreement by which Jesuits could extract up to 60,000 cows. The limit for Buenos Aires would be 30,000 while Santa Fe would limit itself to 6,000. Figures clearly overestimated the Uruguayan potential, since the livestock ran out in only five years. Buenos Aires still had the option of buying cattle from Santa Fe. In 1718 porteños imported around 14,000 or 16,000 cows from Santa Fe. Only one cattle-breeder from that colony was able to come up with an offer of 12,000 cows at the very competitive price of only 6 reales per animal.

Buenos Aires' attempts to control the livestock of Uruguay were not only a way of accumulating resources, but also a means of regulating prices on the local market. In the session that the Cabildo held on March 2, 1713, vecinos reported that the low price of 20 reales per hide resulted from sales by Indians, Mestizos, and Mulattoes to the English asiento. A cabildante reminded the council of the presence of Santa Fe hunters in Uruguay "where only this city [Buenos Aires] and its vecinos had the right over the animals". Porteños were unwilling to tolerate this type of competition. The British asiento had bought 25,000 hides, part of them being extracted from Uruguay. In 1718 the asiento specified that 25,000 hides should come from Buenos Aires region, not including Uruguay in the quota, but the Cabildo disagreed with the proposal because if vaquerías might be done in Buenos Aires, they had to hunt almost in the Pampas' dominions; therefore the dangerous enterprise justified that the price had
to be marked up\textsuperscript{73}. The Cabildo, of course, knew the advantages of monopoly: if Buenos Aires kept control over Uruguay, the British asiento would have to negotiate better prices with porteños.

Finally, it is important to mention that the dynamics between the natives of Uruguay and the Spaniards will duplicate in southern Buenos Aires. In Uruguay, tribes of Minuans hunted wild cattle to trade with European and Brazilian vessels. Buenos Aires then justified the mobilization of armed forces to the Uruguayan countryside under the excuse that hunters were non-Spaniards\textsuperscript{74}. The Cabildo, however, never mentioned that the hunters could also be vecinos of Santa Fe or Paraguayan natives under the control of the Society of Jesus. Nevertheless, during the porteño expansion southward, a similar argument was advanced to justify the use of either the militias or the regulars. Actually, any time the Cabildo asked for military protection for the vaquerías, it only referred to the threat posed by rebel natives, surpressing all mention of the fact that illegal hunters were often vecinos from other jurisdictions. Both armed control of southern Buenos Aires and military protection during the vaquerías seem to indicate that Buenos Aires wanted to intimidate Spaniards from other areas, and that vaquerías were done almost in Pampas' and Serranos' territories.

During the 1730s, Buenos Aires faced the fact that the south was the only direction for further expansion for wild cattle. An Acta of 1733 confirmed that the wild cattle grazed where "there were Aucas and Pehuenches who, since a few years ago, had taken
over the land and the cattle". Spanish desire of controlling
the southern areas was enormous because the region was supposed
to sustain thousands of animals. A map of those years labeled as
"wild horses" a large fringe from Rio Salado to Sierras de la
Ventana in Buenos Aires and from the Atlantic to Cuyo.
Cabildantes found a way to justify the Spanish advance towards
Pampas' and Serranos' territories by blaming them for advancing
northward and penetrating into the Spanish dominion.

4.6 - Allies and Competitors

During the west-to-east articulation of the southern
frontier the four colonies either competed for access to
resources or joined forces to protect themselves against external
threats. These contradictory roles added instability to their
frontier experience. Most of the time, however, the colonies had
to compete for the few markets and tradable resources of the
region. As both regional and international markets fluctuated, so
did the relationships between the communities.

For many years, Santiago considered Cuyo as a region from
where human and material resources could be legitimately
extracted. The fact that contributed to this situation was that
encomenderos of Cuyo were vecinos of Santiago. In other words,
they were the local elite in both colonies. After governors
implemented royal decrees about residential requirements, vecinos
of Santiago and encomenderos in Cuyo did not necessary correlate

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any more. Many encomenderos who were living in Santiago had to settle down in Mendoza, San Juan, or San Luis. The new situation, however, was beneficial as a means of establishing better commercial connections between Santiago and trans-Andean settlements.

Nonetheless, once the encomenderos settled down in Cuyo, they tried to monopolize the scant reservoir of local goods. For their survival, they had to search for markets for the agrarian products. Early in the seventeenth century, for instance, the procurador of Mendoza got the authorization to transport wines to the eastern colonies, which allowed Mendoza to participate in the broad trade that linked Buenos Aires to Santiago. Although a small merchant settlement, Mendoza was competition for the powers of Santiago, Córdoba, and Buenos Aires. The behaviour of the elite in Santiago has already been explained, but Mendoza had to face other obstacles while expanding its economy.

When Córdoba established a transit tax, merchants from Mendoza avoided the Cordoban jurisdiction by following a more direct route from San Luis to Buenos Aires. Merchants justified their behaviour by describing the delays that resulted from travelling by way of the city of Córdoba. Another concern was that the arroba, the standard measure for liquids, was larger in Córdoba and wine traders suffered considerable losses when selling wine in that colony. For its part, Buenos Aires applied sales tax to Mendoza's products. When in 1670 the duty soared as high as $3 per unit (so-called botija), the Cabildo of Mendoza
appointed Captain Domingo Sánchez Chaparro to represent wine producers to higher authorities. Mendoza properly pointed out that taxes were destroying one of the very few economic possibilities of the small community.

To circumvent Santiago's extractions from Cuyo was harder, but Mendoza sharpened the mechanisms of control. As early as 1629 the Cabildo ordered that anyone who had a license to drive Huarpes had to go to the institution to confirm the authorization. The document would specify what type of labour Indians would do once in Chile. With regards to cattle trade, it was affected by the ebb and flow of the Peruvian market since the Cabildo of Santiago took full advantage of its possibility of regulating the imports from Cuyo. Economic activity in Mendoza expanded from the third decade of the seventeenth century until the 1660s when Santiago attempted to cope with the recession in the international market for local tallow. A Cabildo session held on May 30, 1664 in Santiago blamed the abundance of animals from Cuyo for the decreasing value of tallow in Peru. Despite its complaints, Santiago managed to export 30,000 quintales of tallow to Peru in 1663-64. The Cabildo, however, sought to stabilize the market with more protective measures. A decade later, during the 1670s cabildantes still regulated the market by freezing the price of imported cattle, by fixing quotas, and by controlling the one third of the imports to be sold to the army.

The elite in Santiago was aware that the crisis in exports to the Peruvian market could extend for a longer period. It was
not only cattle traders who attempted to regulate the market with protective measures. Merchants also tried to reinforce, or maybe to expand, their commercial relationships with eastern colonies. In 1676 Governor Juan Henríquez requested information about how to proceed with licenses for convoys. The Cabildo responded by urging him not to damage the trade with Paraguay, Tucumán, and Buenos Aires. A factor that modified the economy of the Central Valley and exports to Peru was the Lima earthquake of 1684. The catastrophe had other consequences. It caused agriculture problems such as plagues, crop failures, and modifications in the system of irrigation. The local production in Chile was redirected towards cereals in order to satisfy the demands of that market. This also modified the relationship between the elite in Santiago, the governors, and the trans-Andean colonies since the change in production affected the local and regional markets.

In the case of Córdoba and Buenos Aires, their similar production left them to compete for access to the few consuming markets of the area. When Buenos Aires was officially opened to trade with Portuguese colonies, Cabildo officeholders and Governor Hernandarias safeguarded the privilege. The procurador of Córdoba complained about some of Hernandarias' unfair acts. First, he had seized the Cordoban carts transporting wheat and then he obliged the Indians who were driving the convoys to work on public buildings in Buenos Aires. Lastly, Hernandarias had sent a misleading letter to the Crown stating that "there were
other things inside the wheat sacks"**, insinuating the smuggling of silver that came by way of Córdoba from Potosí. Such an "infamous report," concluded the procurator, had led the King to prohibit the trade between Córdoba and Buenos Aires. The Cabildo of Córdoba sent its own version that included a reminder of the services rendered to the Crown every time a royal expedition passed by en route to Arauco**3**.

Within this atmosphere of competition, Córdoba's military assistance to the port of Buenos Aires became an unwanted burden. Córdoba openly condemned, with the intent to discredit, Buenos Aires for requesting assistance "without legitimate reason**4**. Besides, Córdoba had its own frontiers and needed military resources to control them. Until the mid-seventeenth century the southern border had been quite calm, perhaps due to an agreement between Peso and the natives during Rivera's government in Tucumán. It is possible that the peace derived from another reason: the proliferation of livestock gave enough to hunt to both parties. Tensions and frictions for the access to resources were more frequent between Spaniards from different jurisdictions than between natives and Spaniards. Spanish cattle hunters wandered eastward, which was still considered the safer direction to expand. Cattle theft among Spaniards therefore was quite frequent**5**.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Córdoba's eastward expansion found an immovable obstacle in the form of the vecinos of Buenos Aires. The two jurisdictions argued over their
rights over certain areas to the point that, in 1704, a lawsuit between the Cabildos became inevitable. The Cabildo of Córdoba argued that it was always allied with Buenos Aires, especially when the port was menaced by corsairs. The governor of Buenos Aires, however, refused to bear such a point on the grounds that it could not be relevant to the case under examination. He simply shifted the course of argument, claiming that Buenos Aires had "immemorial rights" to the territories in question. The Cabildo of Buenos Aires supported the governor's emphatic views while explaining that even the wild cattle of Córdoba belonged to Buenos Aires as Córdoba had never had "either cows or bulls on its farms" since it was heavily involved in mule-breeding activities. In an attempt to have the last word on this burning issue, Buenos Aires presented as evidence a document of 1659, which stated that even those wild animals grazing in Córdoba did not properly belong to it because they had already been stolen from southern Buenos Aires by "vecinos of Chile." Following the rationale of the Cabildo even the wild cattle grazing in southern Córdoba belonged to the port".

Buenos Aires followed the same pattern and also strove to enhance its dominion over eastern provinces. In the easternmost territory of Uruguay, porteños had to compete with vecinos of Santa Fe, the Portuguese, natives, and the Society of Jesus. The level of conflicts increased when Portuguese established the Colonia do Sacramento. Notwithstanding the benefits that this Portuguese colony would have for smuggling activities in the Río
de la Plata, inhabitants of Buenos Aires considered the negative aspects of a closer Portuguese presence because they could also profit from the wild cattle of Uruguay. Unfortunately, the porteños' fears turned out to be well founded. A Cabildo session of 1721 received a report that confirmed that both natives of Uruguay and peons from Santa Fe were helping Portuguese to round up the livestock of Uruguay.

With the Society of Jesus, the competition for resources took a different form. Some porteños felt disappointed in Jesuit behaviour, as the Crown did, but for different reasons. The Crown was aware that from the moment that the Society had been granted a license to import slaves, the priests had transformed the convents into centers for smuggling and trading. As early as 1623, an agent of the Audiencia of Charcas was sent to investigate the situation in the port. His report clearly established that the license had served to funnel contraband to the hinterland. Some years later, in 1679 Governor Andrés de Robles sent a petition to the General Father Oliva expecting him to prohibit commercial activities in the Jesuits in Buenos Aires. In that year of 1679, Captain Juan Miluti sent a map describing the location of the convent in Buenos Aires to the Council of the Indies, a piece of evidence which would assist the Council in their pondering of the case. Furthermore, in that year another letter alerted authorities in Buenos Aires of contraband to be shipped in a vessel from Amsterdam whose destination was the farms of the Compañía de Jesús in Buenos Aires.

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For porteños, the dispute centered around the right to hunt cattle in Uruguay. Ironically, Jesuits operated as allies from Buenos Aires's perspective when the Portuguese were expanding towards the Rio de la Plata. In 1694, for example, the governor himself compelled the Fathers of the missions to drive Uruguayan cattle towards Paraguay. The Jesuits, however, kept on driving cattle to Paraguay without waiting for any further mandate from officers in Buenos Aires; in the process, they accumulated impressive holdings in livestock. In 1720 the Cabildo of Buenos Aires had no other option but to negotiate the quotas of the livestock to be extracted from Uruguay.59

The Jesuits also functioned as military allies during the 1660s when Indians from the missions in Paraguay were helping Buenos Aires with tasks like the fortification of the port. The missions, of course, served as a reservoir of soldiers. In those years, a traveller described Buenos Aires as appearing to be underfortified since it counted only 900 soldiers. The visitor, however, pointed out to the fact that, if under attack, the port could rely on a reservoir of well-disciplined and armed Indians from missions in Paraguay.59

The ambiguous role was a paradox from the perspective of Buenos Aires' commercial interests. Another contradictory role concerned the garrison because most of its officers and soldiers were smugglers themselves, although their duty was to protect the settlers. Both authorities and civilians began to distrust the local army. The Cabildo pressured the Crown to instruct these
officers and soldiers to refrain from commercial activity. The
king sent a fiscal from the Audiencia of Santiago to investigate
the case. If there was something that the Audiencia in Chile knew
it was that members of the army were usually involved in trading.
At the end of the seventeenth century, a report confirmed the
irregularities in the garrison of Buenos Aires, including the
fact that governors themselves had given enslaved Indians to
their followers in the army. Moreover, both officers and soldiers
were active traders, and many sergeants regularly sold goods to
foreign vessels11. For their part, cabildantes were more
concerned with the fact that these officers were competitors, for
they had their own licenses to hunt wild cattle, and if they did
not have a license, they could easily buy hides from unlicensed
hunters92.

Nonetheless, although competitors, these officers and
soldiers also protected livestock from extraction by Spaniards
from other jurisdictions or by natives. From the beginning of the
eighteenth century onward, cabildantes urged the governor to
authorize the use of troops from the garrison and the militia to
patrol the southern region. It produced a long-term consequence
since the military attention switched from the river in the north
to the pampas in the south. From April to September, foggy days
impeded navigation, making it easier for fewer soldiers to
control the river93. Part of the troops then could be used in
helping to control the southern areas.

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Such a policy also indicated that porteños had become more aware of the dynamic of the frontier on the native side because it implied a frontier that fluctuated according to a pattern established by natives whose activities followed seasonal rhythms. Both Pampas and Serranos were not only experts in the geography of the areas, but were quite familiar with the rhythms posed by seasonal changes. In Summer, when cattle was able to scatter over larger areas due to the great abundance of herbage and water, it would take an enormous effort to round up enough beasts to economically justify the action. With the change of season, however, the scarcity of nourishment concentrated the animals into small confined pockets with grass and water. Indians easily located these spots and drove the animals to their dominions. Moreover, Pampas and Serranos were aware that the best time to drive horses and cattle over the Andes was during Spring and the beginning of the Summer. This reinforced the need to round up the cattle in Winter, given enough time to arrange the transactions, and drive the animals westward during the early Spring months.

Both natives and Spaniards contributed to articulate the frontier while they were searching for resources. On the Spanish side of the border, Cabildos argued with each other over jurisdictional boundaries in the hope of expanding their control over resources. The eastward expansion was usually safer than the southward one. Altogether, the episodes prove that, in order to maintain their economies, Spaniards had to seek resources anywhere, but they only ventured southward after trying the other
safer directions to expand. With regards to the wild cattle, Uruguay was the easternmost area, a fact that explained why the right to exploit its resources was so bitterly disputed. It also ran out of livestock quite rapidly, eventually forcing a southward expansion. The last segment of the frontier became articulated when porteños ventured southward, penetrating into native dominion, an action that took place after they had extensively explored all the possibilities in every other directions.

By blaming natives for the shortage of livestock, the use of the royal army became justifiable. Otherwise, it would have been impossible to explain why paid soldiers (whose main duty was to defend the port against invasions) were protecting vaquerías in southern Buenos Aires or patrolling the area to prevent cattle theft. Buenos Aires articulated into the southern frontier reproducing what had previously happened in the other colonies during the seventeenth century. The common dynamic was the result of two distinctive, but inter-related, forces. The incapacity to extend the jurisdictions eastward forced Spaniards to expand southward. And viceversa, the incapacity to expand southward (clearly exemplified by the case of Santiago) propelled Spaniards to seek resources in safer areas in the east. It is difficult to demonstrate that there was an identical dynamic on the Indian side of the frontier, but nothing leads one to suspect that natives flows eastward had a completely different rationale.
ENDNOTES

1. For the attempts to regulate the use of the local resources, see the available Actas of the year 1541; for the petition to the governor, see the Acta of October 13, 1549, ACCH, I, v.

2. Cabildantes argued that they had already contributed to finance the Spanish expansion into Arauco and that they needed some financial compensation ("y con el favor y socorro de ella [Santiago] han sido las ciudades de la Concepción, Imperial, Valdivia, Villarica y La Serena pobladas y se sustentan, por lo cual los vecinos de esta ciudad están muy endeudados y gastados"), see the Acta of November 14, 1552, ACCH, I.


4. Actas of April 23, 1607; October 30, 1607; and May 17, 1608; ACCB, IV.


6. The raids to enslave natives were the main reason for Chilean complaints; for other examples, see Jara "La importación de trabajadores indígenas en el siglo XVII," Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía 124 (1956), 177-213, 183-4.

7. For the jurisdictional arguments, see the Acta of March 31, 1604, ACMZ, I.

8. For biographical information on Gregorio Morales de

9. Bartolomé de Rojas y Puebla was vecino of Santiago, but had his encomienda in Cuyo and owned land in Valle de Uco and Xaurúa; his cousin Captain Gregorio de Puebla was regidor in the Cabildo of Mendoza; both Bartolomé and Gregorio were involved in the slave trade; for further information, see Rosa Zuluaga, "La trata de negros en la región cuyana durante el siglo XVII," Revista de la Junta de Estudios Históricos 6:1 (1970), 39-71, 46; Espejo, Provincia I, 63; II, 510; Roa y Ursúa, El Reino, 568 and 571; Carpeta 278, Eclesiástico, AHMZ, Colonial; and the Acta of March 3, 1605, ACMZ, I.

10. For the expeditions from Chile, see Juan Raone, Fortines del desierto (Buenos Aires: Lito, 1969), 219.

11. Rolando Mellafé, La introducción de la esclavitud negra en Chile (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1965), 118.

12. For the decrees regulating Huarpe labour, see Jara, Fuentes para la Historia del trabajo en el Reino de Chile (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1965), 210-2.

13. For details, see Mario Góngora, Encomenderos y estancieros (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1970), 23.

14. As early as 1592, Governor Loyola attempted to stop this abuse by law. In the Ordenanza 26 he forbade encomenderos the owning of land where they already had an encomienda. The law,
however, was not upheld; for further details and examples, see Fernando Silva Vargas, *Tierras y pueblos de indios en el Reino de Chile* (Santiago: Estudios de Historia del Derecho chileno, 1962), 73-130; for a similar device used in appropriating former Indian land in Córdoba, see Adolfo González, "La pérdida de la propiedad indígena. El caso de Córdoba, 1573-1700," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 47 (1990), 171-98; and Josefina Piana de Cuestas, "De encumijendas y mercedes de tierras. Afinidades y precedencias en la jurisdicción de Córdoba, 1573-1610," *Boletín del Instituto Emilio Ravignani* 5 (1992), 19-25, 20-3


16. During the meeting of December 16, the *cabildantes* considered that the decree affected the colony in such a degree that they needed the opinion of most settlers. They called to a general meeting (*Cabildo Abierto*) for the following day; see the *Actas* of December 16 and 17, 1611, ACCH, VII. To illustrate the importance of this labour for Santiago, more Indians from Cuyo (501) than from Arauco (481) were living in the outskirts of the colony; therefore they satisfied the urban labour market; see

17. Unfortunately, it did not come until the Huarpes were almost extinguished, although the *Cabildo* of Mendoza controlled the extractions during the seventeenth century; see Jara, *Fuentes*, 148-71 and 217; and the *Actas* of January 4, 1627; January 12 and May 7, 1629; March 3, 1646; March 4, 1655; January 5 and March 7, 1665; ACMZ, I, II, III.


19. In January of 1610 Gabriel de la Celada noted that this type of commerce was the main obstacle to pacify Arauco; see Document 22, Volume 14, ANCH, Fondo Claudio Gay.


23. The Crown had even ordered to investigate *malocas* against peaceful tribes in Mendoza. The king had been informed that these natives were bought as slaves in Tucumán and Santa Fe; see Espejo, *Provincia I*, 87.
24. Captain Juan Jufré de Arce was born in San Juan (Cuyo) but lived in Buenos Aires where he was alcalde; Captain Sebastián Cabral de Ayala was regidor and his brother was alcalde de la Santa Hermandad (rural policeman); and Alonso Guerrero de Ayala inherited Mateo Leal de Ayala's estate; Mateo was interim governor of Buenos Aires when Diego de Negrón died; for further information, see Ricardo Lafuente Machain, Los portugueses en Buenos Aires en el siglo XVII (Madrid: Archivos, 1931), 202, 205, and 229; and Eduardo Saguier, Mercado inmobiliario y estructura social en el Río de la Plata, 1534-1717 (Buenos Aires: CEAL, 1993), 25.

25. In 1682, 60 Pampas were allotted among the officers and soldiers who went on a maloca, see the Royal Decree of November, 24, 1682, Libro de Registros-Cedularios del Río de la Plata, 1534-1717 II (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones del Derecho, 1984), 2892; for further details on the exploitation of human resources, see Vicente Botta, Historia de Zárate, 1869-1909 (La Plata: Archivo histórico de la provincia de Buenos Aires), 10-4; and Lafuente Machain, Los portugueses, 204-9.


27. The author describes the case of Chief Antuvilú who was
one of the most active suppliers of the army in Arauco; for further details see Claudio Gay, *Historia física y política de Chile* (Paris-Santiago: n.p., 1845) III, 153-4.

28. 44% of this type of labour contracts (so-called *asientos*) signed in Santiago included natives from southern Chile; see Jara, *Los asientos de trabajo y la provisión de mano de obra para los no-encomenderos en la ciudad de Santiago, 1586-1600* (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1959), 81.

29. According to the *alcalde*, natives had previously offered to do this service; see the *Acta* of February 17, 1717, ACBA, III.

30. On the authorization to go to Salinas Grandes, see the *Auto* of August 27, 1720, from Governor Bruno de Zavala, Expediente 7, Legajo D1, Tribunales, AGN, Sala IX. Colonists organized expeditions to the Salinas from 1668 onward. They paid for the right to extract salt from native dominion; for additional information, see Salvador Canals Frau, *Las poblaciones indígenas de la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica, 1986), 212; and Juan Moya, *Contribución a la Historia de Bragado* (La Plata" Archivo histórico de la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1957), 7-8.

31. Historians dealing with Buenos Aires have argued that the third decade of the eighteenth century was the earliest years of the frontier problems in the area; see for example, Raul Mandrini, "Desarrollo de una sociedad pastoril en un área interserrana bonaerense," *Anuario IEHS* 2 (1987), 71-97; Roberto Marfani, "El cuerpo de Blandengues de la frontera de Buenos

32. Horacio Lara, *Crónica de la Araucanía* I (Santiago: El Progreso, 1889), 342; for the price of the heads, see Francisco Encina, *Resumen de Historia de Chile* I (Santiago: Zig Zag, 1956), 136.

33. For commercial agreements, see the Documents 243 and 414, APCB, Protocols, II.

34. The procurator of Córdoba requested the *Cabildo* to prohibit the sales of horses to foreigners in order to protect the local mule-breeding farms, see the *Acta* of March 16, 1655, ACCB, X.

35. On natives habits and activities related to horse-
breeding, see Gay, Historia, 135; Sergio Villalobos, Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1989), 34; Canals Frau, Las poblaciones indígenas en la Argentina; and Horacio Giberti, Historia económica de la ganadería en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica, 1985), 23.

36. Encina, Resumen de Historia de Chile I, 135.

37. For prices, see Jean Borde and Mario Góngora, Evolución de la propiedad rural en el valle del Puanque (Santiago: Universitaria, 1956), 65.

38. On the measures adopted by governors and the response of the capital, see the Actas of April 7, May 12, June 14 and 23, and September 2, 1679; ACCH, XIX; and Julio Alem parte, El Cabildo en Chile colonial (Santiago: Bello, 1966), 142. In 1680 Juan de la Cerda stated that the Cabildo had always recognized that the imports of cattle affected the local prices; see the Acta of January 9, 1680, ACCH, IXI.

39. The Cabildo agreed on a memorial to be sent to Governor José de Garro in Cuyo; for the arguments, see the Actas of November 7, 1681; January 3 and 16, and February 16, 1682, ACCH, XIX.

40. Actas of January 9 and September 13, 1680, ACCH,

41. Actas of September 2, 1678; and February 20, 1683, ACCH, XIX, XX.

42. Cabildantes agreed on an unusual donation of 2,000 horses to the army, see the Acta of June 27, 1683, ACCH, XX.

43. Andrés was a cattle-importer. In 1679 he may have
imported at least 2,000 headssince he sold 600 to the army (the third); see the Actas of April 7, 1679; and June 15, 1684; ACCH, XIX, XX.

44. Acta of February 21, 1594; Actas del Cabildo of Santa Fe, II.

45. Governor Garro prohibited vecinos of Santa Fe to hunt in Uruguay. Garro was concerned with the help that peons from Santa Fe were offering to the Portuguese; for details, see Manuel Cervera, Historia de la ciudad y provincia de Santa Fe, 1573-1853. 2 Vols (Santa Fe: Unión, 1907), I, 96-7; and the Actas of April 21, 1719; March 21 and July 27, 1720; November 5 and 16, 1722; ACBA, IV.

46. For distances for vaquerías, see Emilio Coni, Historia de las vaquerías en el Rio de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Platero, 1979), 14; and the Acta of April 9, 1681; ACBA, XX.

47. In 1709 vecinos of Buenos Aires were alarmed by the sharp decrease in the number of heads of cattle in the Rio de la Plata region. They considered that the reason was the illegal hunting, which did not allow natural reposition of herds; on these arguments, see Manfred Kossok, El Virreinato del Rio de la Plata. Su estructura económicasoicial. (Buenos Aires: Hyspmérica, 1972), 82-3.

48. For the cattle censuses, see Coni, Historia de las vaquerías, 17-8; for cattle-breeders, see Juan Moya, Contribución a la Historia de Bracado (La Plata: Archivo histórico de la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1957), 7-12; Mercedes de tierras
hechas a nombre del Rey (La Plata: Archivo histórico de la provincia de Buenos Aires, 1979), 12, 14, and 23; Saguer, Mercado, 73 and 123; and Lafuente Machain, Los portugueses, 230-1.

49. According to the authorization, 30 Huarpes had to help during the drive of the animals across the Andes, but they had to return to Mendoza as soon as they finished the work; for the regulations, see the Actas of February 20 and June 17, 1631; ACMZ, II.


52. For malones in the eastern segment of the frontier, see Villalobos, Pehuenches, 201; Francisco Enrich, Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile (Barcelona: Rosal, 1891), 650; Ramiro Martinez Sierra, El mapa de las pampas (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Oficial, 1975), 63; and Miguel Angel Palermo, "La innovación agropecuaria entre los indígenas pampeano-patagónicos. Génesis y procesos," Anuario IEHS 3 (1988), 43-90, 10-9.

53. For the report of Maestre de Campo Joseph de Cabrera(a), April 2, 1708; and the Bando of February 17, 1708, see Expedient 21, Legajo Cl. Tribunales, AGN, Sala IX.

54. Colección de Obras y Documentos para la Historia Argentina, ed. Pedro de Angelis, I (Buenos Aires: Colmegna, 1900), 320; for a biography of Juan de Mayorga, see Espejo,
Provincia. II. 485, 539 and 545; and Documents 32 and 53. Carpeta 96, Hacienda, AHMZ, Colonial.

55. For the report of Maestre de Campo Bartolomé de Olmedo in 1715, and the report of September 24, 1714, see the Documents 3129 and 3366, Fondo Documental Monseñor Cabrera, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.

56. Encomendero José de Cabrera y Velazco testified that his Pampas exchanged goods with Araucanians; see Pablo Cabrera, "Los Araucanos en territorio argentino," paper presented at XXV Congreso de Americanistas, Buenos Aires, 1932, 105-7; Captain José Bazán de Pedrosa confirmed these exchanges when he pointed out to the fact that natives in Córdoba had Araucanian-made swords, see Pedro Grenón, Los Pampas y la frontera sur (Córdoba: Liendo, 1924), 19; and for a general survey of the situation in southern Córdoba and northern Patagonia, see Rodolfo Casamiquela, Un nuevo panorama etnológico del área pan-pampeana y patagónica adyacente (Santiago: Museo de Historia Natural, 1969), 90.

57. On these agreements in Mendoza, see Canals Frau, "Etnología de los Huarpes," Anales del Instituto de Etnología 8 (1945), 9-147, 539; and La frontera interna. ed.Archivo Histórico de Mendoza, (Mendoza: Oficial, 1989), 15-6; for Córdoba, see Cabrera, "Los Araucanos," 105-8; and for Buenos Aires, see Mandrini, "Desarrollo de una sociedad pastoril indígena en un área interserrana bonaerense," Anuario IEHS 2 (1987), 71-97, 86.

58. For the military measures, see Document 5, Carpeta 256,
APCB, Escritanos 1; and Document 3371 (testimony of Andrés de Acosta, Agust 15, 1726), Fondo Documental Monseñor Cabrera, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.

59. **Frontera interna**, 39.

60. This member of the *Cabildo* sustained that farms had been abandoned a century ago due to the threat of native raids, and that cattle had migrated to Córdoba and Buenos Aires; see the report of February 15, 1691, see Document 12, Carpeta 22, AHMZ, Colonial.


62. It seems that Córdoba was able to send a considerable number of soldiers to Buenos Aires, although during the second half of the seventeenth century the colony had its own military priorities; for details see the Document 10, Volume 1, APCB, Gobierno; Document 3, Volume 2, APCB, Gobierno; *IV Centenario de las fundaciones de Córdoba y Santa Fe* (Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1974), 107; and Carlos Luque Colombres, "Córdoba, plaza de armas de la gobernación del Tucumán para los socorros al puerto de Buenos Aires," ANH IV, 163-78.

63. Documents 62 and 240, Volume 2, Guerra, AGN, Sala IX.

64. "Notas del *Cabildo* de Buenos Aires sobre el robo de ganado," Letter to Córdoba, August 11, 1704; Document 8, Volume 3, APCB, Gobierno, APCB; and *Acta* of June, 28, 1704, ACBA, I.

65. Manuel Cervera, *Historia de la ciudad y provincia de Santa Fe* (Santa Fe: Unión, 1907), 61.

66. For the *Cabildo*'s policy of how to breed horses in Santa
Fe, see the *Actas* of November 1, 1577, and July (?), 1584; *Actas del Cabildo de Santa Fe*, I.


68. For the arguments used by the *procurador* of Santa Fe to protect the rights of the colony to hunt cattle in these areas, see Agustín Zapata, *El caballo en Santa Fe en los tiempos de la colonia* (Santa Fe: Castellvi, 1947), 60 and 72.

69. This was the price in 1718; see Coni, *Historia*, 19.

70. Cabildantes needed a cattle census in order to know the amount of cattle grazing in the area before negotiating the price with the British; for additional information, see Coni, *Historia de las vaquerías*, 20; prices were usually analyzed before the hunting season in early Spring; for examples, see the *Acta* of September 20, 1715, May 5, September 12, and December 11, 1725; ACBA, III, V.

71. Assadourian, *Argentina*, 175; and the *Actas* of February 27, April 23, 1722; August 26 and September 6, 1724; March 5, April 1 and 4, 1726; ACBA, V.

72. In January of 1718 the Cabildo requested a report to verify who were hunting in Uruguay and how many heads of cattle were annually extracted from the area without license. The option of buying cattle from Santa Fe was also considered. In June, M. de Barrera offered 12,000 cows, half of them to be paid with cash; for the arguments, see the *Actas* of January 10 and June 15, 1718, ACBA, III.

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73. For the British asiento, exports, and prices, see Coni, 
Historia de las vaquerías, 34.
74. This was the usual strategy. In October of 1709, for 
example, the Cabildo proposed to write to the Cabildos of 
Córdoba, Mendoza, San Juan, and San Luis requesting them to 
prohibit hunting cattle outside their jurisdictions; but 
according to the procurador, the only way to stop Cordobans and 
inhabitants of San Luis from hunting in southern Buenos Aires was 
to use soldiers as patrolmen. In December the governor authorized 
the use of soldiers to patrol the area. In 1714 the presence of 
Aucas was the excuse that the Cabildo used to justify the armed 
patrols; for further information, see the Actas of October 15, 
November 25, December 23, 1709; September 1, 1714; January 26, 
March 23, February 4, 1715; and March 2 and 21, 1716, ACBA, II, 
III; for the case in Uruguay, see the Acta of May 16, 1733, ACBA, 
IV.
75. Some meetings of the Cabildo show that there was a direct 
relationship between the decreasing number of livestock and the 
increasing tensions between Spaniards and natives; for examples, 
see the Actas of January 15, 1723; February 10 and September 12, 
1725; May 16, 1733; ACBA, V.
76. On this map, see Martinez, El mapa de las pampas, 101-3.
77. For examples, see the Bandos (1742-1753), Volume 1, 127, 
AGN, Sala IX; for a chronology of the eighteenth-century 
expansion, see Marfani, "Frontera con los indios en el Sud y 
fundación de los pueblos," HNA IV, 265-89.
78. On arguments over control of the markets, see the Real Provisión of February 26, 1610, Document 3, Carpeta 2, Gobierno, AHMZ, Colonial; and the Actas of February 19, November 4, December 4, 1628; April 4, 1629; May 25, 1630; March 14, 1644; June 22, 1652; August 21, 1655; January 17, 1656; August 3, 1657; July 13, 1658; January 28, 1662; June 28, and November 15, 1664; April 9, and August 4, 1670; ACMZ, II, III; for the seventeenth-century measures and equivalences, see Luis Coria, Evolución económica de Mendoza en la época colonial (Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1988), 67; (see the table I in the appendices).

79. The Cabildo required to declare the type of labour, whether mita or rent to someone else; see the Actas of January 12, May 7, 1629; and June 17, 1631; ACMZ, II.

80. Actas of May 30; and October 5, 10, and 15, 1664; ACCH, XVI.

81. For examples of regulations, see the Actas of March 27, April 17, September 5, 1676; and January 28, 1678; ACCH, XX.

82. Acta of March 27, 1676; ACCH, XX.

83. Córdoba used this as a proof of loyalty to the Crown; see the Actas of October 19, 1610; and July 18, 1615; ACCB, V.

84. Acta of July 20, 1646; ACCB, IX.

85. When Cordoban Captain Juan López de Fiusa, one of the most important cattle-exporters of the area, came back from Peru, he realized that someones had profited during his absence by driving his cows towards some farms in Buenos Aires. These
thieves were Spaniards. They argued that the heads were porteño's runaway animals; for the episode, see Cabrera, "Los Araucanos," 112.

86. To conclude the discussion, Buenos Aires explained that Córdoba had never claimed rights over these lands; see Expediente 2, Legajo E2, Tribunales, AGN, Sala IX.

87. Both the governor of Buenos Aires and the Cabildo tried to avoid the extinction of the wild cattle in Uruguay. In 1721 an Auto attested that the Minuans were helping the Portuguese to hunt cattle in the region. In 1722 the governor authorized to patrol with gunmen the hinterland of Uruguay; for these measures, see the Actas of September 15, and November 7, 1721; and February, 27, 1722; ACBA, IV.

88. Commerce had been prohibited by the Bula of Clemente IX; for the Society in the region, see Magnus Morner, The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the Río de la Plata Region, The Habsburg Era (Stockholm Library and Institute of Ibero American Studies, 1953), 70-1, 87, 151; "Jesuitas en Argentina," Catalog, ANCH; and Libro de Registros-Cedulares II, 2522, 2523, 2622, and 2623.

89. For the arguments over the rights to hunt cattle in Uruguay, see the Actas of August 26 and September 6, 1724; March 3, April 1 and 3, 1726; and December 1, 1730; ACBA, IV, V, VI; for these vaquerías and Buenos Aires' economy, see Sergio Villalobos, Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata y Chile, 1700-1811 (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1986), 45; for the agreement on
the quotas, see Coni, Historia de las vaquerías, 48-9.

90. Such a reservoir of 2,000 soldiers did not cost the royal
treasure anything; see Morner, The Political and Economic, 162;
for the letters of the traveler Antonio Seep (April 15, 1691; and
of June 24, 1692), see Lafuente Machain, Los portugueses, 246.

91. Repertorio de los documentos históricos procedentes del
Archivo de Indias, ed. Roberto Levillier (Madrid: Rivadeneyra,
1921), 139.

92. In 1693 the Cabildo complained that the officers obtained
sales quotas to the detriment of the holders of permits to hunt
cattle. Officers also obtained hides by buying them in small
quantities from other hunters; for further details, see Zacarías
Moutoukias, "Power, Corruption and Commerce. The Making of the
Local Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-century Buenos

93. Adolfo Garretón, La municipalidad colonial (Buenos Aires:
Menendez, 1933), 334-6.
5 - CONCLUSION

At the end of the sixteenth century the Spanish expansion ended at latitude 35° S. The southernmost territories remained mostly unknown for the rest of the colonial period. Only the fantastic fable of the kingdom of the Caesars attracted a few expeditions towards Patagonia. Although these entradas failed to locate the golden cities of the Caesars or greatly to extend geographical knowledge, they nonetheless affected the future dynamics of the southern border because these expeditions scattered around horses and cattle, which eventually reproduced into the herds of beasts in areas under native control.

Near the end of the sixteenth century, Santiago, Mendoza, Córdoba, and Buenos Aires were isolated border colonies on the fringes of the Spanish Empire. During the following century, however, both Spaniards and natives transformed them into frontier societies. Santiago became a frontier colony as a direct consequence of the establishment of a royal army in Arauco. The advent of a professional military transformed the local and regional economy, affecting the political and social spheres. A situado of 212,000 ducats per year was a powerful boost to the local economy, despite its irregular arrival. Further, since the needs of around 2,000 soldiers, plus native allies, surpassed the productive capacity of the Central Valley, struggles over control of local resources dominated the political horizon of the capital. Ultimately, government authorities and civilians alike had to extract resources from across the Andes.
The Crown was prepared to entertain proposals which might alleviate the financial burden of supporting the army in Arauco. As part of an ongoing process of military reforms, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Governor Alonso de Rivera conceived a program for self-sufficiency and increased professionalism. Three decades later, Governor Francisco Lazo de la Vega adopted a similar strategy to cope with the difficulties derived from supplying the army, which was a constant source of bitter political arguments with the Cabildo. These initiatives proved to be useless in the long run. The failure left little choice but to extend the Chilean situation eastward since both governors and civilians were compelled to import livestock and other supplies from beyond the Andes. The situation lasted through the seventeenth century. Neither Father Valdivia's program in the first half of the seventeenth century nor the parlamentos of the second half reduced the impact of the army or mitigated the frontier experience.

The presence of troops in southern Chile supported by a situado had generated economic, political, and social conditions whereby the end of conflict would have threatened well-consolidated advantages and privileges. The frontier, although static, provided Spaniards with access to land and labour, and the chance to climb the social ladder. The situado created a job market related to specific military activities, to trade, and many other services. According to the report of Alonso Solórzano Velazco, from 1604 to 1659 the Royal Treasury had
invested more than $31 million in the Arauco. To put this figure into perspective, one must remember that between 1630 and 1650 the Lima treasury sent almost the same amount to Spain, whose war effort in Europe was longer than Chile's. Also, a demographic factor affected the impact of this capital in both societies. Considering the money-to-person ratio, the influx of the same capital may have affected more a colony like Santiago than other societies.

If the frontier had vanished after a complete pacification, all the benefits and privileges it had produced would disappear. Among these privileges was the extensive fuero militar that the army in Arauco was entitled to from the very the beginning of the seventeenth century. Governor García Ramón wrote to the king requesting his authority to restrain the Real Audiencia from attempting to judge officers and soldiers. The governor insisted that in Chile "more than in any other part of the Empire" soldiers deserved the privilege of the fuero militar because of their loyal services to the king.

The endless demands of the army forced Chile to import horses, cattle, and other products from across the Andes, from Cuyo, Tucumán, Paraguay, and Río de la Plata. The exact amount of cattle required each year is difficult to determine, but more interesting than the exact volume is the question of what officers and soldiers did with the hides. Some documents concerning the activities of the officers in the garrison of Buenos Aires note that they often sold hides to foreign vessels.
These officers in Arauco may have done the same by the late seventeenth century.

The testament of Chilean Captain Lorenzo Suarez provides us with further evidence. Suarez, regidor in 1643 and corregidor of Aconcagua two years later, was asentista of Valdivia in 1651. In his testament of 1652 he declared that his tannery prepared approximately 10,000 hides annually. The high figure suggests a market big enough to absorb such an amount. It also implies that Suarez got the untanned pieces from somewhere. Considering the fact that he was the asentista of the garrison of Valdivia, the origin of the hides seems to be the south of Chile since neither in the Actas of the Cabildo nor in other sources, was he mentioned as an important cattle- importer or breeder⁴.

The army represented an extraordinary market for the region, which developed trading networks that expanded the influence of Arauco across the Andes. Networks and trading connections, whether based on family or corporate interests, contributed to the west-to-east articulation of the southern colonies. They guaranteed the distribution of goods and services in politically regulated markets.

The most interesting commercial connection, however, comes from a report that deals with Spanish trade with southern tribes. In his testimony about the kingdom of the Caesars, Silvestre de Rojas assured that natives in southern Mendoza usually traded with the Caesars in Patagonia. Rojas, who was a captive of the Pehuenches, reported to the king that he heard that natives
"traded with the Spanish Caesars". Since the testimony was made under oath, one might presume that Rojas told the truth. It is almost certain that he was right, although quite confused. The Pehuenches traded with Spaniards who lived far south, but the white "Caesar" were likely to have been officers of the army in Arauco. Moreover, those natives serving the "caesars" were probably the allied tribes (indios amigos). The reference to special cloth and the ability to pay with silver (money from the situado?) misled Rojas whose knowledge of native language also contributed to his confusion.

On the eastern segment of the border, Mendoza was immediately affected by a frontier experience due to its proximity to Santiago. The capital considered Cuyo as a place from where to extract resources and saw it as a link with other eastern colonies. Once Spaniards settled down in Mendoza, however, they began to protect their privileged access to local resources and expanded their economic possibilities by opening markets to their east. The policy benefited Santiago whose needs for cattle for both Arauco and Peru absorbed Mendoza's imports. In the third decade of the seventeenth century, the development of ranching activities in the Valle de Uco and Xaurú, to satisfy Santiago's market, transformed the settlement. Ironically, the abundance of domesticated cattle in the area, which allowed the growth of the settlement, also acted as a lure for authorities in Santiago and Indians, both of whom saw the possibilities of access to a large mass of domesticated animals.
From the mid-seventeenth century onward, a shortage of wild
cattle in their immediate environment threatened the growth of
the settlements in the eastern segment of the border. Both
Córdoba and Buenos Aires followed the path that Santiago and
Mendoza had taken in earlier years. They attempted to extract
resources from eastern territories (which, for Buenos Aires,
included Uruguay, the so-called "Banda Oriental") because this
direction was usually less dangerous since it avoided
confrontations with natives living south of latitude 35°.

The struggle for resources in the last segment of the border
reveals its most aggressive facet. When the governor authorized
the use of the royal army to patrol the southern territories
Buenos Aires clearly reacted as a frontier colony. The change
points to new circumstances in the River Plate area. The
garrison, which was established to protect the port, assumed the
protection of what was becoming a frontier society.

The evolution of these settlements from border communities
to frontier societies, and the need for military protection to
expand access to resources, created a class of powerful officers
and soldiers. It was quite clear in Santiago, where they
concentrated the means of production, profitted from commercial
opportunities, and enjoyed political power. Members of the elite
were aware of the economic benefits attached to political
activities, which explains that positions in the local Cabildos
were bought at very high prices and defended to the very highest
levels. For instance, Captain Juan de Avila y Zárate, who was the
lieutenant governor in 1603 and a slave trader with connections in Buenos Aires and Mendoza, argued his right to be appointed to a post in the Cabildo by legally defending his case all the way to the Real Audiencia of La Plata in 1611.

By mid-seventeenth century international conflicts contributed further to the west-to-east articulation of the colonies. The presence of corsairs in southern waters alerted authorities in Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Santiago to new dangers. Thus, the Crown was unable to reduce the military budget in Arauco after the parlamento of Quillín because of the threat of alliance between native and foreign forces. The Dutch seizure of Valdivia in 1643 confirmed the threat and extended its influence eastward, reaching Córdoba. The colony became aware that it was a segment of the southern frontier. Mid-seventeenth century Buenos Aires was also transformed by international tensions derived, in this case, from the threat of Portuguese advance towards the Río de la Plata. It finally forced the Crown to create a permanent garrison in Buenos Aires whose evolution mirrored the transformation of the colony from an outpost for contraband to a frontier society.

On the native side of the border, a few but clear indications testify to the same reality. Araucanians had commercial connections and alliances with eastern tribes from earliest times. By 1628, an Indian confederation already existed since Pehuenches and Puelches helped the rebel-Araucanian Chief Lientur to cross stolen cattle from the farms of Chillán to
southern Mendoza. In fact, natives of different nations had already been hunting in southern Cuyo, Córdoba, and Buenos Aires for several years. When the ex-governor of Chile Alonso de Rivera arrived in Tucumán he ordered the monitoring of the southern border of Córdoba, aware as he was of alliances and trade between Pampas and the rebel-Araucanians. Even an early-seventeenth century governor of Buenos Aires, Pedro Esteban Dávila suspected the existence of such ties. He requested a report to establish whether Araucanians were extracting horses from southern Buenos Aires and driving them to Chile.7

By mid-seventeenth century, Araucanians usually crossed the Andes using passes in the south of Mendoza and northern Neuquén. According to Father Rosales, 4,000 or 5,000 heads of cattle were driven every year by natives from southern Córdoba and Buenos Aires to Arauco using passes in northern Patagonia.8 The policy of parlamentos contributed to the direct presence of Araucanians in the eastern segment of the border. The pacts allowed them to reduce military attention on the Bio Bio River frontier, thereby freeing them to cross the Andes towards the pampas for animals. They no longer needed to be concerned about maintaining the prior agreements with tribes living on the eastern flank of the Andes. As people extracted the same goods, however, tensions arose on the Indian side of the border. At roughly the same time, competition for access to wild cattle and other goods pushed Spaniards southward, even as natives moved northward. The latter, of course, understood that caravans and vaquerías provided them
with access to domesticated horses, wine, food, and metal artifacts.

Our sources describe a frontier that operated as a corridor whose northern side was used by Spaniards while the southern one was for the exclusive use of natives. In 1670 the vecinos of San Luis sketched the same image when they pointed out that if Mendoza were depopulated, San Luis would be the only Spanish settlement connecting Chile and Córdoba. It would then have replaced Mendoza as one of the linkages of the corridor. During the first half of the seventeenth century, Spanish attention was focused on keeping control over the northern side of the corridor: the route that Mosquera had travelled at the end of the sixteenth century.

Caravans, soldiers, merchandise, horses, and cattle moved along this northern side, but it gradually stretched southward. Merchants were the first to initiate the move to avoid paying taxes in Córdoba. Then, it was the need for expanding vaquerías to the south to access to resources the driving force pushing Spaniards into native areas.

Native societies also evolved around a distinctive frontier experience during the seventeenth century. Indians in southern Chile reacted against the European presence, which not only attempted to benefit from their labour force, but also deprived them of material resources. Salt, poisons, horses, and cattle were bought from across the Andes from Pehuenches, Puelches, and sometimes Pampas. This eastward expansion on the native side of
the border promoted trade and arrangements among tribes, therefore modifying their relationships with Spaniards on the different segments of the border.

Unfortunately, the lack of written documents testifying to the native perception of these events leaves historians to rely almost exclusively on the Spanish version of the past. Nonetheless, the Araucanian oral tradition kept alive during generations a romanticized account of the struggle over resources as the motor of history. According to one of the oldest of these legends, it was the immense desire for gold that forced Spaniards to invade Arauco. Before their invasion, gold and silver had been sent to rescue the Inca of Peru, prisoner of the Whites. When the guardians who were protecting the treasury found out that Spaniards had killed the Inca, they decided to bury themselves along with the gold in the Andes. Spaniard arrived in Chile from the north and devastated Arauco while searching for a treasure that they never found. The legend held out the hope that cosmic forces would overturn the course of the history. The treasure buried in the highest mountains would return to the Araucanians "in 60,000 years, when the Earth will be created once again, and mountains will fall down. New men will arrive, but gold will hold no value for them".
ENDNOTES


3. Letter of Governor García Ramón to the king, October 28, 1609; Crecente Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile II* (Santiago: Cervantes, 1908), 88. The garrison of Buenos Aires also had this privilege. A Royal Decree of August 27, 1624, recognized that officers of the militia in the ports in the Indies would enjoy the *fueros*, rights, etc. like any paid soldier on duty. In 1660, however, *fueros* were suspended since a complete investigation on contraband was launched and officers of both the militia and the garrison were charged with smuggling. Moreover, in 1718 the Cabildo argued that the officers who owned *pulperías* could not use the *fuero* to protect themselves from the Cabildo’s jurisdiction to control the sales and collect taxes. The decree suspended all sort of privileges to help the inquiries ("aunque sean caballeros de las ordenes militares, capitanes, soldados actuales o jubilados de cualquiera milicias, oficiales titulares con ejercicio o sin él, familiares de la Santa Inquisición, ministros u oficiales de la Santa Cruzada"); see Juan A. García, *La ciudad india. Buenos Aires desde 1600 hasta mediados del siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires: Hyspamerica, 1986), 134.; on the *fuero*
for members of the garrison of Buenos Aires, see Monferini, "La Historia militar durante los siglos XVII y XVII," HNA IV. 203-310, 250; and the Acta of March 14, 1718; ACBA, III.

4. On Captain Lorenzo de Suárez, see Mario Góngora, Encomenderos y estancieros (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1970), 168; and the Actas of April 1, 1644; and June 20, 1656; ACCH, V, XV.

5. "Derrotero de un viaje a los Césares por Tandil y el Volcán rumbo de sud-este comunicado a la corte de Madrid en 1707 por Silvestre Antonio de Rojas que vivió muchos años entre los indios pehuenches:" Colección de Obras y Documentos para la Historia Argentina, ed. Pedro de Angelis (Buenos Aires: Colmegna, 1900), 358.

6. The governor of Tucumán, Felipe de Albornoz, however, reduced the importance of the fact. He noted that local authorities were only his agents; therefore they were unable to make any decision; for further details, see Letter to the king of December 28, 1628; IV Centenario de las fundaciones de Córdoba y Santa Fe (Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1974), 90; on Luis de Avila y Zárate, see Carlos Assadourian, El Tráfico de esclavos en Córdoba (Córdoba: Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 1966), 37; Arturo Lazcano, Cabildantes de Córdoba (Córdoba Archivo Histórico de Córdoba, 1954), 17; and the Document 696, Volume XXII; Documents 696, 828, 831, and 848, Volume XXIV; and Documents 1013, 1058, 1059, and 1275, Volume 25; APCB, Protocols.

7. On October 8, 1635, Governor Pedro Dávila sent instructions

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to Captain Amador Baez who had to determine the veracity of the presence of Araucanians in southern Buenos Aires ("inquirireis y sabreis con toda particularidad si es cierto que los indios del Reino de Chile pasan la cordillera para esta parte y rescatan y llevan caballos para aquel reino y de quiénes se valen y con qué indios comunican y en qué tiempo pasan la cordillera para esta banda y hasta dónde llegan y qué género de armas tienen y qué practica tienen con los indios que comercian de estas pampas y distrito"), for the report, see Helmut Schindler, "Tres documentos del siglo XVII acerca de la población indígena bonaerense y la penetración mapuche," Cuadernos del Instituto Nacional de Antropología 8 (1972-1978), 149.


10. This military corridor is similar to the Spanish route to Flanders; see Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1972).

11. This legend, known as "The Treasure of the Piremahuida," was translated by I. Muhlhauser, see Bertha Koessler, Tradiciones Araucanas I (La Plata: Universidad de La Plata, 1962), 266-8.
GLOSSARY OF SPANISH TERMS

Acta(s). Formal document(s) elaborated by the Cabildo with its resolutions.
Alcalde(s). Member(s) of the Cabildo (chief executive and judge).
Alcalde(s). Post of alcalde. Alcalde de la Santa Hermandad.
Rural policeman.
Alférez. Ensign. Usually a junior military title.
Alférez Real. Royal standard bearer. Honorary post in the Cabildo.
Alguacil mayor. Chief Constable.
Almojarife. Customs duty.
Arroba(s). Unit of measure. Equivalent to thirty-two pints (liquid) or twenty-five pounds (weight).
A sangre y fuego. By fire and the sword.
Asiento(s). A trading franchise (asentista(s): the person who managed the asiento).
Bando(s). Gubernatorial decree.
Botija. Unit of measure. Jug.
Cabildo(s). Central authority of the Spanish colonial city.
Cabildante(s). Member(s) of the Cabildo; Cabildo Abierto.
Assembly of Spanish colonial citizens (vecinos).
Cajias Reales. Royal Treasury. It refers to the treasury located in a specific town.
Capitanía General. Captaincy General. Jurisdiction of a governor who also enjoys supreme military command within his district.
Comisario real. Royal commissioner. Individual bearing a special commission.
Corregidor(es). Chief of a town and its district (Corregimiento).
Cuadra(s). Unit of measure for land.
Cuartel. Cattle theft.
Depositoría general. Treasury for extraordinary funds.
Derrama(s). Forced contributions.
Diezmo (diezmero). Ecclesiastical tithe.
Encomienda(s). The granting of Indian labour to a Spaniard, the encomendero(s). Encomiendas de tercer vida. Encomienda inherited by the grandson of the first encomendero.
Entradas. Spanish expeditions into new territories.
Fanega(s). Unit of measure. Equivalent to an English bushel.
Fiscal(es). (see Real Audiencia).
Fuero(s). Special legal situation(s) that determine(s) that the person can only be judged by his equals in an ad-hoc trial.
Indios amigos. Allied Indians.
Junta de Guerra. Specialized board within the Council of the Indies charged with planning and supervising military operations.
Malón(es). Indian raids.
Malocas. Spanish expeditions to enslave natives.
Merced(es). The grant of land.
Mita. Indian forced labour for the state.
Navios de registro. Licensed vessels. That is, one authorized to travel to the colonies without forming part of a convoy.

Obría(s). Textile workshop employing forced Indian labour.

Oidor(es). (see Real Audiencia).


Parlamento(s). Conference(s). Specifically with the Araucanians.


Peso(s). Spanish silver coin. Equivalent to a dollar.

Plaza de armas. Military department. Garrison obligated to provide other settlements with military support.

Porteño(s). Inhabitant of Buenos Aires.

Presidio(s). Small fortification and the garrison therein.

Procurador. Procurator.

Productos de la tierra. Local products.

Pueblos. Indian towns.

Pulpería(s). Store-saloons.

Real Audiencia. The highest criminal, civil, and administrative court. Its members were the fiscal(es) (Crown solicitors); the oidor(es) (judges); and the canceller.

Quinta(s). Unit of measure. Fifth part of a hundred weight.

Real(es). Monetary unit. One eighth of a peso.

Regidor(es). Town Councilor(s) in a jurisdiction (regimiento).

Situado(s). Military subsidy.

Tomín(es). Unit of measure equal to one third of a dram.

Unión de las armas. Tax designed by Count-Duke Olivares for defensive purposes.

Vaquería(s). Cattle roundup(s).

Vecino(s). City inhabitant(s) with full rights of citizenship.

Veedor general. General inspector. Charged with the supply and care of provisions.

Yerba Mate. Paraguayan tea.
APPENDICES

I

Measures

1 fanega = 9 arrobas = 103.5 kg
1 quintal = 4 arrobas = 46 kg
1 arroba = 25 libras
1 cuadra = 125 meters = 1.57 has
1 legua = 40 cuadras
1 arroba = 35.76 liters
1 cart = 150 or 160 arrobas = 1,800 kg

Seventeenth-century authorities

Viceroy of Peru

1607-1615 Marqués de Montesclaros
1615-1621 Príncipe de Esquilache
1622-1629 Marqués de Guadalcázar
1629-1639 Conde de Chinchón
1639-1648 Marqués de Mancera
1648-1655 Conde de Salvatierra
1656-1661 Conde de Alba de Liste
1661-1666 Conde de Santisteban
1667-1672 Conde de Lemos
1674-1678 Conde de Castellar
1678-1681 Arzobispo Melchor de Liñán y Cisneros
1681-1689 Duque de la Palata
1689-1705 Conde de Monclova

Governor of Chile

1600-1601 Alonso García Ramón
1601-1605 Alonso de Rivera
1605-1610 Alonso García Ramón
1610-1611 Luis Merlo de la Fuente
1611-1612 Juan de Jaraquemada
1612-1617 Alonso de Rivera
1617-1618 Fernando Talaverano Gallegos
1618-1620 Cristóbal de la Cerda y Sotomayor
1611-1624 Pedro Osores de Ulloa
1625-1629 Luis Fernández de Córdoba y Arce
1629-1639 Francisco Lazo de la Vega
1639-1646 Francisco López de Zúñiga, Marqués de Baides
1646-1649 Martín de Mujica
1649-1650 Alonso de Fiqueroa y Córdoba
1650-1656 Antonio de Acuña y Cabrera
1656-1662 Pedro Porter Casanate
1662-1662 Diego González Montero
1662-1664 Ángel de Peredo
1664-1668 Francisco de Meneses
1668-1670 Diego de Dávila Coello y Pacheco, Marqués de Novamorquende
1670-1682 Juan Henríquez
1682-1692 José de Garro
1692-1700 Tomás Marín de Poveda
Governors of Tucumán

1606-1611 Alonso de Rivera

[Córdoba: Ginés de Lillo (1606), Luis de Abreu de Albornoz (1606), Luis del Peso (1606), Juan de Tejeda (1609-1610), Diego Cornejo (1610-1611), Alonso de la Cámara (1611)]

1611-1619 Luis de Quiñones Osorio

[Córdoba: Pedro Luis de Cabrera (1612), Gerónimo Luis de Cabrera (1612), Fernando de Toledo Pimentel (1613), José de Fuenzalida Meneses (1615)]

1619-1627 Juan Alonso de Vera y Zárate

[Córdoba: Luis de Azpeitia (1619), Lope Bravo de Zamora (1619), Juan Ochoa de Zárate (1620-1621), Diego de Vera (1621-1622), Juan Martínez de Iriarte (1622-1624), Miguel de Ardiles (1624-1625), García de Vera y Mujica (1625-1627), Sancho de Ceballos Valdés (1627-1628)]

1627-1637 Felipe de Albornoz

[Córdoba: Gómez Suarez de Cordero (1629-1631), Pedro de Villaruel (1631-1635), Alonso de Herrera (1635-1637)]

1638-1641 Francisco de Avendaño

[Córdoba: Nicolás de Valdivia (1638), Diego Gómez de Ovando (1639), Miguel de Ardiles (1640)]

1641-1642 Gerónimo Luis de Cabrera

1642-1643 Miguel de Sesé

[Córdoba: Luis de Tejeda y Guzmán (1642), Francisco Ruiz de la Cueva Jaramillo (1643)]

1643-1644 Baltasar de Figueroa y Guevara

[Córdoba: Pedro de Salas (1644), Francisco Ruiz de Porras (1644), Baltasar de los Reyes Aguilar (1644)]

1645-1650 Gutiérrez de Acosta y Padilla

[Córdoba: Juan Castellano (1645), Pedro Ledesma (1645-1648), Luis Vázquez de Tovar (1648), Miguel de Cubas Sánchez Meneses (1648)]

1650-1651 Francisco Gil de Negrete

[Córdoba: Francisco Chirinos de Posada (1650)]

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1651-1654 Roque de Nestares de Aguado

[Córdoba: Francisco de vera Mujica (1652), Andrés Ortiz de Mercado (1652), Bernardo de Reyna Vera (1653-1654), Ignacio Salguero de Cabrera (1654-1655)]

1655-1660 Alonso de Mercado y Villacorta

[Córdoba: Antonio Godoy Ponce de León (1655), Alonso de Herrera y Guzmán (1656-1659)]

1660-1662 Gerónimo Luis de Cabrera

[Córdoba: Luis de Tejeda Guzmán (1660), Cristóbal de Torres Dávila (1662)]

1662-1663 Lucas de Fiqueroa y Mendoza

[Córdoba: Bernardo de Reyna Vera (1662-1665)]

1663-1664 Pedro de Montoya

1664-1670 Alonso de Mercado y Villacorta

[Córdoba: Cabildo (1665), Gabriel Sarmiento de la Vega (1665-1668), Nicolás Brizuela (1668-1670)]

1670-1674 Angel de Peredo

[Córdoba: Andrés Giménes de Lorca (1670-1674)]

1674-1678 José de Garro

[Córdoba: Martín de Garayar (1674-1681), Juan de Perochena (1681)]

1678-1681 Juan Diez de Andino

1681-1681 Antonio de Vera Mujica

1681-1686 Fernando Mendoza Mate de Luna

1686-1691 Tomás Féliz de Argandoña

[Córdoba: Juan de Echenique (1886-1691)]

1691-1696 Martín de Jaurequi

[Córdoba: Juan de Perochena (1691)]

1696-1702 Juan de Zamudio
1702-1704 Gaspar de Barahona

Governors of Río de la Plata

1602-1609 Hernando Arias de Saavedra (Hernandarias)
1609-1613 Diego Marín de Negrón
1613-1618 Hernandarias
1619-1623 Diego de Góngora
1623-1624 Alonso Pérez de Salazar
1624-1631 Francisco de Céspedes
1631-1637 Pedro Dávila
1637-1640 Mendo de la Cueva
1640-1640 Francisco de Avendaño
1640-1641 Ventura Mujica
1641-1641 Pedro de Rojas y Acevedo
1641-1646 Gerónimo Luis de Cabrera
1646-1653 Jacinto de Lariz
1653-1660 Pedro Baigorri Ruiz
1660-1663 Alonso de Mercado y Villacorta
1663-1674 José Martínez de Zalazar
1674-1678 Andrés de Robles
1678-1682 José de Garro
1682-1691 José de Herrera y Sotomayor
1691-1700 Agustín de Robles
1700-1702 Manuel de Prado
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