La critique de la doctrine de l'abstraction de Jacques de Viterbe

FieldValue
dc.contributor.authorCôté, Antoine
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-20T20:03:11Z
dc.date.available2017-03-20T20:03:11Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10393/35904
dc.description.abstractThe paper examines the Augustinian Hermit James of Viterbo’s critique of abstraction theory as an account of the origin of intellectual knowledge. It then examines the details of James’ own preferred solution to the problem of knowledge acquisition, which is based on the idea that the intellect possesses the seeds of all the particular items of knowledge it will ever acquire. Finally, the paper brings to light and then discusses some of the difficulties James encounters in trying to provide a consistent innatist account of knowledge.
dc.language.isofr
dc.subjectabstraction
dc.subjectcognition
dc.subjectinnatism
dc.titleLa critique de la doctrine de l'abstraction de Jacques de Viterbe
dc.typeArticle
CollectionPhilosophie // Philosophy - Publications

Files
Medioevo_FirstProofs.pdf242.51 kBAdobe PDFOpen